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Foreword

I

he International Law Studies "Blue Book"

Naval

War

series

was

initiated by the

College in 1901 to publish essays, treaties and articles

that contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the

seventy- ninth volume of the series, contains edited proceedings of a scholarly

colloquium entitled International
the Naval

The

War College on June

Law and

the

War on

Terrorism hosted here at

26-28, 2002.

colloquium's mission was to examine international law and

its

continu-

ing relevance after the events of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent

Qaeda and the Taliban. In doing so, the colloquium participants focused on the basis for the use of force against organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban, the rules applicable to military
military operations against al

operations against such organizations, the challenges associated with maritime

and coalition operations in the war on terrorism, the proper forum for bringing
terrorists to justice, and finally, the path before us in this war on terrorism.
Renowned international scholars and practitioners, both military and civilian, representing government and academic institutions from throughout the
world participated in the colloquium, which was co-sponsored by the Center
for

National Security

Law

of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Vir-

Yearbook on Human Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel, the Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol, Rhode Island, the
Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island, and the International Law Department of the
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, United States Naval War College.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend to all the co-sponsors, the
contributing authors, and the co-editors, our thanks and gratitude for their invaluable contributions to this project and to the future understanding of the
ginia, the Israeli

laws of war.

RODNEY

P.

REMPT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President,

Naval

War College

Introduction

T

he events of September
perhaps unlike any time

be relied upon to protect

its

1

1th brought

in

its

citizens

home

to the United States that,

past, the "tyranny of distance"

could not

from harm. The destruction of the World

Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon wrought countless millions in
damages to those affected and to the economy of the United States as a whole.

More

importantly, the attacks caused the deaths of

countless others.

Many

some 3,000 and

of the victims were, of course, from countries other

than the United States. With the benefit of hindsight,
of the magnitude of September
Still,

terrorism

on

and brings with

this scale

it

injury to

is

1

it

seem

clear that

an act

1th would eventually strike the United States.

clearly

new

to the United States

and the world

challenges to the law of armed conflict paradigm that has

World War II. This changed environment and its
laws of armed conflict require careful study and debate

lasted since the closure of

impact on the existing

to develop insight into the future legal

framework

for

responding to terrorism.

This was the purpose of the colloquium that this book, volume 79 of the International

Law

Studies ("Blue Book")

In June, 2002, the Naval
tional

series,

memorializes.

War College conducted

a

symposium on Interna-

War on Terrorism. The colloquium, organized by LieutenSteven Berg, JAGC, US Army, was made possible with the

Law and

ant Colonel

the

support of the Center for National Security

Law

of the University of Virginia,

Yearbook on Human Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel, the Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol,
Rhode Island, and the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island. Without the support
and assistance of these organizations, the colloquium would not have been the
Charlottesville, Virginia, the Israeli

success that
port

is

it

was, and this volume would not be before you as

it is.

Their sup-

greatly appreciated.

JAGC, US Army, and Major Paul S. Wilson,
JAGC, US Army, both of our International Law Department, collaborated as
Colonel Frederick

editors of this

L.

Borch,

volume. Their dedication and perseverance are responsible

for

the production and completion of this product.

A special

thank you

is

necessary to Dr. Alberto Coll, the current

the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and Rear Admiral
the President of the Naval

Rodney

P.

Dean

of

Rempt,

War College for their leadership and support in the

planning and conduct of the colloquium and the funding for the printing of
this

book.

The "Blue Book"

series

is

published by the Naval

War

uted throughout the world to academic institutions,

and foreign military

War on Terrorism

is

College and distrib-

libraries,

and both

US

commands. This volume on International Law and the
a fitting and necessary addition to the series as the world

continues to grapple with the senseless acts of terrorism

common

in

our world

today.

DENNIS L MANDSAGER
Law & Chairman
International Law Department
Professor of

xn

Preface

The September

1 1,

2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-

tagon catapulted the United States
terrorism.

On September

thorizing President

14th, the

George

— indeed the world —

US

W. Bush

into a

new war on

Congress passed a joint resolution au"to use

all

necessary and appropriate

force against those nations, organizations, or persons

he determines planned,

authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks ... or harbored such organizations or persons."

Resolution 1373.

It

On September

28th, the

UN

Security Council adopted

not only condemned terrorism as a threat to international

peace and security, but implicitly recognized that

al

Qaeda's use of commer-

weapons constituted an "armed attack" within the meaning of
Article 51 of the UN Charter. In any event, on October 7, 2001, less than a
month after the terrorist attacks on America, US forces began operations
against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
For lawyers and academics practicing and studying international law and
the Law of Armed Conflict, "9/11" and subsequent legal actions taken by the
US Congress, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meant a greatly renewed interest in a subject that had not received
enough attention over the last 10 years. The same was true of military actions
taken by the United States and its allies, as the nature of the fighting against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan raised new jus in bello issues. Recognizing that a forum in which scholars and practitioners could meet and examine legal issues in the war on terrorism would be exciting, instructive, and
rewarding, the International Law Department began planning a conference in
November 2001. The result was a June 26—28, 2002 symposium called "International Law and the War on Terrorism," and this book records the events occurring during those three days, bringing together the perspectives and
cial aircraft as

ruminations of the roughly 100 conference participants.

Almost from the beginning of the symposium, a major theme emerged: that
while al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon represented a type of armed conflict not anticipated by those participating in the
conference, the Law of Armed Conflict was capable of addressing the myriad
legal issues raised

by terrorism after 9/11. This

and practitioners agreed on

all

jus

they did agree, however, that the

is

not to say that the scholars

ad bellum or jus in bello issues discussed;

Law

of

Armed

Conflict and other existing

Preface

laws as they

now

an adequate framework

exist provide

armed

for regulating

conflict with terrorism.

The

first

session, titled "Jus ad Bellum,"

had two presenters.

Prof.

Michael

N. Schmitt, George C. Marshall European Center, Garmisch, Germany, began with a paper titled "Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law." Schmitt explored the circumstances

may

react forcibly to an act of terrorism,

under which

and concluded that

"in

a victim state

most respects

on the use of force has proven adequate" in countering terrorist attacks. That is, while the current "normative system developed for state-onstate conflict," it nonetheless has shown itself to be sufficiently flexible to rethe law

spond to

terrorist attacks

by non-state actors.

In the absence of a post-9/1

resolution from the

1

Schmitt asserted that the sole basis

for the

ners to take action was self-defense.

quired for force used in self-defense;

No
all

UN Security Council, Prof.

United States and

its

coalition part-

advance Council authorization

the U.N. Charter requires

is

re-

is

'notice.' It

follows that while a state's use of force in self-defense does not deprive the

Council of its

'right' to

respond to any

terrorist attack, the Council's failure to

take action does not deprive a state of its inherent right to exercise individual or
collective self-defense. In Prof. Schmidt's view,

the

al

Qaeda

to qualify as

attacks

on September

11,

it is

"tragically self-evident" that

2001 were of sufficient "scale and

effects"

an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 5 1 of the

Charter. Consequently,

US

and coalition operations against

al

Qaeda

UN

in Af-

ghanistan were a legitimate exercise of individual and collective self-defense.
Self-defense requires 'necessity" ("a sound basis for believing that further at-

tacks will be mounted") and 'imminency' ("self-defense

may be conducted

an ongoing terrorist campaign"); the use of force also must be proportional. Schmitt concluded his paper with an examination of the legality of using force against the Taliban. While he determined that the legal authority for
against

acting in self-defense against

al

Qaeda was much

clearer than the legal basis for

using force against the Taliban, Schmitt nonetheless was satisfied that the
principle of state responsibility established in the Corfu Channel case justified

US and
Prof.

coalition military operations against Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Rein Mullerson, Kings College, Univ. of London, followed Schmitt

with an oral presentation of his paper, "Jus ad Bellum and International Terrorism." In examining terrorism

not

all terrorist

and the law of war, Mullerson concluded that

attacks are contrary to jus ad bellum;

state or are "relatively insignificant" in size

if

they lack a link to a

and scope, the attacks

the scope of jus ad bellum. However, any terrorist attack that does
der" jus ad bellum (like 9/11, which Mullerson believes

xiv

is

fall

outside

"come un-

an armed attack) by

;

;

Fred Borch

definition also violates jus in bello.

& Paul Wilson

The

fact, says Miillerson, that

those draft-

ing Article 51 in 1945 contemplated that only states would be conducting

armed attacks does not mean
attack.

To

that a non-state entity cannot launch

an armed

and ignores "current

realities."

conclude otherwise

both

is

illogical

Miillerson further argued that the September 11th attacks are crimes against

humanity
tional

as defined by

criminal

Nuremberg Tribunals and "the

tribunals

adopted."

recently

Like

statutes of interna-

Prof.

Schmidt,

Prof.

Miillerson also arrives at the same "bottom line:" that our existing international legal

framework provides more than adequate authority to use force

against terrorists.

After comments from Prof. Robert Turner and Mr. Harvey Dalton, and
questions from the audience, the conference shifted from jus ad bellum to an

examination of

jus in bello issues.

Dinstein, Visiting Professor,

Leading off

this session

was

Prof.

Yoram

DePaul Univ. College of Law, who talked about

"Unlawful Combatancy." Calling

this topic "a

matter a of great practical

sig-

nificance in present-day international law," Dinstein began with the basics:
that combatants are individuals

who

are either

members

(except religious or medical personnel) or persons

who

of the

armed

forces

take an active part in

noncombatants are civilians (who are not allowed to actively
participate in the fighting); and that one cannot be both at the same time. As
the US, its friends, and allies are involved in a war with terrorists who are almost by definition unlawful combatants, Prof. Dinstein devoted the remainder
of his remarks to explaining the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. In Dinstein's view, combatants must satisfy "seven cumulative conditions" to qualify as lawful combatants and enjoy immunity from prosecution or
punishment for killing and wounding the enemy or destroying and damaging
hostilities; that

his property.

(1)

They must:

Be subordinate

to a responsible

command

(thus excluding

"one-man"

armies)

(2)

Wear

emblem recognizable
of distinction may be observed)

a fixed distinctive

the principle

at a distance (so that

(3)

Carry arms openly (so that they

(4)

Fight in accordance with the jus in bello (so that in claiming the law's
protections
respect this

if

will

not be confused with

civilians);

captured, a combatant must be willing himself to

same

law);

xv

Preface

Act within

(5)

a hierarchic framework,

embedded

in discipline

and

subject to supervision by upper echelons;

Belong to a party to the

(6)

and

conflict;

finally

Not have any allegiance (or nationality) to the Detaining Power (so
that a German soldier in the French Foreign Legion would be entitled

(7)

to

POW status

if captured

be entitled to such status

while fighting in Indo-China but would not
if

fighting in a

war against Germany.)

Based on these seven cumulative conditions,
both the Taliban and
different reasons.

al

Qaeda

The Taliban

Prof. Dinstein

failed to qualify for

fighters

concluded that

POW status, but for very

were members of regular armed forces

government unrecognized by the Detaining Power.
This meant that they could qualify for POW status in the same manner as De
Gaulle's Free French forces were entitled to be POWs when captured by the
Germans in World War II. That was not the principal reason, however, that
captured Taliban fighters were not POWs. Rather, because they did not comprofessing allegiance to a

ply with virtually all of the seven factors earlier identified by Dinstein as re-

POW status

quired for
less

(e.g.

the Taliban wore

no uniform of any

any distinctive insignia), they were not entitled to claim

kind,

much

POW status. Al

Qaeda combatants, however, belong in an entirely different category. In contrast to the Taliban, al Qaeda combatants were irregular forces who failed to

who "displayed utter disdain toward the jus in bello." This
Law of War meant that no al Qaeda fighters were entitled to

wear uniforms and

contempt

for the

POW status. Prof. Dinstein concluded his remarks with the warning that the
combatancy must not ... be seen as
binding only on one Party to the conflict." Some American combatants, notably special forces troops and CIA agents in the field, were not wearing uniforms while in combat. Dinstein cautioned that had any US combatants in
civilian clothing been captured by al Qaeda or Taliban forces, they would not
have been entitled to POW status.
"constraints of the conditions of lawful

Sir

Adam

Roberts followed Prof. Dinstein. Sir

Adam,

a professor of inter-

national relations at Oxford, began by asking these questions:

war "formally applicable" to the war on terrorism?
tions involve "situations different"

should
status?

we

still

try to apply that

counter-terrorism opera-

from those envisaged by the laws of war,

body of law? Are

terrorists entitled to

POW

what "international standards apply to their treatment?"
Adam asked whether the laws of war should be "revised" to take

If not,

Finally, Sir

If

Are the laws of

XVI

Fred Borch

& Paul Wilson

into account the "special circumstances" of the

concluded that there were "particular

That

to counter-terrorism.

is,

war on terrorism.

difficulties" in

while Operation

Adam

Sir

applying the laws of war

ENDURING FREEDOM might

look like an "ordinary" international armed conflict, "a war that has as a pur-

pose the pursuit of people

deemed

sues for which the existing laws of war are not a perfect

the

UN

many awkward isfit." With that said,

to be criminals involves

Security Council, states, and non-governmental organizations have

—

assumed that the laws of war do apply. Consequently, this reality and
require that the US and its
considerations of "reciprocity" and "prudence"
coalition partners apply the law of war "to the maximum extent possible."
all

—

Professor Roberts also concluded that the
al

Qaeda combat

ever,

US

decision to deny

POW status to
How-

captives was sound both as a matter of law and policy.

he faulted the Bush administration

for failing to highlight that the de-

would be accorded humane treatment in accordance with Common
Article 3. Sir Adam also stressed that the United States missed an opportunity to show the world that it is scrupulous in observing the laws of war when
tainees

it

did not

announce that

Taliban and

all

in accordance with Articles
latter articles elaborate a

who

are not entitled to

Qaeda

al

detainees would be treated

45 and 75 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol

range of

minimum

rules of protection for

I.

all

The

those

POW status. Since the US treatment of the detainees

comported with these two Protocol provisions, and since most nations are signatories to Protocol I, announcing that it would adhere to these Protocol pro-

would have been smart public

visions

that "there

While

relations. Finally, Prof. Roberts

opined

a case for consideration of further revision" of the law of war.

is

rejecting the idea that existing laws of war are inadequate in the face of

the "terrorist challenge," Roberts did believe that "some modest evolutionary

changes" should be examined. In Sir Adam's view, legal issues involving
geting, cluster

bombs, and the

classification

and treatment of detainees" were

appropriate topics, as was "the whole difficult problem of

who

"tar-

.

.

.

suicide

bombers

by definition cannot be deterred by normal means."

After commentary from Col. Charles Garraway, Prof. Leslie C. Green, and
Lt. Col.

Tony

issues, the

E.

Montgomery, and questions from the audience on jus

conference participants shifted their focus to a third topic: coalition

operations. Prof.

Wolff Von Heinegg,

legality of maritime interception

ENDURING FREEDOM,

in the aftermath of 9/1
for

terrorist

groups

1.

In

the

member

a

ulty at Europa-University in Frankfurt,

tion

in bello

Germany, presented an

article

and interdiction operations (MIO)

name given

von Heinegg's

(especially

of the international law fac-

Opera-

to the military operation launched

view,

MIO seek to disrupt supplies

by preventing materiel support

xvn

in

on the

for,

and

Preface

financing

of,

ing facilities,

international terrorism), eliminate terrorist

command and

and capture international

purpose of prosecut-

terrorists for the

train-

ing them.

Von Heinegg first
flag states to

and

its

permit

observed that the Security Council has neither required

MIO

against ships flying

MIO.

coalition partners to conduct

It

its flag,

nor authorized the

US

follows that the legal basis for

MIO

must be individual or collective self-defense as permitted by customary
international law and reflected in Article 5 1 of the UN Charter. But von
Heinegg also argued that Resolution 1373, because it obligates all UN member states to prevent and suppress within their territories all acts of international terrorism, provides an additional legal basis for MIO. In Prof, von
Heinegg's view, the clear language of Resolution 1373 acts to waive any
ber states's objection to

MIO

conducted against

terrorists.

The

mem-

right of self-

defense and Resolution 1373, taken together, provide the legal authority for
the "the

US

and

its

coalition partners, [to] control international shipping

and

aviation in order to verify the innocent status of such shipping and aviation."

With

that said, because the principle of proportionality applies to a state's

right of self-defense,

MIO

"indiscriminate implementation and enforcement of

covering vast sea areas" would be impermissible as disproportionate.

MIO

must be based upon "sufficient intelligence indicators ... of conspiracies to commit, or acts of, international terrorism." Prof,
von Heinegg concluded his presentation by explaining that the US and its coConsequently,

all

alition partners "are entitled to establish

maritime interdiction areas"

(i.e.

to

restrict "neutral" or third party state access to certain sea areas) for the pur-

pose of identifying ships carrying terrorists or materiel for them.

examined the

limitations

He

also briefly

MIO "by the law of naval warfare and by

imposed on

the law of maritime neutrality."

Ivan Shearer, Challis Professor of International

Law

at the University of

Von Heinegg with a paper titled "The Limits of
the War on Terrorism." In Shearer's view, there

Sydney, Australia, followed
Coalition Cooperation in

were a number of obstacles to successful coalition warfare against international terrorism. First, as there
state

is

free to

adopt

its

is

no

universal definition of terrorism, each

own definition. These

of terrorism are certain to

make

varying domestic law definitions

coalition efforts against terrorists

more prob-

lematic, especially regarding extradition for prosecution. Second, while there

norms of human rights, how each state interprets these
norms in the detention and prosecution of terrorists is very much controlled
by domestic law. For example, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration oi Hucruel, inhuman, or
man Rights provides that "no one shall be subjected to
are international

.

XVlll

.

.

Fred Borch

& Paul Wilson
how

degrading treatment of punishment." But

United States

pean Union.

quite different from

is

A

how

third potential obstacle

this provision

Article 5

is

is

viewed

is

in the

interpreted in the Euro-

extradition. Since there

is

no cus-

tomary international law requirement for a state to honor an extradition
request from another, bi-lateral and multi-lateral extradition treaties have

been negotiated. Many of these existing
their

own

citizens.

They

treaties prohibit the extradition of

also prohibit the extradition of "politically

offenders." In Shearer's view, these

two provisions are certain to create obsta-

cles to the successful prosecution of terrorists. Fourth, the

a very real obstacle, especially since

The

it

death penalty poses

has been retained in the United States.

countries of the European Union, Australia, Canada, and

example,

for

will

motivated

New

Zealand,

only extradite a terrorist to the United States on the condi-

tion that any death penalty,

if

imposed,

will

not be carried out. Finally, Prof.

Shearer addressed the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in coalition operations against terrorism.

within the jurisdiction of the ICC;
its

He noted
it

was

that terrorism

specifically

inclusion as a crime might politicize the ICC.

that as

some

and, as the
ists

ICC

not a crime

excluded out of fear that

That

said,

Shearer concluded

widespread or systematic attack
—such
population — might constitute
crime
humanity

acts of terrorism

against any civilian

is

as a

against

a

has subject-matter jurisdiction over this offense, some terror-

could be prosecuted in that forum.

Commanders Neil Brown (UK) and Kevin O'Rourke
(US), Wing Commander Paul Cronan (Australia), and Lt. Col. Jean-Guy
Perron (Canada), and questions and comments from the audience and presenters, the conference moved to its next topic: The "proper" forum for
After commentary by

Newton, an Army judge advocate and faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy, and Christopher
Greenwood, a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, presented papers on this subject.
The thrust of Newton's presentation was that existing international law
provides a sufficient framework to prevent and punish terrorism. Newton recognized, however, that the current state of the law, predicated as it is on "the
voluntary efforts of sovereign states to implement and enforce international
norms ... is not a panacea" for combating terrorism. Nonetheless, after examining the Nuremberg trials, the UN tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court, Newton concludes that the
"bringing terrorists to justice." Lt. Col. Michael

creation of "a

new

terrorist tribunal

lishing

superstructure of supranational justice"

—would not

— an international

"materially enhance" the law. In his view, estab-

an international court

to prosecute

xix

terrorists

is

"abdicating state

—
Preface

responsibility to

an internationalized process [and

this]

would be the

first

step

toward paralyzing politicization of the fight against terrorism."
Prof. Chris

Greenwood responded

were the best forum
that al

in

which

Qaeda members were

of international

armed

that he believed that the national courts

to prosecute terrorists.

guilty of

He

war crimes prior

objected to the idea

to the

commencement

mid-October 2001; rejecting
non-state actor and the United

conflict in Afghanistan in

the idea that there could be a war between a
States prior to that time.

After commentary by Col. Manuel E.F. Supervielle, by Mr. Daniel Helle,

and questions and comments from the audience, the conference moved to its
final topic: "The Road Ahead." Prof. John Murphy, Mr. James P. Terry, and
Dr. Nicholas Rostow made presentations. Murphy, a professor of law at
Villanova University, discussed "the application of legal lessons learned [and]
review of the role of international conventions on terrorism." Prior to examining these issues, however,

Murphy

identified a

number of

"trends" in terror-

These include the "globalization" of terrorism," as reflected in the
worldwide expansion of the al Qaeda network of terrorists now operating in as
many as 60 different countries, and the reality that September 11, 2001 signals
"the increased willingness of terrorists to kill large numbers of people and to
make no distinction between military and civilian targets." Another trend is
and
that terrorists appear to be increasingly "smarter and more creative
better equipped to take advantage of the information on weapons, targets, and
resources available on the internet," and that some terrorist organizations are
cooperating with each other (e.g. the IRA traveled to Colombia to assist the
FARC in planning an urban bombing campaign). But Murphy also noted a
ism.

.

.

.

"positive" trend in terrorism: the relative decline of state-sponsored terrorism

when compared to the 1970s and 1980s.
With this as background, Prof. Murphy examined how
has addressed these developments.

He

first

international law

stressed that international terror-

ism had been treated primarily as a domestic criminal law matter prior to Sep-

tember

11,

Now, however, it seems clear that the scope and scale of al
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the US and

2001.

Qaeda's attacks

coalition response to
a

much

—

it

in Afghanistan

—have given the law of armed
But Murphy
the form
UNcriminal law —

conflict

greater role in combating international terrorism.

minded the audience that international
related antiterrorism conventions

:

re-

of 12

in

will also

have an important

role in the

future.

In his view, these anti-terrorism conventions have taken a piecemeal ap-

proach

to

terrorism

because

it

has

xx

been

impossible

to

develop

a

Fred Borch
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comprehensive convention against terrorism, primarily because agreeing upon
not been possible. In any event, while a compre-

a definition of terrorism has

hensive treaty might have been preferable, these individual conventions have

provided

much

coverage, especially those negotiated in the 1990s like the In-

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; in Prof.
Murphy's view, all that is missing is a convention directed toward the use of
ternational

weapons of mass destruction by

terrorists. In short,

while recognizing that

re-

sponding with military force in self-defense may be increasingly necessary in
the war against terrorism, Prof. Murphy's paper highlighted that international
criminal law conventions will remain important and valuable tools in the
struggle as well.

Jim Terry, a retired Marine Corps lawyer now serving as a Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the U.S. State Department, next offered a series of observations

on the Road Ahead
use

all

in Afghanistan. Recognizing that the

United States must

available instruments of power, Terry provided a fascinating road

map of

those actions that should take place in Afghanistan over the course of the next

few years. Terry noted particularly that within the next two years, the United

must help Afghanistan: move toward increased stability and prosperity;
develop an emerging economy, facilitate the establishment o( a national military and police force, and be prepared for the process to be long and hard.
Jim Terry then presented a legal analysis of the "legal rights" of, and "appropriate treatment" of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees held by the United States
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In Terry's view, two questions are central to this
analysis: After the United States and its allies commenced military operations
against Afghanistan in mid-October 2001, did the 1949 Geneva Conventions
apply to the conflict? If so, were members of al Qaeda as a group, and the
States

Taliban individually or as a group, entitled to
Terry explained that the

POW status

US government view was

if

captured?

that the al

Qaeda

orga-

armed forces of a Party," or the "militias and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces." It followed that al Qaeda was
a non-state actor and its members did not qualify for POW status. As for the
Taliban, Mr. Terry agreed that, as the Taliban were the de facto government of
Afghanistan, it followed that there was an international armed conflict between the U.S. and its allies and Afghanistan. However, the Taliban's failure
to require its fighters to wear uniforms or other distinctive insignia, or be subject to a command structure that enforced the law of war, meant that captured Taliban combatants also were not entitled to POW treatment. But,
explained Mr. Terry, "Part II of Geneva Convention III [Relative to the
Treatment of POWs] " requires humane treatment, including food, medical
nization was not part of "the

xxi

Preface

and other benefits. In short, while not
the detainees were entitled to much the same

attention, the opportunity to worship,
legally entitled to

POW status,

treatment afforded
tary commissions,

POWs. Jim Terry closed with a brief discussion about miliand how Taliban and al Qaeda personnel who committed

violations of the law of

war would be subject

to trial

and punishment by such

commissions.

Nick Rostow, General Counsel to the US Mission to the United Nations,
presented "a few words about the UN and terrorism before September 11,
2001, the impact of September 11th and where the UN seems to be headed
from here." Rostow repeated a remark made recently by the Secretary General:

"Terrorism against innocent civilians

is

bad thing and yet most

clearly a

now

of you wouldn't be here except for acts of what are

called terrorism or

what the colonial powers regarded as terrorism." In Rostow's view, this comment "aptly captures the tension at the UN" when it comes to terrorism. With
that said, Nick Rostow believed that the events of September 11th "changed
the focus of both the Security Council and the General Assembly," and there
was every reason to think that the UN would "finally
make progress toward
addressing terrorism on the world stage."
Comments from Messrs. Michael Saalfeld and Ronald Winfrey, and Capt.
Jane Dalton followed, with discussion from conference participants. When
the symposium closed shortly thereafter, all who attended better understood
the complexity and difficulty involved in the challenges facing lawyers and operators in the war on terrorism.
.

.

.

In editing the papers presented and transcribing the hundreds of pages of

commentary, we have striven to be accurate and yet retain the tenor of
the conference. We could not have brought this 79th volume of the International Law Studies to print without the unsung, but outstanding efforts of Ms.

oral

Desktop Publishing. Nor would
this volume be complete without the incredible efforts of Ms. Pat Goodrich,
Ms. Wilma Haines, Ms. Kathleen Koegler, Ms. Erin Poe, Ms. Margaret Richard, and Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan in proofreading and correcting the multiple er-

Susan Meyer and Mr. Matthew Cotnoir

rors

we

surely

made.

Finally,

in

a special note of thanks to

Captain Jack

JAGC, USN (Ret.) for his willingness to again support the International Law Studies series in an effort to insure it remains the standard that it
is. It is only due to these individuals' efforts that the International Law
Grunawalt,

xxn
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Department is able to bring you this volume. However, there are sure to be errors, and these are our responsibility alone.
Last but not least, we dedicate this book to Janet and Pauline, without
whose support and love we would be lost.

Fred

L.

Paul S. Wilson

Borch

Colonel, U.S.

Army

Major, U.S.

Army

Judge Advocate General's Corps

Judge Advocate General's Corps
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Welcoming Address

Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt

W:

elcome to the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island as
we undertake what should prove to be very fruitful discussions and
debate about the defense of our nation and the critical operational and legal issues that confront the United States today. In particular,
lege's

welcome

to our Col-

conference on International Legal Issues in the Global

Terrorism.

It is

War on

exceedingly helpful to have scholars of international renown

and practitioners charged with dealing with these particularly thorny issues
come together to identify and discuss the bases for the conduct by the US and
its coalition partners of military operations against terrorists and those who

As it is in many such cases, over the next few days participants in
this conference will plow new ground and review history at the same time.
Such goals are an important purpose of the US Naval War College and it is imsupport them.

portant that you strive to do this while you are here.

Our academic environment permits

us to exchange thoughts, analyze ideas

and be forward leaning. From conferences such as these, policy is developed
and written, and significant consequences can emerge. As we exchange ideas
amongst ourselves, I encourage you to press the envelope and challenge each
other with creative

new

thinking because frankly our world

gaged in a rapid paradigm

shift.

or they must be discarded as

Current norms must be

new norms

is

flexible

press to the front as

currently en-

and adaptive

we peer

into the

Welcoming Address

future in an effort to vigilantly protect our citizens, our property, indeed our

way of life from cowards who call themselves terrorists.
Your presence here for these several days is extremely important. Bringing
together international scholars and practitioners to examine and study the basis for how the United States and other nations partner together in this comvery

mon cause

of conducting military operations against terrorists and those state

them is of vital importance
community at large.

agencies and organizations that support

United States and to the international

to the

As an example, a current discussion of great interest deals with Iraq. In
some sense, Iraq presents a simple situation. Iraq has a very unstable ruler who
is closing in on his goal of greater access to weapons of mass destruction.
While not currently
with

a policy maker,

Saddam Hussein

militarily,

for the use of force against him.

change?

I

recognize that

we must be

we

face?

Saddam Hussein from

The

What would

question

is

be the legal basis for a regime

rule of law, the question

is

how do we

terms to address the circum-

not whether

Iraq. Instead, since

the need arises to deal

clear as to the international basis

How do we proceed on the best possible

stances that

if

we

it

is

desirable to oust

are a nation founded

pursue what

is

upon the

determined to be in the

national interest while remaining squarely within the parameters of customary
international law

and the

treaties

and conventions of which we are currently

signatories?

You must look

at

how the

law of armed conflict applies to our combat oper-

and elsewhere around the world as it
seems clear that we will be conducting combat operations for the foreseeable
future in many of these areas. So the question is how to proceed in an area and
ations in Afghanistan, the Philippines

in a situation that

is

starkly

new

in our nation's history. In addressing this

question you must analyze and debate
Specifically,

we need answers

many

other difficult questions.

to the following tough questions:

bers of terrorist organizations ever qualify as prisoners of

Do mem-

war under the

Geneva Conventions? Do members of the Taliban qualify for such protection?
Should the Geneva Conventions be amended, updated, changed? In this single series of questions, I have, in some sense, questioned the continuing validity of the Geneva Conventions. The root question is how do the legal
conventions we have in place apply to the circumstances confronting the
United States and the international community? The current international legal regime applicable to the law of armed conflict remains heavily influenced
by World War I and World War II. If our society is truly entering a new era,
should this continue to be the case?
flect

the

new

Or must

reality of non-state actors

international law change to re-

and other amorphous groups?

Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt

Other difficult questions to be considered include: what is the legal status
of members of the US Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation who engaged directly in combat activities in the armed conflict in
Afghanistan? Are these personnel combatants, privileged combatants, unlawful combatants, civilians, or are they entitled to some other status? Did these
personnel uphold or violate the law of armed conflict? Similarly, what are the
standards for the treatment of captured terrorists?
tained?

What if these

terrorists are

How

long

may

they be de-

US citizens? What due process are they en-

titled to receive?

From
Global

these questions must be asked:

War on

Terrorism?

What

what

are the lessons learned from the

action should the legal

community take

re-

garding future military operations against terrorists and those states supporting terrorist activity?

many

others.

These

These are not the only

are,

difficult

questions as there are

however, a small sampling of the types of issues

I

ex-

pect you will consider during the next few days. These are questions of great
significance, not only to lawyers but

more importantly

to

commanders and

policy makers.

Two weeks
rum.

It

ago, the

Naval

War

College hosted our Current Strategy Fo-

brought together the best of military and civilian leadership, academia,

and the defense industry to address the
nation.

The

present conference

is

strategic challenges confronting our

a like effort to bring together the best

in international law to further define

and seek answers

minds

to the critical ques-

must be identified and resolved for our military and our nation's fuYour work here is important to how our nation proceeds in its war

tions that
ture.

against terror in the future.

Again, welcome to this conference.
stay here at the

Naval

I

wish you an enjoyable and productive

War College. Your

challenge awaits you.

—
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Counter^Terrorism and the Use of Force in
International

Law

Michael Schmitt

T

1

September 11th undoubtedly ushered in a new
era in international security affairs. Although terrorism has been a
tragically prominent feature of the global condition for most of the past half
he

terrorist attacks of

and qualitatively different than
those of the past. They involved extensive and sophisticated long-term planning by a group that cuts across lines of nationality and which operates from
within many countries. 2 The scale of the destruction in both human and physical terms was shocking; the fact that the attacks and their aftermath were
century, these operations were quantitatively

broadcast live only served to further exacerbate their psychological impact.

1.

Professor of International Law,

George C. Marshall European Center

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

The

for Security Studies,

views expressed herein are those of the author in his

personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of any United States or

government agency.
2. For an excellent discussion of how the attacks were
international terrorism, see Paul

Confronting New
in

a

Name? How

Realities,

to Fight

declaring a "war"

J.

a turning point in the evolution of

Smith, Transnational Terrorism and the

PARAMETERS, Summer 2002,

at 33. See also,

a "terrible

and irrevocable

al

Qaeda Model:

Michael Howard, What's

Terrorism, FOR. AFF'S, January/February 2002, at 8,

on terrorism was

German

error." Id. at 8.

which argues that

Counter -Terrorism and the Use of Force

That

19 terrorists directly involved executed

all

spite the certainty of their

century terrorism

—

Law

in International

them with

own deaths may well portend

great precision de-

a terrifying face of 21st

a genre of terrorism likely to prove extraordinarily difficult

to counter by traditional means.

Combating

this

aggravated form of terrorism will require

security strategies. Certainly, the Global

War on

new

cooperative

Terrorism articulated by the

United States represents one such strategy. As time passes and opportunities
and threats become clearer, the worldwide war on terrorism will evolve re3

Other governments and intergovernmental organizations
ready developing parallel and complimentary strategies.

sponsively.

Lest the lawlessness inherent in terrorism spread to

its

are al-

victims, counter-

must be formulated with great sensitivity to the international
law governing the use of force. Some have suggested that this body of law, interrorism strategy

cluding that facet regarding the right to self-defense,

3.

The extent

with threats

is

to

which the

is

not up to the task?

GWOT represents a fundamental shift in US strategies for dealing

apparent in President Bush's discussion of preemptive

available at

Remarks by
Academy, June 1, 2002,

strategies. See

the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (Jun. 18, 2002).

Released on September 17, 2002, the

US National Security Strategy incorporates such strategies.

See U.S. National Security Strategy, at 4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

(Nov.
4.

the

4,

2002).

See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law. Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence

United Nations Charter, 25

HARV.

J.

L.

& PUB. POL. 539

(2002). Professor

in Article

5 1 of

Glennon argues

that:

The

come to subsist in a parallel universe of two systems, one
The de jure system consists of illusory rules that would
among states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not

international system has

de jure,

and the other de

govern the use of force
exist.

which

The

facto.

de facto system consists of actual state practice in a real world, a world in

states

weigh costs against benefits

in regular disregard of the rules solemnly

proclaimed in the all-but-ignored de jure system.
overly schematized
its

Id.

and

scholastic, disconnected

aspirations for state conduct.

at 540.

8

The decaying

de jure catechism

from state behavior, and

is

unrealistic in

Michael Schmitt

Others counter that effective responses to terrorism and state "supporters"
thereof are proving entirely consistent with existing prescriptive norms. 5 This
article explores

those norms, specifically the relevant jus ad bellum, 6 in the con-

text of the response to the 9/1
state react forcibly to

1

attacks.

Under what circumstances can

an act of terrorism? Against whom?

what degree of severity?

a victim

When? And

with

concludes that a natural evolution in the community

It

understanding of limitations on the use of force has occurred over the past decades, such that claims o( international law's present insufficiency are over-

blown. However, assertions that the law as traditionally understood supports a
full

range of forceful responses to terrorism equally overstate

ally

the case, the truth

lies

reality.

As

is

usu-

between the extremes.

The Relevant Facts
In order to effectively appraise the international law governing the use of force
in counter-terrorism today,

necessary to

first

and

to acquire a sense for

sponsive to the factual context in which
for

Law

paint the factual backdrop.

customary international law, which

emergence. The same

is

true,

it

operates. Obviously, this

relies, inter alia,

Jack M. Beard, America's

Law, 25

[T]he case

for

HARV.

J.

L.

it is

is

the case

state practice for

its

however, for convention-based law. Despite dec-

undeniable that community understanding of law

See, e.g.,

on

UN Charter, should be in-

with the ordinary meaning of their

terpreted in accordance

International

normative vector,

tends to be reactive and re-

larations that international agreements, such as the

5.

its

New War

shifts

text,

it

is

over time to remain

on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under

& PUB. POL. 559 (2002).

America's forcible response to the September 11 attacks as being

fully

consistent with the inherent right of self-defense under customary international law and
Article 51 of the

U.N. Charter

is

very strong.

The unanimous condemnation

of the

attacks by the U.N. General Assembly, the affirmation of the right of self-defense by the

Security Council, the growing consensus in the international

community

to hold states

accountable for terrorist actions, and the repeated condemnation by the Security

Council of the Taliban Regime's support of terrorists in particular, clearly help establish

an appropriate framework under international law

for the exercise of self-defense

by the

United States.
589-90.

Id.

at

6.

That component of international law that governs when

pursuit of

its

national interests, such as defending

itself

it is

that a state

may resort to force

from armed attack.

in

.

Counter -Terrorism and the Use of Force

in International

Law

coherent and relevant to both current circumstances and the global
nity's

commu-

normative expectations. 7

On

September 2001, terrorists seized control of four passenger aircraft in the United States. Two were
flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a
third was driven into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and the fourth
crashed in Pennsylvania following an unsuccessful attempt by passengers to
Sadly, the facts of 9/11 are

all

too familiar.

11

regain control from the highjackers. Roughly 3000 people of over 80 nationalities

perished.

on Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization. 8 Al Qaeda operates from more
than 60 countries through a compartmentalized network using operatives of
numerous nationalities. By October, the British government felt sufficiently
confident in intelligence reports at its disposal to release certain facts and conclusions regarding the group. These were subsequently confirmed by the
United States. Specifically, 10 Downing Street announced that al Qaeda had
planned and conducted the attacks, that it continued to have the resources to
mount further operations, that US and UK citizens were potential targets and
that "Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida were able to commit these atrocities
Investigation quickly led authorities to focus their attention

7.

Law of Treaties:

Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
1

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
and

to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context

purpose
2.

There

.

.

.

in light of

its

object and

;

shall

be taken into account together with the context:

.

.

.

any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
b.

.

.

.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969). This point was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations. There, the Court noted "the
first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which
they occur." 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8.
8. For background on bin Laden, see PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET

WORLD OF OSAMA
Terrorism,

BIN

WASH. POST,

LADEN

(2001); Michael Dobbs, Bin laden: Architect of

Sep. 16, 2001, at A8.

10

New

Global

Michael Schmitt

because of their close alliance with the Taleban regime, which allowed them
9
to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity."

Of particular

Qaeda was
hardly venturing into terrorism for the first time on September 11th. The organization had allegedly been involved in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (attacks for which Osama bin Laden has been indicted 10 ), and the attack on the

USS

is

the fact that

al

Cole in 2000; the group had also claimed responsibility for the 1993 at-

tack on

US

special forces in Somalia, as well as three separate 1992

intended to

kill

ment of State
kill

relevance to the use of force issue

US

bombings

Yemen. Moreover, the US DepartQaeda ties to plots (not executed) to

military personnel in

alleges the existence of al

the Pope, attack tourists visiting Jordan during the millennium celebra-

tion,

bomb US and

Israeli

embassies in various Asian capitals, blow up a dozen

passenger aircraft while in flight and assassinate President Clinton. 11

That

al

Qaeda

represents a continuing threat

is

apparent not only from

track record, but also from statements periodically issued by
himself.

most

The

British government's

its

Osama bin Laden

October Press Release cited

a

number of his

virulent:

The people

of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice

imposed by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators .... It is the
duty now on every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad and cleanse the
land from these Crusader occupiers. Their wealth is booty to those who kill
them. (1996)
[T]errorising the

American occupiers

[of Islamic

Holy Places]

is

a religious

and

logical obligation. (1996)

We —with God's help— call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to
be rewarded to comply with God's order to

money whenever and wherever they

find

it.

Americans and plunder their
We also call on Muslims ... to

kill

United Kingdom Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom,

9.

Responsibility for the Terrorist

Atrocities in the United States,

Oct. 4, 2001, at paras. 21-22, available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2686 (J un 18, 2002). As to US confirmation of the facts, see
David E. Sanger, White House Approved Data Blair Released, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at B6.
10. Indictment, United States v.Usama bin Laden et al, S (2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y.Nov.
-

4,

1998).

11.

Department of

State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, app. B:

Background Information on

Terrorist Groups, al-Qa'ida, April 30, 2001, available at http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/

2000/2450.htm Gun.

18, 2002).
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them, and to displace those

who
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troops and the devil's supporters allying with
are behind them. (1998)

[Acquiring [chemical or nuclear]

.

.

.

weapons

for the

defence of Muslims

[is]

a

religious duty. (1998)

Thus, in

al

Qaeda we have

a

determined

terrorist organization that

mitted multiple acts of terrorism over the course of a decade
sulted in the deaths of thousands

measured

in the billions of dollars

—

has com-

which

acts

re-

and caused property and financial damage
and views its continuing campaign in terms

—

of jihad.

The US

reaction was swift. Within a week, President Bush formally pro-

claimed a national emergency 12 and called up members of the reserve compo-

nent of the armed forces. 13
rity

He

also established the Office of

and the Homeland Security Council

response to the terrorist threat.

14

For its

in order to facilitate a coordinated

part,

that authorized the President to "use

Homeland Secu-

all

Congress passed a joint resolution
necessary and appropriate force

against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,

committed, or aided the

terrorist attacks that

occurred on September

11,

2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the

nizations or persons."
ing.

15

Essentially, the

United States by such nations, orga-

United States was placed on a war foot-

Indeed, the President characterized the attacks as "an act of war against

our country." 16 Thus, the

US

government quickly moved beyond

law enforcement paradigm in determining

al

12.

how

a criminal

to respond to the attacks.

Almost immediately, the spotlight focused on Taliban connections to
Qaeda, which was "headquartered" in Afghanistan. Although the United

Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sep.

18,

2001).

A number of other steps were
Bush gave the Treasury Department greater power to undermine
financial support for terrorism through freezing assets and imposing financial sanctions on those
who refused to cooperate in the effort. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23,
13.

Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sep. 18, 2001).

taken. For instance, President

2001).
14.

Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001).

15.

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.

16.

President George

W.

L.

No. 107-40, 115

Stat.

224 (2001).

Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United

States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37
(Sep. 20, 2001).
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States did not formally recognize the Taliban as the legitimate

the country, the Taliban controlled the greatest
that where al

Qaeda was

based.

17

government of

amount of territory, including

Working through the

Pakistani government,

which maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban, the United States issued a series of demands. These were set forth publicly in late September during a Presidential address to a joint session of Congress. Specifically, the

United States insisted that the Taliban:
Deliver to United States authorities

your land. Release

all

all

the leaders of Al-Qa'ida

who

hide in

American citizens, you have
diplomats, and aid workers in

foreign nationals, including

unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists,

your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp
in Afghanistan,

and hand over every

structure to appropriate authorities.
terrorist training

and every person in their support
Give the United States full access to

terrorist

camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. 18

made

would be no negotiation and that
he expected immediate compliance. Moreover, he unambiguously laid out the
consequences of non-compliance: "They will hand over the terrorists, or they
President Bush

it

quite clear that there

will share in their fate." 19

Despite the "no-negotiations" stance, the Taliban expressed a desire to

re-

These entreaties were rebuffed and on October 6 the President issued a final public warning to cooperate. 20 The following day the
United States and United Kingdom launched the first phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, consisting of airstrikes against both al Qaeda and Taliban
targets. The scope and nature of the campaign quickly expanded to encompass ground and maritime operations.
solve the matter.

17. For background on the Taliban, see AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL
AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2001); PETER MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR,
RELIGION AND THE NEW ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN (1998).
18.

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, supra note

19.

Id.

20.

President George

W.

Bush, Radio Address, 37

(Oct. 6, 2001).
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required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the United States

promptly notified the Security Council that
21

it

was acting

in individual

and

In the report, the United States asserted that

col-

had
"clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is
supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks" and that there was an "ongoing threat" made possible "by the decision
lective self-defense.

of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that

used by
tions

Qaeda]

[al

was

as a base of operations."

The purpose

it

nously, the United States warned,

"We may

controls to be

of the military opera-

and deter further attacks on the United

to "prevent

it

States."

Omi-

find our self-defense requires

further actions with respect to other organizations and other States." 22 In an

address to the nation, the President echoed the threat contained in the Arti-

make. In

cle 51 notification: "Every nation has a choice to

this conflict, there

no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will
is

take that lonely path at their

Because

it

own

had participated

peril." 23

in the strikes, the

United Kingdom also trans-

mitted the requisite report to the Security Council.

It

announced

that the at-

"Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda
Taliban regime that is supporting it." The

tacks were conducted in self-defense against

and the

terrorist organization

avowed purpose was
source."

21.

24

Thus, although limiting the scope of

U.N. CHARTER,
Nothing

art. 51.

if

its

operations to

al

Article 51 provides that:

Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective

in the present

self-defence

same
Qaeda and

"to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the

an armed attack occurs against a

Member

of the United Nations, until

the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.

Measures taken by Members

in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be

immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at

any time such action

as

it

deems necessary

in order to

maintain or restore international

peace and security.
22.

Letter from the

Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/

Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct.

946, available at http://www.un.int.Zusa/s-2001-946. htm (Jun. 18,2002) [hereinafter
23.

US Letter].

W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaeda
Camps and Taliban Military Installations, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 1432, (Oct.

President George

Training
7,2001).
24.

Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (Oct.

7,

2001) available at http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleT>pe.l7/Article_

ID.328/qx/articles_show.htm Gun. 18, 2002).
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the Taliban, like the United States

it

suggested that action was necessary to

prevent further attacks.

The

international reaction to the affair was almost universally one of outrage

over the terrorist acts and support for the United States.

On

September 12th,

condemning the attacks as "horriinternational peace and security, and reaffirm-

the Security Council passed Resolution 1368
fying," labeling

them

a threat to

ing the "inherent right of self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the

United Nations." 25 Resolution 1373, passed on September 28th, likewise cited
the right to self-defense and laid out steps to combat terrorism, such as suppressing the financing of terrorism, denying safe

haven

to terrorists

and

their

accom-

26

and cooperating in law enforcement efforts. Interestingly, the General
Assembly did not refer to self-defense in its own resolution on the attacks. 27
Following commencement of the military campaign, the Security Council
plices,

passed a

number of relevant

resolutions. For instance,

on November 14th

sued Resolution 1378, which expressed support for "international

it is-

efforts to

root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations"; reaf-

firmed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (which had cited the right to self-defense);

condemned

the Taliban for "allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the

export of terrorism by the Al Qa'ida network and other terrorist groups and

haven to Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qa'ida and others associated with them"; and expressed support for the "efforts of the Afghan people
to replace the Taliban." 28 On December 20th it passed Resolution 1386,
which (as with Resolution 1373) expressed support for rooting out terrorism
in accordance with the Charter, reaffirmed Resolutions 1368 and 1373, and
for providing safe

25.

S.

C. Res. 1368, pmbl., U.N.

SCOR, 56th

Sess,

U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2001).

It is

interesting

that the Security Council did not reference self-defense in response to the 1998 attacks

on the

East African embassies even though the United States formally invoked Article 51. According to
Article 39 of the

UN Charter, the Security Council has cognizance over "any threat to the peace,

breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and decides upon measures necessary to "maintain or
restore international peace

and

a threat to international peace

Council to
26.
27.
28.

security."

and

U.N. CHARTER,

security

is

art.

39. Therefore, labeling the acts as

normatively significant in that

act.

S. C. Res. 1373, pmbl. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 8 (Sep. 18, 2001).
S. C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2001).
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authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force

[ISAF]. 29 Reaffirmation of the international counter-terrorist

ous resolutions, of

its

prior

condemnation of the Taliban and

effort,
al

of previ-

Qaeda and

of

the fact that terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security

occurred yet again on January 20th, 2002 with Resolution 1390. 30 In
curity Council

Taliban and

al

it,

the Se-

employed its Chapter VII authority to impose sanctions on the
Qaeda, including a freezing of assets, a prohibition of travel and

an arms embargo.
In none of the resolutions did the Security Council explicitly authorize the
United States, any coalition of forces, or a regional organization to use force
pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter, as the Council is entitled to do in the
face of a "threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression." 31
ever,

it is

How-

important to note that the Security Council twice referred to the

in-

herent right to individual and collective self-defense prior to coalition combat

Qaeda, that no effort was made to condemn the forceful response once launched, and that the Council repeatedly
operations against the Taliban and

a]

reaffirmed the right to self-defense and expressed support for the international
effort to "root

out terrorism" as those operations were ongoing.

Beyond the United Nations, the most powerful military alliance in the
world articulated its position in even more unequivocal terms. The day after
the terrorist attacks, NATO's North Atlantic Council, consisting of Permanent Representatives of all 19 NATO member states, announced that if the
attacks originated from outside the United States, they would be "regarded as

SCOR,

U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001). Pursuant to the
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement of Dec. 5, 2001), ISAF is to assist in
maintenance of security in the vicinity of Kabul. ISAF executed a military technical agreement
(MTA) with the Interim Administration in Afghanistan on 4 January 2002. For the text of the
Bonn Agreement, see http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm (J un 18,
29.

S.

C. Res. 1386 U.N.

56th

Sess.,

-

2002).

The

MTA text

30. S. C. Res. 1390,

is

at http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf

U.N. SCOR, 57th

Sess.,

Gun.

18,

2002).

U.N. Doc. S/1390/(2002). The operation

itself is

described by the British Ministry of Defence at http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/ Qun. 18,
2002).
31.

U.N. CHARTER,

art.

42.

The

text reads:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land

may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
forces as
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an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty." 32 Article

on

Article 5

member

1

of the

UN Charter,

provides for collective self-defense

an "armed attack."

5,

based

if

any of

33

Within three weeks, and following briefings in which US officials provided "clear and compelling" evidence that the attacks were not the work of domestic terrorists, the North
Atlantic Council made precisely that finding and invoked Article 5. 34 There
was no mention of whom the defense, which began five days later, could be directed against. This was a normatively significant omission given that one of
the entities the United States and United Kingdom struck on October 7th was
a non-state actor, whereas the other was a government supportive of that
group, but which did not control it.
Similarly, the Organization of American States invoked the collective selfthe

states suffers

defense provisions of the Rio Treaty 35 following

its

finding that "these terrorist

attacks against the United States are attacks against

Australia did likewise, citing Article IV of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
North Atlantic Council (Sep. 12, 2001) available
32.

ANZUS

Press Release
at

American

all

States." 36

Treaty in offering to

No. 124, statement by the

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-

124e.htm, Gun. 18, 2002).
33.

The

an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Parties agree that

America

shall

will assist

be considered an attack against them

the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in

deems necessary, including the use of
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

concert with the other Parties, such action as

armed

force, to restore

North Atlantic Treaty, Aug.

it

24, 1959, art. 5, T.I.A.S. 1964,

34. Secretary General Lord Robertson, statement at

34 U.N.T.S. 243.
Headquarters (Oct.

NATO

2,

2001)

available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm, (Jun. 18, 2002).

35.

The High Contracting
American State

shall

Parties agree that

an armed attack by any State against an

be considered as an attack against

all

the

American States and,

consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sep. 2,

1947,

art.

3.1,

62

Stat.

1681, 21

U.N.T.S. 77.
36. Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Resolution

1,

Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of

Organ of Consultation In Application of the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sep. 21, 2001).
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Acting as

17
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deploy military forces. 37 Russia, China and India agreed to share intelligence

with the United States, while Japan and South Korea offered

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke

off diplomatic relations

with the Taliban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate
States.

logistics support.

fully

with the United

Twenty-seven nations granted overflight and landing

multilateral declarations of support were obtained.

Once

the campaign against

pressions of support flowed in

noted, participated directly in

such as Georgia,

Oman,

rights

and 46

38

Qaeda and the Taliban began, offers or exfrom many sources. The United Kingdom, as
the initial strikes, whereas many other states,

al

Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

Turkey and Uzbekistan, provided airspace and facilities. China,
Egypt, Russia and the European Union publicly backed the US/UK operations. The Organization for the Islamic Conference simply urged the United
States to limit the campaign to Afghanistan, 39 while the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum condemned terrorism of all kinds. Neither organization criticized the operations. Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom offered ground troops. 40 By May 2002, the forces of several
nations, in particular sizable British, Australian, Canadian and American contingents, were engaged in dangerous "mop-up" actions. 41
Tajikistan,

37.

Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes

ANZUS Treaty—Press Conference

(Sep.

14, 2001), available at http://australianpolitics.com.au/foreign/anzus/01-09-14anzus-invoked.shtml,

Gun.

18,

2002). See also

White House, Fact Sheet: Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM

Overview (Oct. 1, 2001) available at http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/5194.htm Qun. 18,
2002). Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty provides: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in
the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes." Security Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, United States), Sep. 1, 1951, art. IV, 3
U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84.
38.

Fact Sheet, supra note 37.

39. See

Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and

the

Concept of "Armed Attack"

in Article

51 of the U.N.

HARV. INT'L L. J.

41, 49 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L. LAW 237, 248 (2002).
40. Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 248. The European Council

Charter, 43

which are legitimate under the
terms of the United Nations Charter and of Resolution 1368." Declaration by the Heads of State
of Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission: Follow-up to the
September 11 Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism, Oct. 19, 2002, SN 4296/2/01 Rev. 2.
4 1 Perhaps best illustrative of the coalition nature of the campaign were operations that month
from Manas airport, near Bishket, Kyrgyz Republic. Although typically a sleepy airfield, it was
"confirm [ed]

its

staunchest support for the military operations

US

.

.

.

and French fighter-bombers; Australian and French tankers; transport aircraft from
Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway; and a South Korean medical team. Americans in
hosting

a Strange Land,

THE ECONOMIST, May

4,

2002, at 41.
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Since the counter-terrorism operations began, controversy has surfaced

among

garding a number of legal issues. Most notable

re-

these has been the de-

and proposed prosecution of the detainees held at US
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay. Also a point of contention, albeit more muted,
is the extent of collateral damage and incidental injury from the strikes contention, treatment

ducted against

Qaeda and Taliban

al

very divisive issue,

i.e.,

minimum

And

looming on the horizon

and

a

particularly the sub-circle of academia, there

controversy about the lawfulness of the operations con-

ducted within Afghanistan under the jus ad bellum.

On

the contrary, and as

illustrated in the events described above, support for the

military response has

grounded

is

carrying the fight beyond the borders of Afghanistan.

Yet, except in legal circles,

has been

targets.

US

been strong. The extent to which

in either the lex lata or lex ferenda

is

and coalition

this

support

is

the subject of the remainder of

this article.

The Normative Framework

The

for the

Use

of Force

UN Charter expresses the basic prohibition on the use of force in interna-

tional law.

It

provides, in Article 2(4), that "[a] 11

Members

shall refrain in their

international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any

state, or in

tent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

42

any other manner inconsis-

Within the four corners of the

Charter, there are but two exceptions to this prohibition.
Article 39,

empowers the Security Council

The

and decide what mea-

sures are necessary to maintain or restore international peace

may

set forth in

to determine the existence of a

threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression

Article 42, the Council

first,

and

security.

By

turn to military force to resolve these situations in

what are generally labeled "enforcement operations." 43 States would provide
troops under a

42.

UN

U.N. CHARTER,

flag, as

art. 2(4).

a coalition of the willing or individually. Regional

On

this article, see

Charter of the United Nations:
43.

U.N. Charter,

art.

Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article

A Commentary 72

42.

19

(Bruno Simma

ed.,

2, in

1995).
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organizations are also authorized to engage in "enforcement" activities, but

only with the approval of the Security Council. 44

The second exception
Nothing

in the present

is

found in Article 51.

It

provides

Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or

an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
collective self-defense

if

this right

of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council

and

not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security

shall

Council under the present Charter to take

at

any time such action

as

it

deems

necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Thus, states victimized by an armed attack may not only defend themselves,
but also receive assistance from others in mounting that defense. They need

not await a Council authorization to

act,

taken to the Security Council, which may

but are required to report actions

determine that

needs to

re-

assert that additional exceptions to the prohibition

on

itself

it

spond in some fashion.

Some commentators
the use of force

lie

outside the Charter.

Most frequently

manitarian intervention, a topic rendered timely by
tion

in

the

cited

NATO's

is

a right to hu-

1999 interven-

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on behalf of the Kosovar

Albanians. 45 However, no such purported exception, or at least none that has

44.

The

Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or

agencies for enforcement action under

its

authority.

But no enforcement action

shall

be

taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any

enemy

state, as

defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional

arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such
until

such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be

charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a

U.N. Charter,
45.

On

state,

art. 53.1.

this issue, see

INT'LHUM.

state.

Adam

Roberts, The So-Called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B.

L. 3 (2000).
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garnered any significant support, would apply in the case of counter-terrorist
operations. 46

Despite the seeming expansiveness of the Charter prohibition, there has
been, as will be discussed, growing support
of criticism

of,

for,

or at least a diminishing degree

forceful counter-terrorist operations. Tellingly, they are almost

always justified in terms of the right to self-defense, rather than as an exception to the general prohibition

on the use of force. Perhaps more normatively

significant

is

the fact that acceptance by other states of their legitimacy,

expressed,

is

also usually

framed in self-defense terms. Thus, while

when

appar-

it is

more appropriate to consider that acceptance as bearing on the evolution of the norms
regarding self-defense, than as exemplars of an emergent exception to a prohient that such activities are increasingly acceptable politically,

it is

bition generally characterized as comprehensive in nature.

Returning to the Charter, a more apropos inquiry
terrorist operations

can

fall

whether counter-

is

within the Chapter VII enforcement framework.

That international terrorism may constitute a threat to international peace
and security, as understood in the Charter use of force context, is unquestionFor instance, in 1992 the Security Council, reacting to attacks against

able.

Pan

Am Flight

103 (the Lockerbie case) in 1988 and

UTA Flight

722 the

fol-

lowing year, affirmed "the right of all states ... to protect their nationals from
acts of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace

and security" and expressed concern over
establishing responsibility for the acts.

47

Libya's failure to fully cooperate in

The same

year,

Libya's failure to render the requisite cooperation, the

and

in response to

Council re-emphasized

that "suppression o{ acts of international terrorism, including those in

States are directly or indirectly involved,

46.

It

is

essential for the

which

maintenance of

has been suggested that the Article 2(4) prohibition does not apply in any event to limited

strikes against terrorists

based in another country. Such operations, so the reasoning goes, do not

"violate the territorial integrity or political

independence" of the state

in

which they occur since

they are not directed against that state's personnel or property, are not intended to affect

its

independence in any way, and are limited temporally to the period necessary
eradicate the terrorist threat. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, And The Use

to

political

MUtary

Force,

18 WIS. INT'L L.

Responding Lawfully

NORTON MOORE

to International

ET

AL.,

J.

145,

166-67 (2000),

Terrorism, 8

WHITTIER

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

citing,

L.

inter alia, Jordan

J.

Of

Paust,

REV. 711, 716-7 (1986); JOHN

131 (1990); LOUIS HENKIN,

HOW

NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (1979); Jean Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine,
Human Rights and International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 25-33 (Council on Foreign Relations
1989). This article rejects the approach, favoring, as discussed infra, one that acknowledges an

infringement on sovereignty, but balances
47. S. C. Res. 731,

U.N. SCOR, 47th

it

against other state rights.

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/731/(1992).
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and

international peace

security."

with the principle in Article

of the Charter

4,

.

.

Law

u

further reaffirmed that

It

paragraph

2,

in International

accordance

in
.

every State has

the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in

another State or acquiescing in organized

territory directed

towards the commission of such

acts,

activities within its

when such

acts in-

volve a threat or use of force." Finally, the Council styled the failure of Libya
to cooperate a threat to international
Similarly, following the

1998

peace and security. 48

US Embassy bombings

in

Nairobi and Dar-es-

Salaam, the Security Council condemned "such acts which have a damaging
effect

on international

relations

and jeopardize the security of

States."

As

it

did in 1992. the Council also reiterated the duty to refrain from "organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in

escing in organized activities within
sion of such acts."

1269

49

The

which,

(1999),

its

another State or acqui-

territory directed

towards the commis-

following year, the Council approved Resolution

without

condemned]

being

tied

to

any

particular

incident,

methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and
manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those
which could threaten international peace and security."
"[u]nequivocally

all acts,

Indeed, the Security Council characterized the pre-September 11th situa-

one implicating international peace and security. In
"strongly condemn[ed] the continuing use of Afghan terri-

tion in Afghanistan as

October 1999,

it

by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training

tory, especially areas controlled

of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirm [ed]
the suppression of international terrorism
international peace

and

security."

2000. In July 2001, the Council

50

made

It

is

its

essential for the

conviction that

maintenance of

same in December
position completely unambiguous by

did precisely the

its

determining that "the situation in Afghanistan constitutes a threat to international peace

and security

in the region." 51

By September 2001, therefore,

was abundantly clear that international terrorism,
territory to

be used as a base of terrorist

activities,

as well as allowing one's

could

"threat to the peace." This being so, the Council

SCOR, 47th
U.N. SCOR, 53d

48.

S.

C. Res. 748, U.N.

Sess.,

49.

S.

C. Res.

Sess.,

1

189,

U.N. SCOR, 51st

it

is

rise to

entitled,

U.N. Doc. S/748/(1992).
U.N. Doc. S/l 189/(1998). See

the level of a

pursuant to

also S.

C. Res. 1044,

U.N. Doc. S/1044/(1996) regarding assassination attempts against the
President of Egypt, which styled "the suppression of acts of international terrorism ... an
essential element for maintenance of international peace and security."
50.
51.

S.

S.

Sess.,

C. Res. 1267, U.N.

C. Res. 1363, U.N.

SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999).
SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1363/(2001).
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on the appropriate measures to take to "maintain or reinternational peace and security," and such measures include the use of

Article 39, to decide
store
force.

them

threats

condemned]

in the

In the aftermath of the attacks, the Security Council labeled
to the peace.

On

September

12,

2001,

it

"[sjtrongly

strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place
11,

2001

such

New

in

acts, like

York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania and, regard [ed]

any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international

peace and security." 52
guage.

53

on September

Meeting

On September 28,

at the ministerial level

it

did so again in nearly identical lan-

on November

12,

2001, the Council

which it declared "that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century." 54 In subsequent resolutions on the situation
issued Resolution 1377, in

in Afghanistan,

it

adopted the practice of reaffirming

thereby continuing to characterize the September

1 1

all

previous resolutions,

attacks, as well as

any

other act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.

Such

a finding

is

the sine qua

non of an authorization

for a forceful re-

sponse pursuant to Chapter VII (with the exception of self-defense)

Thus,

it is

unquestionable that the Security Council could have elected to

—

mount enforcement operations either under the UN banner or by granting a
mandate to member states or an intergovernmental organization in an effort

—

55

and maintain international peace and security. Since the demise of
the Cold War, the Council has not hesitated to exercise its enforcement authority, sometimes in quite creative fashion. Chapter VII enforcement operations have been conducted in response to such diverse situations as the Iraqi
to restore

invasion of Kuwait, the failed-state disorder in Somalia, fighting resulting

from the breakup of Yugoslavia and internal violence in Indonesia.
even, in the case of Operation

NATO,

DENY

It

has

FLIGHT, authorized a regional security

And when that same organization mounted Operation ALLIED FORCE to stop human rights abuses against
organization,

to maintain a no-fly zone.

the Kosovar Albanians by forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ad

SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001).
SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1377/(2001).

52.

S.

C. Res. 1368, U.N.

53.

S.

C. Res. 1373, U.N.

54.

S.

C. Res. 1377,

In the resolution,

it

adopted the Declaration on the Global Effort to Counter Terrorism.
55. For an article arguing that there is "a continuing process of attempting to widen customary
rights while eroding the effective

ENDURING FREEDOM
Towers Attack:

An

is

powers of international organizations," of which Operation
an excellent example, see Eric P.J. Myjer and Nigel D. White, The Twin

Unlimited Right to Self Defence?, 7
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bellum-based criticism of the bombing centered on the fact that the

members had

not turned to the Council for authorization to

manitarian intervention, rather than on the operation
lustrative of the flexibility with

VII authority

human

is

NATO

conduct their hu-

itself.

Perhaps best

which the Council has interpreted

its

il-

Chapter

creation of international tribunals to try those charged with

and humanitarian law violations during both international and
non-international armed conflicts. 56
rights

In fact, the Security Council has used

its

Chapter VII authority

to terrorism in the past by imposing sanctions

lowing

terrorist organizations to

respond

on both Libya and Sudan

operate from their territory.

Council was never asked to issue a mandate

rity

to

57

for al-

Yet the Secu-

in response to the 9/11

no resolution did it do so. Although some commentators have
searched for an implied use of force authorization in the post-attack Security
Council resolutions, 58 such efforts are unnecessary. There was no reason for
attacks and in

the Council to issue one.

The

sole basis for

conducting Coalition operations

which does not require advance Council authorization. All
the Charter requires is notice whenever such activities are undertaken. By the
terms of Article 51, an operation in self-defense does not deprive the Council
of its "right" to respond to the situation, but, by the same token, that fact does

was

self-defense,

not deprive states of their inherent right to exercise individual or collective
self-defense, a

56. See,

e.g.,

form of armed

self-help. 59

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, available at http://

S. C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th
U.N. Doc. S/827/(1993)]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ Gun. 18, 2002) [established by S. C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/955/(1994)]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sierraleone.org/specialcourtstatute.html (Jun. 18, 2002) [established by S. C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/13 15/(2000)]. Note that the authority of the Council to establish such
tribunals was unsuccessfully challenged in an interlocutory appeal before the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995). See George H. Aldrich, Comment: Jurisdiction Of The
International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1996).
57. S. C. Res. 748 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/748/(1992) (Libya); S. C. Res. 1054,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1054/(1996) (Sudan).
58. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Addendum: Security Council Resolutions 1377 (2001) and 1378

www.un.org/icty/index.html Gun. 18, 2002) [established by
Sess.,

(2001),
59.

ASIL

Insights,

Dec, 2001,

http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm Gun. 18, 2002).

Report of the International Law Commission, 32d

(1980).
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Self-Defense

As

noted, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 cited the inherent right

to self-defense in the specific context of international terrorism. Further, both

the United States and the United

Kingdom

notified the Security Council that

they were conducting operations against the Taliban and
their right of individual

and

collective self-defense.

may respond

to international terrorism in self-defense or of

the Taliban and

verbal and

significant criticism of either the general premise that states

this particular case.

Qaeda

al

its

invocation in

However, the operations that have been mounted against
raise a

number of issues regarding

so precise) parameters of the right to self-defense
tion. Before turning to

them though,

rounding self-defense generally.

One

They received

to

and intergovernmental organizations,

actual support from an array of states

and there was no

Qaeda pursuant

al

the precise (or not

and the nature of its evolu-

useful to survey several of those sur-

it is

60

involves ascertaining whether an action constitutes an "armed at-

tack," for

under Article 51 the

Not

of such an attack.

all

right to

defend oneself surfaces only in the face

uses of force rise to this level. For instance,

able that certain operations that

do not involve physical

force,

it is

argu-

such as a com-

puter network attack, might be a "use of force" [and thereby contrary to
Article 2(4)], but not an "armed attack." 61 Similarly, the International Court

60.

One important issue is whether or not Article 5 1

represents the entire body of the law of self-

defense. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that the customary
international law right of self-defense "continues to exist alongside treaty law," specifically
Article 51 of the Charter.

To

begin with, the article

individual and collective self-defense.

More

leaves unanswered certain aspects of

although Article 5 1

its

sets a threshold of

definition of that term.

The Charter

itself refers to

to the point in this inquiry

exercise.

As

the "inherent right" of

is

the fact that Article 51

the Court pointed out, for instance,

"armed attack"

for vesting of the right, there

is

no

also fails to articulate the well-accepted requirements that

acts of self-defense

be proportional and necessary. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and

against Nicaragua

(Nicaragua

v.

US), Merits,

I.C.J.

Reports 1986, para. 176 [hereinafter

Nicaragua]. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
I.C.J.

Weapons (Advisory Opinion),

Reports 1996, para. 41 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. Customary international law can

prove useful in

filling

campaign normatively

voids in the understanding of self-defense. This fact renders the current
significant in that pervasive state practice over time,

a sense of legal obligation,

when

the product of

matures into received customary international law. The Afghanistan

operations therefore represent important data points in the development of the right of

self-

defense.
61.

See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law.

Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37

COLUM.
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of Justice, applying customary international law, held in the Nicaragua case
that:

the prohibition of

armed attacks may apply

to the sending by a State of

armed

bands to the territory of another State, i/such an operation, because of its scale
and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere
frontier incident

had

it

been carried out by regular armed

forces.

But the Court

does not believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes only acts by armed

bands where such acts occur on a
the form of the provision of
assistance

may be

significant scale

weapons or

but also assistance to rebels in

logistical or

other support. Such

regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention

in the internal or external affairs of other States. 62

It is

therefore the "scale and effects" of the act that are determinative in as-

whether an armed attack

sessing

self-defense vests.

That

is

taking place such that a right to respond in

By the Court's standard,

said, the Court's reference to a

ceptance of actions by other than a
site significance

acts of a "significant scale" suffice.

mere frontier

state's

oi the scale and effects

armed
is

incident, as well as the ac-

forces, imply that the requi-

rather low. Border incidents are

characterized by a minimal level of violence, tend to be transitory and spo-

and generally do not represent a policy decision by a state to
engage an opponent meaningfully. They are usually either "unintended" or
merely communicative in nature. By negative implication, it would not take
radic in nature,

much
It is

and

force to exceed this threshold.
possible, then, that a state

in doing so

employing violence

will

have "used

committed an international wrong, or even engaged

force," 63

in activity

constituting a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression

(thereby allowing the Security Council to take cognizance of the matter under

Chapter VII), but not have conducted an armed attack

62.

Nicaragua, supra note 59, para. 195 (emphasis added).

63.

Note

that Article 2(4) prohibition

on the use of force

26

as that

applies only to states.

term

is
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understood normatively in the context of self-defense. 64 Analogously, actions

by non-state actors (the applicability of self-defense in such situations

is

dis-

cussed infra) might be criminal in nature and/or represent threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, but not be of a scale

suffi-

cient to implicate the international law right of self-defense. Despite the gaps,

would appear that the level of violence necessary to rise to the
level of an armed attack is markedly low.
Once an armed attack has been launched, the victim state may respond
with force in self-defense. However, customary international law imposes cerhowever,

it

tain requirements

on self-defense. In the 19th century Caroline

case, Secretary

of State Daniel Webster set out the standard that has since achieved nearly
universal acceptance. According to Secretary Webster, there

a "ne-

overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,

cessity of self-defence, instant,

and no moment

must be

and the defensive acts must not be "unreasonable or excessive." 65 This standard has matured into the requirements that
self-defense be necessary and proportionate. The International Court of Justice confirmed their existence in both the Nicaragua case 66 and the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion. 67 In the latter case, the Court noted "this dual
for deliberation"

armed attack has occurred, resort is sometimes made to the term
which was defined in General Assembly's Definition of Aggression Resolution.
However, aggression is not wholly synonymous with armed attack. As Randelzhoffer has noted,
64.

In ascertaining whether an

"aggression,"

The

travaux preparatoires of the Definition illustrate that a definition of 'armed attack'

was not intended. In the special committee that worked out the Definition, the United
States, supported by other Western states, strongly opposed tendencies to include the

made by the US representative (U.N. Doc. A/
and S. C. 108, p. 43), the representative of Japan
(U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/S. C. 112), and the UK (U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/S. C. 113)]. Like
the Soviet Union [see stmt by the Soviet Representative (U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/S. C.
105, p. 16)], they also expressed the view that the notions of 'act of aggression' and
'armed attack' are not identical [see the statement by the US representative (U.N. Doc.
A/AC.134/S.C. 105, p. 17)].
'armed attack'. [C/ the statements

AC.134/S. C. 113,

S.

C. 105,

p.

Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51,

17

in

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

A

COMMENTARY 661,

668 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995).
65. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug.
STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-1).

6,

1842), 29 BRITISH

AND FOREIGN

66. Nicaragua, supra note 60, para. 176.

Weapons, supra note 60, para. 41. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 905 (1987). Ian Brownlie labels
proportionality "the essence of self-defence." IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 n. 2 (1963).
67. Nuclear
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condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter," thereby verifying the

both customary and conventional law. 68

applicability of the requirements in

The

principle of necessity requires that the resort to force occur only

no other reasonable options remain

to frustrate continuation of the

tack. Obviously, directly reacting with force to

when

armed

an armed attack that

is

at-

under-

way would seldom be deemed unnecessary. More normatively complex is the
situation where an armed attack has taken place, but for some reason has
paused. Perhaps

have prevailed

it

has achieved

its

Or cooler heads may
government. Maybe the government

intended objectives.

in the attacking state's

been ousted and a successor government opposed
to the conflict is now in power. Whatever the case, necessity mandates other
than forceful responses whenever feasible.
Transposing the standard to terrorism, the question is generally whether
law enforcement operations are likely to be sufficient to forestall continuation
of the armed attack. Such operations/may be undertaken by the victim state,
the state where the terrorists are based, or, for that matter, any other state.
Similarly, if a state in which the terrorists are located conducts military operations with a high probability of success, there would be no necessity basis for
that ordered the attack has

self-defense by the victim state.

The

proportionality principle simply requires that the response in

self-

defense be no more than necessary to defeat the armed attack and remove the
threat of reasonably foreseeable future attacks. Yet,

suggested that the
portional to the

size,

size,

it is

sometimes wrongly

nature and consequences of the response must be pro-

nature and consequences of the armed attack.

As

to the

would be absurd to suggest that there must be an equivalency of force between the armed attack and self-defense. On the contrary,
the attacker typically seizes the initiative, thereby acquiring an advantage. To
successfully defend against an opponent enjoying such an advantage may take
much greater force than that used to mount the attack.
size

of the attack,

it

Requiring equivalency of nature

Court of Justice suggested
ion.

When

as

is

equally inappropriate.

International

much by implication in its Nuclear Weapons

opin-

assessing the proportionality of the use of nuclear weapons, the

Court opined that "(t)he proportionality principle may

68. Nuclear

The

Weapons, supra note

60, para. 41.
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itself exclude
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the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense in
resenting a non-decision

on the

possibility that use of a nuclear

non-nuclear attack. Scaled

all

circumstances." 69 While rep-

issue at hand, the

weapon might be

down from

mand and control assets.

may be

targets of particular value to

attack.

70

In fact, doing so

would be necessary

in responding to a

maritime

to disrupt land-based maritime

com-

Likewise, in an effort to cause an attacker to desist by

altering his cost-benefit calculations,

on

legitimate in the face of a

the nuclear level, such a criterion re-

mains equally malapropos. By way of illustration,
attack the most productive tactic

Court had admitted the

may

him

may be more

it

effective to concentrate

rather than those directly involved in the

well result in a lesser level of violence than

to definitively defeat the attacking units themselves.

Surely international law does not mandate tit-for-tat exchanges.

At

glance, a standard of proportionality vis-a-vis the

first

possible) to the victim

harm caused

might seem more reasonable. In other words, the state

engaging in self-defense should not be entitled to cause more harm than

But such a standard ignores the

suffered.

To

it

has

fact that international law grants

states the right to self-defense in order that they not

the face of an attack.

(or

be rendered helpless in

suggest that a state cannot use the destructive force

necessary to cause an attacker to discontinue (or to prevent future attacks)

because the resulting destruction outweighs that the victim state originally
suffered

to effectively deprive the victim of the right to self-defense.

is

Finally, there

portionate

if

have been suggestions that self-defense operations are dispro-

they cause more collateral damage and incidental injury than the

and damage to civilian objects originally suffered by the vicSuch assertions have been made in the context of the current

civilian casualties

tim

69.

state.

Id.,

para. 42.

There

are, as

noted in the discussion of self-defense, competing views of

proportionality. India argued that the principle

meant

a nuclear

weapon could not be used

except in response to a nuclear attack. But even in such a case, so India argued, the use of nuclear

weapons would be malum

in se.

Thus, any nuclear reprisal would be unlawful. Written statement

Government of India, June

20, 1995 (Legality of the Threat or Use oi Nuclear Weapons)
Other approaches include proportional to the harm caused, vice technique employed to
cause the harm, and proportional to the force needed to cause the other side to desist. Compare
the approach of the Netherlands and United States, both of which argued that the legality would
be situational, with that of India. Observations of the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, June 16, 1995 (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons), at 12; Written
statement of the Government of the United States of America, June 20, 1995 (Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons), at 30.
70. In a slightly different context, this approach lies at the heart of compellance strategies. On

of the

at 2-3.

the issue of affecting an enemy's decision-making, see Jeanne

Faqade:

A

Critical

Doctrine, 51

A.

Look

F. L.

at the

Current

Law on

M. Meyer, Tearing Down the
Enemy and Air Force

Targeting the Will of the

REV. 143 (2001).
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which the number of civilian casualties allegedly exceeds the number of fatalities resulting from the 9/1 1 attacks. 71 Claims
counter-terrorist operations, in

of this nature confuse the self-defense proportionality requirement of the jus

ad bellum with the jus in bello proportionality principle that forbids attacks
"expected to cause incidental

loss

of civilian

life,

injury to civilians,

damage

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 72 But even
by the in bello standard, the correct phenomena to compare are incidental into civilian objects, or a

juries/collateral

damage and

military advantage.

military advantage accruing from

damage

to civilian objects; there

an attack

is

The

justifies

issue

is

whether or not the

the civilian casualties and

no balancing of the

civilian suffering

on the

opposing sides of the conflict.
Restated in the context of terrorism, the proportionality standard allows
only that degree of force necessary to fend off a terrorist attack and protect
oneself from a future continuation thereof. But the force necessary to achieve
this

purpose

may

far

exceed that employed in the attack. Terrorists often op-

erate in loose networks from dispersed locations, receiving logistic support in

ways intended to mask their nature. Further, they may be fanatical devotees

makes it extremely difficult to meaningfully
calculations. Taking them on is a daunting task that

willing to die for their cause; this
affect their cost-benefit

typically requires

extremely aggressive measures.

Beyond necessity and proportionality, the Caroline standard has also often
been deemed to impose an imminency requirement, i.e., that the attack be
ongoing, or at least so imminent that the victim state has to react almost reflexively to counter it. This requirement has generated enormous debate
about precisely when it is that an attack becomes imminent enough to merit

71.

Estimates of civilian casualties vary widely. Compare,

Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial
10,

2001,

available

at

e.g.,

Bombing of Afghanistan:

1,

Dossier on

A Comprehensive Accounting, Dec.

http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm

(approximately 4000 by Jan.

A

Marc W. Herold,
(J

un

-

18,

2002) with Carl Connetta, Operation Enduring Freedom:

2002)

Why

a

Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties, Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://wwAv.comw.org/pda/

0201oef.html#ref7 Qun.

Watch Report
72.

is

18,

2002) (1000-13000 over the same period).

forthcoming on the subject (unreleased as of Jun.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Convention of

Protection of Victims of International
12, 1977,

1125 U.N.T.S.

3,

Armed

A Human

Rights

19, 2002).

12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Conflicts, arts. 51.5(a)

16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), reprinted in

<St

ADAM

57.2 (a)

(hi)

ROBERTS

& (b), Dec.
& RICHARD

GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 419 (3d ed. 2000). On proportionality, see
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol Additional I in Conventional Warfare, 98
REV. 91 (1982); Judith G. Gardam,
J.lNT'LL. 391 (1993).
MIL.

L.

Proportionality
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"pre-emptive" action in self-defense. This
"anticipatory self-defense."

Certain commentators

is

the issue of the appropriateness of

73

who

read Caroline narrowly suggest a high standard

74

Such a reading logically flows from Webster's "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" verbiage. However, the nature of combat has evolved dramatically since the time
of the Caroline correspondence. In the 21st century, the means of warfare are
of imminence.

such that defeat can occur almost instantaneously. Indeed, the linear
krieg strategies of the

Second World

standards, in which the battlespace

blitz-

War appear slow and unwieldy by today's
is

four-dimensional and effects are gener-

ated in fractions of a second.
In such an environment, the most apropos approach
the underlying intent of the right to self-defense.

Its

is

to concentrate

primary purpose

is

on

to af-

mechanism by which they may repel attackers; it recognizes that the international community may not respond quickly enough, if at
all, to an armed attack against a state. Yet, the limitations of necessity, proportionality and imminency play to the community's countervailing aversion to
ford states a self-help

between the state's
right to exist unharmed and the international community's need to minimize
the use of force, which is presumptively destabilizing.
The most responsive balance between these two interests lies in permitting
a use of defensive force in advance of an attack if "the potential victim
must immediately act to defend itself in a meaningful way and if the potential aggressor has irrevocably committed itself to attack." 75 This standard
combines an exhaustion of remedies component with a requirement for a reasonable expectation of future attacks
an expectation that is more than
the use of violence by states. Thus, there

is

a balancing

—

merely speculative.

73.

Yoram Dinstein

basis that the

has rejected the terminology "anticipatory" in favor of "interceptive" on the

former term suggests that preventive actions in the face of a "foreseeable" armed

attack are legitimate. For Professor Dinstein, the question

committed

is

whether or not the "other

side has

an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way." As he explains, "[t]he
crucial question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the
Rubicon. This, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what casts the die and forms what may be
categorized as an incipient armed attack. It would be absurd to require that the defending state
itself to

should sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a

conception of self-defence."

YORAM

DINSTEIN,

fatal)

blow, only to prove an immaculate

WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE
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(3rd ed. 2001).
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States
1634-35 (1984).

74.

75.

Schmitt, supra note 61, at 932.
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However, what

if

an attack

sponse in self-defense?

"complete"

is

To some

in International

time of the proposed

at the

extent, this question bears

requirement; the termination of the

initial

may

action

Law

on the

re-

necessity

allow for other than

forceful resolution of the situation, thereby rendering a use of force in self-

defense unnecessary. But the query also touches upon the imminency require-

ment. Must defense against a future attack be measured by the same standard
of imminency as defense against an

The answer
makes

it

is

"yes," but the

easier to conclude that

initial

mere

it

will

one?

fact that

an entity has attacked once

do so again. After

all,

the "potential" at-

mens rea has now been tangibly demonstrated. Much more to the
point, it may also be reasonable to conclude that the first attack was part of an
overall campaign that in itself constitutes a single extended armed attack. By
tacker's

this

understanding, an after-the-fact reaction to an

initial

response to an on-going armed attack in which there

The approach

reflects the reality of combat, in

is

attack constitutes a

but a tactical pause.

which pauses

are the norm, not

They may be necessary for logistical purposes, as a result of
weather, due to enemy responses, pending acquisition of further intelligence,
to leverage surprise, etc. The question is whether the attack that has occurred
the exception.

is

part

and parcel of a related

series of acts that will

continue to unfold.

Treating a series of actions as a unitary whole makes particular sense in the

context of terrorism. Terrorist campaigns generally consist o{ a series of ac-

extended periods of time. Moreover, given

tions that occur periodically over

their nature, they are very difficult to

potential target

is

defend against while underway

usually only revealed by the attack

itself, all

— the

of society repre-

sents a potential target thus rendering effective on-the-spot defense problem-

may occur after the terrorists have left the
in a bombing), the terrorists may be willing to die in the attack, and
tity and location of the terrorists may not be uncovered until after
atic,

the actual violence

pletion of a particular action. In fact, in the majority of cases

the attack that the victim state can
is

willing to

deny victim

terrorists, it is

the identhe com-

only after

response. Therefore, unless one

states a consequential right of self-defense against

who

intend,

ther attacks against the victim.

of an isolated action that
of attacks.

its

(as

reasonable to interpret self-defense as permitting the use of

force against terrorists

ries

mount

it is

scene

Once

the

is

By

and have the

capability to,

this interpretation,

it is

fur-

not the imminency

relevant, but rather the relationship

first

conduct

between

a se-

of the related attacks has been launched, the

question becomes whether the victim state has sufficient reliable evidence to

conclude that further attacks are

likely,

themselves imminent.
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Self-Defense Against al

Qaeda

"Armed attacks" by terrorists. That the attacks of 9/11 were of sufficient "scale
and effects" to amount to an armed attack is tragically self-evident. However,
the self-defense operations launched against the al Qaeda terrorist network in
Afghanistan raise a number of other interesting issues. The first is whether an
"armed attack" can be carried out by a terrorist group or, stated conversely,
whether self-defense can be conducted against one.
Some commentators have suggested that until 9/11, the understanding oi
self-defense against an armed attack was essentially limited to aggression by
states. 76 But Article 51 makes no mention of the nature of the entity that must

mount

the attack that in turn permits a forceful response in self-defense. This

omission

is

particularly meaningful in light of the fact that Article 2(4)'s pro-

on the use of force specifically applies only to actions by Members of
the United Nations, all of which are states. That one key provision on the use

hibition

of force [2(4)] includes a reference to states, whereas another (51) does not,
implies that the latter was not

meant

to be so limited. This distinction

makes

The Charter was meant to govern state behavboth limits what states may do and empowers them.

sense in the Charter context.

but in doing so

ior,

Thus, in 2(4)

it

it

restricts a state's resort to force,

force in the face of armed attack.

It

but in 51 authorizes

would make no sense to

it

to use

limit the authori-

zation to attacks by states because at the time the Charter was drafted, that

was the greater
Article 39

is

threat.
similarly

devoid of reference to state action

Security Council with responsibility for deciding

when charging

on the measures

the

to take in

the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. In

the various resolutions regarding the events of 9/1

1

(and those resulting from

the Council characterized the situation as a threat to international peace

it),

and

security.

Moreover,

it

specifically

noted that as a general matter terrorism

constituted such a threat. While Article 39 does not directly address

defense and armed attacks, both

which

is

it

and Article 51

fall

self-

within Chapter VII,

entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of

the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Considering these related points vis-a-vis

76.

See,

Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
Law, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, available at http://

e.g.,

International

www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-cassese.html (Jun. 18, 2002). See also Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense
Was There an "Armed Attack"?, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum,
available at

http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html (Jun. 18, 2002).
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and 51,
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reasonable to conclude that the entire chapter deals

with actions that threaten international peace and security, whatever the
source.

Moreover,

recall that Security

Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which

both cited the inherent right of self-defense, were issued before the counterterrorist

campaign began and

at a

when

time

suspicion was focused

on an

in-

ternational terrorist group as the culprit. In particular, recall that Resolution

1368 passed the very day
sibility

that a state

after the attack,

when no one was discussing

may have been behind

the pos-

the actions. This indicates that the

Council's understanding of self-defense includes defending against armed attacks by non-state actors.

State practice in the aftermath of 9/1
self-defense to acts by non-state actors.

1

further supports the applicability of

No voices were raised claiming that ei-

ther the customary right of self-defense or Article 5
text of state actions.

such as

NATO's

On

1

was limited to the con-

the contrary, there were very visible illustrations,

invocation of Article

V for

the

first

time in

its

existence, of

an armed attack meriting actions in
self-defense; in no case was there any suggestion that the right was dependent
on identifying a state as the attacker. Lest there be any question on this point,
the fact that most states viewed 9/1

1

as

once the self-defense actions commenced against both
actor

on October

a state

and a non-state

7th, the dearth of controversy over using self-defense

against non-state actors persisted. 77 In fact, post-October 7th Security
cil

resolutions

went so

far as to

urge

member

Coun-

states to "root out terrorism, in

keeping with the Charter of the United Nations." 78
Necessity

and

the impact of

law enforcement

alternatives. It

is

interesting to

note that support for using force was widely evident despite the fact that a logical alternative to self-defense existed

the September

1

—

criminal law enforcement. 79 After

all,

1th terrorist acts constituted a variety of criminal offences un-

der the laws of a

number of

jurisdictions.

Because

it

allows for universal

Ambassador to the United Nations, who was acting as President oi the Security
Council, noted the unanimous support of the Council following the briefing on the United
States' and United Kingdom's operations in self-defense. Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N.
Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5.
78. S. C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2002); S. C. Res. 1386, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001); S. C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/1390/(2002). Specific reference was made to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network
77.

Ireland's

in the

79.

January resolution.

For a pre 9/11 discussion of the alternatives, and the appropriateness of each, see Walter

Gary Sharp, The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegemony or Impotence?,
J. INT'LL. 37(2000).
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jurisdiction, of particular significance

is

the offense of crimes against

human-

on the incident
(or analogous terrorist incidents) include, inter alia, the Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Tokyo Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Ter81
Although these treaties do not directly criminalize the acrorist Bombings.
ity.

80

Further, relevant international law instruments that bear

tions,

they often require criminalization at the domestic level and/or set forth

mutual law enforcement cooperation and extradition procedures. 82 Under

Act of

federal law, the acts violated certain sections of the Antiterrorism

1990

83

and the

US

statutes

implementing the Montreal Convention. 84 Of

course, specific elements of the attacks violated the criminal law of the
states (and the District of Columbia)

bitions

US

where they occurred, such

on murder and the various forms of accomplice

US

as the prohi-

participation.

A crime

against humanity involves the commission of certain acts, including murder and
inhumane acts
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health" when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
80.

"other

.

population."

Rome

.

.

Statute for the International Criminal Court,

art. 7.1, reprinted in

37 I.L.M.

999 (1998), M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 39 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm G un 18, 2002). Widespread consensus exists that the attacks of 9/11 constituted
crimes against humanity. For an analysis of its applicability to the 9/1 1 attacks, see Cassese, supra
-

note 76.

Hague Convention

81
1,

for the

Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,

art.

22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other

Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.

14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219;
Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. § 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 1, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 107.

On

the applicability, or difficulties thereof, of the treaties to the 9/11 attacks, see Arnold N.

Pronto,

Comment, ASIL INSIGHTS, Sep. 2001,

insigh77.htm (Jun.
82. Professor
this topic

is

available

at

http://www.asil.org/insights/

18, 2002).

M. Cherif Bassiouni has convincingly argued

that the international law governing

not comprehensive. "lG]overnments have avoided developing an international legal

regime to prevent, control, and suppress terrorism, preferring instead the hodgepodge of thirteen

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of
HARV. INT'L L. J. 83 (2002).

treaties that currently address its particular manifestations."

International Terrorism:

A Policy-Oriented Assessment,

43

Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq. (2000).
32 (2000). See Jordan J. Paust, Addendum: Prosecution

83. Antiterrorism
84.

18 U.S.C. §

Violations of International

Law and

Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims,

of Mr. bin Laden

ASIL INSIGHTS,

et al.

for

Sep. 21,

2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Jun. 18, 2002). Professor Paust also
discusses the possibility of civil suits against the perpetrators.
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apparent, therefore, that the international

community does not view

the applicability of a criminal law enforcement regime as precluding a re-

sponse in self-defense to an armed attack by
of law enforcement bears

on the

terrorists.

That

said, the

prospect

issue of whether particular acts of self-defense

are necessary. Recall that necessity requires an absence of reasonable alterna-

may

tives to the defensive use of force. In this context, then, the state

against the terrorists

if

classic

law enforcement reasonably appears unlikely to

net those expected to conduct further attacks before they do
careful here.

There

is

will fail; rather, the

timely
if

no

enough

to

armed

One must

be

for

requirement

that success not be expected to prove

head

force at

so.

no requirement
off a

is

an expectation that law enforcement

continuation of the terrorist campaign.

further attacks are anticipated, the necessity principle

sort to

only act

all,

since self-defense contains

no

Of course,

would preclude

re-

retributive element.

In this case, the necessity of resort to force was obvious despite the nearly

and apprehend members of the
al Qaeda network and prevent further attacks. Recall that al Qaeda had been
implicated in numerous prior acts of terrorism, most notably the 1998 East African embassy bombings, and was at the time of the 9/11 attacks already the
target of a massive international law enforcement effort. Nevertheless, law en-

global law enforcement effort to identify

forcement

failed to

hardly surprising. Al

which

cells

prevent the tragic events of September 11th. That

Qaeda

is

is

a shadowy, loose-knit terrorist organization in

operate with substantial autonomy from scores of countries.

complexity of coordinating law enforcement

The

efforts in the face of widely diver-

gent capabilities, domestic laws and national attitudes was daunting. Further,

Qaeda was headquartered

government
seemingly oblivious to international pressure to deny al Qaeda its main base of
operations. Simply put, there was no guarantee that even a law enforcement
effort that was proving successful against much of the organization could effectively eradicate the threat of another major attack. At the same time, aggressively attacking the senior leadership and denying it a base of operations
promised great returns in alleviating the threat, far greater than would likely
al

in Afghanistan, then ruled by a

be realized by law enforcement in a comparable period.

membered

that the clock was ticking.

As

And

it

the United States and

must be
its

re-

coalition

partners planned their response, warnings of imminent attacks flowed through
intelligence channels with great frequency.

The second core requirement of self-defense, that of proportionality, also limits when a state may resort to self-defense in responding to a
terrorist act. Whereas necessity asks whether the use of force is appropriate,
proportionality asks how much may be applied.
Proportionality.
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Like necessity, proportionality

ment

activities.

Even

if

armed

affected by the prospect of law enforce-

is

force

is

necessary, the extent of that force

be diminished by on-going or future law enforcement
terrorist operations,

law enforcement and military force can act synergisti-

terrorist cells

within an organization

may

in the aftermath of 9/1

1.

of

lessen the extent (number, location,

of military strikes that need to be conducted. That

pened

number

nature). For instance, law enforcement disruption of a

its

etc.)

counter-

thereby reducing the level of force that needs to be applied (and affect-

cally,

ing

activities. In

may

Thousands of potential

is

exactly

terrorists

what hap-

were arrested

or detained worldwide, thereby dramatically reducing the need to resort to
force in countering future terrorism.

Were

the strikes against

al

Qaeda

proportionate, particularly in light of the

extensive parallel law enforcement campaign? Clearly, they were. Al
forces in Afghanistan

numbered

in the

Qaeda

thousands and were widely dispersed.

Moreover, to be disproportionate, the use of force would have had to be exces-

needed

sive in relation to the degree of force actually

of

al

the

Qaeda's

field,

terrorist

campaign. As of June 2002,

al

to prevent continuation

Qaeda

forces

remain in

periodically engaging coalition forces, albeit in small unit fashion.

Further, intelligence sources have reported that mid-level al

Qaeda

operatives

have pulled the organization back together again and are forging alliances
with other terrorist groups.

The

organization reportedly

"is as

capable of plan-

ning and carrying out potent attacks on U.S. targets as the more centralized

network once led by Osama bin Laden." 85 So, despite the success of international law

enforcement and military

threat, continuing to operate

group

may have been

That

said,

from bases in

gravely wounded, but

contend the wounds are

Qaeda remains a very viable
any number of countries. The

efforts, al

it

would be highly premature

to

fatal.

the increasing effectiveness of international counter-terrorist

law enforcement efforts and the fact that the fight
outside the borders oi Afghanistan
tionality of future military efforts.

do

may now need

to be taken

raise questions regarding the propor-

Using an extreme example

for the sake of

il-

one might question the proportionality of a large scale military
operation mounted into an uncooperative state which refuses to hand over a
small number of low-level operatives. The action might be necessary in the
sense that diplomacy and law enforcement offered slim prospects of taking
lustration,

85.
17,

David Johnson
2002, at

et

al.,

Qaeda

Lieutenants

Form Terror Alliance, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June

1.
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them out of the terrorist network, but the extent of the use of force would appear to be more than reasonably required to accomplish the objective.
Imminency. As noted above, it would make little sense to evaluate each terrorist attack individually in every case. Doing so would deny the reality that
most

conflict,

even conventional

ments, with contact repeatedly
ations

may be

it

conflict

between

states,

is

a series of engage-

made and broken. This being

so, in

many

situ-

reasonable to conclude that an attack was merely the opening

shot in an overall campaign that in

itself

constitutes a single on-going

armed

attack.

That

is

exactly the case with regard to the 9/1

involved in terrorism against

US

life

and

injury.

hiatus between attacks, they did occur with
it is

achieving

its

absurd to suggest

most

al

attacks.

Al Qaeda had been

assets for a decade, terrorism that resulted in

extensive property damage, loss of

record,

1

Although there was often

some

regularity. In light of this

Qaeda would terminate

significant victory; logic

would impel

clusion. Additionally, not only did al Qaeda's

own

a

the campaign after

just the opposite con-

statements style continued

one of the organization's central objectives, withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Islamic territory, remained unfulfilled.
Since 9/11, multiple al Qaeda related plots have been uncovered or foiled,
attacks as a religious duty,

most recently that involving use of a "dirty (radiological) bomb" against a US
population center. 86 Thus, it is not necessary to speculate on whether further
attacks were likely

main

and imminent on October

7th; they clearly

were (and

re-

so).

Cross-border counter -terrorist operations. While

it

is

appropriate to extend

committed by non state actors, and though the availability
of criminal law enforcement responses does not preclude doing so, since nonstate actors possess no territory as a matter of international law (they may in
fact), can the victim state enter another state's territory in order to conduct
self-defense operations? The answer requires balancing the rights and duties
of the respective states involved. The state in which the terrorists are located
self-defense to acts

has a right of territorial integrity. This well-established customary international law right creates corresponding duties in other states. For instance, Article 2(4)

of the

UN

"territorial integrity

86.

On

... of any State." 87 Commentators generally agree that

the continuing operations of the organization, see David Johnston et

Links Increase Threats
87.

Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the

U.N. CHARTER,

From Far-Flung

Sites,

N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at

2(4).
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the prohibition extends to any non-consensual penetration of a state's

not simply those intended to seize parts of that

tory,

ance may amount to an act of aggression.

However, the

terri-

Non-compli-

89

No

state victimized by terrorism has a right to self-defense.

one would dispute that a state forfeits
rity when it commits acts that vest the
least to the

territory.

88

a degree of

right to territorial integ-

its

right to self-defense in

another

state, at

extent necessary for self-defense to be meaningful. Thus, an armed

attack by state

A may justify the crossing of state B's military forces into state

A to put an end to the attack.
Lest the right to self-defense be rendered

empty

in the face of terrorism, in

must

yield to that of

when

the acts of ter-

certain circumstances the principle of territorial integrity
self-defense against terrorists. Putting aside the issue of

may be

rorists

ascribed to a state, thereby justifying self-defense directly

against that state, the balancing of self-defense

and

pends on the extent to which the state in which the
complied with

is

its

own

territorial integrity de-

terrorists are located

has

responsibilities vis-a-vis the terrorists.

As John Basset Moore noted in the Lotus case, "it is well settled that a State
bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions

of criminal acts against another nation or

its

people.

." 90
.

.

This principle has

numerous pronouncements on terrorism. For instance, the
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations urges each state to "refrain

been reflected
from

88.

.

.

.

in

acquiescing in organized activities within

its

territory directed

Randelzhoffer, Article 2(4), supra note 42, at 117. See also Declaration

International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

Every State has a duty to refrain in

its

on

toward

Principles of

Among

States

in

international relations from the threat or use of

force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any

state, or in

any

other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or
use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United

Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N.
65

AM.

J.

INT'L

L.

GAOR,

243 (1971) and

in

25th

Sess., anx,

issues.

U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 (1970),

reprinted in

KEY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL

ASSEMBLY, 1946-1996 (Dietrich Rauschning, Katja Wiesbrock & Martin Lailach eds., 1997), at
3 [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. The resolution was adopted by acclamation.
89. Aggression is the use of "armed force by a State against the
territorial integrity ... of
another State." Definition of Aggression, anx, art. 1, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'L 710 (1974).
Additionally, pursuant to Article 3, aggression includes "[t]he invasion or attack by the armed
.

forces of a State of the territory of another State.
90.

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.)

1927

P.C.I.J. (ser.

.

."
.

.

A) No.

39

.

10, at 4,

88 (Moore,

J.,

dissenting).
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the commission of [terrorist acts in another state]," 91 a proscription echoed in

on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism. 92 In the context of
recall the 1999, 2000 and 2001 Security Council resolutions

the 1994 Declaration

the instant case,

condemning the Taliban's
used by al Qaeda.
Should

a state

victim state
rorists are

is

be unable or unwilling to comply with

this obligation, the

then permitted to enter the territory of the state where the

ter-

located for the limited purpose of conducting self-defense opera-

tions against them. This
state

willingness to allow territory they controlled to be

is

A to comply with the

be deemed to deprive state

only logical, since the unwillingness or inability of

requirements of international law cannot possibly

B

of

its

authority to defend

itself

against an

armed

attack, the seminal right of the state-centric international normative archi-

Of course,

tecture.

all

requirements of self-defense must be met. There must

be an on-going armed attack (or armed campaign), no reasonable alternative
to the penetration of state A's territory for the purpose of using force against

the terrorists can exist, and the force used has to be limited to that necessary
to accomplish the defensive objectives.
state

Once

B must immediately withdraw because

self-defense to justify

its

at that point there

obligation to deny use of

its

A takes

no

right of

self-defense operations, as state

if,

actions that comply with

territory to terrorists, state B's right of self-

defense will diminish accordingly. Finally, state

B

is

A may not interfere

with the

simply exercising a right under interna-

tional law. Since state B's use of force

is

lawful,

any other

state's use

of force

93

would constitute an "armed attack."
In fact, there have been numerous instances of

against

is

"violation" of state A's territorial integrity. Further

during the self-defense operations, state
its

those objectives are attained,

it

states exercising this self-

help right of self-defense. In the aftermath of the coalition operations against

91.

Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 88.

92.

Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N.

GAOR 6th Comm.,

49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/743 (1994); Declaration to
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
51/210, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/631 (1996).
93. Professor Robert Turner perceptively offered an analysis along these lines in the aftermath of
the September 11th attacks. Robert F. Turner, International Law And The Use Of Force In
Response To The World Trade Center And Pentagon Attacks, JURIST, available at http://
jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).

Guy

B. Roberts, Self-Help in

Reprisals,

19

CASE W.

RES.

Combating Terrorism, 25
Territorial

On

the subject of self-help, see also

Combating state-Sponsored Terrorism:
J.

INT'L L. 243 (1987); Franz

COLUM.

J.

TRANSNATL

L.

Self Defense

and Peacetime

Paasche, The Use of Force

in

377 (1987); Oscar Schachter, The ExtraJ. INT'L L. 309 (1989).

Use of Force against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS.

40

W.

Michael Schmitt

al

US

Qaeda, the most often cited has been

General John Pershing's unsuc-

Pancho Villa and his bandits killed 18
Americans in New Mexico. At the time, Mexico was in the midst of a revolution and, thus, incapable of effectively controlling Villa. Note that the Mexican government asked the US forces to withdraw three months after they
entered Mexican territory, a demand refused on the basis of Mexico's inability
to police Villa. Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict, the United States conducted aerial and ground attacks against enemy forces that had sought refuge
in Cambodia. Although criticized widely, such criticism was arguably more the
1916 foray into Mexico

cessful

after

product of general anti-war fervor, than concern over the legality of the operations. 94 In

another example,

Israel

conducted

Tunisia during 1985 on the grounds that the
operations for terrorist attacks

on

Israel

airstrikes against

PLO facilities in

PLO was using Tunisia as a base of

—with the acquiescence of the Tunisian

government. 95 The Security Council, with the United States abstaining, con-

demned

armed aggression perpetrated by

the bombings as an "act oi

Israel

against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United
tions, international

law and norms of conduct" in a 14-0 vote.

Na-

96

cern centered on the alleged violation of international law or

Whether conon the fact that

the operation posed a "threat to the peace and security in the Mediterranean
region" 97 (and

on general

hostility to Israel)

Political unacceptability instead of

remains an open question.

normative concern also drove most

in-

ternational criticism of South Africa's operations against African National

Congress groups based in Angola during the 1970s. 98 Similarly, the international

community was unsupportive

as

Turkey mounted regular incursions

into Northern Iraq against Kurdish terrorists throughout the 1990s.

South African

case, opposition arguably

was driven by

At

legal acceptability of crossing into Iraq.

concern over violation of

94.

On

in

Cambodian

the

Incursion,

ARIZ.

1 1

Cambodia

in

J.

the

incursions, see

INT'L

&COMP. L. 215

INTERNATIONAL

LAW
in

S.

97.

Id.

at

86-7 (Oct.

4,

C. Res. 573, U.N.

98. See

W.

than the

factors other

integrity,

as

Iraqi

forces

and

Timothy Guiden, Defending Americas Cambodian
(1994) John Fried, United States Military Intervention
;

Law, reprinted

in

3

THE VIETNAM

COLUM.

Law and

WAR AND

Military Operations

REV. 1127 (1968).
Ambassador to the UN, Benjamin Netanyahu, U.N. Doc. S/
L.

1985).

SCOR, 40th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc S/573/(1985).

Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses

53 (1999) G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N.
Res/45/150 (1990).
;

in the

the time there was de minimus

100 (Richard Falk, ed. 1972); International

Neutral Territories, 68

95. See statement of [then] Israeli

96.

territorial

Light of International

Against Insurgents

PV.2615,

Iraq's

As

to Terrorism,

22 HOUS.

J.

INT'L L.

3,

GAOR, 3d Comm., 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
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government

officials

Law

were already excluded from the area due to their suppres-

sion of the Kurds. Rather, criticism most likely derived from irritation over interference with the relief and no-fly operations in northern Iraq" and concern

over a track record of
military operations

Most

human

conducted

in Southeastern

Turkey.

United States launched raids on

recently, the

Kurds during Turkish

rights abuses against the

100

terrorist facilities in Af-

ghanistan and Sudan following the 1998 bombings of the

US

embassies in

101

Although the cruise missile strike against the al
Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (it was allegedly involved in chemical
weapons production) was criticized, most censure surrounded the alleged invalidity of the claim of a connection between the plant and international terrorism, not the violation of Sudanese territory; 102 the attacks against al Qaeda
training bases in Afghanistan evoked little condemnation. Nor did the 1999
pursuit of Hutu guerrillas in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Ugandan
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.

forces following a massacre of foreign tourists, 103 although the internationalization of the conflict did

draw international concern and resulted

patch of a peacekeeping force by the Security Council.

Of

on the

greatest normative relevance

terrorist operations

is

in the dis-

104

issue of cross-border counter-

the famous Caroline incident cited above in regard to

the core requirements of self-defense. 105 Recall the facts. In 1837 a rebellion

Canada against the British. Some of the rebels were based in
the United States. The British attempted to negotiate with the American
side, in particular the Governor of New York, to no avail. At that point they
was underway

99.

First

in

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,

advocate of the operations during
100. See,

e.g.,

available at

later

NORTHERN WATCH. The author was staff judge

this period.

Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on

Human Rights

Practices: Turkey,

http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/turkey.html Qun.

18, 2002).

101.

Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to

Terrorism:

The

Strikes

Against bin Laden, 24

559 (1999); Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism:
Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067 (2000).
102.

On

YALE J.

INT'L

L

of the Decision to

the confusion surrounding whether the facility was involved in terrorist activities, see

Vernon Loeb,
Tests,

A Legal Analysis

U.S. Wasn't Sure Plant

WASH. POST, Aug.

Had Nerve Gas

21, 1999, at

Role; Before

Sudan

Strike,

CIA Urged More

Al.

103. Reisman, supra note 98, at 54.
104. In S. C. Res.

1291, U.N.

SCOR, 55th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/l 29 1/(2000), the Council

authorized the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

For details and background, see http://www.un.org/Oepts/dpko/monuc/monuc_body.htm (Jun.
18,

2002).

On the Caroline incident in the context of the issue at hand, see Reisman, supra note 98, at
42^7. On the facts, see R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L 82 (1938).
105.
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mounted

a small raid (80

men)

and

Caroline, a vessel used by the rebels

ablaze

and sent over Niagara

The

where they seized the
supporters. The ship was set

into the United States
their

Falls.

incident generated a fascinating correspondence over the next several

and the United States Department of
State. The issue in dispute, though, was not whether the British could legitimately cross into the United States for the limited purpose of attacking the rebels. Instead, controversy focused on the circumstances permitting them to do
years

between the

so and how.
terpart,

I

British Foreign Office

As Lord Ashburton, the Foreign

Minister, wrote to his

US

coun-

Daniel Webster:

might

safely

put

it

to

any candid man, acquainted with the existing state of

whether the military commander in Canada had the remotest
on the 29th day of December, to expect to be relieved from this state of
suffering by the protective intervention of any American authority. How long
could a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting its own people,
be reasonably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to expect? 106
things, to say

reason,

Ashburton's premise that crossing the border was proper in the absence of effective action by the authorities

lenged, with

Webster simply

where the

STATE PAPERS
107.

Ashburton

were based went unchal-

asserting that the action

particular circumstances of the case.

106. Letter from Lord

rebels

to Daniel

had been excessive

in the

107

Webster Ouly

28, 1842),

30 BRITISH

AND FOREIGN

195.

A necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment

for deliberation. It will

be for

it

to show, also, that the local authorities of

Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of The
act, justified

United States

at

all,

did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the

by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept

clearly within

it.

It

must be shown that admonition or remonstrance

board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing;

on
must be shown

to the persons
it

no attempt at discrimination
would not have been enough to seize and
detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking
her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men
were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her into the
current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there
might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead,
committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for all this,
that day-light could not be waited for; that there could be

between the innocent and the

the

guilty; that

Government of The United

it

States cannot believe to have existed.

Jennings, supra note 105, at 89 (quoting Daniel Webster).
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Therefore, quite aside from the trinity of self-defense

criteria,

Law
Caroline sup-

ports the principle that a state suffering attack from non-state actors in another

may,

after seeking assistance

from that state (assuming the requested state

capable of doing so), enter

its

ther attacks, although

actions

its

purpose of preventing

territory for the limited

is

fur-

must be necessary and proportional. State

practice seems guardedly consistent. Objections to such limited cases as have

occurred are usually attributable to
course, in fairness, the

cism

when

political, vice

same could be

Of

said regarding the relative absence of criti-

penetrating the territory of ostracized states, such as Afghanistan, in

operations against organizations which enjoy

members of the
tation,

normative, motivations.

no consequential support from

international community, such as

however,

is

al

Qaeda. The better interpre-

that, as a general matter, state practice,

beginning with the

Caroline case, supports the approach posited.

Do US and

coalition operations in Afghanistan

comport with

this stan-

dard? Recall the Security Council's pre and post 9/11 demands that the

Taliban cease allowing territory they controlled to be used as a

and that they cooperate
Recall also the

in bringing

US demands

Laden and other

al

Qaeda

Osama bin Laden and

al

terrorist base

Qaeda

to justice.

that the Taliban unconditionally surrender bin

leaders

and grant the United States

sufficient ac-

cess to terrorist bases to ensure their inoperability. In reply, the Taliban re-

gime

first
108

stated

As

it

wished to see the evidence linking bin Laden to the 9/1

US

drew closer, the Taliban indicated
that they had Osama bin Laden and might be willing to negotiate, possibly
about turning him over to a third country. The United States again stated that
only an unconditional surrender of bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders
would suffice. 109 After the coalition attacks commenced, the Taliban renewed
the offer. However, the US administration maintained its no-negotiation
attacks.

the likelihood of

strikes

stance. 110

Were
cient?

It

the

US

demands, particularly

in that they

might be argued that no demand

at all

were unconditional,

was necessary,

for

suffi-

on multiple

occasions the Security Council had insisted that the Taliban comply with the

Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 244. The situation caused divisions
within the Taliban and Afghan religious leadership. Clearly, unanimity did not exist as to how to
respond to the US demands. John F. Burns, Afghans Coaxing bin Laden, But VS. Rejects Clerics'
Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2001, at Al.
109. Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 244.
1 10. Elisabeth Bumiller, President Rejects Offer By Taliban For Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2001, at Al.
108.
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measures sought by the United States. Consider,

unambiguous language

in Security

[The Security Council] Demands

.

for instance, the following

Council Resolution 1333 (2000):
.

.

that the Taliban comply without further

(1999) that

demand of the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1267
requires the Taliban to turn over Usama bin Laden to appropriate

authorities

in

delay with the

country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate

a

authorities in a country

where he

will

be returned to such a country, or to

appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively

brought to

justice;

Demands further

all

camps where

and

calls for the

that the Taliban should act swiftly to close up

within the territory under

terrorists are trained

control,

its

confirmation of such closures by the United Nations, inter

alia, through
United Nations by Member States in
accordance with paragraph 19 below and through such other means as are
necessary to assure compliance with this resolution.

information

made

available to the

.

.

.

m

Extended non-compliance with the Security Council demands arguably
provided a good faith basis for determining that further exhortations would
prove fruitless. However, the Council's insistence was made in the context of
cooperative law enforcement (albeit in the face of a threat to international
peace and security) rather than self-defense. Therefore, the most defensible
position is that while non-compliance strengthened the political case for action by the Security Council under Chapter VII, a separate demand was required for action by a state pursuant to the right to self-defense.

As

made one. Unconditionally was certainly reasonable in the circumstances. The United States had just suffered a horrendous terrorist attack, with every reason to believe more were imminent. The
Taliban request for evidence oi al Qaeda's complicity might have made sense
noted, the United States

but for the previous Security Council resolutions, which clearly rendered the
request superfluous. Moreover, the United States government, which had

been conducting
al

Qaeda

sibility for

had previously provided evidence of al Qaeda responthe 1998 bombings of the two US embassies in East Africa
at the re-

in Afghanistan,

quest of Taliban
talks,

with the Taliban since 1996 over the presence oi

talks

—

officials.

had no discernible

112

The

affect

provision of that evidence, and the continuing

on the Taliban's continued harboring of the

rorist organization.

111. S. C. Res. 1333,
112.

U.N.

SCOR,

UK Press Release, supra

note

55th

Sess.,

9, at paras.

U.N. Doc. S/1333/(2000).
14-15.
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Additionally, unless the Taliban regime controlled

which

it

did not, post 9/1

dow of vulnerability

1

for the

Law

in International

al

Qaeda

absolutely,

negotiations would merely have extended the win-

United States.

If

the right to self-defense was to be

meaningful in these circumstances, the United States needed to act as quickly
as possible.

This meant that either the Taliban should have complied with the

demands promptly
stood aside as

acknowledged they lacked the capability
the United States entered Afghanistan to engage
or

to
al

do so and
Qaeda.

In other words, the adequacy of a request to the state in which terrorists are
located, as well as the sufficiency of the response thereto,

contextually.

Have

there been prior requests? For what.

7

must be assessed

What

is

the nature of

between the requesting and requested state. Between the terrorist
group and the state in which it is located What capability does the requested
state have to counter or control the terrorists 7 What is its track record in doing so 7 What are the nature and the imminency of the threat by the terrorists
7

relations

7

Under the circumstances, the US

against the requesting state 7

decision to at-

Qaeda on October 7th, despite Taliban quibbling over the US
turn over members of the organization, was reasonable and

tack
to

al

request
legally

defensible.

which it is unquestionable that one
state can enter the territory of another to conduct defensive counter- terrorist
operations. The first is upon invitation, though any such operation would
have to comply with the relevant provisions of human rights and humanitarian law, as well as any conditions imposed by the host state. 113 Obviously, that
There are two other circumstances

in

did not occur in the case of Afghanistan.

which the

terrorist

More problematic

is

the situation in

group acts on behalf of the state such that

be deemed those of the state

itself.

As

in traditional

its

attacks can

armed attacks by

a state

actor, the sole question regarding the penetration of the attacker's territory

whether cross-border operations are necessary, proportional and

is

in response

an armed attack. To the extent the state could be attacked in self-defense,
so too can the terrorist group that actually executed the armed attack. The isto

sue of Taliban support for

al

Qaeda

is

Summarized, the campaign against

considered in the following section.
al

Qaeda

in

Afghanistan

is

a legitimate

and collective self-defense. The right extends to armed attacks from whatever source, the 9/1 1 attacks met the threshold requirement of being "armed," crossing into Afghanistan was appropriate
exercise of the right to individual

113.

On

the conduct of forces in another country, see

VISITING FORCES (Dieter Fleck

ed.,

2001).
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once the Taliban

failed to police the territory they controlled, the attacks

were necessary and proportionate, and they occurred in the face of an immi-

Qaeda campaign

nent, credible continuation of an al
for a period

measured

that had been underway

in years.

Operations Against the Taliban
In his address to a Joint Session of Congress

ominous warning that

uttered his
terrorists.

From

this

"[ejither

on 20 September, President Bush

you are with

us, or

you are with the

day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or sup-

port terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." 114

When the

attacks began, the United States cited the Taliban's decision to "al-

low the parts of Afghanistan that

it

controls to be used by

[al

Qaeda]

as a base

of operation," a policy which the Taliban refused to alter despite repeated en-

do

treaties to

so, as justification for their actions.

115

It

should be noted that in

June 2001 the United States had already warned the Taliban regime that

would be held responsible
was sheltering.

any

for

terrorist acts

committed by

terrorists that

it
it

116

The United Kingdom has

released the most extensive information to date

regarding the relationship between

al

Qaeda and the

Taliban. 117 Al

provided troops, weapons and financing to the Taliban for

Northern Alliance. The organization was

its

Qaeda

conflict with the

also reportedly involved in the plan-

ning and execution oi Taliban operations, assisted in training Taliban forces,

and had representatives assigned to the Taliban command and control structure. Additionally, al Qaeda was a source of "infrastructure assistance and humanitarian aid." 118 In return, the Taliban granted
base for

do

as

it

its

terrorist training

camps;

essentially, al

Qaeda safe haven and a
Qaeda enjoyed free rein to
al

pleased in Taliban controlled territory. Further, the two groups coop-

erated closely in the drug trade, with the Taliban providing security for
al

Qaeda's drug stockpiles. 119

114. President

George

W.

Was

this relationship

such that conducting

Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, supra note

16, at

1349.
115.

US

116.

UK Press

117. See

10
14,

Letter, supra note 22.

id.

Release, supra note

9,

para. 16.

generally. See also the update to the

Downing

Street

Newsroom,

UK press release. United Kingdom Press Release,

Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States,

2001, available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId = 3025 Gun. 18, 2002).

118.

UK Press

119.

Id.,

Release, supra note 9, para. 12.

para. 13.
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Law

on October 7th was a legitimate exercise of the use of force by the United States and United Kingdom?
State Responsibility. Unfortunately, there has been much confusion surrounding the relationship between Taliban obligations and the attacks
mounted against them on October 7th. In the discussion of self-defense
against al Qaeda, it was noted that the Taliban had a duty to keep their territory from being used as a base of terrorist operations. Failure to comply with
that duty in part justified penetrating Afghan territory when attacking al
Qaeda, albeit only to conduct operations against al Qaeda. If the Taliban were
incapable of stopping al Qaeda, then they would incur no responsibility for
military operations against the Taliban

their failure to address the situation.

On the other hand,
ble for their failure

if

capable, but unwilling, the Taliban would be responsi-

under the international law of state

duty to desist from assisting
eral

Assembly articulated

terrorists in

this

any way

is

responsibility. 120

manifest. In 1996 the

The

Gen-

duty in the Declaration on the Strengthening of

International Security. Specifically,
States, guided by the purposes

it

stated that:

and principles of the Charter o( the United

Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of

other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their
territories directed

In doing

so,

Declaration

120.

it

122

towards the commission of such

acts.

121

echoed earlier exhortations in the 1970 Friendly Relations
and its 1965 progenitor, Resolution 2131 (1965). 123 Similar

On the issue of state responsibility, see Gregory Townsend, State Responsibility for Acts ofDe

Facto Agents, 14 ARIZ.
Activities of

121. Declaration

GAOR,

J.

& COMP. L. 635 (1997); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the
& COMP. L. QTRLY 712 (1958).

INT'L

Bands, 7 INT'L

on Measures

6th Comm., 49th

to Eliminate International Terrorism,

G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N.

84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/743 (1994); Declaration to
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.

51/210, U.N.

GAOR,

Sess.,

6th Comm., 51st

Sess.,

88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/631 (1996).

122. "Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within
territory directed

towards the commission of such

acts,

when

its

the acts referred to in the present

paragraph involve a threat or use of force." Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 88,
prin. 1.

123.

"No

armed

state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist or

activities directed

2131, U.N.

GAOR,

20th

toward the violent overthrow of another regime.
Sess.,

Supp. No.

14, at

48

.

.

."

G.A. Resolution

107, U.N. Doc. A/6221 (1965).
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prohibitions can be found in Article 2(4) of the International

1954 Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Man-

sion's

kind.

Law Commis-

124

Case law supports these declarations. Most notably, in the Corfu Channel
case the International Court of Justice held that "every State has an obligation to not knowingly allow
rights of other States."

125

British destroyers struck
Strait in 1946.

Albanians

Though

laid the

its

territory to

be used in a manner contrary to the

Corfu Channel involved an incident in which two

mines in Albanian waters while transiting the Corfu

the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the

mines, the Court nevertheless held that they had the obli-

gation to notify shipping of the danger posed by the mines. Albania's failure to

do so represented an internationally wrongful act entailing the international
responsibility of Albania. Other case law and arbitral decisions are in accord. 126

Applying the Corfu Channel principle to the case of terrorism, states that
permit their territory to be used as a base of operations for terrorist acts against

no question
to be used by al Qaeda,

other countries have committed an international wrong. There

Afghan

that Taliban acquiescence in allowing

124.

The

territory

is

encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a
State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the
territory of another state, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own
territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of
organization, or the

operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as
well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.

Draft

Code

of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,

www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offfra.htm
125. Corfu

Channel Case

(Merits),

G un
1949

-

art. 2(4), available at http://

18, 2002).
I.C.J.

Rep.

4, 22.

JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 77-85
(2002). Article 2 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility
126. See

discussion

in

(adopted by the Commission in 2001) provides that "There

when conduct

is

an internationally wrongful act of a
is attributable to the State under

an act or omission: (a)
an international obligation of the State."
International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in id. at 61. These
elements have been articulated in a number of tribunals. Among those referenced specifically by
Professor Crawford are: Phosphates in Morocco, Preliminary Objections, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/
B, No. 74, p. 10; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.
3; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 14, 117-118, para. 226; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary /Slovakia),

State

consisting of

international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of

I.C.J.

Reports 1997,

p. 7, 54, para. 78.
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assuming arguendo that their conduct
stan, 127 created responsibility

is

in International

Law

attributable to the "State" of Afghani-

under international law

for that

wrongful

act.

Does this responsibility justify the October 7th attacks by the United States
and the United Kingdom?
Despite occasionally loose discussion of the subject in the aftermath of 9/

an international wrong does not
the use of force in self-help to remedy the wrong. Traditional repara-

11, the existence of state responsibility for
justify

tions for

an international wrong come

or satisfaction.

128

It is

in the

form of restitution, compensation

also permissible to take

an internationally wrongful
would otherwise be contrary

act.

129

countermeasures in response to

Countermeasures are "measures which

to the international obligations of the injured

State vis-a-vis the responsible State

if

they were not taken by the former in re-

sponse to an internationally wrongful act by the
sation

and reparation."

on-going wrong,
fered,

132

and

obligations

But

it is

133

131

130

latter in order to

Various requirements, such as the existence of an

proportionality oi the countermeasure to the injury suf-

a call

on the

committing the wrong to comply with

state

generally agreed that countermeasures employing

on

from the threat or use of force

127.

as

embodied

to the

ILC

Articles

on State

.

in the

This provision tracks the holding in

The Commentary

armed

force are

State Responsibility specifically

provides that "Countermeasures shall not affect

tions."

its

apply to the taking of countermeasures.

prohibited. 134 Article 50 of the Articles

135

procure ces-

.

.

the obligation to refrain

Charter of the United NaCorfu Channel. There the

Responsibility describes a "state" as "a real

organized entity, a legal person to act under international law." Crawford, supra note 126, at 82

commentary to art. 2).
on State Responsibility, supra note 126, arts. 34-37. Restitution is reestablishing
"the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed" (art. 35); compensation is
covering any financially assessable damage not made good by restitution (art. 36); satisfaction is
"an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another
appropriate modality" that responds to shortfalls in restitution and compensation when making
(para. 5 of

128. Articles

good the injury caused
129.

Id., art.

(art.

37).

49.1.

130. Crawford, supra note 126, at 281.

131. Articles

on State

132.

Id., art.

51.

133.

Id., art.

52.1.

Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 52.3(a).

134. Certain countermeasures employing force are permissible.

agents into a state to apprehend a terrorist

who

An

example would be sending

that state wrongfully refused to extradite.

Mary

Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Responses to Terrorism, JURIST, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/

forum/forumnew30.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
135. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126,

50

art.

50.1(a).
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International Court of Justice held that Albania's failure to comply with
sponsibility did not justify the British

minesweeping of the

Strait,

its re-

an act that

therefore constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty. Thus, breach of the
obligation not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorist activities

did not, alone, justify use of force against the Taliban.

An
al

Qaeda

in

whether the actions of
(and other) attacks can be attributed to the

would apply

identical analysis

conducting the 9/1

1

in assessing

Taliban under the law of state responsibility.

The

International

Law Commis-

sion's Articles

on State

armed group's

acts to a state for the purpose of assessing state responsibility.

Two

Responsibility set forth the standards for imputing an

are relevant here.

Article 8 provides that the "conduct of a person or group shall be consid-

ered an act of a State under international law
is

in fact acting

on the

if

the person or group of persons

instructions of, or under the direction or control

that State in carrying out the conduct."

136

of,

This was the issue in the Nicaragua

where Nicaragua argued that the United States was responsible under
international law for violations of humanitarian law committed by the
Contras, the anti-Sandinista rebel group it supported. After finding that the
United States had provided "subsidies and other support", the Court held
case,

that:

United States participation, even

if preponderant or decisive in the financing,
and equipping of the contras, the selection of its
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is
still insufficient in itself, ... for the purpose of attributing to the United States
the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation
mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent state over a
force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean,
without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged
by the applicant State.
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of
the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed. 137

organizing, training, supplying

.

.

.

Aside from the Contras, certain individuals, not of

US

nationality,

were

paid by the United States and directly instructed and supervised by

136.

Id., art. 8.

137. Nicaragua, supra note 60, para. 115.
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and intelligence personnel. For instance, they carried out such operations as mining Nicaraguan ports. The Court easily found their actions imputable to the United States, either because they were paid and instructed by the
US, and were therefore agents thereof, or because US personnel had "participated in the planning, direction, support and execution" of particular operamilitary

tions. 138

The evidence released to date regarding Taliban ties to al Qaeda does not
suggest that al Qaeda was under the direction or control of the Taliban in conducting the 9/1

attacks or any other acts of international terrorism. In fact,

1

—

some have suggested precisely the opposite that it was the Taliban that was
dependent on al Qaeda, both financially and militarily. While that may be a
more accurate characterization, such dependency bears little direct connection to al Qaeda's international terrorist campaign.
Article 11 sets forth a second possibly relevant standard.

"[c]onduct which

is

It

provides that

not attributable tp a State under the preceding

articles shall

nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law

the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct as

its

and

to

own."

139

if

This principle lay at the core of the International Court of Justice's Diplomatic

and Consular Staff case. 140 There the Court held that the Iranian government
olated

US

1979 seizure by militant students of the

responsibility to prevent the

its

Embassy in Tehran and subsequently

promptly in ending the seizure.

141

vi-

failed to

meet

its

obligation to act

Following the takeover, the Iranian govern-

Khomeni, expressed approval of the
student actions. Indeed, in a decree issued within two weeks of the seizure,
Khomeni declared that "the hostages would remain as they were until the U.S.
had handed over the former Shah for trial" and that "the noble Iranian nation
until the American Government acts
will not give permission for the release
142
For the International Court of Justice,
according to the wish of the nation."
ment, including

its

leader, the Ayatollah

.

.

.

"[t]he approval given ... by the Ayatollah

nian

state,

tion of the
138.

Id.,

Khomeni and other organs of the

Ira-

and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupa-

Embassy and detention of the hostages into

acts of that State." 143

para. 86.

139. Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 11.
140. United States Diplomatic

and Consular

Staff in

Tehran

(Iran v.

USA), 1980

I.C.J. 3.

141. According to the court, Iranian authorities were "fully aware of their obligations to protect

the premises of the U.S. Embassy and
the

means

Id.,

para. 68.

at their disposal to

142.

Id.,

para. 73.

143.

Id.,

para. 74.

its

diplomatic and consular staff from any attack [,]... had

perform their obligations
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[but,]

.

.

.

completely failed to comply."
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Therefore, while the Iranian government breached

Embassy was taken,

it

became responsible

continuing occupation thereof)

own obligations when the

its

for the seizure itself (or at least the

when it supported

the student actions and took

steps to continue the occupation.

Are the Taliban

responsible for the 9/1

tribution of state responsibility?

The

1

attacks under the principle of at-

level of Taliban support falls far

that of the Iranian government in the

Embassy

case.

It

below

did not express open

and public support for the attacks, nor did it ever assume control of the terrorist campaign in the way that the Iranian government took control over release
of the US hostages. Further, although its military did conduct combat operations against US and coalition forces in concert with al Qaeda, that was only
after October 7th, following air attacks on its own facilities and personnel.
By either of these two standards of state responsibility, it is difficult to attribute al Qaeda's terrorist attacks to the Taliban. That said, any such assessment is
fact-dependant; unfortunately,
al

Qaeda and

ever,

many

is

in discussions over the state responsibility of

that the existence of responsibility in the general sense

tion quite distinct from that of whether an

The

principles of state responsibility determine

responsible for an act
as noted, forcible

when

is

a state

a very fine

may be

held

countermeasures are not an acceptable remedy for violations
is

so whether the issue

or being responsible for an act

is

harboring a terrorist group

committed by one.

Nevertheless, certain acts that generate state responsibility
justify a violent response.

impermissible to

a ques-

and thus subject to reparations or countermeasures. But

of state responsibility. That

same time

is

armed attack has been committed by

that state, so as to justify self-defense by the state attacked. This
point.

How-

vice versa remain either unreleased or as yet undiscovered.

what must be remembered

the Taliban

of the relevant facts tying the Taliban to

make whole

Although

forcible

may

at the

countermeasures are

the victim or cause the wrongdoer to desist in

breaching an international obligation, the application of force against the

144- This reality explains

compensated

why

the prohibition

for in those cases

an armed attack

—by

on

forcible

countermeasures

where one might most want to engage

in

is

them

reasonable; the

—when

ban

is

victimized by

the existence of the right to self-defense. Conversely, the various limits

on

self-

defense are compensated for by the fact that once the need for self-defense vanishes, the state that

committed the wrongful attack remains

liable

for

the consequences under the law of state

The classic example is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In S. C. Res. 681, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/681/(1991), the Security Council found that "Iraq ... is liable under
responsibility.

international law for any direct

loss,

damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of

natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's

unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."

Compensation Commission

to

It

subsequently established the United Nations

handle claims in S.C. Res. 692, 46th

53

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/69 2/(1 991).
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wrongdoer may be
or on-going

armed

justified as

attack.

144

in International

an act of self-defense

Law

in the face of an

imminent

Restated in the context of the present case, the

proper query in assessing the lawfulness of attacking the Taliban on October
7th

is

not whether the Taliban are in any

way responsible under

principles of

whether or not the Taliban
can be determined to have committed the armed attack under the law of selfstate responsibility for the acts of 9/1

1.

Rather,

it is

defense.
Self-Defense.

No

evidence has been released to suggest that Taliban forces

played a direct role in the attacks of 9/11 or any other

Was
ist

the Taliban relationship with

acts constructively

The

amounted

al

Qaeda

al

Qaeda

operation.

nevertheless such that the terror-

to a Taliban

armed attack?

between a non-state organization and
state sponsor necessary for attribution of an armed attack to the state is a matter of some controversy. 145 However, on September 1 1th, the most widely accepted legal standard on the issue was that set forth in the Nicaragua case.
That case was discussed earlier vis-a-vis the nature of an armed attack, as well
as state responsibility. However, the International Court of Justice also addressed the issue of imputing an armed attack to a state.
In the case, the United States argued that Nicaragua had conducted an
armed attack against El Salvador through support to guerillas attempting to
overthrow the El Salvadoran government. This being so, US activities directed against Nicaragua were, so the argument went, legitimate exercises of
the right of collective self-defense with El Salvador. The Court rejected the
precise degree of association

assertion, setting a high standard for attributing the actions of a non-state ac-

tor to a state in the context of

an armed attack.

There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can
be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to
be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely
action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by
regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein". This description,
145. For instance,

Oscar Schachter has argued "When a government provides weapons, technical
and encouragement to terrorists on a substantial scale, it is not

advice, transportation, aid

unreasonable to conclude that an armed attack

is

imputable to the government." Oscar Schachter,

The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another Country, reprinted in HENRY H. HAN,
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 250 (1993). See also Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. SOC. INTL L. 297 (1987).
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contained
to

in Article 3,

paragraph

(g),

of the Definition of Aggression annexed

General Assembly resolution 3314(XXIX),

international law.

maybe taken

to reflect

customary

146

which the

must be
"substantially involved" in an operation that is so grave it would amount to an
armed attack if carried out by regular members of its armed forces. Recall from
the earlier discussion of the holding that armed attacks are measured in terms
By

this standard, the state to

acts are to be attributed

of their scale and effects, and that the Court specifically held that the provision of "weapons or logistical or other support" was insufficient. Further, to

armed attack by the state, that state must have "sent" the group
into action or it must be acting on the state's behalf. These criteria resemble
the requirement under state responsibility that the group in question act on
the instructions of, or under the direction or control o{ the state to which reconstitute an

y

sponsibility

is

to be imputed. In this sense, the principles of state responsibility

an armed attack.
It should be noted that the Court was not unanimous in its findings. Most
notably, Judge Stephen Schwebel of the United States dissented, arguing that
there had been an armed attack:
can

assist in

The

determining whether specific conduct

is

Nicaraguan government have not been confined to
provision of very large quantities of arms, munitions and supplies (an act which
delictual acts of the

might be viewed as not tantamount to an armed attack) Nicaragua
(and Cuba) have joined with the Salvadoran rebels in the organization,

of

itself

;

planning and training for their acts of insurgency; and Nicaragua has provided
the Salvadoran insurgents with command-and-control facilities, bases,
communications and sanctuary, which have enabled the leadership of the
Salvadoran insurgency to operate from Nicaraguan territory. Under both
customary and conventional international law, that scale of Nicaraguan

subversive activity not only constitutes unlawful intervention in the affairs of El

Salvador;

it is

What seems
is

cumulatively tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador. 147

to run through both the Court's

that the state

must

and Judge Schwebel's position

at least exercise significant,

perhaps determinative,

in-

fluence over the group's decision-making, as well as play a meaningful role in

the specific operations at hand, before an armed attack will be imputed to

The

facts asserted

by Judge Schwebel suggest that Nicaragua not only pro-

vided the means to conduct operations against El Salvador, but

146. Nicaragua, supra note 60, at 195.
147.

Id.,

it.

(Schwebel dissent) at 258-259, para.

6.
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did so in a
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manner
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Law

would allow operations it helped plan to be mounted. Further, by
organizing and planning the actions, Nicaragua occupied a central position in
that

the decision-making hierarchy. By contrast, the Court focused almost exclusively, as
trol

it

did regarding the issue of state responsibility, on the extent of con-

the state has over the specific actions of the group.

There seems to be little evidence that the Taliban "sent" al Qaeda
against any particular targets or even that they provided the materiel and logistic support that the Nicaragua Court found insufficient to amount to an
armed attack. In essence, the key contribution made by the Taliban was
granting al Qaeda a relatively secure base of operations. By the classic Nicaragua test, or even the lower standard advocated by Judge Schwebel, it would be
difficult to argue that the Taliban, through complicity with al Qaeda,
launched an armed attack against the United States or any other country.
Harboring terrorists is simply insufficient for attribution of an armed attack to
the harboring state. Rather, the situation appears to have been a marriage o{
convenience convenient for al Qaeda's conduct of external terrorist acts
and convenient for the Taliban's control over territory within Afghanistan
and their battles with internal enemies.
One further judgment of relevance is that rendered by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadic. There the issue was whether acts of Bosnian Serb forces could

—

be attributed to Yugoslavia. The Chamber held that the degree of control nec-

would vary according to the factual circumstances of the
case. Refusing to apply the Nicaragua approach in its entirety, the Chamber
adopted a standard of "overall control going beyond the mere financing and
equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and
supervision of military operations" for acts by an "organized and hierarchically
essary for attribution

structured group." 148

It felt

the dual requirements of effective control of the

group and the exercise of control over a specific operation were excessive, except in the cases of individuals acting alone or disorganized groups.

By way of caveat,

must be noted that Tadic involved neither state responsibility nor the criteria for attribution of an armed attack. Rather, the issue was
whether the Bosnian Serb actions could be attributed to Yugoslavia such that
there was an international armed conflict. The existence of such a conflict
was a prerequisite for applicability of various aspects of humanitarian law to
it

148. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia,

I.L.M. 1518 (1999), at paras. 120

& 145.
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Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor

v.

Tadic, 38
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the defendants before the tribunal. Because there was no jurisprudence

the

issue,

Chamber turned

to the law of state responsibility by

Again, and though the opinion

is

on the

way of analogy.

only relevant by analogy to the issue at

would appear that Taliban relations with al Qaeda did not rise to this
level. Thus, al Qaeda actions do not appear imputable to the Taliban as a matter of state responsibility, as an armed attack or in the context of having
caused an international armed conflict (although no doubt exists that its harboring of the terrorists was an internationally wrongful act). It must be emphasized, however, that this assessment is entirely fact-dependant, and that there
is a relative paucity of reliable open-source information on the subject.
To summarize, al Qaeda conducted an armed attack against the United
States on September 1 1th. That attack activated the right of self-defense, one
that continues as long as the terrorist campaign against the United States can
reasonably be characterized as ongoing. Once attacked, the United States
properly demanded that the Taliban turn over al Qaeda leaders and allow the
United States to verify that no further operations were ongoing from the
country. When the Taliban failed to comply, the United States and its parthand,

it

ners acquired the right to enter Afghanistan for the limited purpose of putting

Qaeda

Had

done so, and had the Taliban interfered,
the interference would have amounted to a separate attack of its own. Howan end to

ever,

al

operations.

from the evidence

sufficiently

entwined with

be imputed to
Taliban.

available,

Were

it,

al

Qaeda

it

it

does not appear that the Taliban were

terrorist operations for the 9/1

1

attacks to

thereby justifying the immediate use of force against the

the attacks against the Taliban therefore illegal? That

is

a very

uncertain matter.

The Evolving Standard
There
ber

1

is

little

of Self'Defense

doubt that the response to the

tragic events of

Septem-

1th has tested accepted understandings of the international law regarding

the use o{ force.

above— that

Many would

dispute certain of the legal conclusions set forth

a terrorist group

terrorist attacks

can be treated

can mount an "armed attack"; that a
as a single

series of

on-going attack; or that the United

and the United Kingdom were justified in forcibly crossing into Afghan
territory on October 7th. Indeed, this article has concluded that use of force di-

States

rectly against the

attribution of

Taliban

an armed

is

difficult to

fit

attack.
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Such unease has
dead

in fact,

if

led

some

to

pronounce the

in International

Law

traditional normative system

not in law. For instance, Michael Glennon has opined that:

no longer regarded as obligatory by
states. Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations
126 states out of 189 fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over
22 million people were killed. This series of conflicts was capped by the Kosovo
campaign in which nineteen NATO democracies representing 780 million
people flagrantly violated the Charter. The international system has come to
the rules concerning the use of force are

—

—

subsist in a parallel universe of

two systems, one de

jure, the

other de facto.

The

de jure system consists of illusory rules that would govern the use offeree among
states in a platonic

world of forms, a world that does not

exist.

The de

facto

system consists of actual state practice in a real world, a world in which states

weigh costs against benefits in regular disregard of the rules solemnly proclaimed
in the all-but-ignored de jure system. The decaying de jure catechism is overly
schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior, and unrealistic
in

its

aspirations for state conduct.

The upshot
collapsed. ...

I

the

that

is

'

Charter's

use-of-force

regime

has

all

but

suggest that Article 51, as authoritatively interpreted by the

International Court of Justice, cannot guide responsible U.S. policy-makers in

the U.S. war against terrorism in Afghanistan or elsewhere. 149

Professor Glennon's thoughtful analysis exaggerates the de jure-de facto di-

what has been happening over the past half-century is a regular
evolution in the global community's understanding of the use offeree regime.
This evolution has been, as it always is and always must be, responsive to the
changing circumstances in which international law operates. Practice does
not contradict law so much as it informs law as to the global community's norvide. In fact,

mative expectations.

It is

a

phenomenon

that

is

particularly important in in-

ternational law because of the absence of highly developed constitutive
entities

and processes.

Consider the changing context in which use of force norms have operated.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second

World War an understandable

preference for collective remedies to threats to international peace and security,

remedies that would be executed through inclusive international institu-

tions,

emerged

regime.

system
149.

With
fell

—hence

the United Nations and

Glennon, supra note

4, at

restrictive use of force

War, and its resulting bipolarity, that
the veto power of the permanent five members

the outbreak of the Cold

into desuetude as

its

540-41.
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[P-5] rendered the Security

Council impotent. States were therefore com-

pelled to engage in various forms of coercive self-help to perform tasks that

would otherwise have been the preferred prerogative of the Council. 150
The demise of the Cold War removed two contextually determined constraining influences on the use of force. First, the Security Council was reinvigorated because the zero-sum paradigm of the Cold War no longer held; for
the first time in nearly 50 years, the P-5 could share common cause (or at least
not find themselves inevitably in opposition). This meant that the Council
could assume its intended role in the maintenance of international peace and
security. The Council promptly did so, authorizing one major international effort to counter aggression, the 1990-91 Gulf War, and multiple peace enforcement operations.

Second, the Cold
of force

War had imposed an implicit limitation on unilateral uses

— that they not threaten the

fragile

peace between East and West.

Thus, for example, whereas intervention was deemed inappropriate as a general

matter during the Cold

War

(it

risked sparking a broader conflict), inter-

vention within a zone of influence appeared more palatable (or as "the other
fellow's business").

more

With

this

second constraint removed, states today are

willing to accept unilateral uses of force, as there

spillover effects (as reflected by

What happened

is

is

less

chance oi

Operation ALLIED FORCE)

that the operational code regarding the use of force

emergence of new geo-political circumstances. Circumstances determine the viability of normative strategies for advancing shared
shifted with the

Michael Reisman has identified nine basic categories of unilateral uses of force
which has been construed
quite broadly; self-determination and decolonization; humanitarian intervention; intervention
150. For instance,

that enjoyed a significant degree of community support: "self-defense,

by the military instrument within spheres of influence and

critical

defense zones; treaty-

sanctioned interventions within the territory of another state; use of the military instrument for
the gathering of evidence in international proceedings; use of the military instrument to enforce
international judgments; and counter measures, such as reprisals

Reisman, Criteria for

W.
PROC. AM. SOC.

(1985). See also

and

retorsions."

W. Michael

Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 281
Michael Reisman, Article 2 (4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International
the

INT'L L. LAW 74, 79-84 (1984-85); W. Michael Reisman, War Powers:
The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 777 (1989).

Law,

59

Counter -Terrorism and the Use of Force

community values. 151
as

much

as

evolves as

it

is

This

not that

new law emerges or

Law

that old law fades away,

that the understanding of the precise parameters of the law

it is

responds to fresh challenges or leverages

international law
itself

It is

in International

is

understood in

light of the

new

opportunities.

circumstances in which

it

That
finds

a strength, not a weakness.
is

certainly true regarding responses to terrorism.

Cold War, the pressing problem of violence outside the

During much of the

classic state-on-state

paradigm was guerilla warfare by insurgents against a government. Both

sides

and in many cases the conflicts were proxy in nature. The geopolitical and normative appeal of proxy
wars was that they tended to facilitate avoidance of a direct superpower clash.
Thus, as demonstrated in Nicaragua, a very high threshold was set for attribut-

had

their clients,

whether

states or rebel groups,

ing rebel acts to their state sponsors or for characterizing assistance to a rebel

group as an "armed attack" legitimizing a victim

was

a very practical approach.

The

(bipolar

state's forceful response.

This

superpowers were surely going to

engage in such activity regardless of the normative limits thereon, so a

legal

scheme that avoided justifying a forceful response by the other side contributed to the shared community value of minimizing higher order violence. The
result was creation of a legal fiction that states that were clearly party to a conflict,

were not.

To some

extent, this paradigm

was

illustrated

by community reactions to

EL DORADO CANYON, the
and Libyan government facilities by US forces

counter- terrorist operations. Consider Operation

1986

air strikes against terrorist

bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin. The Libyan
Muammar el Qadhafi, had previously praised terrorist actions.

in response to the
leader,

Such as physical survival and security for individuals and the tangible or intangible objects
on which they rely, human dignity, social progress and quality of life, and "the right of peoples to
shape their own political community." These aims derive from those expressed in the Preamble
151.

to the

UN Charter:

To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life- time has
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and to establish conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
and of nations

large

and

small,

freedom.

U.N. CHARTER, pmbl. The final aim was articulated
Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World:

Law and Force

in

the

New

in

International Order

Scheffer eds., 1991).
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Moreover, in advance of the attacks the United States intercepted communications to the Libyan People's Bureau in

West

Berlin containing an order to

attack Americans. Additional intercepts immediately preceding and following
the La Belle

bombing provided

further evidence of Libyan complicity. 152

Despite Libya's support of terrorism, international reaction to the

which was

ation,

negative.

ceptions of the United
resolution

on the

justified

Kingdom and

condemning the

closest allies

were

critical,

with the ex-

The General Assembly

Israel.

passed a

action, while Secretary-General Javier Perez de

Cuellar issued a statement "deploring" the "military action by one
state against another." 154

oper-

was overwhelmingly

basis of self-defense,

Many of the United States'

153

US

Viewed

member

in the then-existing international security

context, this was an unsurprising reaction. If state sponsorship of terrorism (a
particularly ill-defined

armed attack

of an

both

sides'

power

term given the bipolarity of the period) rose to the level

justifying a forceful response in self-defense, then, given

propensity to support opponents of their foe, the risk of a super-

affray grew.

However, the geopolitical context has changed dramatically in the last decade. Today there is but one superpower. Additionally, any antagonism that
exists between it and other significant world players, such as Russia and
China, is unlikely to erupt into open conflict. On the contrary, in many cases
the former antagonists are cooperating against
trated by the recent creation of the

common

NATO-Russia

threats, a trend illus-

Council. 155

Yet, as the likelihood of inter-state conflict receded, the relative impor-

tance of the terrorist threat grew correspondingly. For the major players on
the world scene,

it

was no longer attack by another

tegic risk assessment,

dominated

stra-

but rather the spread of instability, particularly through

mechanism of non-international armed

the

state that

conflict,

and the related menace

152. Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice 80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 612, 633 (1986); Gregory Intoccia,
American Bombing of Ubya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE WES. RES. J. INT'L L. 177
(1987); Jeffrey A. McCredie, The April 14,1986 Bombing of Ubya: Act of Self-Defense or Reprisal?,

19

CASE WES.

Response
153'.

to

RES.

J.

INT'L L. 215 (1987); David Turndorf, The U.S. Raid on Ubya:

Terrorism, 14

BROOK.

J.

A Forceful

INT'L L. 187 (1988).

See Reisman, International Legal Responses, supra note 98, 33-34, for a detailed description of

the international reaction. See also Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq
the

1986 Bombing of Ubya: The

New

Interpretation of Article 51,

24 GA.

J.

INT'L

& COMP.

L.

to

99

(1994).
154. Israelis Praise
155.

It

While Arabs

The NATO-Russia

the

Russian

to

Federation,

It, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
May 2002, is specifically

Avenge

Council, approved in

terrorism. See Declaration by

b020528e.htm Gun.

Vow

Apr.

16, 1986, at

Heads of State and Government of NATO Member

May

28,

2002,

available

18, 2002).

61

at

A9.

tasked with countering
states

and

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/
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of terrorism, either domestic or international.

in International

Not

surprising,

Law

normative un-

derstandings shifted accordingly.

That

shift

was dramatically

at the outset of this article,

attacks of October 7th.

by the deafening silence, described

illustrated

over the issue of the lawfulness of the

Of course, some academic

US and UK

voices pointed to the nor-

mative faultlines in the operations, but academe was by no means united on

Media

the subject.

criticism

mental organizations. Most

on the

the actions;

was

rare, as

significantly,

was that by important non-governthere was almost no state censure of

contrary, states scrambled to join the cause.

This reaction was a logical continuation of a trend evident in two earlier
post-Cold

War

responses to terrorism. In 1993, a plot to assassinate former

President George Bush during a
gested

visit to

Kuwait was

foiled. Investigation sug-

government involvement. In response, the United States

Iraqi

launched cruise missiles against

Iraqi intelligence facilities. President

Clinton

justified the action in the following terms:

This Thursday, Attorney General Reno and Director of Central Intelligence

Woolsey gave me

their findings.

evidence that there was, in

Based on their investigation there

fact, a plot to assassinate

is

compelling

former President Bush and

that this plot, which included the use of a powerful

bomb made

in Iraq,

was

directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service.

These actions were directed against the
responsible for the assassination plot.

Iraqi

Government, which was

Saddam Hussein

repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression

has demonstrated

if left

unchecked. Our

intent was to target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States
and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw

behavior in the future. Therefore, we directed our action against the

facility

associated with Iraq's support of terrorism, while making every effort to

minimize the

Of course,

loss

Iraq

of innocent

is

life.

156

a unique case given that

an international armed conflict

with the United States had occurred in 1991 (and arguably continues today).
Nevertheless, the international

community

generally supported the strikes, or

William Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence
Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 1180-81 i]un. 26, 1993). For an excellent
156. President

analysis

on the

strikes, see

state of international law regarding counter-terrorism in the

wake of the

US

Robert J. Beck and Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread On Us": International Law and

Forcible State Responses

To

Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.

Taking Assassination Seriously: Did
Iraqi Plot to Kill

George Bush, 28

the

J.

153 (1994). See also Robert

United States Violate International

CORNELL

INT'L L.

62

J.

569 (1995).

Law
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F. Teplitz,
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at least

muted

its

criticism thereof.

Of the

China expressed concern.
the United Kingdom, Israel,

P-5, only

By contrast, support was voiced by, inter alia,
Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea,
states

on the Security Council, Pakistan, Djibouti and Morocco.
Jordan and Iran criticized the attack, but on the basis of the civilian ca-

then

Egypt,

as well as the three Islamic

sitting

sualties caused. 157

What is

normatively remarkable

that the attack was

is

somewhat question-

able as a traditional exercise of self-defense, the legal basis asserted by the

was

had already been

United States.

It

some of those

directly responsible for executing

in response to a plot that

was no assertion that

it

foiled; indeed,

were behind

bars.

Addi-

was but one phase in a continuing
campaign by the Iraqis against the United States. Interestingly, the Security
Council appeared more interested in the facts of the case, which it reportedly
found sufficient to establish Iraqi involvement, than in the legal sufficiency of
tionally, there

the

US

this

actions. 158

A

more viable argument legally would have been that an international
armed conflict was still in existence between the United States and Iraq,
punctuated only by a cease-fire agreement, the terms of which had been
breached by Iraqi complicity in the
faced. Instead, Article 51

plot. Curiously, that

was the sole

that was relatively uncontested.

It is

argument never

legal justification asserted,

sur-

an assertion

also important to note that, aside

from

the strict legal stylization, the strikes were characterized as deterrent in purpose, a warning to Iraq to desist from any further involvement in acts of terrorism. This purpose has
terrorists

The

pervaded virtually every justification

for striking

back

at

over the past two decades.

relative lack of criticism

is all

the

more

striking

that generated by the 1986 attacks against Libya.

when

contrasted with

Some 50 Americans were

in-

jured and two died in the La Belle Disco attacks. Further, prior to the attacks

Qadhafi had threatened that the Libyans were "capable of exporting terrorism
to the heart of

was no reason

America," a threat repeated on multiple occasions. 159 There

at the time to believe the Libyans

would

desist in their support

of terrorism against the United States; indeed, such support continued after

157. Baker, supra note 152, at 99-101.
158.

On

the extent to which the Council was satisfied with the

Evidence Convinces the U.N.,

US

evidence, see U.S. Photo

TORONTO STAR, June

159. Text of the State Department Report in Libya

28, 1993, at A13.
Under Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

63

9,

1986, at A6.
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bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. 160
Thus, the severity of the terrorist attack and the likelihood more were forthcoming make the Libya case more egregious than the plot against George
the strikes, most notably with the

Bush. Nevertheless, international reaction differed dramatically.
Further evidence of the trend came in 1998 in response to the bombings of
the

US embassies

in Nairobi

and Dar

es

Salaam. Almost 300 people, including

which were tied to Osama bin Laden
and al Qaeda. In response, the United States launched cruise missile attacks
against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant
suspected of involvement in chemical weapons production in Sudan. On the
12 Americans, perished in the attacks,

day they were conducted, President Clinton announced

his rationale for or-

dering the attacks:
First,

because we have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in

Kenya and Tanzania; second, because these groups
attacks against Americans in the past; third, because we

the Embassy bombings in

have executed terrorist
have compelling information that they were planning additional

terrorist

attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties

we saw

so tragically in Africa; and fourth, because they are seeking to acquire

chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons. 161

Formal

legal justification for the actions

came

in the required notification

of the Security Council that actions in self-defense had been taken.

These attacks were carried out only atter repeated efforts to convince the
Government of the Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these
terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin Laden
organization. That organization has issued a series o( blatant warnings that
"strikes will continue from everywhere" against American targets, and we have
convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation from these
same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no choice but to use
160. The accused bombers were tried in Her Majesty's Advocate v. Abdelbaset ali Mohamed al
Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, Scot. High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No.
1475/99. Megrahi was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2001; the
Court accepted the allegation that he was a member of Libya's Jamahariya Security Organization.
In March 2002, Megrahi's appeal was denied. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi v. Her
Majesty's Advocate, Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, Appeal No: C 104/01. Negotiations
over Libyan compensation for the victims' families have been ongoing for some time. See, e.g.,

Rob

Crilly,

(Glasgow),

Libya Denies Offer of (Pounds) l.8bn Deal for Lockerbie Families,

May

161. President

THE HERALD

30, 2002, at 2.

William Clinton, Remarks on Departure

Vineyard, Massachusetts,

34 WEEKLY COMP.

for

Washington, D.C., from Martha's

PRES. DOC. 1642 (Aug. 20, 1998).
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armed force

to prevent these attacks

from continuing. In doing

so,

the United

States has acted pursuant to the right of self defence confirmed by Article 51 of

The

and the timing and
method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral
damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of
necessity and proportionality. 162
the Charter of the United Nations.

targets struck,

International reaction to the two strikes was telling. Although Iran, Iraq,

and Yemen condemned them, Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom were supportive. 164 In other
words, support or condemnation tended to track political alignment with the
United States. More normatively significant is the difference in the reaction to
the two strikes. The League of Arab States' Secretariat condemned the strikes
against the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory, but not those against the terror165
Similarly, Sudan, the Group of African States, the
ist bases in Afghanistan.
Group of Islamic States and the League of Arab States individually asked the
Security Council to consider the attacks against the pharmaceutical plant and
send a fact-finding mission to Sudan, but did not do likewise vis-a-vis the
Libya, Pakistan, 163 Russia

strikes into Afghanistan. 166

The

best explanation for the difference

lowed the

gan

strikes

on the Sudanese

is

factory.

revealed in the brouhaha that

Almost immediately questions be-

to surface in the press regarding the accuracy of

162. Letter from the

fol-

US

claims that the plant

Permanent Representative of the United States of America

to the President

of the Security Council (Aug. 20, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (1998), available at http://

www.undp.org/missions/usa/sl998780.pdf (Jun. 18, 2002).
163. Pakistan protested the violation of its airspace. Letter from the Permanent Representative
of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council, Aug. 24, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/794
(1998).
164.

The

international reaction

is

well-described in Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of

Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 164-5 (1999).
165. Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Aug. 21, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/
the United States Relating to International

789 (1998).
166. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, Aug. 21, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/786, annex (1998); Letter

from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Aug. 25, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/802 (1998) (Group of African states

Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Aug. 21, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/790
(1998) (Group of Islamic states request); Letter from the Charge d Affaires of the Permanent
Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Aug.,
21, 1998, U.N./ Doc. S/1998/791 (1998) (League of Arab States request).
request); Letter from the

Charge d Affaires

A.I. of the
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chemical weapon production. In the end, the United States never

was engaged

a convincing case that the plant

Moreover, even

if

in the activities alleged. 167

the assertions had been accurate, the causal relationship be-

tween the plant and the attacks against the embassies was indirect at best. By
contrast, little doubt existed that terrorists were operating from bases in Afghanistan with the seeming acquiescence of the Taliban or that the organization targeted was tied to the bombings.

The

reaction of the

politically

relevant

governmental organizations, and the media
that

it

was not the

cern as

much

as

it

actors

such as

non-

states,

in this case reflects a general sense

United States struck back which caused conwas that the United States "got it wrong" in the Sudanese
fact that the

case. In other words,

a state

if

is

going to take the dramatic step of conducting

military operations against terrorists,

it

needs to have sufficient evidence of

the connection between the target and the act that was committed, as well as
a reasonable belief that future acts

What

on the horizon.

the relationship between these incidents and the law of

is

defense as

ar,e

it

applies to international terrorism?

ceptively noted, "law

As

Professor

self-

Reisman has

per-

not to be found exclusively in formal rules but in the

is

shared expectations of politically relevant actors about what

is

substantively

and procedurally right." Though such New Haven School pronouncements
often evoke controversy, there can be little doubt that the received law
customary, conventional and case law
is informed by state practice and the
practice of other politically relevant actors on the international scene. Their
168

—

—

normative expectations as to

how

law should foster shared community values

are determinative of international law's vector. In the context of counterterrorist operations

conducted in

self-defense, a

number of conclusions

as to

on the international community's assessment of lawcan be suggested from both the legal analysis offered earlier and the

possible criteria bearing
fulness

short discussion of the evolving international reaction to counter-terrorist
operations.

Armed attack. A community consensus now appears to exist that armed
tacks may be conducted by terrorist organizations. At the same time, such
tacks constitute violations of international

167.

Tim Weiner

W.

A2

law. Thus,

(Aug. 19, 1998).

Michael Reisman, The Raid on Baghdad: Some

Implications, 5

at-

& Steven Lee Myers, After the Attacks: The Overview, Flaws in the U.S. Account

Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, at
168.

and domestic criminal

at-

EUR.

J.

INT'L

L. 120,

the lawfulness of an incident ...

used by the relevant actors."

is

121 (1994).

an

He

Reflections

on

its

Lawfulness and

further notes "a prerequisite for appraisal of

identification of the yardstick of lawfulness actually being

Id.
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engage in
"scale

may respond

them with armed force in self-defense and/or
law enforcement activities. To amount to an armed attack, the

the target state

and

effects"

significance

is

must be

to

"significant,"

a cumulative calculation. This

dard, but factors such as the nature

ducting the attack, the extent of

have been caused

(or likely to

although in a

if

and

is

a

somewhat ambiguous

it

stan-

capabilities of the organization con-

human

the attack

injury
is

and physical damage caused

foiled or otherwise unsuccessful),

the relation of the attack to previous attacks and the
to conduct

series of related attacks

method and means used

bear on the appraisal.

Necessity. For

compliance with the necessity requirement of self-defense,

mounted

there must be a sound basis for believing that further attacks will be

and that the use of armed force is needed to counter them. This requires the
absence of a reliable means other than force to counter the prospective attacks. The relative success of any law enforcement efforts (or likelihood
thereof) will affect the extent to which resort to armed force is necessary. Similarly, if

self-defense operations involve crossing into another state's territory,

must be unable or unwilling

that state

to prevent the terrorists

from continu-

ing to threaten the victim state.

As an

aside, the option of seeking Security

Council action under Chapter

VII has no relation to the necessity assessment. Although
serted that states should turn to the Council for assistance

presents

itself,

Article 5

Proportionality.

it is

if

sometimes

as-

the opportunity

contains no such legal obligation.

1

and

Self-defense operations against terrorists

states in-

volved in terrorism are limited to the nature, targets, level of violence and
cation required to defeat an on-going attack or,

if

lo-

that attack has ended,

prevent any further reasonably foreseeable attacks. That

said,

those

in self-defense should be sensitive to the other face of proportionality,

who
its

act

jus in

bello face.

Imminency. Self-defense

imminent or ongoing.

An

may

only be conducted against an attack that

attack

imminent when the potential victim must
and the potential aggressor has irrevocably

is

immediately act to defend

itself

committed

In the context of terrorism, this point

itself to attack.

is

may occur

due to the difficulty of locating and tracking
not measured by the objective time differential be-

well before the planned attack
terrorists.

Imminency

is

tween the act of self-defense and the attack it is meant to prevent, but instead
by the extent to which the self-defense occurred during the last window of
opportunity.

More

significant are responses to on-going attacks.

The

acceptability of

viewing separate acts of terrorism conducted by the same organization (or
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closely related organizations acting in concert) as a single on-going attack ap-

pears clear in the aftermath of the response to 9/11. Thus, whereas Operation

EL

DORADO CANYON was widely characterized as punitive

in nature, the

US

counter- terrorist strikes in 1993, 1998 and 2001 were generally seen as appro-

armed attack has
evolved from one looking at particular operations in isolation, and asking
whether each is imminent or ongoing in and of itself, to one where terrorists
are viewed as conducting campaigns. Once it is established that an ongoing
campaign is underway, acts of self-defense are acceptable throughout its
priately preventive. In other words, the understanding of

course, so long as the purpose

is

actually to defeat the campaign. In this sense,

deterrent self-defense has become, or
cepted.

As

noted, almost

terrorist strikes cite the

Purpose.

The

is

at least in the process of becoming, ac-

all justifications, official

and otherwise, of counter-

purpose of preventing and deterring future terrorism.

sole acceptable

purpose for self-defense operations

an on-going attack or prevent one that

is

is

to defeat

imminent. The motivation cannot

be retribution, general deterrence (deterring terrorism generally vice deterring

punishment or any other motive. Oi course,
though each of these may be the logical consequence of a defensive action

specific acts

and

actors),

al-

or,

perhaps, a secondary goal, they are impermissible as the primary purpose of
the actions.

Conducting self-defense
ritory of

in

another

state. It is

permissible to cross into the ter-

another state to conduct defensive counter-terrorist operations

when

do so or when it is unable or unwilling to effectively prevent terrorist activities on its soil. In the latter two cases, a request
from the victim state to take the steps that are necessary must precede
nonconsensual entry into the country. Operations may only be conducted
against the terrorists and their assets; however, if the host state forcibly interferes with them, then that state may have committed an armed attack against
that state has granted consent to

the force carrying out the counter-terrorist actions.

Conducting self defense against a

state sponsor.

The

formal rules regarding the

extent of support to a terrorist organization necessary to attribute an armed
attack to a state appear to differ from the normative expectations of the global

community. Those rules require a high degree of control over a specific operation, such that the terrorist organization is sent by or on behalf of a state to
conduct the attack. Mere harboring does not

However, normative expectations are
tion.

suffice.

clearly in the process oi rapid evolu-

Seemingly authoritative articulations of the standard, such

as that

by the

International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, are increasingly out of step with

the times. Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn yet regarding the
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extent and nature of the relationship between the state and terrorist group

deemed

sufficient to

impute an armed attack, several factors seem to have

formed the community's general support
rity

(or at least lack of criticism) for the

Of particular importance

strikes against the Taliban.

in-

is

the fact that the Secu-

Council had made repeated demands that the Taliban put an end to the

no avail. The existence of these warnings
by an authoritative international body rendered the Taliban the masters of
their own fate. Refusal to cooperate even after the unthinkable happened on
September 11th, despite demands and an opportunity to do so, only served to
use of its territory by terrorists,

all

to

exacerbate their culpability.

Moreover, the

being harbored were o( a particularly nasty

terrorists

sort.

They had conducted multiple operations in the past that resulted in hundreds
of casualties, and had now mounted an attack in which the death toll was
measured

in the thousands.

verberations were

felt

Their attack also had global impact; financial

re-

throughout the world economy, citizens of over 80

countries were killed, and a pervasive sense of fear infected millions. Clearly,

the scale and effects of al Qaeda's attacks bore directly

on the community's

as-

sessment of Taliban actions (or the lack thereof)
Additionally, the relationship between al

tremely close, actually symbiotic in

many

Qaeda and

the Taliban was ex-

ways. Although

no evidence has

been released of direct complicity in the 9/1 1 attacks, it is difficult to imagine a
more cooperative host for al Qaeda than the Taliban, cooperation that was

own dependence on al Qaeda.
were viewed as illegitimate in many ways. Only

the inevitable result of the Taliban's

Taliban

Finally, the

—Saudi Arabia,

three

—

Arab Emirates and Pakistan recognized them as the proper government of Afghanistan, by no stretch of the
term could they be described as democratic and their human rights record was
horrendous. 169 To describe the Taliban as internationally ostracized would be
an understatement. Thus, conducting assaults against them seemed to do less
countries

the United

violence to countervailing international law principles such as territorial integrity

than would similar actions against other governments and

Drawing these strands together, relevant

states.

factors in assessing the lawfulness

of a response against a state sponsor include the severability (or lack thereof)

between

it

and the

ings to desist

169. See,

e.g.,

and timing of warnfrom cooperation with the group; the scale and nature of the
terrorist group; the frequency, source

Department of State,

Human Rights Country

Report: Afghanistan, Mar.

4,

2002,

available at http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8222.htm (Jun. 18, 2002). See also the

various reports by

Human

pubs.php Gun.

2002).

18,

Rights Watch, available at http://hrw.org/reports/world/afghanistan-
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perceived as generally law abid-

and legitimate or not; the inclusivity of the threat in terms of states threatened; and the severity of the acts committed by the terrorist group with which
ing

the state has chosen to associate

involvement

vis-a-vis state

itself.

Further,

it

(like that against the

appears that self-defense
themselves)

terrorists

heading in deterrent directions. Although each determination
specific,

it is

Evidence.

clear that the bar

As

is

will

is

be fact-

being measurably lowered.

illustrated in the case of the

1998

strikes against the

Sudanese

pharmaceutical plant, the international community expects states carrying
out counter-terrorist strikes to act only on the basis of reliable information.

The United

States learned

States provided briefings

lesson well; in the recent attacks, the United

its

on

al

Qaeda and Taliban

activities to the Security

Council, North Atlantic Council and other intergovernmental organizations,
as well as

The

numerous

states bilaterally.

incidents considered above highlight the core facts that need to be

demonstrated: that the target of the self-defense operations conducted the

at-

and that the self-defense complies with
the requirements of necessity, proportionality and imminency. A much more
difficult question is that of how heavy the burden of proof should be.
tack, either directly or constructively,

Because the issue at hand involves the most significant act of international
intercourse, the use of

quired.

force, a high standard of

A preponderance of the evidence standard

in issue
port.

armed

is

On

more

likely

than not)

is

(i.e.,

proof

is

obviously

re-

evidence that the fact

clearly insufficient to justify acts of such im-

the other hand, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard would prove

impractical in

all

but the rarest of cases.

The shadowy world

of international

terrorism simply does not lend itself to immediate access to credible information.

By

this standard, states

would almost never have

sufficient evidence to

mount a timely and decisive response to a terrorist act.
Mary Ellen O'Connell has suggested a "clear and convincing"

standard. 170

Although acknowledging that no accepted standard exists, she draws on domestic law evidentiary standards and an assortment of decisions by international courts, including the Nicaragua case, 171 as well as the work of other

170.

Mary

Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7

171. Professor
para. 101],

J.

CONF.

& SEC. L.

O'Connell notes that the Court referred to the need

which she argues equates by implication

70

to

19,

22-28 (2002).
proof

for "sufficient

convincing proof.

Id.

at 24.

[at

437,

Michael Schmitt

scholars. 172

Her suggested standard

is

consistent with the

US

notification of

which the United States adopted a
173
this was also the verbiage used
"clear and compelling" evidentiary standard;
174
Applicato describe the evidence presented to the North Atlantic Council.
tion of such a standard, or an analogous one, meets the dual requirements of
practicality in the sense that an evidentiary burden
practicality and rigor
self-defense to the Security Council, in

—

should not render a state paralyzed as

it

seeks the requisite quality of evidence,

but rigor in that the burden should be heavy enough to preclude states from
reacting precipitously to terrorist attacks. Ultimately, an adequacy assessment

on the international community's determination of whether a reasonable international actor would have acted in self-defense on the basis of the
evidence in question. All such assessments are inherently subjective and
will rest

contextual.

Once

a state possesses the requisite

Jonathan Charney argues that

To

it

evidence must

it

disclose

it?

Professor

must.

which is the primary goal of
must be checks on its use in self-defense.
the international community of the basis for such action would

limit the use of force in international relations,

the United Nations Charter, there

Disclosure to

help to serve this purpose.
state's leadership

alleged credibility of conclusory statements by a

should not be a sufficient basis for actions in self-defense since

would encourage abuse.

it

The

When

attacks

on

a state are so grave as to justify

would normally be readily
available. Disclosure of that evidence should be required even if the state would
wish to claim that classified information would be disclosed. The use of force in
self-defense is limited to situations where the state is truly required to defend
itself from serious attack. In such situations, the state must carry the burden of
actions in self-defense, the supporting evidence

presenting evidence to support

its

actions, normally before these irreversible

and irreparable measures are taken. 175

172.

Id.

at 25, citing

Christopher Greenwood, International

W. VA.

Law and

the

United States' Air

L. REV. 933, 935
The Use of Force to respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (1999) [clear and stringent evidentiary standard]; LOUIS HENKIN,
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979) [the attack must be "clear, unambiguous, subject to
proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation or fabrication"].

Operation Against Libya, 89

(1987) ["sufficiently convincing"]; Jules

Lobel,

173.

US

Letter, supra

note 22.

174. Robertson statement, supra note 34.
175.

Jonathan

International

I.

Charney,

Law 95 AM.

J.

Comments: The Use of Force Against Terrorism and
835, 836 (2001).

Editorial

INT'L. L.
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This

a noble proposal, but unfortunately

is

in International

Law

an impractical one. In the vast

majority of cases, the information necessary to establish the material facts will

be extraordinarily sensitive. Releasing

it

may endanger

the lives of

human

sources, jeopardize on-going intelligence operations of use in targeting the terrorists or foiling future attacks,
critical

information regarding the extent to which the battlefield, and the en-

command and

emy's

surrender the element of surprise, and reveal

defense operations.

control,

An

transparent to the state engaged in

is

absolute disclosure standard

self-

not one the interna-

is

community will ever adopt in the case of self-defense against terrorism.
more reasonable standard would require disclosure to the extent practi-

tional

A

cable in the circumstances. Professor Charney's concern about abuse of the
right to self-defense

is

well founded; however, that concern

must be balanced

need to be able to conduct self-defense, and otherwise safeguard
oneself from terrorists, effectively. Moreover, the situation is not always a
strict disclosure/no disclosure conundrum. For instance, it may serve both
against the

purposes to disclose the necessary information in closed session, as was done

when

the United States briefed

NATO

its

states that

have received such

beit a less

than perfect one. Additionally,

allies.

The subsequent

support of

briefings serves as a safeguard against abuse, alit

may be

possible to disclose infor-

mation after the fact, as was done by the United States in 1997 regarding
Operation EL DORADO CANYON. 176 Doing so will allow states to build a track
record of credibility in their claims, a particularly valuable safe-guard in those
cases

where immediate disclosure

is

impossible.

Conclusion

It

has been asked whether the attacks of September

matically

new

1

1th ushered in a dra-

era in international law. This article has suggested that in

respects the law

on the use of

most

force has proven adequate vis-a-vis interna-

Where it has not, the emerging normative expectations repnew era than the logical and constant evolution of the existing

tional terrorism.

resent less a
legal

system in the face of changing global

sulted in

some degree of softening

self-defense

Such

is

in the

realities.

That evolution has

re-

community understanding o( when

appropriate.

a softening

is

appropriate in the face of the

new

threat environment.

Terrorism today represents a particularly pernicious prospect. Unfortunately,
176. See Bill Gertz, U.S. Intercepts from Libya Play Role in Berlin
19, 1997, at

Bomb

Trial,

WASH. TIMES, Nov.

A13. The United States provided intercepted communications gathered by the

National Security Agency.
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the attacks that occurred in September 2001
iceberg.

wide.

177

state conflict, in
is

represent only the tip of the

Thousands of individuals trained under bin Laden are at large worldMore ominously, the threat of terrorism using weapons of mass de-

struction looms ever larger.

ent,

may

which the

The normative system developed

risk

for state-on-

of super power confrontation was always pres-

predictably shifting to remain responsive to

community values

in the

face of the changing threat.

Consider the apparent relaxation in the requirements for attribution of an

armed

attack.

Although

it

may make

striking at a state in self-defense

more

acceptable, thereby heightening the likelihood of state-on-state conflict,

may have

just the opposite effect

it

by serving as an effective deterrent to state

sponsorship without risking the higher order conflict that was the danger dur-

Cold War. Similarly, characterizing terrorist attacks as part of a campaign rather than a series of individual actions actually gives the state acting
in self-defense an opportunity to seek resolution of the situation without being
compelled to immediately resort to force lest the imminency pass. This permits greater community involvement in the decision-process and greater opportunity to gather and assess evidence.
The final normative verdict on the US and coalition attacks against
al Qaeda and the Taliban is uncertain. The attacks against al Qaeda appear
novel, but consistent with the community expectations existing on September 10th. By contrast, the attacks against the Taliban represent a less than
crystalline glimpse of the direction in which the international law regarding
responses to terrorism may be heading. But given the existing security landing the

scape, the vector appears positive.

177.

According to the Egyptian Minister of

trained in Afghanistan under bin Laden."

1

Interior, "as

many

as

80,000 people may have been
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1

Legal Regulation of the Use of Force: The Failure of Normative Positivism

he central tenet in international law
force.

The

tional law mirrors,

the legal regulation of the use of

nature, content and effectiveness of this area oi interna-

much more

ter of international law. In
this area of international

of the proscription

is

clearly

than any other branch, the very charac-

order to grasp the essence of the current debate in

law

helpful to have a brief review of the evolution

it is

on the use

of force.

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates a complete absence of any legal (or even legal-moral-religious) restriction on the recourse to
war.

war

As Thucydides

writes, "the

Athenians and the Peloponnesians began the

after the thirty-year truce" since "Sparta

was forced into

it

because of her

apprehensions over the growing power of Athens." This sounds somewhat
2

miliar

and contemporary

caused

Sparta

to

ally

as there

with

fa-

was a violation of the balance of power that
smaller

Greek

city-states

—forming

the

Peloponnesian League to counter militarily the Delian League headed by

London; Institut de droit International, Membre.
11-12 (W. W. Norton
Company, 1998).

1

Professor of International Law, King's College,

2.

THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN

WAR

&
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Athens. But differently from today's or even from yesterday's world, Greek
city-states did

not need to

justify their

recourse to arms. Athenians believed

can

it

weak" as "justice never kept
anyone who was handed the chance to get something by force from getting
more." 3 Their ambassadors explained to the Melians that "those who have
power use it, while the weak make compromises.
Given what we believe
about the gods and know about men, we think that both are always forced to
dominate everyone they can. We didn't lay down this law, it was there and
we weren't first to make use of it." 4 "[E]ach of us must exercise what power he
to be "an eternal law that the strong

rule the

.

.

.

—

really thinks

he can." 5

Starting from Saint Augustine, through Saint

Thomas Aquinas and

other

War had

to be

Christian theologians, various concepts of just wars developed.

declared and waged by proper authorities, had to have just cause and just intention.

What

causes were just was, of course, open to debate. During this period,

natural law doctrines in international relations dominated and were indistin-

guishable from religious and moral reasoning. This period continued beyond the

times of Hugo Grotius. Legal limits
tion of religious texts or

on the use of force came from the interpretaRoman private law and not from what states or other

political entities actually did. If international
justified) the use

of armed force

and supported by religious texts
Christianity was not the only

law at

all

governed

(i.e.,

limited or

was because its arguments were drawn from
and their interpretation.
it

had something to say about the
use of force, as interpreters of the Old Testament and the Koran, similarly,
tried to distinguish between just and unjust causes of resorting to arms. There
are some striking similarities, though no doubt there are significant differences
too, between the main monotheistic religions in that respect. For example, the
Spanish Dominican professor, Franciscus Victoria, explained that, as the Indians in America, though not Christians, were nevertheless humans and therefore endowed with reason, it was not possible to use force against them
without just cause and "difference in religion is not a cause of just war." 6 At
the same time, "the Indians had violated the fundamental right of the Spaniards to travel freely among them, to carry on trade and to propagate Christianity." 7 Hence, though force could not be used to proselytise, it could be
religion that

3. Id. at 30.
4.

Id.

at 229.

5.

Id.

at 227.

6.

YORAM

DlNSTEIN,

WAR, AGGRESSION AND

[hereinafter DINSTEIN].
7.

Id.

at 61.
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61-62

(3rd

ed.

2001)

Rein Mutterson

used

when proselytes refused

to be proselytised. In 1948,

Sheikh Shaltut of Ah

Azhar University in Cairo justified the Muslim conquests of Byzantine and
Persia on the grounds of the response by the Byzantines and Persians to communications calling them to convert to Islam. He wrote that "Moslems only
attacked people when they showed a spirit of hostility, opposition and resistance against the mission and a contempt for it." 8 As Ann Elisabeth Mayer
comments, "here religious reasons, resistance to converting to Islam and contempt for Islamic missionaries, apparently justify recourse to military force at
least where the states attacked are perceived to be a danger to Muslims or the
spread of Islam." 9 Here too, only those who refused to adhere to the true faith
were killed and their lands conquered.
After Emerich de Vattel, positivism gradually started to prevail in international law and the differentiation between just and unjust wars based on reli-

—

gious laws or the laws of nature (the

meaning. Although

human nature

or the nature of the state)

was not a return to the naked power politics of
Ancient Greece it was only thinly veiled power politics where any offense, real
or perceived, may have been good enough to justify the use of military force.
In such a situation the Caroline incident and the subsequent exchange of letlost its

this

between US Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British Minister to
Washington was more an aberration than a pattern of behavior. 10 As will be
ters

discussed below, the Caroline formula holds interest for explaining
day's conflicts but in the middle of the 19th century,

it

was

some of to-

at best opinio juris

of two states that was not confirmed by any practice. Recall that in 1914 dur-

Vera Cruz incident, triggered by the arrest by Mexican authorities of
several crewmembers from the USS Dolphin, the United States used military
force against Mexico when Mexican authorities refused to honor the US flag
with a 21 gun salute as an official apology. 11 Similarly, Great Britain and Germany used gunboats to force Venezuela to pay its debts to nationals of these
ing the

states. 12

Positivism, that

is

the resort to the use of force without limits resulted in a

system where any offense against a state or

its

honor could be responded

to

in ANN ELISABETH MAYER, WAR
THE ISLAMIC TRADITION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN JUST WAR AND
JIHAD. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN WESTERN
AND ISLAMIC TRADITION 204 0- Kelsay and J. T. Johnson eds., 1991).
8.

Sheik Shaltut, Al-Azhar University Cairo, Egypt, quoted

AND PEACE

9. Id. at

IN

205.

McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
an brownlie, International Law and the Use of force by States, 36-37

10.

See R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and

11.

I

[hereinafter
12.

Id.

BROWNLIE].

at 35.
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with force. At the beginning of the 20th century, this positivism, became

di-

luted by normativism. International law regulating the use of force evolved

not to what states did to each other but what they had agreed they should or
should not do (normative positivism). Using customary law terminology,

was not so

much

term opinio

juris is

ments by

it

state practice as their opinio juris that mattered. Here, the

used in a wider sense and

states as to

what international law

in international treaties.

it

includes authoritative state-

including those laws enshrined

is,

13

This has been a controversial development.

It

may be

said that there has al-

ways been an immense gap between words and deeds, but words as well

as the

when repeated long enough and
Though this gap may be still immense,

notions and ideas expressed in those words,
desired by many, often change reality.

the world's views

on the use of force

A learned few may change laws,

not what

was hundreds of years ago.
while laws may also change the views of many
is

it

and even force those whose views remain unchanged to act within the law.
Here the relationship between law and behavior is a kind of chicken-and-egg
question as it is impossible to say whether European neighbors (e.g., the
United Kingdom, Germany and France) who warred against each other for
ages do not do it now because they finally concluded that they needed effective norms and institutions to protect their citizens from the scourges oi war.
Alternatively, it may well be that Europe remains at peace because of these
very norms and institutions. Obviously, the change in viewpoint and the cre-

norms and institutions occurred simultaneously.
Europe is not the only, though the most prominent place (having also been
one of the bloodiest and having become the most peaceful), where such
changes have taken place. The American continent also has moved in the
same direction.
Beginning in the 20th century, the development of the League of Nations
Covenant, the Kellogg- Briand Pact of 1928, the UN Charter and other important international treaties, worked to severely restrict use of military force in
relations between states. Unfortunately, this normative system has been vioation of

lated so

many

times, often with impunity, that

it is

hardly possible to call

effective (even relatively effective) legal regime. This system does,
reflect the world's desire to

it

an

however,

avoid the repetition of the two world wars that

brought untold sorrow to Europe and mankind. This system

now

shapes the

mentality of many people and therefore conditions their attitude towards the
use of force amongst states.
13.
is

Whether a

another

treaty that

issue.

The same

is

formally in force but that

question

is

not implemented in practice

may be asked about
78

is

law or not

opinio juris not confirmed by practice.

Rein Miillerson

The

UN

current

Charter paradigm concerning the use of force can be

called normative positivism since

upon what

states (or at least

it is

based on the consent of states and not

most of them) do

it is

not premised on the actual practice of

not

make

distinctions

between

in practice. It

states. It

just, unjust,

more

is

is

normative since

positivist since

justified,

and

it

does

less justified

causes for the use of force.

The Charter paradigm
solute evil (after the

ing

between causes

two world wars

meant

it is

illegal

UN,

between

states as

an almost ab-

understandable) without distinguish-

for the resort to force.

founding fathers of the
response to the

sees the use of force

This paradigm, as understood by the

did not provide for the use of force at

all

except in

use of force (even the collective security paradigm was

to provide for the possible pre-emptive use of force in collective self-

defense).

As

the

UN

Charter was drafted, humanitarian

crises or

even

civil

wars were not considered to constitute threats to international peace and security, the

The Cold War pewhat was just for the West (e.g.,

magical talisman for Security Council approval.

riod supported formal

normative positivism

as

containment of the Soviet expansion) was most unjust from the point of view
of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Similarly, what was just in the eyes of the
Soviet leaders

(e.g.,

advancement of socialism throughout the world) was the

thing most feared by the West. Accordingly, in this bipolar world order, inter-

national law

on the use of force had

two antagonistic groups were able
impossible, for these

competing

to

titans

use of force, except in self-defense,
Clearly, the world has

There are
competing

still,

and there

on the formal norms that the
agree upon. That it was difficult, if not
to agree on the proper invocation of the

to be based

is

not surprising.

now changed, though no change
will

remain

is

ever absolute.

in the foreseeable future, states with

interests. Additionally, religion

may perhaps have

ogy as one of the main sources of confrontation, but

is

replaced ideol-

not religion one of the

forms of ideology?

With

respect to the use of force amongst states, a significant transition has

occurred towards morality or ethics and away from
ism.

Recent uses of force not sanctioned by the

been

justified

None

UN

formal-

Security Council have

by references to morality. For example, references to "humani-

tarian intervention"
force.

strict positivistic

have been used

to legitimate

if

not legalize certain uses of

other than Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations

and the chief custodian of

its

Charter, speaking in Stockholm

Intervention, stated that "there

is

on the Kosovo

emerging international law that countries

cannot hide behind sovereignty and abuse people without expecting the

79
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Although the current legal regime
may still be a far cry from the doctrine of just war, neither can it be claimed to
be one of "formal positivism" on which the UN Charter was premised. The Security Council itself has expanded the concept of threats to international
peace and security, legitimizing use of force that would not have been justified
in the eyes of the drafters of the UN Charter. Just war considerations have led
to this flexing of the Charter paradigm and are now even reflected in the new
National Security Strategy of the United States. In that document, President
George W. Bush stated that "the reasons for our [preemptive] actions will be
clear, the force measured and the cause just" (emphasis added). 15
of the world to do something about

Changes

it."

14

World's Political Configuration and Jus ad Bellum.

in the

Jus ad Bellum in Treaties and Practice
In 1963, British scholar Ian Brownlie published an excellent

monograph

still

considered today as perhaps the best study of the history of the legal regulation
of the use of force

International

forty years later, a highly

QC, Member of the

Law and

the

Use of Force by

States.

16

Almost

decorated and respected Professor Brownlie (CBE,

International

Law Commission), emphasizing the

continu-

ing relevance of the ideas and conclusions developed in this book, observed:
"whilst there

have been obvious changes

in the political configuration of the

had any particular effect
true, what are the implica-

world, especially in the 1990s, these changes have not

on the

law."

17

What does this mean?

Is it

true? If it

is

between the "obvious changes in the political configuration of
the world" and the absence of any particular effect of these changes on internations of the gap

tional law?

Does

this

not

mean

that the world

universes without impacting one another at

14.

and the law

exist as

if

in parallel

all?

Tim Burton & Robert Anderson, UN Warns Yugoslavia Over Human Rights, FINANCIAL
May 26, 1999, at 2.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 16 (Sep. 17, 2002) available

TIMES,
15.

at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (Nov. 26, 2002).

BROWNLIE, supra note 11.
A Europaeum Lecture on

16.

See generally

17.

Ian Brownlie,

HEI, Geneva (Feb.

1,

International

Law and

2001) [hereinafter Brownlie Lecture].
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Law, as one of the main stabilizing factors in society,
conservative

phenomenon

hind transformations in
positive

and negative

Law not

negative.

sides of conservatism generally,

flect

is

not of course wholly

only cannot, but must not, vacillate in synchronicity with
all political

upheavals. In such an environment, law could not

At

indeed a relatively

and changes in all legal systems typically lag be"real" life. This phenomenon, a reflection of both the

every change in society, reacting immediately to

tions.

is

18

the same time,

when economic,

turmoil and social

fulfill its

stabilizing func-

social or political transformations re-

longer-term trends that are substantial and lead to changes in political

configuration of society, the conservative nature of the law's change
ate serious problems for both law

and

may

cre-

society.

International law has relatively recently (during the last quarter of the pre-

vious century) overcome

some

radical

and rapid changes. However,

it is

true

that such changes have mainly occurred not at the core of international law

but instead in some, albeit important, but quite specific areas of international

development of international space law occurred so
quickly that it led to the emergence of the concept of "instant custom." 19 The
law of the sea that had slowly developed over the centuries was codified in
1958 but so many of its basic norms were outdated even before the four
law. For example, the

Geneva Conventions entered
vention was adopted to codify

into force that the 1982

new developments.

Law

of the Sea

Con-

Equally, international envi-

ronmental law has emerged and rapidly developed within only a few decades. 20
Despite this seemingly rapid evolution of international law in these three
areas though, the treaties concerning the use of force have
any,

change since the adoption of the

UN

undergone

little, if

Charter in 1945. Even General

Of course,

law may be used not only for the stabilization of existing relations and situations
enhancement of tendencies that are already discernible. Law can perform creative
functions as well. Through treaty making or decisions of international bodies, international law
may help to create new relations and situations. However, even in such cases (or maybe
18.

or for the

especially in

such cases), international law also tends to freeze

accepted, but incorrect in

my

(crystallize, to

use the widely

opinion, term to describe the process of custom formation)

relations that are created with the assistance of

such legal mechanisms.

19. BIN CHENG, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant' International
Customary Law," INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 273 (Bin Cheng ed.,

1982).

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
3, 1973), 27 U.S.T. 1087; Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, art. 23, reprinted in 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 759, (1992); Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary
20. See,

Flora,

e.g.,

(Mar.

Fluxes, art. 3, para. 3, 31 I.L.M. 573, (1992).
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Assembly resolutions on international law have not contained anything that
could be remotely defined as "progressive development of international law." 21
Why? Why have treaties on the use of force been so conservative while in
other areas they have demonstrated, responding to societal change (including
international society), considerable ability for change? Perhaps the law

use of force has changed but

some experts and even

states

on the

have not yet

noticed?

The aforementioned branches

of international law (space law, the law of

the sea, environmental law) have undergone significant changes following, or
in parallel with, equally manifest transformations in these respective areas of

human

activity. In the legal

regime regulating the use of force, so central to in-

ternational law that novelties in
all

legal system, significant

conflicts that

it

may

affect the very foundations of the over-

changes have occurred only

after the

shocked the conscience of humankind. In such

most

cases,

terrible

changes in

the geo-political environment, in international law generally and in jus ad

bellum in particular have not only coincided in time and space, but have

been caused by the same
same process.

all

set of factors, simply reflecting different facets of the

For example, the absence, existence, content or enforceability of rules concerning preservation of living resources in the Northern Atlantic are impor-

and economic issues for many countries. However, whether
these issues are resolved in one way or other will not alter the structure or basic characteristics of international society or international law. At the same
time, this is not the case depending upon how the following question is answered: Is the UN Security Council the only organization that can decide how
and when to use force (not involving self-defense) or can states, for example,
tant political

reclaim unpaid debts by using gunboat diplomacy? Radical changes in jus ad

bellum

reflect serious transformations taking (or that

have taken) place

in the

very structure and characteristics of international society. Such transformations create

shock waves necessary

for

overcoming

states' inertia

and the

tra-

ditional conservatism found in legal regimes.

21.

For example, the 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle

of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations swearing allegiance to
the

UN Charter and confirming what had been already said in many previous UN resolutions, did

not touch upon any controversial

G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess.,
TREVES, La Declaration des Nations Unies sur le
du non-recours a la force 33 AFDI (1987) CHRISTINE GRAY,

issue. See generally

U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/22 (1987). See
renforcement de

I'efficacite

INTERNATIONAL

du principe

also

;
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The Thirty Years War and

its

subsequent peace led to the emergence of the

Westphalian international system. This system has served

as the basis for the

development of the modern international system as well as the development
of international law, to include its fundamental principles such as sovereign
equality of states

World War

I

and non-intervention

in the internal affairs of

such

states.

provided the impetus for considerable innovations in interna-

tional legal treaties generally

and

in the use of force in particular.

The

ing-off periods provided for in the Statute of the League of Nations
'

"cool-

and the

1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawing wars of aggression have been significant

landmarks in the development of
tional relations.

War

significant

II,

and jus

22

Moreover,

after

on the use of force in internathe horror and tragedy caused by World

legal texts

changes occurred in both jus ad bellum (the

in bello (the

1949 Geneva Conventions).

clude that only multi-state wars and the shocks
to

It is

felt

UN Charter)

reasonable then, to con-

in their aftermath are able

change international law on the use of force. Changes

in jus

ad bellum have

always been accompanied by changes in the geo-political configuration of the
world; or rather have been caused by the latter

(e.g.,

the rise of nation-states

instead of feudal multi-layered authority in Europe; the effect of the two world

and subsequent collapse of the Cold War bipolar world).
If bilateral wars have usually ended with bilateral treaties on "eternal peace
and friendship," multi-state wars have ended with attempts to create general
norms that purport to regulate, limit or even completely prohibit the use of
force between states.
wars; the emergence

Geo-political restructuring does not seem, by itself to cause changes to the

law regulating the use of force. These changes must also be accompanied by
significant events operating to
states to

come

shock the conscience of the world, causing

together to ensure such events do not happen again.

Such con-

WW

War, the Napoleonic Wars,
I
and
II. However, even after
II, the consensus on the prohibition to
use force was only temporary, conditional on unrealistic expectations (unrealistic understood only with hindsight) that the Chapter VII collective security
mechanism would work. Unfortunately, bilateral treaties espousing "eternal
friendship" as well as the general limitations on the use o{ force have been
honored more in the breach than in the observance. Things are not completely hopeless and at least in one region, Western Europe, where both
ferences took place after the Thirty Years

WW

WW

22.

See League of Nations, arts. 10-13; General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as

an Instrument of National

Policy, art.

1

(Aug. 27, 1928), 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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World Wars

started as well as

where many

earlier

bloody conflicts occurred,

the consensus to ban the aggressive use of force has been quite genuine and
the Europeans have

made

it

work, at least in their mutual relations. 23

Since the end of the 1980s the geo-political structure has undergone dra-

matic changes but

this

has happened without any single shocking event that

would have implicated the vital interests of the most powerful states to the extent, or in the manner, of the two World Wars of the last century. Rather,
changes have been more gradual, and some of the most significant ones have
not been bloody. Neither the genocide in Rwanda, nor the crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia, nor even the September 1 1th terrorist attacks (though the last directly affecting by far the most powerful state
in the world), have forced the states to sit down and draft new rules corresponding to a changed political environment requiring new legal responses for
such new threats. These developments have not impacted the evolution of international law treaties concerned with the core of international law itself
jus ad bellum, as the two World Wars did. However, due to the
character of the main victim-state and the particularly tragic nature of the attacks witnessed by millions on television screens on 9/11, terrorists may well
become victims of their own "spectacular success" for these events may have
shocked the world enough to open the way to radical reappraisal through cus,

—

tomary process of some basic principles of the
Consequently, a
exist that

can be

new

geo-political

jus

ad bellum.

environment now

effectively dealt with only

exists.

by using, inter

alia,

New

threats

military force

and therefore not provided for (at least
explicitly) in the UN Charter. However, states have not been, and will hardly
be, able to draft new rules corresponding to the new geo-political environment
and allowing for an adequate response to these new threats. No consensus exists on responses to new global threats such as civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (including into the hands of terrorists) Achieving consensus on
in circumstances not foreseen in 1945

.

23.

The European

experience, as well as various examples from other parts of the world, shows

no such thing as inherently peaceful nations or regions (or vice versa, inherently
bellicose ones). Smaller and weaker nations have historically been more peaceful only due to
their inability to successfully carry out more aggressive foreign policy. As the European
experience testifies, institutions and rules that become a part of political culture are necessary to
make peace durable. Peaceful relations between nations, like human rights in society, are not
natural or inherent. Rather, war and human wrongs are natural. For nations and peoples to enjoy
peace and human rights it is necessary to fight and constantly work for them as they are the rather
fragile results of the long and difficult development and acculturation of humankind.
that there

is

84
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these issues

is

dependent, inter

on the co-existence in the contemporary
of states and societies
pre-modern, mod-

alia,

world, of three different categories

—

—

ern and postmodern each with different characteristics, values, interests
and perceptions of security threats. Of course, societies and states with different levels of societal development have co-existed in the world before but
never before have they co-existed in the world that is so interdependent and
shrinking.

Accounting for the fact that the treaties attempting to regulate the use of
II, created unrealistic expecI and
force which were adopted after
tations and noting the absence of consensus on important new issues concerning the use of force, the difficulty of drafting new rules of jus ad bellum may,
however, not be so dramatic. The customary process may be not only more

WW

WW

natural and flexible, but in today's circumstances,

more rapid

emerging trends into law. Such a process, inevitably, has

at consolidating

its

shortcomings

though.

Brownlie observes that the main reason for a huge gap between the dynamics

of political change and the consistency in law

lies

in the fact that "individ-

ual States continue to have a fairly conservative view of the law."
critical o{

those academics,

pecially of those

who,

who

And

he

is

think that that the law has changed, and es-

for instance, "believe that there

is

a right to use force for

humanitarian purposes." 24

However, even
of political will to

many states are conservative or inertial, given an absence
draft new rules on the use oi force and intervention, it does
if

not necessarily follow that law too

is

as inertial as are these states.

practice in customary international law

and

its

effect

on

jus

Recent

ad bellum proves

this point.

To an

been a kind of partial effect: a part of international
law on the use of force, that was understood by most states and by most commentators, has ceased to exist as a reliable normative guide (if it had ever existed as a reliable guide). 25 Moreover, new norms that would have enjoyed
general consensus have not (yet?) emerged, though there are new trends enextent, this has

joying at least relative consensus.

24.

See Brownlie Lecture, supra note 17.

25.

A different, though related, question: to what extent did the Charter paradigm on the use of

force correspond to the reality existing during the

Cold War? During the Cold War, the Charter

paradigm on the use of force competed (usually not very successfully) with rules of the game
expressed, for example, in the Brezhnev, Johnson or

Reagan

doctrines, with concepts of wars of

national liberation, as well as with various ad hoc practices that did not find legitimization in any
laws or doctrines.
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Therefore,

agree with Ian Brownlie, but only to an extent. Legal treaties

I

and even some

have not undergone any changes since the esCharter. However, the position on, and the practice of,

states' practice

tablishment of the

UN

the jus ad bellum by other states as well as actions undertaken by the Security

Council in recent

digm of the

What

years,

is

in

many ways

quite different from the Charter para-

legal regulation of the use of force.

are these "obvious changes in the political configuration of the

world," that, from Professor Brownlie's point of view, have had no effect

the law, but that in

have a complete

my

effect

on

opinion have had at least a partial effect and should

on the

jus

ad bellum?

Most obvious is the conclusion of the Cold War. Initially, the end of the
Cold War raised the expectation that the UN Charter, and especially its
Chapter VII, would start working as planned when originally drafted. The
Gulf War of 1990-91 provided support

for this expectation.

However, though

the Security Council became considerably more active in the 1990s, the

Chapter VII paradigm did not become reality. Instead, a new interpretation
o{ "threats to international peace and security" and delegation of Security
Council powers to individual states and regional organizations became widespread. 26

The Council

also started to ex post facto legitimize cases of the use

of force by individual states or groups of states 27 and the latter started to use
Security Council's findings to carry out acts that, though arguably necessary
for the

implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

were nevertheless neither expressly nor implicitly authorized by the Security
Council. 28

26. Danesh Sarooshi, United Nations and the Development of Collective
SECURITY (1999); Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of

Force against Iraq, 13 EUR.

J.

INT'L

L.

1-19 (2002), available

at http://wv'w.ejil.org/journal/Voll3/

Nol/artl-03.html (Nov. 26, 2002).
27.

See, e.g., Security

Liberia

is

the

"first

Council Resolution 866 stating that the

UN

peace keeping mission in

peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with

up by another organization." S. C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/866/(1993). See also S. C. Res. 1181, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/l 18 1/(1998) (authorizing the same thing in Sierra Leone).
the humanitarian aid mission in
28. For example, neither Operation PROVIDE COMFORT
northern Iraq nor Operation ALLIED FORCE
the NATO led campaign for humanitarian
intervention against the former Yugoslavia were undertaken pursuant to authorization although
the Security Council had certainly expressed its concerns with situations in these areas. See, e.g.,
S. C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1203/(1998) and S. C. Res. 688, U.N.
a peace-keeping mission already set

48th

Sess.,

—

SCOR, 46th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/688/(1991).
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War had

Secondly, the Cold

frozen or at least limited the development of

certain trends beginning before the

the trends of globalization and

considerable impact

on the

two World Wars.

nemesis

its

Among

—fragmentation, both

issue of the use of force.

these trends are
of which have a

Fragmentation often mani-

wars of secession, conflicts between different religious or ethnic

fests itself in

groups. Globalization (which ironically leads also to the globalization of fragmen-

and other developments and processes, which in different circumstances may have had only a local or regional
effect. Today, "internal" wars are neither politically nor even legally speaking
internal affairs of the state in which they occur. Also, such internal wars often
tation

itself),

internationalizes such conflicts

extend to neighboring

The

legal

This internationalizes the conflict.

states.

regime regulating the use of force

is

only one, though perhaps the

most controversial, of the areas covered by international law demonstrating
that traditional distinctions between domestic and international affairs are, if
not disappearing, then at
ad bellum does not relate

and super-state actors play important

state, sub-state

new wars

right that "the
state
state

roles.

Mary Kaldor

fulfil its

it is

—

unreasonable to expect the

UN

The

defensive needs.

lacks the capability,

The

UN

was established to deal

to rely

new form of
with wars among states,
this

while a transnational actor that cannot be definitively linked to a state
the attacks

on the United

Afghanistan

contingent, with

is

Al Qaeda's relationship

States.
al

Qaeda being more

as parts of

on the UN
authority and will to

US government

respond to the kind of threat to global security posed by
terrorist world war.

is

involve transnational networks, which include both

and non-state actors mercenary groups, warlords, as well
apparatus." 29 Based on this, Richard Falk is also correct that:

at this stage

to

becoming more confused. Strictly interstate jus
well to a changed international system where non-

least

is

behind

to the Taliban in

the sponsor of the state

than the other way around. 30

This

is

one of the reasons why

response to the

Twin Towers

Eric

Myjer and Nigel White are worried that "the

attack

may

contribute to a development of inter-

national law, which would place self-defense outside the context and thereby
outside the limit of the Charter of the United Nations." 31 This potential danger

becomes
29.

real if the

Charter norms are interpreted out of the current context.

MARY KALDOR, The Power of Terror

WORLD—THE LONG TERM

[hereinafter The Power of Terror] RE-ORDERING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 1 1TH (Mark Leonard ed. 2002)
,

21-22 [hereinafter RE-ORDERING THE WORLD].
Richard Falk, Defining a Just War, THE NATION, October 29, 2001 at 11.
31. Eric Myjer
Nigel White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to
30.

&

CONFLICT AND SEC.

1

at 17 (2002) [hereinafter

87

Myjer

& White].

Self-Defence, 7
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The end

of the Cold

tended democracy and
lifted

the

War ended

the

Soviet-NATO confrontation and

civil liberties to

Eastern and Central Europe.

on the multitude of suppressed hatreds and simmering

lid

As Bernard Lewis
The ending

It

exalso

conflicts.

observes:

of the Cold War, and the collapse of the bi-polar discipline which

the two superpowers, sometimes acting in competition, sometimes in accord,

had managed

to impose, confronted the people of the

Middle East,

like those o(

other regions liberated from superpower control or interference, with an awful
choice.

They could move, however

slowly and reluctantly, to settle their

disputes and live peacefully side by side, as

happened

in

some

parts of the world;

or they could give free rein to their conflicts and hatreds, and

descending

spiral of strife,

bloodshed and torment,

as

happened

fall

in others.

into
32

Today, both scenarios are being realized in different parts of the world. In some

weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, humanitarian crises, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts have all increased manifold after the end of the Cold War and these developments,
unavoidably, affect how and whether military force is used in various regions.
Bassam Tibi is right that:
parts of the world proliferation of

with the restraining power of bipolarity no longer maintaining a global order o(

and balances, the aspirations of ethnicities and religio-political
ideologies that had lain low during the Cold War now boiled to the surface. It
was only after the Cold War that the factors underlying these conflicts came to
be perceived. Previously, ethnicity, religion, and culture were considered to be
the terrain of anthropologists, and of little interest of international politics. 33
checks

These

factors

were of even

tional politics.

less interest for

However, without taking these

tional lawyers

may indeed conclude

the same as

was

it

international law than for interna-

in

factors into account, interna-

today that international law

1945 notwithstanding that

it is

is

essentially

a very different world.

Morover, with the end of the Cold War, the polarity of the world changed.
Instead of being distinctively bipolar, the world

is

now

unipolar, especially in

The Middle East. 2000 Years of History from the Rise of
Christianity to the Present Day at 371-72 (1995).
33. Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political islam and the New
32.

Bernard

Lewis,

WORLD DISORDER at 64

(1998) [hereinafter Tibi].
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the military

not opinio

field. 34

This means that state practices on the use of force (even

juris) will

be determined for the foreseeable future mainly by the

United States, acting either with
there

and

would be natural that

it

change again.

No balance,

permanent. Nor

However,

is

or unilaterally. Historically speaking,

can do

in the future the geo-political

in the foreseeable future

as

it

environment

will

or imbalance for that matter, of power has yet been

such a power arrangement
(which does not

militarily unipolar
tarily

its allies

tendency to counterbalance such dominance by one "hyperpower"

a

is

if

wishes) and

it is

at all

likely to

become permanent.

likely that the

mean

US dominance

world

remain

will

that the United States mili-

will

remain significant in most

other instruments of power as well. For liberal democratic societies as well as

become such, it would be counterproductive to try to
counterbalance US dominance in either the political and military-strategic
domain. 35 At the same time, it might well be necessary to join the United
for societies aspiring to

States in an effort to influence

its

policy choices to further

enhance

its

role in

modinsightfully on

the world as raw power does not always mix well with sophistication and

Audrey Cronin of Georgetown University, writing

eration.

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, on the basis of thorough analysis of various
American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing
William Wohlforth, American Primacy in Perspective, 81 FOR.
ever will." See Stephen Brooks
34.

indicators, write: "If today's

&

AFFS21

(2002).

35. Until

September

11,

2001 Russia seemed to be trying to create a multi-polar world. The

Concept of National Security of Russia signed by President Putin in January 2000 stated that
Russia "will advance the ideology of the creation of a multipolar world." See Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation, 24 G an 10, 2000). However, things have changed
considerably since then. In their Joint Declaration, the United States and Russia, speaking of the
need to promote stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity in Central Asia and the South
Caucasus, stated that they "reject the failed model of Great Power rivalry that can only increase
the potential of conflict in those regions." See Joint Declaration on New US-Russia Relationship
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 21, 894-897 (May 24, 2002), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/multidb.cgi (Nov. 27, 2002). Dmitri Trenin writes that "a
confrontation with NATO is something Russia cannot afford and should never
attempt.
Rather, it is in Russia's supreme national security interest to strive toward full
demilitarisation of its relations with the West." See DlMITRI TRENIN, THE END OF EURASIA, at
285 (2002). Trenin concludes that "Russia stands on the boundary between the post-modern
and modern and even pre-modern world. It must make its choice. The only rational option is to
fully stress Russia's European identity and engineer its gradual integration into a Greater
-

.

Europe."

.

Id.,

.

at 31

1.

Though

there are various political forces in Russia vying to steer

its

foreign

it seems that President Putin has reasonably chosen supporting the
United States on many strategic issues. In his keynote public address to the Russian Foreign

policy in opposite directions,

Ministry

on

12 July 2002, President Putin emphasized that cooperation with the United States

is

the key to Russian political and economic revival. B.B.C. Worldwide Monitoring, Putin Notes

Importance of Diplomacy

in

Helping Russian Business (B.B.C. Radio Broadcast, July 12, 2002).
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terrorism, observes that "the

United States

ill-equipped by culture, history

is

and bureaucratic structure to respond effectively to this new kind of strategic
threat" 36 and that "US political and cultural sophistication lag behind its military technological capabilities." 37

However, Europe can fulfill its potential in the current and future fight
against terrorism and other threats by becoming militarily stronger and mentally tougher. Robert Kagan may have a point that Europeans "hope to con-

American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be
the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience." 38 Subtlety and sophistication without
power though are often impotent while single-mindedness without subtlety
and sophistication often leads to unexpected and unwanted consequences.
Regardless, today's liberal democracies can hardly afford the luxury of becoming disunited versus a less centralized but no less serious threat than the one
that existed during the Cold War.

strain

,

Subtlety

The war

against terrorism

"War" cannot be
"armed

and Sophistication or Single-Mindedness?
is

many ways

in

different

from traditional wars.

used, in this context, as a legal term

conflicts" are only a part of this wider

war on

nomic, financial, educational and other means.

39

and "war" or rather

terror to be fought

Audrey Cronin

is

by eco-

right that

"military responses, while disruptive in the short run, tend to drive terrorists

underground, to encourage innovation, to engender sympathy and, sometimes,

even build support

for the

"underdog."

uses of force are irrelevant; far from

it.

The

point

is

Instead, the

not that swift and decisive

argument

is

that effective

counter-terrorism policy must be placed in a larger strategic context, in which

the longer-term consequences are understood and calculated." 40

36.

Audrey Cronin, Rethinking

SURVIVAL
37.

Id.

2, at

Sovereignty:

American Strategy

in

the

Age of Terrorism, 44

127 (2002) [hereinafter Cronin].

at 132.

Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y REV. 7 (2002) [hereinafter Kagan].
39. Granville Byford makes an important point writing that "wars have typically been fought
38.

against proper nouns (Germany, say) for good reasons that proper

promise not to do
successful.

it

again.

Wars

against

Such opponents never give

second category." See

Graham

Byford,

common nouns

The war on
The Wrong War,
up.

Byford].
40.

Cronin, supra note 36, at 127.
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nouns can surrender and
have been less

(poverty, crime, drugs)

terrorism, unfortunately, falls into the

81 FOR. AFF'S, 34 (2002) [hereinafter

Rein Miillerson

The

use of force against terrorists in the

new

environment

geo-political

some questions that before the end of the Cold War and September
11, 2001 seemed far from the law regulating the use of force. Today, because
of the radical change of the political and military-strategic context in which
identifies

ad bellum functions and the need to extend the application of jus ad

jus

bellum rules to areas such

as

humanitarian intervention, intervention in failed

states or against "rogue" regimes that

(WMD),

develop weapons of mass destruction

or self-defense against terrorist attacks by non-state actors, these

questions are

no longer

distant from the law governing the use of force.

Flatland Thinking and the Fight Against Terrorism

The

current debate about terrorism and responses to

it

reveal a dichotomy

(sometimes almost an abyss) in thinking and acting between hawks and doves,

and conservatives, human rights activists and military (or
political) leaders, and pacifists and militarists. This is not the natural dichotomy between terrorists, their supporters and civilized society, rejecting terrorism whatever its form. No, this dichotomy, to borrow the simple but effective
words of President Bush, is "you're either with us or against us" in this war

and

left

right, liberals

against terrorism.

This division

clearly reflected in the different approaches to

is

combating

and other forms of anti-social behavior.
often speak of changing social, economic or political conditions caus-

crime, including the crime of terror,
Liberals

ing high crime rates or terrorism while conservatives (often) call for zero toler-

ance, longer prison terms or wider use of the death penalty.

Ken Wilber

philosopher

writes:

tend to believe in exterior causes, whereas conservatives tend to

liberals

believe in interior causes.
liberal tends to

That

blame external

is,

if

an individual

social institutions

you are oppressed by society) whereas the
,

internal factors (you are poor because

Real
tive

life

calls

suffering, the typical

you are poor

it is

because

typical conservative tends to

you are

lazy).

blame

41

and dynamic and a pure liberal or conservathe only answer for all circumstances is bound to fail.

as

both of these approaches "flatland" thinking and acting. "Truly

integral politics

41.

(if

is

situations are fluid

approach

Wilber

As American

Ken Wilber,

politics, Science

would

.

.

.

A Theory

encourage both interior development and exterior

of Everything:

and Spirituality 84

(2001).
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development

—the growth and development of consciousness and

subjective

and development of economic, social, and
What seems difficult, if sometimes not impossible, is to

well-being, as well as the growth

material well-being."

be conservative (or
valid point)

when

42

at least

admit that those

who

are conservative

may have

a

the situation requires tough and resolute actions against

and those who support them and to be more liberal in thought and
deed when studying and addressing contextual issues giving rise to terrorists
and their supporters (such contextual issues are often invoked as a pretext or
terrorists

justification for terrorist acts).

This dichotomy manifests
tions.

using

Whether
all

itself in

individual answers to the following ques-

the national policy should be to pursue vigorously terrorists,

necessary means, dead or alive, or whether to "drain the swamp,"

to deal with

what some

call root

causes of terrorism

equality, injustice in various forms or religious

ism)?

What

are

US

liberal society

poverty, social in-

fundamentalism and extrem-

the root-causes of terrorism?

guarantee security in a

(e.g.,

i.e.,

How

does a government

without sacrificing fundamental

human

war on terrorism correct or inappropriate?
These are not easy questions and often contain real dilemmas as choosing
one option may foreclose another. However, this is not always the case as when
choices must be made the response must not always be dictated by the same set
of reasons (e.g., either exclusively by humanitarian concerns or exclusively
by security rationale). When comparing Benjamin Netanyahu's views on
terrorism 43 to that of some Amnesty International representatives, it is easy to
feel frustrated by the simplicity and singlemindedness of either position. Those
who are tough on crime, on terrorism, on "rogue" states may view talk about
human rights, economic assistance, state building and other similar issues, as at
best an annoyance, at worst as pouring water on the mill of terror. 44 On the
rights? Is the

42.

Id.

strategy in

its

at 88.

NETANYAHU, FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISM. HOW
DEMOCRACIES CAN DEFEAT THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK (2001) [hereinafter

43. See

generally,

BENJAMIN

FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISM].
For example, the American
44.
General John Ashcroft

for his

Civil Liberties

Union has harshly

criticized

US

Attorney

testimony where he equated "legitimate political dissent with

something unpatriotic and un-American." The statement by Laura W. Murphy, Director of
ACLU Washington Office emphasized that "the Attorney General swore an oath to guard the

Amendment. For him to openly attack as
enemy" those who question government policy is all the more frightening in light of
his constitutional duty to protect each and every American's right to speak and think their
mind." (Laura Murphy, Statement on Attorney General John Ashcroft's Testimony (ACLU
Washington National Office, Dec. 10, 2001)).
Bill

of Rights and the Constitution, including the First

"aiding the
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other hand,

human

rights activists, leftist liberals

often seem to be blind to real

The former Prime

life

and sophisticated academics

hard choices.

Ehud Barak

Minister of Israel

analyzing the

Septem-

1 1

ber attacks writes:
This kind of terror cannot be defeated without determined patience, strategic
goals

and

You have to think and act, not by the book, but
open eyed, your mind free from any dogma or conventional

tactical flexibility.

"out of the box,"

wisdom. The approach must be systematic: intensive worldwide intelligence-

economic sanctions
applying them; diplomatic ultimatums and no backing down

gathering; a wide operational and logistical deployment;

and no softness
from them. 45

Beyond

this,

in

writes Barak, a systematic battle will require fully streamlined im-

migration rules and procedures, internationally coordinated anti-money laundering legislation, and, importantly, the reassessment of the generation-old

American practice not permitting pre-emptive strikes against terrorists and terror operatives. 46 These measures are clearly important and necessary to fight
terrorists

but are they sufficient?

The short answer is

they are not.

to use only military or law-enforcement measures in the

tile

It is

rather fu-

war against

terror-

would be counterproductive and look very much like a Sisyphean toil. As
Professor Lawrence Freedman observes, "if raids failed to differentiate between
ism.

It

the guilty, the half-committed and the innocent then the

main

would be
insightful com-

result

many new recruits and supporters." 47 Juxtapose this
ment with the recent Israeli attack which killed the Hamas military commander
to generate

Sheikh Salah Shehada and 14 others, including 9 children, while wounding

more than 140 people. 48
If

Is it

Barak then, or Freedman

Barak were only a former general

it

who

is

correct?

might be possible to understand

his

exclusive attention to military and law-enforcement measures. But Barak was
also

Prime Minister of Israel, a country constantly facing

a politician, such one-sidedness

45.

Ehud Barak,

Security

terrorist attacks.

For

And

this

and single-mindedness may be

and Counter-Terrorism in RE-ORDERING THE

fatal.

WORLD, supra note 29,

at

93.

46.

Id.

47.

Lawrence Freedman,

A New

Type of War,

FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 40 (Ken Booth

WORLDS
et

al.

IN COLLISION.

eds.,

2002)

TERROR AND THE

[hereinafter

WORLDS

IN

COLLISION].
48. Brian

Knowlton, Heavy Handed

24, 2002, at

Israeli

Attack

1.

93

is

Condemned, INT'L

HERALD TRIBUNE,

Jul.

Jus ad Bellum and International Terrorism

Ehud Barak and not Benjamin Netanyahu, whose views on
much more simplistic. 49
is

However, human
ing any better.

terrorism are

and those with a liberal agenda are not doFor example, Daniel Warner, the acting Secretary General of
rights activists

the Institute of International Studies in Geneva, writes:

But what

is

terrorism?

It is

the activity of the dispossessed, the voiceless, in a

radically asymmetrical distribution of power.
in inequalities of wealth

and lack of

.

.

.

Terrorism has causes. Growth

political access lead to frustration,

which

The greater the levels
The higher the levels

eventually leads to aggression, violence and terrorism.
the

frustration,

greater the

of violence.

levels

repression, the higher the levels of reaction.

This

is

less to

is

of

50

the corresponding liberal approach to terrorism and while there

truth in this approach, such a view

of

and simple.

also one-sided

It is

is

some

often use-

argue what the root causes of terrorism are because there are different

views on this issue that are firmly entrenched.

It is

also useless because

ten quite impossible to distinguish clearly between causes

conducive to and pretexts or
terrorism.

"To

a

justifications for various

Western observer,"

—freedom

circumstances

phenomena, including

writes Bernard Lewis,

schooled in the theory and practice of Western freedom,
of freedom

of,

of-

it is

it is

precisely the lack

of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to

question and inquire and speak; freedom of the economy from corrupt and
pervasive mismanagement; freedom of

of citizens

from tyranny

—

women from male

that underlies so

many

oppression; freedom

of the troubles of the Muslim

But the road to democracy, as the Western experience amply
demonstrates, is long and hard, full of pitfalls and obstacles. 51
world.

Thomas Friedman
stand what this war

ism

is

just a tool. It

Whether

49.

is

is

believes that, "the anti-terror coalition has to under-

about.

It is

not fighting to eradicate "terrorism." Terror-

fighting to defeat

religious totalitarianism

Although most,

if not all,

is

an ideology:

religious totalitarianism." 52

a cause or a circumstance

of the remedies Netanyahu proposes

are limited to law-enforcement measures,

conducive to

may be necessary indeed,

they

economic or diplomatic sanctions and the use of

FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note
Daniel Warner, For The West, A War On Terror Makes No

military force. See

43, at 129-148.

50.

Sense, INT'L

HERALD TRIBUNE.

Sep. 21, 2001, at 11.
51.
52.

Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?, 289 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 1, at 6 (2002).
Thomas Friedman, World War III is Against Religious Totalitarianism, INT'L HERALD

TRIBUNE, Nov.

28, 2001, at 7.
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terrorism

is

beyond the point.

modern

cially to its

It is

a factor closely linked to terrorism, espe-

version.

Poverty, discrimination, repression, inequality

and

religious intolerance all

contribute to the creation and sustainment of terrorism. However, not

all

and most of the terrorists are not at all poor
and oppressed. The false dilemma whether to concentrate on changing the
conditions that may be conducive to terrorism or to respond forcefully to acts
is answered differently at different times. This is a false dilemma beof terror
tween liberals who see the problems arising from external factors and the conpoor and oppressed are

terrorists

—

—

servatives blaming only internal factors

— the

criminal acts. Addressing both sets of factors
sary.

equally important and neces-

Responses to terrorism should involve various methods, addressing

the causes and conditions favorable to
rey

Cronin

the

UK

also,

is

mindset of perpetrators of

writes, "the

its

creation and development.

United States, working

in

tandem with key

As Aud-

allies

from

must disable the enabling environment of terrorism." 53

to Japan,

all

It is

however, necessary to use military and/or law-enforcement measures

against terrorists

and

their accomplices as

it is

demands

impossible to appease terrorists

would end their terTerrorists understand strength and power even if they do not necrorist acts.
essarily respect (or may even hate) that power. Terrorists also despise
weakness and see it in every concession and moderation.
Successful domestic societies use both criminal justice and social programs
in efforts to lower the crime rate. Similarly, in international society it would be
inadequate to resort to only one category of measures. Conditions conducive
to terrorism have to be addressed and terrorists and those who support them
must be arrested and tried. Moreover, where necessary, military force, as a
measure of self-defense or collective security, must be used against them.
Richard Falk correctly distinguishes between two fallacies: "just as the pacifist fallacy involves unrealistic exclusion of military force from an acceptable
and hopeless to

try to

meet

their

believing this

54

response, the militarist fallacy involves excessive reliance

manner

that magnifies the threat

it is

on military force

in a

trying to diminish, almost certain to

53. Cronin, supra note 36, at 133.

demands since to meet
made by terrorists, would encourage
demand the end of the Israeli occupation

54. In a way, terrorists act counterproductively to the content of their
their

demands, even

if

these

demands were

justified if

further terrorism. For example, Palestinian terrorists

not

and dismantlement of the settlements in the occupied territories. Ending this occupation would
terrorists, however, as a victory of their means. Surrendering to their demands then
would only tempt them to increase their demands underpinned by terrorist threats.
be seen by
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intensify

and inflame anti-Americanism." 55 Only when these

bine can they

become mutually supportable and achieve

Post-Modem

The

post September

Societies

fallacies

com-

success.

and Pre-Modern Threats

and widening rift
related to the gap between liberals and conservatives, the gap between the
United States and Western Europe in their attitudes towards the war against
terrorism and terrorists. One explanation for the different visions on terrorism
may be the huge difference in their military capabilities. Robert Kagan puts it
1th world reveals another unfortunate

1

only as a rhetorical question: "If Europe's strategic culture today places

less

value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools
as

economics and

trade, isn't

economically strong?"

56

it

militarily

weak and

differing visions are not only

due to the

partly because

However, these

Europe

is

gap in military capabilities on both, sides of the Atlantic. Kagan insightfully
notes that along with natural consequences of the transatlantic power gap,
there has also opened a broad ideological gap:
Europe,

because

of

its

—culminating
Union — has developed
century

unique

in the past

historical

experience

of

the

past

half-

decade with the creation of the European

and principles regarding the utility and
morality of power different from the ideals and principles of Americans, who
have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United
States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a
worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce
one another. 57

Although by

a set of ideals

their internal characteristics

European

states

and the United

same category of liberal democratic states with highly developed market economies, their place and role in the international system are
States belong to the

rather different indeed.

As

international actors they belong not only to differ-

ent weight categories but also even to different worlds.

55.

Richard Falk, Defining a Just War,

THE NATION,

56. Kagan, supra note 38, at 9.
57.

Id.

at 3.
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Robert Cooper, a senior British diplomat, writes of pre-modern, modern

and post-modern
of the existence

states that co-exist side-by-side in today's world. 58

He speaks

oi:

—

—

two new types of state: first there are now states often former colonies where
in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist: a "premodern" zone where
the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries
like Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan). Second, there are post imperial,
postmodern states that no longer think of security primarily in terms of
conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional "modern" states
who behave like states always have, following Machiavellian principles and
59
raison d'etat (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China).
In the post-modern world

no

— the world of the European Union— there

security threats in the traditional sense (at least threats that

would

are

origi-

nate from within this world) and instead of power (or balance of power), law
prevails. In this world, the traditional distinctions

eign affairs have broken down; there

is

between domestic and

for-

not only the legal promise not to use

between post-modern states has become almost
unthinkable as their security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability. This is a new paradigm of international relations, which Western European nations have created only recently
after centuries of wars, anarchy and the traditional struggle to balance power.
The two World Wars served as the main catalyst for the creation of this new
Kantian world, albeit in one region only. "Within the confines of Europe,"
writes Robert Kagan, "the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into
force but the use of such force

the Kantian world of perpetual peace." 60
It is,

of course, debatable to what extent this peace

is

right in emphasizing: "Consider again the qualities that

strategic culture, the

perpetual but

make up

Kagan

is

the European

emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial

on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on
multilateralism over unilateralism." 61 These are admirable qualities indeed
ties,

58. See generally
ed.,

2000)

ROBERT COOPER, THE POST-MODERN STATE AND THE WORLD ORDER (2nd

[hereinafter

OBSERVER, (Apr.

WORLD,

7,

WORLD

ORDER]; Robert Cooper, The New

Liberal

Imperialism,

THE

2002); Robert Cooper, The Post-Modem State in RE-ORDERING

supra note 29, at 12.

Robert Cooper, The Post-Modem State in RE-ORDERING THE WORLD, supra note 58, at
60. Kagan, supra note 38, at 11.
59.

61. Id.atlO.
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and hopefully they may serve
of the world.

Kagan may be

cle to the rest of the

There
ideas,

is

as

an example

for

other states and other regions

European mira-

right that "the transmission of the

world has become Europe's

new

mission civilatrke." 61

nothing wrong with such a mission as the expansion of human rights

economic

and other

aid, assistance in state-building

similar policies as

European experience (negative and positive) may
avoid disasters that the Europeans experienced, without

well as the very lessons of

help other societies

necessarily repeating

all

made

the mistakes

in Europe.

No society can or should repeat the development or evolution of other societies, especially if their historic, cultural

ferent. Nevertheless

if

countries like

and

religious traditions are rather dif-

Rwanda

or Burundi of today do not learn

something from the past experience of countries

Rwandas and Burundis o( tomorrow
1994.

Some

will

not be

like

Sweden

much

different

aspects of the European experience, for example,

long process of secularization,
today's major terrorist threats.

or Finland, the

from those of

its

painful

and

may be especially important in the context
Chris Brown insightfully writes that:

of

the subjection of all accounts of the ultimate ends of life to the same rationality,

which has induced a self-consciously ironic dimension to even deeply held
religious and social beliefs; the notion that representative forms of democracy
are the only legitimate basis for political power; the spread of a

culture in which the privileges once extended only to rich

males are understood as legitimate only

if

disparate,

meaning

and thereby separable, but

as a

to the notion of modernity within

come

—

this actually

to be seen not as

package that, taken

Western

rights

and powerful white

universally available

rather disparate set of ideas and propositions has

human

as such, gives

society and, with the onset

of globalisation, within a nascent global society. 63

However, fundamentalists of various kinds "want a world with modern tech-

may not be
there are many

nology, but with scientific rational confined to the technical." 64

accidental that amongst terrorists, especially Islamist terrorists,

young men educated
ily

It

either in madrasas or technical institutions (not necessar-

in flight schools)

huge differences between the realities of Europe and the
situation in most other parts of the world. Still it happens that in their dealings
with actors from different parts of the world, the Europeans often try to use

Today there

62.

Id.

63. C.

are

at 12.

Brown, Narratives of Religion,

Civilization

and Modernity, [hereinafter Brown] in

IN COLLISION, supra note 47, at 299.
64.

Id.
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post-modern rules of the game that (even amongst each other) are of recent
origin.

when

Europeans too often follow their newly acquired post-modern mindset

modern

confronting

or even

pre-modem

actors.

These standards may

not apply.

The United

States, because of

its

unique position in the world, Cooper be-

combines characteristics of modern and post-modern society. Defining
the United States as a "partially post-modern" state, he writes:
lieves,

Outside Europe,

USA up

who might

to a point perhaps.

be described as postmodern? Canada certainly; the

The

USA

is

the

more doubtful case

since

it is

not

US

government or Congress accepts either the necessity and
desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual
surveillance and mutual interference to the same extent as most European
The knowledge that the defence of the civilised world
governments now do.
rests ultimately on its shoulders is perhaps justification enough for the US
clear that the

.

.

.

caution. 65

A recent film

66

captures the essence of a post-modern society. In

was unthinkable, everybody was
reached quite absurd

levels.

it

violence

and political correctness had
(played by Wesley Snipe) from the ear-

terribly polite

A villain

"modern" age returns to help the leader of the city deal with some difficult
problems left over from previous times. When the "villain," quite predictably
acts like a villain, the authorities must bring a "modern" police officer (played
by Sylvester Stallone) back to deal with the "modern" villain. Using physical
force and all necessary means, he succeeds in eliminating the "modern" threat
to the benevolent "post-modern" world.
By analogy, what was Europe when facing President Milosevic, Radovan
lier

on the
own backyard. At

Karadjic or General Mladic? Ultimately, Europe was forced to rely

United States to face
the same time

real (and

not fictional) villains in

many Europeans continued

its

to criticize the United States for

not being nice enough towards such "modern" and "pre-modern"

not treating them in accordance with European post-modern

villains for

rules. Is there

not some truth then in the notion that post-modern values can flourish in
places of the world today

where

societies are at different levels of development

because the United States has performed for the Europeans the role of a modern cop? As Kagan points out, "Europe's

new Kantian

order could flourish

only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules

65.

WORLD ORDER, supra

66.

DEMOLITION

MAN

note 58, at 27.

(Warner Brothers 1996).
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of the old Hobbesian order" and that "most Europeans do not see the great

paradox: that their passage into post-history has depended on the United

making the same passage." 67 Though the Vietnam and Mogadishu
syndromes seriously affected the US ability to act adequately and decisively in
some pre-modern situations (e.g., in Rwanda or Haiti) there is nevertheless
States not

the ring of truth in Kagan's words.
also not by

It is

chance that

al

Qaeda and many other

terrorist organiza-

have been able to operate freely in Western European countries (and in
the United States) exploiting in their fight against modern (or post-modern)
liberties and freedoms, the very same liberties and freedoms, using technologitions

cal

achievements of the West to undermine

mocracy,

human

tolerance)

rights,

far

is

that have

cultural achievements (de-

made

these technological

68

achievements possible.
In the world that

its

from post-modern, post-modern

states

must have to

upon not only some oi their modern capabilities (police, prisons, military power) but also some of the norms of the modern world based on
power politics. Adequate armed forces and intelligence services combined
with the readiness to use them are necessary even for post-modern states.
Robert Cooper is absolutely right that "in the coming period of peace in Europe,
retain

and

rely

there will be a temptation to neglect our defenses, both physical and psychological.

This represents one of the great dangers for the post-modern

state." 69

Chris Brown, observing that fascism and national socialism did not collapse of
their

own

contradictions, emphasizes that "the opponents of Islamo-fascism

have to be prepared to

what they believe in, and the intelligent use of
be one component of the struggle." 70

fight for

military force will, inevitably,

67.

Kagan, supra note 38,

68.

Bassam Tibi has written

at 16.

that:

Muslim fundamentalists very much favour the adoption of modern science and
technology by contemporary Islam. But they restrict what may be adopted to select
instruments, that is, to the products of science and technology, while fiercely rebuffing
the rational worldview that made these achievements possible. The late great Berkeley
scholar Reinhardt Bendix showed that 'modernisation in some sphere of life may occur
without resulting in [a full measure of] modernity,' and added that 'more or less ad hoc
adoption of items of modernity [actually] produces obstacles standing in the way of
successful modernisation.
Tibi, supra

note 33, at 74.

69.

WORLD ORDER, supra note

70.

Brown, supra note 63,

in

58, at 39.

WORLDS

IN COLLISION, supra note 47, at 300.
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A

dangerous side of European reliance on

wider world

is

illustrated

its

post-modern values

in the

by the disastrous standoff between the post-modern

Dutch peacekeepers and pre-modern Mladic thugs at Srebrenica in 1995,
which ended with thousands of Muslim men dead. This is not to criticize the
young Dutch soldiers but instead the softness of Western and especially European leaders and societies as a whole when confronting pre-modern villains.
Therefore, is not there some truth in Robert Cooper's words when he emphasizes that "when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside
the post-modern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era

—

force, pre-emptive attack, deception,

who

sary to deal with those
state for itself?"

we

71

still

live in the

Among ourselves,

are operating in the jungle,

whatever

neces-

nineteenth century world of every

he continues, "we keep the law but when

we must

also use the laws of the jungle,"

phasizing the need to get used to the idea of double standards.

The language used by Cooper may be
taken

is

em-

72

too provocative and should not be

International law and not the law of the jungle has to play a

literally.

even in dealings with modern and post-modern states and other actors
from that world. However, double standards, or even treble standards for that
role

matter,

may be

categories of

Saddam

acceptable

weapons

are

if

we openly

much more

recognize, for example, that certain

dangerous in the hands of regimes

like

Hussein's than in the hands of more responsible and civilized actors,

or that not

all

ideologies are of equal value (we

communism too)

have already made exceptions

some of them are so intolerant that they constitute a threat to international peace and security. The principles and rules of international law applicable in the non-Kantian world must

for fascism

and recently

for

,

that

be different from those applicable in the post-modern environment.

It

follows

then that contemporary jus ad bellum cannot be based on the values and principles applicable in the

applicability of jus
jus

post-modern Kantian world where the usefulness and

ad bellum

is

ad bellum and what should

unthinkable.
it

be?

As

minimum

states that are unwilling or
for carrying

then

is

the contemporary

further discussed infra, the sover-

eignty of those states that massively violate
are unable to guarantee a

What

human

rights or failed states that

of order and justice and especially those

unable to prevent their territory from being used

out terrorist attacks against other states and their nationals can-

not be respected in the same way as the sovereignty of other
71.

Robert Cooper, The

New

Liberal Imperialism,

72. Id.
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7,

states.

2002, at

3.
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Annan, the

UN

NATO

Secretary General, said during the

operation in

emerging international law that countries cannot hide behind sovereignty and abuse people without expecting the rest of the world to
Kosovo: "[TJhere

is

do something about

it."

73

The Charter Paradigm and

The

the

Use

of Force at the

Turn

of the

question of the current state of the law on the use of force

is

Century

approachable

from different angles:

UN Charter say?

(a)

What

does the text of the

(b)

What

did the drafters of the Charter

(c)

What may be
principles

(d)

What do

(e)

What

is

mean

in 1945?

reasonable or plausible interpretations of the Charter

and

rules

concerning the use of force?

the current circumstances require?

the prevalent

(if

any) consensus

on use of force today?

Different authors have used in their study of the use of force

proaches.

States have

also

relied,

depending on circumstances, on

all

in

all

of these ap-

various degrees and combinations

these possible interpretations of jus ad

bellum.

Today, however, we have a rather schizophrenic situation in jus ad bellum.

The more one
tries to

thinks of

understand

Therefore,

it is

it,

wise in

it,

the less one seems to understand

The more one

the less certain one becomes about what

many

national law certainly allows

Most conclusions of

it.

it

requires.

cases to avoid definitive conclusions like "interit,"

or vice versa, that

certainly prohibits

"it

that nature are not only vulnerable to convincing

it."

criti-

cism but also cannot be verified as correct.
It

would be equally wrong

whatsoever in the

legal

to say either that there

have been no changes

regime regulating the use of force,

or,

on the

contrary, to

interpret too creatively certain tendencies in the rather confused international

practice in order to conclude, for example, that there undoubtedly

use force to save lives in foreign countries. Today, there are not

Tim Burton
TIMES, May 26,
73.

&

Robert Anderson,

1999, at

UN

Warns Yugoslavia Over Human

2.
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jus

ad bellum where the word "undoubtedly"

speak of trends, legitimization and more
It

follows that

it is

For some, the
the Holy Books

used. Instead,

is

it

is

better to

justifiable or less justifiable practices.

better to avoid definitive terms such as lawful or

illegal.

UN Charter seems to have acquired certain characteristics of

—

either the Bible or the Koran.

One cannot change

it,

one has

and even swear allegiance to it, but at the same time, one can
hardly live by it. However, a Charter fundamentalism may be almost as dangerous as Biblical or Koranic fundamentalisms. Literal and non-contextual interto believe in

it

pretation of any text

—be they

religious or secular texts

justifies violence, in

is

bound

to lead to

such interpretation sometimes guides

social impasse. If in the case of holy texts

towards and

—

the case of the

UN Charter,

it

may

be one of

the causes of the inability to adequately respond to violence.

However,

it is

often said that the prohibition

cogens norm

on the use of

force [Article

74

and therefore treaties and practice
not only cannot deviate from it but even when such practice is widespread, it
does not undermine or change the fundamental norm. In such a case, how can
2(4) of the Charter]

is

a jus

one question what the Charter says on the use of force?
Many things might be said about jus cogens in support of this concept as well
as by way of criticism. 75 It is necessary here to emphasize what Oscar Schachter
has written about principles of international law.

He

distinguishes

between the

penumbra of applicability of such principles. While the core may be
jus cogens, the penumbra need not necessarily be of such a character.
If we take by way of comparison and illustration, for example, one of the bathe right to life
sic human rights norms
we see that the core of it the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life and especially the prohibition of
genocide (e.g., Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights)
is undoubtedly jus cogens in the sense that no deviation from it is
permitted under any circumstances. When deviations do occur, they do not
undermine the basic prohibition since there is strong and general opinio juris
supporting this core of the norm. However, when considering, for instance,
76

core and

—

—

—

—

the issue of the death penalty

it is

much

less clear.

Contradictory practices as

well as contradictory opinions (including opinio juris) exist

Sensitive areas such as abortion and euthanasia
life

issues

74. See,

—make the problem of the

e.g.,

1966 Y.B. OF THE INT'L

L.

jus

COMM

REIN MULLERSON, ORDERING

this matter.

—both hotly debated

right to

cogens character of the right to

life

247-48 (1966).
156-61 (2000).

ANARCHY

75.

See, e.g.,

76.

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW

[hereinafter

on
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and non-derogable character)

absolute

(its

as

a

whole uncertain and

complicated.
Similar situation exists in the legal regulation of the use of force.
there are areas of jus ad bellum where legal rules are rather certain.
ter

Of course,
The Char-

and customary international law prohibition against the use of

example, for
(as well as

territorial

aggrandizement or

force, for

political subjugation of other states

the affirmative right to use force in self-defense) remain valid and

relatively non-controversial.

The

world community's responses to

Iraqi aggression against

it

Kuwait and the

have confirmed and reinforced these

as-

As Anne-Marie Slaughter and
William Burke-White, referring to the numerous resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council, write, "when interstate aggression happects of the prohibition

on the use of

force.

pens, the vast majority of the world's nations routinely and automatically con-

demn it as illegal." 77 However, when considering issues

like the use of force for

humanitarian intervention different practices and conflicting views

issues

—

the

is,

today,

on which consensus is necessary for a treaty or customary rule
Though consensus does not exist in some domains of jus ad
somewhat difficult to accept this negative evaluation of the role of

issues

to work."

bellum,

states.

Mi-

no coherent international law
States disagree profoundly on fundamental

chael Glennon's point that "there

concerning intervention by

exist.

78

it is

UN Security Council in the changes that are taking place in jus ad bellum.

Glennon

writes:

By intervening

in the internal affairs of states, the Security

Council

itself

contributed to the erosion of the Charter's constraints on use of force, beginning

with Southern Rhodesia and continuing with legally questionable interventions
in

South Africa,

come

Iraq, Somalia,

Rwanda, and

Haiti.

Governments

to justify humanitarian intervention by states acting in the face of Security

Council paralysis

rely

on the Council's own

Glennon

believes that "there can be

acted in a

manner inconsistent with the

little

record. 79

doubt that the Security Council has

limits

placed on

39 and Article 2(7) of the Charter." 80 In support of this

77.

Anne

INT'LL.J.
78.

that have

Slaughter
1

its

authority by Article

thesis

he quotes Sean

& William Burke- White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV
& Burke- White].

(2002) [hereinafter Slaughter

Michael Glennon, limits of Law,. prerogatives of power, interventions

after kosovo
79.

Id.

at 114.

80.

Id.

at 120.

2 (2001).
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Murphy who

wrote: "by considering essentially internal

human

rights viola-

and deprivations to be "threats to the peace," the Security Council is expanding the scope of its authority beyond that originally envisioned in Chapter
tions

VII of the Charter." 81

However, these are two rather

different statements.

Murphy's understand-

ing corresponds to Schachter's explanation that "no text adopted by govern-

ments can or should foreclose choices imposed by changing conditions and by
new perceptions of ends and means. The Charter is a living instrument. It is,
like every constitutional instrument, continuously interpreted, moulded and
adapted to meet the interests of the parties." 82
reacted to changing circumstances, had
tion of the Charter held by

its

it

Had

not the Security Council

continued to apply the interpreta-

drafters in 1945, the

Council would have

re-

mained completely inadequate. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice observed in 1923, "the question whether a certain matter is or is not
solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations." 83 The Council has
not yet come close to intervening in any state's internal affairs. While the
Council, using its wide discretionary powers, have found threats to international peace and security (e.g., Haiti) where no such threat seemed to exist,
given the egregious behavior of these states towards their people, their behav-

could not be viewed as within the "internal

ior

Michael Schmitt

is

correct

affairs

when emphasizing

of the state" any longer.

that:

Professor Glennon's thoughtful analysis exaggerates the de jure- de facto divide.
In fact,

what has been happening over the past half-century

is

a regular

evolution in the global community's understanding of the use of force regime.

This evolution has been, as

changing circumstances
contradict law so

in

it

always

is

and always must

be, responsive to the

which international law operates. Practice does not

much as it informs law as to the global community's normative

expectations. 84

Sean Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations
Evolving world 196 (1996).
82. SCHACHTER, supra note 76, at 1 18-19.
81.

in

the

83. See Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco Case, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 4, at 24, 2 I.L.R.
349 (1923).
84. Michael Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, supra Chap. II
this

volume.
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Although the end of the Cold War and the accelerating pace of events have required more changes in the law of jus ad bellum 85 than in the previous fifty
years, neither the existing
rules

is

either possible or

Charter interpretation nor a completely new

even

set of

desirable. International lawyers, be they in the

governments or academics, must avoid extreme choices between, using the words of Ronald Dworkin, "the dead but legitimate hand of
the past and the distinctly illicit charm of progress." 86 Past decisions have to be

service of their

interpreted and reinterpreted in the light of current needs and tendencies.

Terrorism: Jus ad Bellum or Jus in Bello?

Since terrorism

is

basically about

pose for the use of force

85.

87

why

means and methods and not about the

is it

a jus ad bellum issue at all?

Should not

purit

be,

Slaughter and Burke- White even write that "[T]o respond adequately and effectively to the

and challenges that are emerging in this new paradigm, we need new rules. Just as in
1945, the nations of the world today face an international constitutional moment." Slaughter &.

threats

Burke-White, supra note 77,
86.

at 2.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

choose between these extremes,

his

348 (1998). While Dworkin writes that judges have to
whole book seems to indicate that the proper choice has to

be somewhere in between and not always either the legitimate hand of the past or the

illicit

charm of progress.
87.

Granville Byford draws our attention to the fact that

admired

(at least,

would be defined

who

but not exclusively, by their
as terrorism or crimes against

own

many

historical figures

who

today are

people) have committed acts that today

humanity. He, for example,

refers to

Henry

V

Agincourt but was still lionized by Shakespeare.
Tamerlane enjoyed building huge pyramids from human skulls but
today on his monument in the centre of Uzbek capital Tashkent the following words are ascribed
to him: "Power is in Justice." Even in the second half of the twentieth century (the UN Charter
period) several future Israeli leaders used terror tactics in their fight for Israeli statehood and
killed his prisoners before the Battle of

Byford, supra note 39, at 36.

even the accusations of terrorism against Nelson Mandela's
Irish

Republican

Army

has had sympathizers in various

ANC were not all groundless.

US

governments and the

list

The

can be

continued. Byford, therefore, proposes, in order to untangle the knot, "to think of a graph with

means running along one

and the morality of the ends running along the
other." (Id. at 38). Byford correctly observes that even in today's world in certain conditions
noble aims cannot be achieved without the recourse to violence. However, what was acceptable
or even heroic in the past may well be criminal today, and secondly, if violence (even
considerable) may be necessary and acceptable for the achievement of even noble aims, this does
not mean that terrorism is acceptable too. No graph that would justify terror violence depending
on the high morality of pursued aims should be acceptable. We have had it enough already and it
the morality of

is

called:

one man's

terrorist

is

axis

another man's freedom
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as

some

argue, 88

an

issue of criminal justice, or

legal regulation of use of force at

something cannot be a

if it

has anything to do with the

then a jus in bello topic only? However,

all,

jus in bello issue

without

first

coming under

bellum and terrorism belongs to the domain of jus ad bellum as

may

jus

ad

terrorist attacks

what the drafters of the UN
1945) form of an armed attack that gives rise to

constitute a specific, non-traditional

Charter did not have in mind in

(i.e.,

the right of self-defense and/or collective security measures involving use of
force under

Chapter VII of the

Of course,

if

UN Charter.

a terrorist attack

is

covered by jus ad bellum,

if it

constitutes an

armed attack or a threat to international peace and security against which
Chapter VII collective security measures involving use of force are applied, it is
automatically also contrary to jus in bello. Such a conclusion follows from the
very definition of terrorism as a crime. 89 Note here that not every terrorist attack is contrary to jus ad bellum (either because it does not have any foreign element or because of the relatively insignificant nature of the attack). However,
every terrorist attack that comes under jus ad bellum, by definition violates jus
in bello. For terrorists, attacks against civilians and civilian objects are not collateral to the recourse to military force but one of the necessary elements of it.
Jason Vest notes that a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare
"the emphasis

on bypassing an opposing

cultural, political, or

kind of tactic
88. Abdullahi

is,

ab

and striking directly at
This is what terrorists do and this
in bello and (as discussed infra)

military force

population targets."

90

contrary to jus

initio,

is

Ahmed An-Na'im, for example, writes

that "the answer

is

simply that the attacks

were international crimes of the utmost seriousness that must be vigorously investigated in order
to hold those responsible accountable

under the law.

.

.

.

If

there

is

attacks as a matter for law enforcement, not military retaliation,

the political will to treat the
I

believe there are

enough

normative and institutional resources to begin the process of criminal accountability under
international law." See Abdullahi An-Na'im,

WORLDS IN COLLISION, supra note 47, at
in the case of the 9/1

1

169.

Upholding International Legality against Jihad,

It is

interesting that

accuses the United States of failing to do so. This
extradite

though An-Na'im writes that

attacks pursuing extradition would have been unrealistic, he nevertheless

Saddam Hussein. Such

is

like

asking the current Iraqi regime to

a request does not correspond with the seriousness of the

matter. Moreover, in the case of crimes of that magnitude, history since the

Nuremberg

trials

have shown, that military and criminal justice measures are almost necessarily interlinked.
89.

One may ask whether those who commit acts of terror in armed conflicts are terrorists or war

criminals.

They

civilians, killing

are both, of course. In time of war, acts of terror

POWs,

(e.g.,

deliberately attacking

using indiscriminate force etc.) are either grave breaches under the

Geneva Conventions or other acts defined as war crimes. See, e.g., Article 130, Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS

435 (D. Schindler

&

J.

Toman

90. Jason Vest, Fourth-Generation Warfare,

eds.,

288

3rd

ed., 1988).
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some modalities of defensive responses. Still, Caleb Canhas ably demonstrated in his book The Lessons of Terror that terror tactics were
historically used as a supposedly effective method of waging wars (however,
necessarily changes

Carr convincingly argues that even in the

past,

though such

may have

tactics

provided some short-term tactical advantages, they have always been counterproductive in the long run). 91

armed attack by armed forces of state A against state B
may be also committed as a terrorist attack if the attack is carried out in flagrant violation of jus in bello requirements and if at least one of the purposes

Of course,

a direct

of the use of such modalities of attack
tion of the victim state or forcing the

is

among

spreading terror

government

to

change

the popula-

its

policies or

surrender.

Terror Attacks and the Necessity of Self'Defense

Terrorism has different causes and circumstances exist that

may enhance or di-

emergence and flourishing. These circumstances must, of
course, be addressed. However, leaving terrorist attacks without a tough and

minish

its

likely

physical response, addressing only the so-called "underlying causes"

demon-

weakness thereby only encouraging new attacks. The use of force as a
law-enforcement measure or as a military response, though not the only or even
strates

perhaps the most important means of dealing with terrorism,

is

nonetheless

necessary as both a special and general deterrent. Authorization for military re-

sponses to terrorist attacks
that of necessity.

Of course,

may combine both

the element of self-defense and

these two are closely linked any

Caroline case speaks of the "necessity of self-defense."

Caroline case

is

92

way as the seminal

In fact, though the

often used in the practice and teaching of international law as a

self-defense precedent that clarifies issues such as necessity,

proportionality, the International

Law Commission

immediacy and

(ILC) has dealt only with

the case as one dealing with the concept of necessity. 93

The 1980 Report of the

ILC, for example, observes that:

91. See Caleb Carr, Lessons of terror. A History of Warfare against
Civilians—Why it Has always Failed, and Why It Will Fail again (2002).
92. R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, 32 AM. J. INTL. L. 82 (1938) [hereinafter

Jennings].
93. See International

Law Commission Commentaries

States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts, para.

5,

to the

Draft Articles on Responsibility of

UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.

56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Commentaries].

108
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been no lack of actual cases in which necessity was
invoked precisely to preclude the wrongfulness of an armed incursion into
foreign territory for the purpose of carrying out one or another of the operations
in the past, there has

referred above.

To cite only one example of the many involving situations of this

kind, there was the celebrated "Caroline" case." 94

Unlike in the

half of the 19th century

first

when

the Caroline incident oc-

curred, the right to self-defense today includes measures undertaken against

non-state entities. 95 Accordingly, a situation can exist today
against terrorist attacks

may be

carried out, by necessity

when self-defense

and under certain

cumstances, in the territory of a third state even without the

latter's

cir-

consent.

Hence, the concept oi self-defense characterizes the use of force vis-a-vis a
terrorist organization, while the concept of necessity characterizes the use of
such force in the

territory o(

right to self-defense,

is

another

state. Necessity, unlike the

inherent

not a right (though both are considered as circum-

stances precluding wrongfulness), but as a justification used in exceptional

circumstances, or as the ILC comments, "under certain very limited conditions." 96

When terrorists operate from the territory of a state and that state is unable
or unwilling to end the terrorist acts, military action by other states directed at

the terrorists within the state where the terror operations are originating from

can be

This

justified as a state of necessity.

is

what Roberto Ago's comment

the draft article in the ILC Report called "the existence of conduct which,

though infringing the

territorial

to
al-

sovereignty of a State, need not necessarily be

considered as an act of aggression, or not, in any case, as a breach of an international obligation of jus cogens." 97 This
against the terrorist organization that

is

is

instead a self-defense operation

by necessity carried out in the

tory of a third state; preferably, of course, with the latter's consent.
if

94.

the territorial state, which has

1980 Y.B. INT'L L.

itself

COMM. Vol II, Part 2 at 44

been unable

(1980),

terri-

However,

to prevent terrorists

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.

1.

95.

In the Caroline incident, the British in 1837 crossed the Niagara River and destroyed the

steamship Caroline which was being used by private persons to help rebels fight the British.
British

The

were not attacked by the United States or by irregulars acting on behalf of the United

States. Therefore, the ensuing discussion

Envoy Lord Alexander Ashburton might

between US Secretary of State Daniel Webster and UK
have been about the actions of non-state entities

as well

in the territory of another state. See generally Jennings, supra note 93.

96. See Commentaries, supra note 93 at para. 14.
97.

See 1973 Y.B. INT'L L.

COMM. Vol II, at 249

(1973), U.N. Doc.
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A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.
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attacking other states or their nationals and interests, resists the victim-state
(or its allies) in their efforts to eliminate the terrorists,

complice to the
this point nicely.

terrorist organization.

When Ugandan

The Entebbe

it

itself

raid in

forces attacked the Israeli

becomes an
1976

ac-

illustrates

commandos

at-

tempting to liberate the hostages (something the Ugandan authorities had

Ugandan

failed to do),

forces

became

legitimate targets of Israeli counter-

measures.

Once

again, of course, the requirements of necessity

and proportionality

play an important role in determining the character of self-defense measures.

Indeed, the character of terrorist attacks themselves, often of uncertain origin

and magnitude, puts an even higher emphasis on the need to observe the principles of necessity and proportionality in the use of military force in response
to such attacks. They are especially important in helping to avoid escalation of
terrorist related conflicts.

This portion of

response to terrorists attacks

responses to terrorist

—

leaving for another day the discussion of the

These two paradigms

and ideattacks should involve the use of force across both

collective security paradigm.
ally,

concentrates only on the self-defense paradigm

this article

are not exclusive

paradigms.

An armed attack, in the form of a terrorist attack or not,
olation of international law and the victim state

A terrorist

is

is

an erga omnes

not the only injured

vi-

state. 98

tantamount to an armed attack concerns the entire
international community and therefore any such attack should ideally trigger
the UN collective security mechanism at the same time as the right of the vicact(s) that

is

tim state to use force, either alone or together with
curs. Indeed,
terrorists,

although dealing primarily with

its allies,

in self-defense oc-

and support

terrorists

Security Council Resolution 1373 states that

all

for

such

states shall "take

the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts." While differ-

ent from, and falling short of authorizing the "use of
interpretation of this language

may

all

necessary means," the

well lead to similar conclusions.

Interestingly, the Security Council, while taking measures necessary to

maintain international peace and security, at the same time recognized in

its

Resolution 1368 and reaffirmed in Resolution 1373 the inherent right to

98.

International

Law Commission,

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts, Report of the International haw Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Art.
48(lb), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles}.

110

Rein Miillerson

individual

and

collective self-defense." Accordingly,

though the Council was

acting within the collective security paradigm in these resolutions,

it

did not

consider that these measures in any way interfered with or superceded the
right to use force in individual or collective self-defense.

In the current fight against terrorism the use of military force in self-defense
in Afghanistan by the United States, United
lies is

combined with

Kingdom, Canada and other

al-

collective security such as those that are the basis for the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 100 These are not the only collective security
it

measures being used by the Security Council. As an example,

has also used financial measures against

al

Qaeda, other

terrorist organiza-

and individuals linked to them. Chapter VII non-military measures are
beyond the scope of this article and will not therefore be addressed. However,
their use does help make the point that only combinations of various means
tions

and methods of fighting terrorism can lead ultimately

to success.

Specific Characteristics of Self-Defense Against Terrorist Attacks,

Terrorist attacks have
tacks, as a rule,

some

do not have:

(i)

characteristics

which

traditional

armed

at-

attacks are usually carried out not by a state's

armed forces but by non-state groups which may or may not have links with
some states (except that terrorist groups have to operate on the territory of at
least some states and this is one of the essential differences between piracy and
terrorism, though in some respect they may be comparable); (ii) the identity of
the attackers and their affiliation with other entities (including states) is usually not clear; and, (iii) the means and methods used by terrorists are, by definition, contrary to international

99.

Myjer and White point to the

humanitarian law since they intentionally

fact that references to the right to self-defense

were only in

the Preambles of the Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and therefore, in their opinion,
the Council did not unequivocally determine that there had been an

United States on

1 1

September 2001. They believe that

Council should have made

an

it

clear without a

"at

armed attack against the

an early stage therefore the Security

shadow of doubt whether

it

was of the opinion that

&

Chapter VII self-defence situation." See Myjer
However, on 12 September when the Security Council passed
Resolution 1368 it may not yet have been clear who was behind these attacks (e.g., had they been
committed by a US terrorist group, then such an attack would not have given rise to the right to
self-defense under international law notwithstanding the magnitude of the attack). Therefore,
the Security Council could hot have used such specific language. Moreover, a reference to the
right to self-defense in the preamble of a resolution wholly devoted to a terrorist attack is a
there solely

is

article

White, supra note 31, at

39

situation, or a

10.

sufficient indication that the

Council believed that there was at

least a

situation.

100. S. C. Res. 1386

U.N. SCOR, 56th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001).
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target

non-combatants and attack prohibited

These particular

objects.

fea-

tures of terrorist attacks condition the character of responses to them.
First,

what

is

the status of terrorist organizations in international law? Does

Article 51 apply to attacks carried out by non-state entities? Michael Byers
writes that

"it will

probably be argued that the atrocities of

1 1

September did

not constitute an armed attack since they did not involve the use of force by a

and that the relevant framework of analysis is instead international criminal law." 101 Eric Myjer and Nigel White write that "the categorization of the
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington as an "armed attack" within
the meaning of article 51 is problematic to say the least.
Self-defence, tradi-

state,

.

.

.

an armed response to an attack by a state." 102
Pierre-Marie Dupuy writes that "the shock of 1 1 September should cause a retionally speaking, applies to

examination of norms conceived solely on the basis of relations between
states." 103

However, such

a

time and international law

1945

in

when

the

UN

re-examination has already been ongoing for some
is

no longer

as state-centric as

it

was, for example,

Charter was adopted. Not only are individuals held

criminally responsible directly under international law for genocide, war

crimes and crimes against humanity, but the Security Council has gone so far
as to

impose sanctions against non-state

entities

such as the Ian Smith regime

UNITA in Angola

and Bosnian Serbs. 104
There is little doubt that the drafters of Article 51 contemplated armed attacks committed only by states even though the article itself does not explicin

Southern Rhodesia,

itly

say so.

However,

armed attack by

it is

not only the absence of any direct reference to an

a state in Article 5

but more importantly, the need to inter-

1

pret the Charter in the context of current realities that indicates that the right

of self-defense

may

Yoram Dinstein

arise also in the case of attacks

& White, supra note 31, at

103. Pierre-Marie

entities. 105

As

writes:

101. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force

411 (2002).
102. Myjer

by non-state

at

1

International

Law after

1 1

September, 5

1

ICLQ

7.

Dupuy, The Law After

DISCUSSION FORUM

and

the

Destruction of the Towers,

EUR

J.

INT'L L.

(2002) available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-dupuy.html

(Nov. 30, 2002).

924 imposed sanctions against Bosnian Serbs. See
U.N. Doc. S/924/(1994). Similarly, Resolution 864
found that "as a result of UNITA's military actions, the situation in Angola constitutes a threat
to international peace and security." An arms embargo was imposed against a non-state
entity—UNITA. See S. C. Res. 864, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/864/(1993).
105. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against bin Laden, 24 YALE J.
104. For example, Security Council Resolution

S.

C. Res. 924, U.N.

INT'L

L

SCOR, 49th

Sess.,

559(1999).
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should be pointed out that, for an armed attack to

[I]t

justify

countermeasures

need not be committed by another state.
Ordinarily, the perpetrator of the armed attack is indeed a foreign state as such.
although mounted from
Yet, in exceptional circumstances, an armed attack
106
is not launched by that state.
the territory of a foreign state
of self-defence under Article 51,

it

—

—

when

Referring to the case

the Security Council had employed the term

"armed attacks" characterizing

raids

by mercenaries from the territory of An-

and condemning Portugal for not preventing these raids, Dinstein emphasizes that "armed attacks by non-state actors are still armed attacks, even if
commenced only from and not by another State." 107
Giorgio Gaja, analyzing the 1 1 September attacks against the United States
gola

—

—

in light of the references to the right to self-defense in Security

tions

and the

Council resolu-

NATO decision activating Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,

cautiously opines that "depending

on the

factual circumstances, the definition

of the terrorist acts of September 11th as "armed attack"

may not

necessarily

imply that the concept actually refers to acts that are not attributable to a
state." 108

However, the

US demands

addressed to the Taliban (which

itself

was a non-recognized authority that various Security Council resolutions had
called "the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan") 109 to surrender

Qaeda

terrorists

seem

US demands and

Only the

DINSTEIN, supra note

6, at

refusal of the Taliban regime to

their active defense of the

led to the use of force in self-defense against

107.

al

United States, at least initially, did
even the Taliban for that matter) was di-

rectly responsible for the attacks. 110

106. See

bin Laden and other

to indicate that the

not consider that Afghanistan (or

comply with the

Osama

both

al

Qaeda network

Qaeda and

the Taliban.

192.

at 214.

Id.

108. Giorgo Gaja, In

FORUM at

1

What

Sense was There an

"Armed Attack?", EUR

J.

INT'L L. DISCUSSION

(2002) available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html (Nov. 30, 2002)
,

SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999).
The Unites States insisted that the Taliban: "Deliver to United States authorities all the
leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign diplomats, including American
109. See,
1

e.g., S.

C. Res. 1267, U.N.

10.

you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in
your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan,
and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure to appropriate
authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure
citizens,

they are no longer operating." President George

W.

Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the

Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September

COMP.

PRES.

DOC. 1347

(Sep. 20, 2001).
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The

current war against terrorism, of course, differs from previous wars in

the sense that though there was a clear victim of the attack

— the United

hundreds of British and other
nationals were also attacked), there was no prima facie perpetrator. This is
States (or rather several victims because,

e.g.,

one of the peculiarities of 21st century wars, that is not without precedent.
Acts of so-called indirect aggression 111 do not always have an obvious author
since

it

may be

specific state.

difficult to attribute acts

of paramilitary or irregular forces to a

However, indirect aggression,

as

enshrined in the 1974 Defini-

tion of Aggression, presumes the existence of an aggressor state,

of using
lar

its

regular

armed bands,

armed

which instead

forces perpetrates acts of aggression through irregu-

guerrilla forces, etc. In

such a case, irregulars are agents of an

aggressor state.

Contemporary terrorism is even more complicated. Acts of indirect aggression are usually, though not necessarily always, carried out against neighboring states and notwithstanding that- there may be difficulties in attributing acts
of irregulars to the state from the territory of which these attacks are
launched, the identity of the state

is

not, as a rule, in question (what

may be

whether that state is an aggressor or not). Attacks like those of
September 11th may not even have a prima facie culprit, state or non-state.
questioned

is

However, this does not mean that an aggressor does not exist. Such a conclusion would not only be contrary to common sense, it is not one required by
contemporary international law.
In a sense, military responses to terrorist attacks do not raise legal, philosophical, moral or

even

political issues as

qualified as

armed attacks giving

as, for

example, human-

and even
attacks originating from abroad can still be

itarian intervention does. First of

non-traditional features, terrorist

complicated

all,

notwithstanding

rise to

its

specific

the inherent right to self-defense.

Together with military operations to rescue one's nationals abroad, such
anti-terrorist operations

may be

qualified as special (non-traditional) self-

defense operations. Secondly, military responses to terrorist attacks are today
politically less controversial than, for

man

example, the use of force to protect hu-

Although some states still refuse to condemn
attacks and even try to find justifications for some of them

rights in foreign countries.

specific terrorist

which states that "the sending by or
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of

111. See Article 3(a) of the Definition of Aggression of 1974

on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars
armed force against another state of such gravity as to amount
substantial involvement therein,"

29 U.N.

GAOR,

Supp. 31,

art.

is

to the acts listed above, or

its

an act of aggression. See 1974 U.N. Definition of Agression,

3(a),

U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (1975) (hereinafter

Definition of Aggression]
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most Arab

(e.g.,

states

still

refuse to

condemn, without any

qualification, Pal-

estinian terrorism), the traditional support for the idea that a just cause

national-liberation struggle) justifies the use of terrorist

weaker.
If

methods

is

(e.g.,

becoming

112

the right to the use of force in self-defense

is

dependent on the existence

of an armed attack (or arguably in the case of so-called anticipatory or interceptive self-defense in anticipation of such an attack), the modalities of the
exercise of this right

Therefore,

we have

depend on the

armed

attack. 113

and distinctive features of terrorist
methods and means of defensive

to consider the specific

would condition

attacks that

characteristics of the

specific

responses.

In the case of responses to terrorist attacks, the question of immediacy

have to be addressed
ately obvious

differently.

and preparations

As

may

may not be immedihave to be secret may

the source of attacks

for responses that often

take time (gathering intelligence data, building coalitions etc.), the period be-

tween the attack and responsive measures may be rather substantial. In that
respect, the situation may be compared to one that existed, for example, after
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although for almost half a year there were no active military operations going on after the Iraqis had occupied Kuwait, the
Kuwait and its allies to use force in self-defense was not extinguished
(maybe only suspended for a while due to the active involvement of the Secu-

right by

rity

The Gulf War did not start on January 15th, 1991 when the Colaunched Operation DESERT STORM. It started on August 1st, 1990

Council).

alition

when

the Iraqi troops attacked and occupied Kuwait. Similarly, the war

on September 11th at 8:45 when the first airthe World Trade Center, if not earlier had the United States been

against terrorist attacks started
craft hit

able to use

its

right to anticipatory or interceptive self-defense.

112. In 1978 the statement by

Hoc Committee on

Ambassador Harriman of Nigeria, who was Chairman of the

Hostages, disputed the use of the word

"Here

Ad

the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of

wish to reiterate that

'terrorist'

describing the Palestinian struggle against

my Government

does not believe that any liberation
and that the noble fights for liberation
should be based on very high values. I believe that the PLO at no stage in its war for liberation has
abused privilege; at no stage has it terrorised; it is at war." Ambassador Harriman is quoted in
William O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Countertenor Operations, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 449 (1990). If at that time, the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security
Council, wholeheartedly subscribed to this statement, today Russia, which is facing separatist
terrorism in Chechnya, as well as Central Asian successor states to the Soviet Union, adamantly
reject such assessments of 'liberation' movements.
Israel:

I

movement should damage

113.

DINSTEIN, supra note

its

prestige by taking hostages,

6, at

192-221.
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The

question of immediacy

two other issues: use of force in
anticipation of an attack and defensive reprisals. Often military responses to
terrorist attacks have to draw a fine balance between two controversial modalities

is

close also to

of the use of military force in self-defense

defense and the Charybdis of reprisals.
ticipated action by terrorists
is

is

— the

Scylla of anticipatory self-

As Gregory Travalio

writes, "if the an-

not sufficiently imminent, the right to use force

not available for purposes of deterrence.

On the other hand,

actions by a group are too remote in time, the response by force

characterized as an
sists

illegal reprisal."

114

Because

past terrorist

if

is

likely to

terrorist warfare usually

be

con-

of a series of relatively small-scale attacks that often need to be prevented

by measures that combine some elements of retaliation (since a response co-

mes

after the attack)

of a

new

and anticipation

(since a response

comes

in anticipation

attack), the exercise of the right to self-defense against terrorist at-

some (sometimes quite considerable) practical use of
concepts of a anticipatory self-defence and defensive reprisals.
The need to use preventive force against terrorists becomes even more obvious when we take into consideration the fact that terrorists do not attack
military targets that are usually well defended and that, at least in principle,
should be ready to defend themselves when attacked. Anne-Marie Slaughter
and William Burke- White observe that "in our previous understanding of war,
it was possible to attack the vital life within a nation by first destroying the
army that protected it." 115 Today, terrorists avoiding military objectives intentionally target defenseless civilians and civilian objects, i.e., non-combatants;
they choose soft targets that would be almost inevitably destroyed if attacks
tacks requires at least

were not prevented. Therefore,
terceptive self-defense

from achieving their

is

in

many

cases preventive, anticipatory or in-

method of preventing

the only effective

goals.

Interceptive self-defense seems to indicate that only

ready launched

is it

terrorists

legitimate to intercept

(e.g.,

when an

is

is al-

on

their

intercepting missiles

boost trajectories but not destroying them in their launching
of traditional inter-state conflicts this

attack

silos).

In the case

probably a prudent interpretation of

the right to self-defense. However, today and in the context of self-defense
against terrorist attacks (especially
tive or anticipatory

measures seem

if

the latter have access to

justified.

As

terrorism

ous process being carried out in the murky underworld,

1

14.

Gregory Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and

L.J. 165 (2000) [hereinafter Travalio].

115. Slaughter

& Burke-White, supra note 77, at 3.
116

the

it

is

WMD), preven-

usually a continu-

would be too

late or

Use of Military Force, 18 WIS. INT'L

.
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risky to rely only

on the interception of individual

attacks that have been

al-

ready irrevocably launched without attempting to destroy terrorist bases, supply lines, training

The

camps and other

similar facilities.

necessity to use military force in self-defense against terrorist attacks

drawn, for example, by the International Court of

shows that the dividing

line

Justice in the Nicaragua

Case between armed attacks and

the use of force, 116
J.L.

is

no longer

tenable,

Hargrove and J.I. Kunz, has

rightly

ever was.

if it

117

"less

grave forms" of

Dinstein, referring to

emphasized that "in

there

reality,

is

no

cause to remove small-scale armed attacks from the spectrum of armed attacks. Article 51 in

tacks."

118

The same

no way

limits itself to large, direct or

important armed

at-

criticism also applies to Article 3(g) of the Definition of

armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries "sent by or on behalf of a state," which carry out acts of armed
force against another state "of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed
Aggression, which emphasizes that actions by

attack conducted by regular forces" could be considered as acts of aggression. 119

Why

only attacks of such gravity?

Why

this difference? It

quirement of proportionality between a legitimate purpose

and the character and

is

the re-

for the use of force

scale of force necessary to achieve that purpose that has

to take care that relatively

minor incidents involving the use of military force

do not escalate (sometimes unintentionally) into whole-scale wars.
Antonio Cassese recently observed that:
As

to the specific question of

how

to react to terrorist attacks,

some

states

(notably Israel, the United States and South Africa) argued in the past that they

could use force in self-defence to respond to such attacks by targeting terrorist

on the
someway

bases in the host country. This recourse to self-defence was predicated
principle that such countries, by harbouring terrorist organisations,

promoted or at least tolerated terrorism and where therefore "accomplices":
they were responsible for the so-called indirect armed aggression. However, the
majority of states did not share let alone approve this view. Furthermore, armed
reprisals in response to small-scale use of force short of an "armed attack"
proper, have been regarded as unlawful both against states and against terrorist

116. Military
I.C.J.

117.

and Paramilitary

Activities in

and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

v.

US), Merits,

Reports 1986, para. 191 [hereinafter Nicaragua]

Many

authors have criticized this distinction drawn by the ICJ between armed attacks and

incidents." See,
e.g.,
ROSALYN HlGGINS, PROBLEM AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT, 250-51, (1994); DINSTEIN, supra note 6 at 192.

"mere
118.

border

DINSTEIN, supra note 6

at 192.

119. Definition of Aggression, supra note 112, art. 3(g).
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organisations.

framework."

The

events of

1 1

September have dramatically altered

this legal

120

This traditional attitude that

may have been

prevailing before 9/1

1

was predi-

cated on the paradigm of traditional state-to-state conflicts but today

does

it

not correspond to the character and seriousness of terrorist threats.
In the case of terrorist attacks the immediate gravity of a single attack

not be very significant indeed either because

this

is

may

a link in a chain of attacks,

more importantly, because in the case of a terrorist attack the immediate target is not the only and even the most important objective. As Michael
Reisman writes:

or even

terrorism, like any other act of unauthorised violence, has three
circles of effects including:

are

deemed, either

an immediate

expanding

effect of killing or injuring people,

for all purposes or in that context,

who

to constitute

an

internationally prohibited target; an intermediate effect of intimidating a larger

number of people and thereby
their

influencing their political behaviour and that of

government; and an aggregate

effect of

undermining inclusive public

order. 121

This means that legal frames of responses to terrorist attacks cannot be
lored

on the

basis of the experience of the

World Wars

(or

tai-

even the Gulf War

for that matter) only.

In order to provide for effective responses to terrorist attacks, international

law cannot prohibit the use of military force in self-defense in cases that the
ICJ

may have

defined as "less grave forms." 122

At

the same time, responses to

may combine significant elements of deterrence, anticipation
The changing character of jus ad bellum, it seems, will most prob-

terrorist attacks

and

reprisal.

ably lead in the short run towards the

ad bellum

—

jus

ity is central,

emergence of a kind of flexible

(soft) jus

ad bellum in which the concept of legitimacy instead of legal-

where the impact of a few

ganizations such as

NATO, G8 or G9)

the Security Council (especially

its

specially interested states (or their or-

is

crucial,

where the

legitimizing role of

P5) remains noticeable, where the practice

of some states and opinio juris of other states

may considerably differ and where

Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is also Disputing some Crucial Categories of International Law, 12
EUR. J. INT'LL. 996 (2001).
121. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7
120.

(1999).
122. Nicaragua, supra note 118, at para. 191.
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becoming more and
of guidelines enjoying consensus of the ma-

the frontiers between interstate and intrastate conflicts

is

Such a flexible set
jority of states and being supported by the world public opinion creates relative predictability and is therefore preferable to "hard," definitive and clear
more

blurred.

rules that are not observed in practice.

Terrorist Organizations

and States Supporting Them

Another specific feature of military responses to terrorist attacks arises from the
link between terrorist organizations and states in the territory, or from the territory, of which they operate. Somewhat different is the situation when a state
supports terrorists
erwise) but

its

territory

ferences, however,

support of

The

(e.g.,

financially, logistically, politically, ideologically or oth-

is

not used as a basis for launching

do not mean that the

latter

terrorist attacks. Dif-

can eschew responsibility

for

its

terrorists.

fact that non-state entities are directly responsible

under international

law for armed attacks and that states have the right to use force in self-defense

mean

which these terrorists
operate are not themselves responsible under international law. Depending
against such entities does not

on the degree of support given

or control exercised by, a state over a terror-

may be

armed attacks

car-

has been argued, however, that a mere tolerance of the presence of

ter-

organization such a state

ist

to,

that the states from

directly responsible for

ried out by terrorists.
It

rorist

groups in the territory of a state or even encouragement of their activi-

ties is

an

It

insufficient

connection to constitute an armed attack by that

state.

123

has been asserted that the state must exercise actual control over a terrorist

organization to have the latter's acts attributed to the state. 124
In the Nicaragua Case the ICJ held, for example, that assistance in the form

of providing weapons, logistical or other support did not
tack. 125

The Court found

123. See,

e.g.,

amount

to

an armed

at-

and supplying the Contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua" the United States
had been "in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to
intervene in the affairs of another state." 126 The Court also said that only "by
that by training, arming, equipping, financing

RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE AGAINST STATE SPONSORED

TERRORISM, 134

(U.S. Air

War College

A. Boyle, Military Responses
SOC'YlNT'LL. 288(1987).
124- Francis

1989).
to

Terrorism: Remarks of Francis A. Boyle, 81

125. Nicaragua, supra note 119, at para. 195.

126.

Id.,

para.

292

(3).

119
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those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3)

(i.e.,

aiding the

contras and otherwise encouraging and supporting military and paramilitary ac-

and against Nicaragua)," which involved "the use of force," had the
United States acted "in breach of its obligation under customary international
tivities in

law not to use force." 127 Here the Court clearly made a distinction between the

breach of the non-use of force principle and the concept of armed attack since

it

did not consider that any support by the United States to the Contras consti-

tuted an armed attack. However,

it is

not clear

at all as to the

by whom?) the Court spoke of in paragraph 292

(4). If

it is

Contras against the Sandinista government then should not
that the

US

kind of force (used
force used by the
it

be quite obvious

support as a whole should have been in breach of the non-use of

force principle?

Judge Stephen Schwebel in his dissenting opinion concluded that "the

Judgement of the Court on the critical question of whether aid
may be tantamount to an armed attack departs from accepted
able

—

law."

128

to irregulars

—and

desir-

Judge Sir Robert Jennings expressed a similar view stating that:

may be readily agreed that the mere provision of arms cannot be said to
amount to an armed attack. But the provision of arms may, nevertheless, be a
very important element in what might be thought to amount to armed attack,
it

where

it is

coupled with other kinds of involvement. Accordingly,

it

seems to

me

that to say that the provision of arms, coupled with logistical or other support

not armed attack

Although

it

is

going

much

too

far.

is

129

seems that during the Cold War, state practice did not con-

sider assistance in the

form of arming and financing armed groups that oper-

ated in other countries as armed attacks by supporting states (because both
parties of the
ies),

Cold

War

used to support financially and militarily their prox-

today there are rather strong arguments in favor of reconsidering such a

condescending posture towards states that support
ternational law has not always

had such

terrorist groups.

That

in-

a complacent attitude towards

attributability to states of acts of non-state entities

was recently reinforced by

the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The Appeals Chamber

ICTY

Judgement of 15 July 1999 in the
Dusco Tadic case found that "a first ground on which the Nicaragua test as
such may be held to be unconvincing is based on the very logic of the entire

127.

Id.,

para.

292

of the

in

its

(4).

128. Nicaragua, supra note 119, at Dissenting
129. Nicaragua, supra note 119, at Dissenting

Opinion of Judge Schwebel, para. 155.
Opinion of Judge Jennings, para. 543.
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system of international law on State responsibility." 130

The Chamber

stated

that under this logic
States are not allowed

on the other

on the one hand

to disassociate

to act de facto through individuals

themselves from such conduct

individuals breach international law.

The requirement

when

these

of international law for

the attribution to States of acts performed by private individuals
State exercises control over the individual.

and

is

that the

The degree of control may, however,
The Appeals Chamber

vary according to the factual circumstances of each case.
fails

to see

why in each and every circumstance

high threshold for the test of control.

The Chamber found
tice."

various

propounded by the Intervariance with international and State prac-

that "the "effective control" test

national Court of Justice
132

international law should require

131

is

at

References to state practice collected over

ILC

years, inter alia, in

on State Responsibility seem
of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.

reports

port the position

many

on the Draft

Articles

to sup-

Although one of the important features of the changing international landscape is the increasing role (both positive and negative) of non-state actors,
the world still is, and in the foreseeable future will remain, divided between
sovereign states. Therefore, terrorists necessarily act (preparing for their at-

and other support) from the territory of
some states even when they do not act on behalf of, or are not even supported,
by any state. Such states are either unable or unwilling 133 to prevent non-state
tacks, training, receiving financial

terrorist organizations using their territory for the

purposes of carrying out

at-

tacks against other states. Thereby they are committing, using the language of

the Draft Articles

on State

Responsibility recently adopted by the ILC, 134 inter-

nationally wrongful acts either by action (condoning or supporting terrorists)

130. See Prosecutor v. Tadic,

(ICTY Appeals Chambers,
131.

Id.,

para. 117.

132.

Id.,

para. 124.

133.

The term

Judgement of 15

Jul. 15,

July

1999

in the

Appeals Chamber,

at para 116,

1999).

'unwilling' should here include not only tolerance of the presence of terrorist

organizations and sympathy for their cause but also active support, assistance as well as various

degrees of control.
134. See generally Draft Articles, supra note 99.
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or by omission (not preventing attacks from
state).

135

At

although

its

another

territory against

the same time, as Gregory Travalio writes,

this

may not

necessarily preclude the use of military force in response

emanating from such

to a terrorist attack

a state, the

impotence of a state to

control international terrorist organisations would not be an armed attack
against another state, and, therefore the use of force in response

sanctioned by Article 51.

is

not expressly

136

However, this only means that the use of force is not sanctioned against
such an impotent state. This does not mean that use of force would be unlawful against the terrorist group which is present and operates in the territory of
that state.
its

If a state is

territory

state or

and

impotent to prevent the presence of

their attacks against third states

its allies

it

terrorist

groups in

must not prevent

a victim

from exercising their right to individual or collective

self-de-

armed attacks by terrorists. In such a case, the state from
o{ which a terrorist group operates is under the obligation not to

fense in response to

the territory

hinder the victim state in the exercise of
self-defense in the territory that

it is

its

right to individual or collective

unable to control.

If

such a state

tries to

prevent the exercise of the right to use force in self-defense against the terror-

becomes an accomplice of the terrorist organization and in
that case it is not important whether the state supports terrorists, or vice versa
the latter, as it seems to have been the case with al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
control the state. Otherwise, the impotence of territorial states would lead to

ist

organization,

it

impunity of terrorist organizations.

Conclusion
Simplifying a

sponded to the

bit,

the law of self-defense has, at least until recently, corre-

strictly inter-state

bilateral manifestation.

The law

nature of international society mostly in

of collective security corresponds to rather

feeble shoots of the supra-state elements in international society.

about uses of force against

its

terrorists or to protect

fundamental

But what

human

rights?

These seem to be contrary to the very nature of a strictly inter-state system.
However, the contemporary international system itself is less and less strictly

135. Article 2 of the Draft Articles states "'there

when conduct

consisting of action or omission'

is

is

breach of an international obligation of the State."
136. See Travalio, supra note 115, at 153.
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an internationally wrongful act of a State
and constitutes a

attributable to the State
Id.

at art. 2.
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an

inter-state one.

tional system

is

One

of the consequences of such a change in the interna-

the impossibility of seeing states as "black boxes."

If states tra-

ditionally collided as "billiard balls" (from the point of view of international

law) in the "armed attack

engage and continue,

—

self-defense" paradigm they could eventually dis-

more or

at least for a while, to co-exist

less peacefully

(often until the next conflict) without changing their internal, or

what usually happened. The relatively
example, ended in such a way. However, even in the

nal, characteristics. Historically, this

recent Iraq-Iran war, for
inter-state

even exter-

"armed attack

—

is

self-defense" paradigm

it

may be

necessary, in or-

der to break the cycle of violence, to change internal characteristics of some of
the participants in the conflict.

The

Germany or demilitarmay serve as examples of

de-nazification of

WW

II
and democratization of Japan after
such necessary changes. Even today there are potential, simmering or actual
conflicts between states that could find peaceful and durable solution only if
participating states (all or some) radically change their policies, including internal ones. For example, Iraq was defeated in 1991 as a result of Operation
DESERT STORM but notwithstanding measures requested from, and sanctions
undertaken against it, the regime in power in Iraq is the same as it was in 1990
and the threats it constitutes to the regional and world security are therefore

ization

the same too.

To

conducive to the

fight against terrorists

rise

without addressing circumstances

of terrorism or intervening for the sake of

without being ready to undertake considerable
ing will be in most cases simply a Sisyphean

efforts

toil.

human

rights

focused on state-build-

As Dmitri Trenin,

the future place and role of Russia in the world and referring, inter

writing
alia,

on

to the

Russian problems with Islamic militants, observes,
alternative to fighting Islamic terrorism. At the same
and humanitarian dialogue across that divide is a must, and the
development of economic links, including new communications along both
East-West and North-South axes, is one of the few instruments available to
encourage modernization and help resolve or manage the various conflicts. 137

there

is

no acceptable

time, cultural

and not against terrorism. Fighting terrorism or waging a war against terrorism (which in any case is
a non-legal concept) goes far beyond jus ad bellum or jus in bello, for that matI

ter.

prefer to discuss the use o{ force against terrorists

Fighting terrorism implies, besides fighting terrorists through military,

fi-

nancial or law-enforcement means, also addressing the conditions conducive

137. Dimtri Trenin, the End of Eurasia.
Geopolitics and Globalization, 196 (2002).

123

Russia

on the Border between

Jus ad Bellum and International Terrorism

to the

emergence and flourishing of terrorism.

the fight against terrorism

is

One

of the peculiar features of

that tough military or, depending

on circum-

enforcement measures, practically always have to be paralleled by
the search for political solutions to problems exploited by terrorists or by

stances, law

changes in the social and economic conditions that are conducive to
terrorism.

and causes of some of the most violent contemporary conflicts, states, and the societies they represent, have to become in some
important respects more similar to each other than they are today. Cultural diLooking

versity

is,

at the character

of course, a source of the rich tapestry of the world. However,

huge developmental gaps are taken

same time, that certain
that such factors

for cultural differences,

denying

when
at the

cultural factors condition the existence of these gaps,

may be

also a serious source of the wealth of

and the poverty of others, serious sources of

some

societies

cannot be ignored. If
people, for example, in Saudi Arabia or other Islamic states have only two
the corrupt and authoritarian regimes or Islamic fundamentalchoices
conflicts

—

ism

—these

societies will

gions have always

remain a

had and many

As Hamid Enayat has written,
lates of democracy
trinsic

it is

"if

fertile soil for terrorism.

axiom."

this totalitarian exclusivist trend.

because of its general character as a religion.
.

.

.

.

.

.

An in-

many a sacred
that come out of the

involves a challenge to

And Rabbi David Hartman writes:

—Judaism,

all reli-

Islam comes into conflict with certain postu-

concomitant of democracy
138

have

still

Of course,

"[a] 11 faiths

—

and Islam have the tendency to believe that they have the exclusive truth." 139 However, in contradistinction to
Christianity, Islam has not gone through what Francis Fukuyama has called
biblical tradition

Christianity

the Protestantisation of Catholicism 140 or the secularization of religious

world views. Bassam Tibi writes:
[ijn the

Middle East

as well as in other parts of the

World of Islam,

there has

never been a process of structural change underlying a substantive

worldview from a religious one to a secular one,
process that took place in Europe. Given the

as did

shift in

occur in the historical

community and dominance of the

Muslim's worldview there has never been a genuine process of secularisation in
the Middle East underlain by secular ideologies. 141

138.

Hamid Enayat, modern islamic Thought,

139.

id.

140.

Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues

Prosperity, 41 (1995).
141. Tibi, supra note 33, at 97.

124

126 (1982).
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Secularization of religious worldview has helped

Western

societies to

change

(modernize) in response to natural and social challenges. Returning to basics

is

never an adequate response to any new challenge and only adequately responding to constant challenges are societies able to develop and flourish.

Modern-

development of human rights,
including freedom of expression, and equality between sexes, is a conditio sine
qua non of the development of Islamic and other societies in the so-called deization,

including

democratization,

the

veloping world. Karim Raslan, a Malaysian lawyer, writes that:
[t]he
its

moral bankruptcy of militant Islam as embodied by the Taliban, as well as

abject failure in socio-economic terms, should

embolden the leaders of

moderate, predominantly Muslim nations such as Turkey, Indonesia and
Malaysia in their struggle against religious obscurantism and backwardness.

Needless to

Saudi Arabia, as an absolute monarchy with no concern for civil

does not constitute a model Islamic polity. 142

liberties,

He

say,

must be driven from within the Islamic world. It is doubtful whether those Islamic scholars who, as Karim Raslan
writes, try to "extract the prophetic truths from the Koran to show the inherent
compatibility of modern-day concerns with sacred texts," 143 can do what Christian scholars failed in doing. Bassam Tibi has written that:
also correctly points out that reforms

[t]he

predicament of Islamic fundamentalists

vis-a-vis

modernity has in fact

become an expression of their ambiguity: on the one hand they seek to
accommodate instrumentally all or most of the material achievements of
modernity (that is, science and technology) into Islamic civilisation; on the
other hand, they reject vehemently the adoption of the man-centred rationality
that has

made

these achievements possible. 144

As a result of that we have post-modern weapons in pre-modern hands. Bassam
Tibi further writes that "secular cultural modernity

is

worth defending against

the predations of religious fundamentalisms," and he and Ernest Gellner share
the conviction that "reason and enlightenment need also be protected from the
intellectual adventures of postmodernism." 145

142. Karim Ralsan, Now a Historic Chance
TRIBUNE, Nov. 27, 2001, at 8.
143.

to

1

agree.

Welcome Muslims

Id.

144. Tibi, supra note 33, at

1

18.

145. Id. at 47.
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Western

political correctness that

sense of guilt and

shame

not unrelated to the post-colonial

is

committed against non-Western peoples sometimes reminds of the ostrich who, facing a threat, hides its head in
sand. Something like that happens when some Western liberals discuss, or
face, threats from culturally and religiously different sources. It is correct, (and
also politically correct), to say that poverty and injustice are conducive to terfor injustices

rorism (whether they are root-causes or not,

is

another matter). However,

and

also correct (but politically incorrect), to say that often poverty

it is

injustice

due not only and not so much to the colonial or neo-colonial inheritance,
but are of endogenous, and not exogenous, origin. Chris Brown writes that:
are

the West's handling of the religious dimension of the current conflict has been

based on a rather

irritating,

if

perhaps politically understandable, double
Blair

sincere in their beliefs, but living in a

with irony

— cannot express

their

—

and George W. Bush undeniably
world where religious conviction is tinged

Tony

standard. Christians such as

own

deeply held convictions in explicitly

Christian terms for fear of alienating the decidedly un-ironic beliefs of their

and the Arab world. The sensibilities of the
have to be respected; and, indeed, respect in this

coalition partners in Pakistan
latter

—however

case seems to

irrational

mean

—

actually pandering to irrational.

The

implicit assumption

seems to be that it would be both unfair and unsafe to subject Muslim beliefs,
attitudes and behaviour to the kind of robust criticism common in Western
societies. 146

Brown

calls

it

"reverse racism" that

is

expressed, for example, in the words of

British correspondent of The Independent

beaten up in Afghanistan, but

Robert Fisk who,

who seemed

lims, the

and justify the beand violence to which they had

New Yorkers seem not to be justified in beating up Mus-

obvious explanation, writes Brown,

is

that Muslims as individuals can-

not be held morally responsible for their acts in the way
Politicians

and diplomats may be

bad habit) in avoiding
tions but journalists

Westerner, was

to understand

havior of his tormentors "given the indignities

been subjected." 147 As

as a

justified (naturally

straight talk

and

especially

when

New Yorkers

not always

lest it

can." 148

become

a

building shaky but necessary coali-

academics have to

however unpleasant or inconvenient they may

try to

uncover truths

be. Pretending that religious

Brown, supra note 63, in WORLDS IN COLLISION, supra note 47, at 295.
147. Robert Fisk, M> Beating by Refugees is Symbol of the Hatred and Fury of the
146.

INDEPENDENT, Dec.

10,

2001, at

148. Brown, supra note 63, in

1.

WORLDS

IN COLLISION, supra note 47, at 295.
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fundamentalism has nothing to do with the religion of which

it is

one of the

trends does not help.

The war
and

against terrorism requires moral clarity, intellectual sophistication

military toughness

—

qualities that are not always in

harmonious

relation-

However, only addressing all the
conditions that are conducive to the emergence and flourishing of terrorism,
searching for solutions to political situations and crises that are exploited by
terrorists but that often are real and serious, using available and creating new
criminal justice mechanisms and, finally, when necessary intelligently resortship.

This makes that war especially

ing to military coercion,

is it

difficult.

possible to control terrorism.
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tarting with the issue of the Taliban,

1

Mike Schmitt continues

bled about the legality of using force against the Taliban.
position also. Indeed, at one point
stating that

if

the Taliban resisted

I

authored an opinion

when

for

an

I

to be trou-

began

at this

editorial

page

the United States used force against

would be legally permissible to use force against the Taliban. Subsequently, I have re -thought this view and I now think the appropriate way to
deal with this issue is to recognize that the Taliban was not in fact either de jure
or de facto the lawful government o{ Afghanistan.
al

Qaeda,

it

To begin with,
in the world,

at the height of the "Taliban

Regime," only three countries

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, conducted

diplomatic relations with the Taliban. This means that 189 countries did not.

When

the

UN

Security Council ordered countries to either break relations

with the Taliban or not to have dealings with the Taliban, the number of
states with diplomatic relations
aside,

1.

I

with the Taliban became one, Pakistan. As an

believe that Pakistan was probably encouraged by a

number of states
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retain such a relationship with the Taliban in order to have a state capable of

communicating demands to the Taliban. However, almost
prise the world community did not recognize the Taliban

all

as

comthe government
states that

of a sovereign state. Moreover, at the time the United States initiated the use
of military force against the Taliban, the

UN

Security' Council,

on behalf of

the international community, had taken the position that the Taliban did not

comprise the government of a

state. In fact, the Security

has referred to them as the "faction in Afghanistan
as to ensure there

is

a clear international

Council consistently

known

as the Taliban" so

understanding that the Taliban do

not comprise the recognized government of the country of Afghanistan. 2

The

way then, to resolve the issue of whether the Taliban was the
recognized government of Afghanistan or not is to conclude that the Taliban
was a religious force that had seized control over substantial parts of Afghanistan and was trying to enforce its moral rules upon the people. I do not believe
that the Taliban viewed itself as the. government of Afghanistan. My strong
guess

easiest

is

that military leaders of the Taliban militia did not hold commissions

name

issued in the

of the government of Afghanistan nor did they think of

themselves as the armed forces of Afghanistan but rather as the enforcement

arm of

DOM

a religious organization or entity. Before Operation

ENDURING

FREE-

do not think the United States government, its citizens, or the
citizens of Afghanistan perceived that the United States was going to war with
Afghanistan. I think the perception and the reality were that the United
States was using force inside Afghanistan to bring to an end a very abusive, ilbegan,

I

legitimate, totalitarian regime, controlling the people of that country.

The

United States was liberating the people of Afghanistan not oppressing them.

On a related note,
grounds

for the

US

an argument

exists

based on humanitarian intervention

intervention in Afghanistan. After

all, if

one takes the po-

makes it unlawful for sovereign states to intervene to prevent the genocide in World War II or the slaughter of two-million
Cambodians, then international law itself has become part of the problem, not
the solution. Indeed my friend Rudy Rummel in his book Death by Government
points out that during the 20th century, probably three to four times more
sition that international law

people were slaughtered by their

throughout the entire century.

Now

let

me

raise a trivial point

Professor Schmitt.

2.

3.

Mike

own governments than

died in hostilities

3

refers to

and one I have previously discussed with
the September 11th attacks as "causing

C. Res. 1193 U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N.
RUDY RUMMELL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994).

See, e.g., S.

130

Doc. S/l 193/(1998), para.

7.

Robert Turner

damage measuring in the hundreds of millions of dollars." The reality is that this cost must be in the many billions of dollars.
Counting only the value of the human lives lost in the attack on the World
Trade Center, the cost would surely be in the billions of dollars. This is to say
nothing of the incredible clean-up efforts currently underway or the impact of
the attacks on financial institutions throughout the world. Added to this, of
property and financial

course, are the countless costs such as the lost time of business executives to
airport security, the cost of strengthening cockpit doors, the loss to the airline

industry.

These costs are only

financial in nature though.

How much

to attempt to quantify the emotional costs in fear, anger

and

more

grief?

I

difficult

recently

Naval Justice School, and my son came with me.
During my presentation, my nine-year-old son drew a picture of the World
Trade Center with some very poignant words about terrorism. This type of
emotional cost cannot be measured in dollars but it is nonetheless tremenlectured

dous.

on terrorism

at the

When all of these costs are quantified, we may well be talking in the tril-

lions of dollars.

More

nuanced difference with Mike Schmitt regarding the definition of what an "armed attack" truly is. I think Professor Schmitt
is taking a literalist approach to the UN Charter regarding the definition of an
armed attack. It is true that Article 5 1 refers to the inherent right of self defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. 4
However, Professor Schmitt also makes the point that only members of the
substantively,

I

have

a

United Nations are cloaked with the inherent right of self-defense pursuant to

While perhaps true with respect to Article 51 in the literal sense,
this is false in reality inasmuch as the inherent right to self-defense is a cornerstone of customary international law. As an example, when non-UN member
North Korea invaded non-UN member South Korea, the United Nations Security Council acted and authorized the use of force in collective self-defense.
Clearly, South Korea had this right before the action of the Security Council. Undoubtedly, the prohibition on the use of aggressive force contained in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is binding but the more important point is
Article 51.

4.

U.N. CHARTER,

art. 51,

provides that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defence

if

an armed attack occurs against a Member

of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace

and

security."
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that Article 51 of the Charter does not create the right of self-defense. 5 While
Article 5

1

was one of the most important parts of the charter,

it

was

also

an

afterthought.

The

embodied in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. With the conclusion of the Act of Chapultepec in
1945 6 which embodied the principle of collective self-defense, the United
States and its Latin American neighbors wanted the UN Charter to clearly
state that if the Security Council was blocked from taking action by a veto or
some other reason, the traditional right of collective self-defense as embodied
in the Act of Chapultepec remained unimpaired and available. This was the
ultimate purpose of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Although the drafters of the UN Charter had in mind World War I and
World War II, the French version of Article 5 1 uses the term armed aggression and not armed attack and I believe this to be the more appropriate focus
of Article 51. The question is whether there is a wrongful act involving the use
prohibition against the aggressive use of force

is

of lethal force that creates a right to use force in self-defense.
proportionality doctrine applies in this analysis

and

Mind

you, the

a small incursion will not

authorize a nuclear response or any disproportional response.

This view

is

quite clearly supported by a review of the notes exchanged at

the time of the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. Prior to entry into force of this
Pact, a

number of countries were prepared

to include reservations to their rati-

fication reserving the right to self-defense.

The US response was

diplomatic note saying the right to self-defense
pre-exists treaties,

is

to

send out a

imprescriptable. This right

inherent in treaties, and cannot be taken away, even by

is

treaty. Interestingly, the

Russian text of Article 5 1 also does not refer to the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defense but instead to the
is inherent in every state and is
and regardless of treaty provisions to
defend its territory from invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstance
require recourse to war in self-defense." Frank B. Kellogg, Address Before the American Society

5.

In 1928, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg stated "that right

implicit in

each

of International

treaty.

Law

quote constituted

Every nation

is

free at all times

(Apr. 28, 1928) in 22

official

US

PROC AM. SOCT

INT'L L. 141, 143 (1928). This

recognition at the time that the right of self-defense cannot be

restricted by treaty.
6.

Inter-American Reciprocal Treaty of Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec,

Mexico); March

6,

1945 This act provided:

[t]hat every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or

against

the sovereignty or political independence of an

American

State,

shall,

an act of aggression against the other
States which sign this Act. In any case invasion by armed forces of one State into the
territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in
conformably to Part

III

hereof, be considered as

accordance therewith shall constitute an act of aggression.
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imprescriptable right of individual or collective self-defense.

US

became

position and indeed that of the nations that

Thus, given the

signatories to the

Kellogg Briand Pact, the individual and collective right to self-defense

is

in-

deed imprescriptable.
So, to state that after entry into effect of the

UN

Charter, self-defense

is

only permissible in response to an armed attack, misses the point that lethal

members and non-members,

force continues to be available to states,

in self-

defense and in collective self-defense supporting the victims of aggression o{
the

use of lethal force by other states. Accordingly,

illegal

do not believe the

I

standard to invoke either self-defense or collective self-defense to be quite as
difficult to

achieve as perhaps Professor Schmitt indicates.

Additionally,

and Paramilitary

I

believe that the International Court of Justice in the Military

Activities

Case In and Against Nicaragua 7 quite simply, reached

the wrong conclusion. This case had

more

my view does not reflect the

political

involvement than most

Although Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that ICJ decisions have "no binding force except between the parties and in respect to that particular case," 8 such decisions are
cases

and

in

law.

often very useful for international lawyers trying to understand the developing
law.

However, with the exception of the

brilliant dissent

authored by Judge

Schwabel, the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua Case is mostly cited in disagreement. In my opinion, this particular case has absolutely no precedential value.

The

Caroline Case

I

think

better viewed as a description of anticipatory

is

defense than of self defense. 9 Others

self

may

disagree but

if

you

really

look at

the facts, the steamboat was being fitted out with the intention oi providing

support to rebels in Canada.
the Caroline

afire,

onboard sent

it

cut

it

The

adrift,

over the

falls.

British crossed the

and apparently not
I

Canadian-US border,

realizing there

think the Caroline Case

test for self-defense. Regardless of

which term

overwhelming presumption against the

may be

set

were people
too strong a

used, there ought to be

an

legality of initiating force prior to

an

is

attack by another country. But, particularly in an environment of weapons of

mass destruction, the idea that the law ought to say a Saddam Hussein gets
one more free kick before a state can defend itself strikes me as not very well
thought out.

7.

Military

1986
8.

and Paramilitary Activities

in

and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

v.

US), Merits,

14 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].

Article 59, states:

and
9.

I.C.J.

The decision of the Court has no binding force except between

in respect of that particular case. I.C.J. Statute, Article 59.

See R.Y. Jennings,

The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, 32 AM.
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seemed

to struggle a bit with justifica-

terrorist group.

Charter only talks about

states.

problem to resolve though. The Charter

This

is

so because Article

This seems to be a somewhat

is

designed to primarily defend

tremendous growth of international humanitarian law involving individuals. I think the best view is
that terrorists such as al Qaeda members are just like pirates in the sense that
the rights of states although

they are the

also set the stage for a

common enemy of mankind.

position, that terrorists

does not

it

mean

occupy the same

I

think this should be the

legal status as pirate.

official

Note

US

that this

that terrorists are not protected by international law. Just as

you cannot murder

you cannot murder, maim, or torture terrorists.
Both of these groups are entitled to some fundamental due process protections
once they have either surrendered or are under your control. However, as long
pirates,

continue to engage in piracy or ongoing acts of terrorism, they are law-

as they

ful targets.

With

respect to Rein Miillerson's paper, his notion that the

UN

Charter

continues to be updated by evolving customary international law makes great
sense.

I

also share his

Qaeda is more the marionette than the
comments on post-modern societies in Europe

view that

Taliban. Professor Miillerson's

al

and the tension created between post-modern European societies and the still
modern society of the United States were also quite intriguing. The tension
between these two models presents serious problems.
Sun Tzu teaches us that the acme of skill is not to win one hundred victories and one hundred battles but to subdue the enemy without fighting. 10 The
best way to do that with thugs such as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein
is

to demonstrate to

greatly

them

that the perceived benefits of their behavior are

outweighed by the perceived

cost.

To do

this,

the world must unite

against them.

We had to use force in

1991, but at that point

we

reestablished the credibil-

community through the Security Council. Sadly, since then,
we have largely frittered away that credibility in a variety of rather tragic incidents. At least prior to 9/11, we missed several opportunities to respond firmly
to threats to the peace and particularly the problem of terrorism. And sadly,
time is not on the side of the United States nor the other peace loving countries. In this era of weapons of mass destruction, this ostrich-like idea that the
United States should not do anything until Saddam Hussein obtains weapons
of mass destruction and delivery systems is fatally flawed. Should the United
ity

10.

of the world

SUN TZU, THE ART OF

WAR

(Samuel Griffith

134

trans., 1963).
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States really wait to act until after

destroys Israel? This approach
I

is

Saddam Hussein blows up

his neighbors or

not helpful to the cause of peace.

do not share Professor Mike Glennon's view that there

ternational law regarding the intervention of states.
against the aggressive use of force by states

is

The

is

no coherent

in-

basic prohibition

well understood.

As an example,

even before the United Nations Charter, when Adolf Hitler invaded Poland,
he claimed he was defending Germany from Poland. This was a lie but why did
Hitler bother to lie? Hitler understood that, by itself, aggression was unlawful
and that the world community viewed aggression as unlawful. Similarly, when
Kim II Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, he claimed that North Korea was
simply defending

itself

against attacks by South Korea. This too was a

lie.

These two events highlight the reality that even the worst tyrants understand
that it is illegal to engage in major acts of aggression. They mask it.
When the Sandinistas attempted to overthrow the government of El Salvador, they did a brilliant job of turning the world against the defensive response

come out and claim

of the United States. But they did not

a right to

overthrow

They did it in secret because they knew to do
so was unlawful. If you read the American and Nicaraguan briefs before the
world court, it would be hard to distinguish them. They basically gave the
same summary of the law. 11 And each party charged the other with providing
money, support and advice and said this is illegal. The question dealt with
the government of El Salvador.

whether the

US

involvement was a defensive response, or was

gression directed against Nicaragua?

I

an act of agthink the evidence now clearly shows it

was a defensive response.

11.

See Nicaragua Case, supra note

7.
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William Dalton

I

1

note with interest and some curiosity that the two presenters for

employ a

this

panel

UN Charter paradigm when discussing the war on terrorism. The

inherent right of collective and individual self-defense embodied in customary
international law might well be a

more appropriate

analytical starting point

when discussing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, however. This seems
fundamental question worthy of debate and discussion.
raised by

Rear Admiral Rempt

this

morning are

Many of the

also of a

to be a

questions

fundamental nature.

Such questions as what is the nature of terrorism, are terrorists lawful combatants, do terrorists comply with the law of armed conflict; do they wear a distinctive uniform, are they

under military command, are

import as the United States prosecutes this Global

my view,

all

questions of great

War on Terrorism.

do not qualify as lawful combatants. Instead, they are
unlawful combatants and international thugs. Given this starting point, why
In

terrorists

are nations constrained in pursuing

and eliminating international

terrorists?

Why are preemptive strikes not routinely taken? One basic reason states operate within the

framework of international law

corded state sovereignty. The
1.

William Dalton

is

Intelligence with the

a retired

UN

is

the existence and strength ac-

Charter prohibits states from engaging in

Navy captain and now serves as

US Department of Defense.

the Assistant General Counsel for

Panel

1

Commentary

aggressive wars against one another. 2

—Jus ad Bellum

Numerous mutual agreements

exist pur-

suant to this same charter that recognize, with the exception of variations
of self-defense, that the Security Council

is

the only organization that

may

authorize the aggressive use of force. This inability to use aggressive force,
properly or improperly, constrains
ism. This

when

is

how

states

respond to international terror-

quite an interesting dilemma; one almost certainly not considered

the Charter

itself

was written.

When looking at the Caroline Case, Secretary Webster was really applying a
domestic concept of self-defense

— the defender having

his

back to the wall

and having to respond immediately. Groups engaging in terrorist acts against
the United States need time to plan, to organize, to mount such attacks.
When applying the imminency requirement necessary for anticipatory selfdefense to international terrorism, there must be a lessening of the immediacy
of the threat. In other words, the requirement to have an immediate threat before anticipatory self-defense can be invoked must be moderated.
On a different matter, in looking at the close relationship between the
Taliban and al Qaeda, it is clear that a mutual dependency existed between
the two organizations. Each of these organizations enjoyed a mutual benefit
from the other. The Taliban enjoying the purchasing power of al Qaeda funds
and al Qaeda enjoyed the safe haven of Afghanistan provided by the Taliban.
In order to allay the threat presented by al Qaeda it was necessary to prosecute the Taliban as well because as long as the Taliban provided safe haven to
al Qaeda, al Qaeda continued to be an imminent threat to the coalition partners. So it was as a matter of military necessity in applying anticipatory selfdefense that action was undertaken against the Taliban. In my mind, this
made the Taliban a perfectly legitimate target. Note also, that this analysis ap3

plies to the

some

point,

current situation with Iraq.
it

will

become necessary

The key here

is

At
At some

that of necessity.

to respond to the Iraqi regime.

point the threat will be so imminent and so serious that the international

community

will

have to respond. Clearly then, the key to the overall war on

terrorism

this

notion of imminency and the exercise of the extraordinary

is

right of self-defense.

2.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the aggressive use of force by

states; Article
3.

51 recognizes the customary international law right of self-defense.

See R.Y. Jennings,

The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM.
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Discussion

On
Leslie

the Application of Force to al

Qaeda and Taliban Members

Green

do not believe that we have distinguished sufficiently between al Qaeda members and Taliban members. Bear in mind that many of the volunteers from the
United Kingdom or from other countries who went to join the Taliban had no
I

Qaeda

These volunteers were concerned with spreading a fundamentalist type of Islam. They were proselytizing,
in many cases assisting Islamic colleagues in places such as Chechnya.
The Taliban may indeed not have been the government of the people of
Afghanistan. They were, however, the de facto authority in control of most
of the territory comprising Afghanistan. If this be the case though, once
al Qaeda has been dealt with, the issue of what are we doing in Afghanistan
must be raised. Otherwise, we might be supporting a government in frustratdesire to take part in al

terrorist activities.

ing a revolution or a civil war.

word terrorism is used with too much abandon. This pejorative
has been too widely used and attributed to non- terrorist groups. Governments
have always argued that, those trying to overthrow them are terrorists. Historically, governments have also taken the position that if the group was fighting a government that was not liked, the group consisted of freedom fighters,
fighting for their liberation. Care should be taken to not become involved in
what are simply civil wars even when carried out by political ideologies that do
Finally, the

Panel

I

Discussion

Such civil wars do not
simply because we do not like them.
not appeal to

us.

—Jus ad

rise to

helium.

the level of terrorist

movements

Rein Mullerson
There are many governments which use the mantra of the Global War on Ter-

who may not be

rorism to fight their opponents

terrorists at

all.

This danger, of

and can be seen today in both Russia and Central Asia.
Our task is to distinguish between those using terror tactics and those who are
not. It is true that in Afghanistan, and also in Chechnya and other places, religious fundamentalists have used terror tactics. So one has to make distinctions
between freedom fighters genuinely struggling for independence and common
terrorists. Though I believe in many cases, if not in most cases, terrorists are
independence fighters and independence fighters are terrorists too since they
use terror tactics in order to achieve their aims. There should not be any difference whether their aims are noble, lawful or not. If they use terror tactics, they
course, always exists

are terrorists.

Now

about the distinctions between

there are these distinctions. Al

Qaeda

is

al

a

Qaeda and

the United States

made

Oi course,

worldwide net, and the Taliban was

an endogenous organization operating only

And

the Taliban.

in the territory of Afghanistan.

these distinctions

I

believe.

The United

States

demanded that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden and other leaders of
al Qaeda to it and that the Taliban dismantle the bases used by al Qaeda. The
Taliban did not comply with these requests and so the United States used

Qaeda and the Taliban.
Perhaps a fine distinction between al Qaeda and the Taliban may be that
you could initially attack only al Qaeda and then based upon the reaction of
the Taliban, attack them as well. That is to say, if the Taliban come to the assistance of al Qaeda then they too could be properly targeted. This seems to
force in self-defense against both al

me

to be too formalistic, however,

making

and international law does not require

this distinction.

Robert Turner

When

"who was the government of Afghanistan on 11 September?," I
would respond by querying whether Somalia had a government a decade ago. It
is clearly possible to have states that are so dysfunctional and so split that no authority constitutes the legitimate government. The UN Security Council, acting on behalf of the world community, has taken the position that the Taliban
asked,

140

Panel

I

Discussion

—Jus ad Bellum

was not the government of Afghanistan, referring to it only as a faction. Moreover, the Security Council had ordered all states to immediately cease support1

Given that the
Security Council had de-legitimized any Taliban claim to act on behalf of the
government of Afghanistan, it is hard to argue the case that the Taliban was
the government of Afghanistan. In my view then, the Taliban was never the leing terrorism, declaring such support a threat to the peace. 2

gitimate government of Afghanistan. This of course does not necessarily

mean

government actually existed within Afghanistan.
I am not of the same opinion as Michael Schmitt that the case for using
force against the Taliban would be easier to understand if the Taliban was the
legitimate government of Afghanistan. Subparagraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN
that a true, legitimate

Charter protects states against intervention by other
tells

us that international law

permissive. 4

is

The

states. 3

The

Lotus case

UN Charter and the Kellogg

Briand Pact say states cannot use armed force in their political diplomatic
lations against

re-

each other to solve problems. States may use force to defend
5

themselves against attacks by other states. 6 However, a large body of interna-

on

by non-state entities such as

terrorist

States are not guarantors of the security of their neighbors but they

do have

tional law

state responses to attacks

groups does not currently

exist.

a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to insure that their territory

ter
is

is

not

Having been placed on nooriginating from within their territory and thereaf-

used to launch armed attacks against other
tice that terrorist activity

is

states.

7

demonstrating an unwillingness or inability to control such

deprived to some degree of

its

activity, a state

right against non-intervention

by the ag-

grieved state. In this case, in the absence of other effective remedies, the aggrieved state

may

enter the host state for the express purpose of self-defense

against the terrorist threat.

1.

The

aggrieved state

generally attack the

SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1214/(1998), and
U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).

See generally S. C. Res. 1214, U.N.

1373, U.N.

SCOR, 54th

Sess.,

2.

Id.

3.

Article 2(4) specifically provides that "[a] 11

relations

Members

from the threat or use offeree against the

of any state, or in any other

Charter,
4.

may not

S.

C. Res.

shall refrain in their international

territorial integrity or political

independence

manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N.

art. 2(4).

Lotus Case

(Fr. v.

Turk.), P.C.I.J.

(ser.

A) No. 10

(1923), 2 Hudson,

World Court Reports 20

(1929).
5.
6.
7.

Kellogg Briand Pact, 27

U.N. Charter,
Oscar Schachter,

1626 (1984); JOHN

art.

Aug

1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 U.N.T.S. 57.

51.

Law. The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
MURPHY, STATES SUPPORT OF INTERN ATIONAL TERRORISM at 89 (1989).

International

F.
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However, when that government is actively engaged in supporting the terrorist, then it too becomes a
lawful target. Under this rationale, the Taliban were clearly a legitimate target
of the United States, after September 11th.
host state's government or attempt to overthrow

A note of caution
may not

appropriate though.

is

The

it.

general principle that states

means of resolving differences with other states
in a non-defensive setting is thoroughly agreed upon and is tremendously important to uphold. Taking the position, as some do, that there is no internause armed force as a

tional law governing use of force

is

not only

silly

but

it is

harmful to the notion

of the rule of law that prohibits states from engaging in aggressive wars.

Michael Schmitt

Once

demands of the United States, it
against ai Qaeda. At that point, the

the Taliban refused to comply with the

relinquished the exclusive right to act

Taliban right to

territorial integrity

was subordinated to the

fense possessed by the United States. This type of distinction

portance because

many

right to self-deis

of critical im-

states provide support to different rebel groups. This

argument that any state prois engaging in an armed attack

difference needs to be maintained to prevent the

viding support to a rebel group in another state

thereby authorizing the state to invoke self-defense as a basis for action.

US support of the Iraqi resistance is a great example of this. Clearly,
States does not

want

Saddam Hussein

to claim a right of self-defense against the

to be in a position

ply because the Unites States

is

The

the United

where international law permits
United States sim-

funding the acts of the Iraqi resistance.

Recognizing that the right to self-defense

may

only have applied

against al Qaeda, as soon as the Taliban interfered with the

US

initially

exercise of

became targetable as well. Such interference
would have been wrongful and would constitute an armed attack by the
that right the Taliban properly

Taliban, justifying the application of force against the Taliban by United
States and coalition forces.
forces engaged the Taliban

I

remain somewhat surprised that

on the

first

day of Operation

US

and

UK

ENDURING FREEDOM

instead of waiting until Taliban forces proved they were hostile to the exercise

of US self-defense. Certainly, had coalition forces waited until the demonstration of such hostility by the Taliban, their claim that their actions against the

Taliban were legitimate because they had been attacked and were exercising
the right of self-defense would ring truer.

142

Panel

Wolff von Heinegg
I would caution against

I

Discussion

—Jus ad Bellum

a rush to abolish recognized principles

ternational law just to serve certain purposes.

Taliban

is

for

example,

if it is

rules of in-

agreed the

the de facto regime, the Taliban should be treated as such and the

protections of the Third

members.

So

and

Geneva Convention should be

applied to Taliban

8

Christopher Greenwood

The Taliban cannot be considered anything other than the de facto government of Afghanistan immediately before the use of force in October. They controlled 80% of the territory of the country. They controlled virtually all the
power within the state and all of the ordinary organs oi government
from the central bank to the air traffic controllers. The border authorities were
taking their instructions from the Taliban. I know it was not the kind of government the civilized world is used to. However, in functioning terms it was the
government of Afghanistan. And therefore its acts are imputable to Afghanistan. I agree with Professor Schmitt that this makes the actions of the coalition
easier rather than more difficult to justify. However, I do not believe that the
question of whether it is convenient to us or not that these people were the government of Afghanistan has any real bearing on the question of whether they
were in fact the government. It seems to me that we have become all too ready
to accept interpretations of the law on the basis of the convenient result which
they produce. As lawyers we should have the integrity to say this is what we
levers of

think the law

is.

If

the consequences of that are inconvenient,

what we can do about

that.

let

us look to see

We should not, however, allow the wish to be father

to the thought.

Legitimacy of the Use of Force

Robert Turner

As

is

well established, there are two instances

used. pursuant to the

and

UN

Charter:

when

in different variations of self-defense.

patory self-defense

is

where force may be appropriately

authorized by the Security Council
9

Interceptive self-defense or antici-

the theory that force

may be used

against the prospective loss of lives caused by an

8.

See generally

Geneva Convention Relative

1949.6U.S.T. 3516.
See U.N. CHARTER

9.

arts.

to the

42 and 51.
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pre-UN Charter, that if a state was slaughtering its own citizens,
another state would have no legitimate basis for intervening as these were

historically,

purely matters internal to the affairs of the state. However, the growth of inter-

national humanitarian law subsequent to the Charter clearly recognizes that
individuals have internationally respected rights

gage in an act like genocide,

it is

and that when

not an internal matter.

It is

a state does en-

a matter of legiti-

mate global concern and international law should apply and prohibit such state
acts. To promote such international law, states must act as if it is their customary practice to recognize a limited right of the world community to intervene, to
stop massive slaughter of innocent people.

Wolff von Heinegg
There is no need to refer to humanitarian intervention as a legal justification
for the attacks on Afghanistan. There seems to be a general consensus that the
fight against terrorism justifies the action taken in and against Afghanistan and
probably in and against

all

other states similarly situated. Referring to humani-

tarian intervention as a basis for action against Afghanistan
tive,

is

counterproduc-

lessening state credibility in the fight against international terrorism.

In looking at the action taken against Afghanistan, the strongest and best
legal justification

is

self-defense. If it

are attributable to the Taliban

defense

may be

taken. This

is

tional concept of self-defense

is

proved that the acts of September

and thus

to Afghanistan, every

a very important point as

it

If

1th

measure of self-

addresses the tradi-

and what we are today ready

be within the competency of the Security Council.

1

acknowledge to

to

the Security Council in

Resolution 1373 requires states to take very concrete measure against international terrorism, every state

conferred

is

obliged to do just that.

upon states by the Security Council

for the

ternational security. Benefiting from these measures

community and not
laid

down by

gations.

just the

Such

obligations are

purpose of peace and

is

in-

the entire international

United States or Germany. So these obligations

the Security Council, for example in 1373, can be qualified obli-

When a state does not comply with such resolutions,

it

violates

its

ob-

community of states as a whole. This violation, when it
constitutes a threat like permitting al Qaeda to continue operations in Afghanistan, can then be acted upon by the affected community o( states as a
whole. Clearly in a situation like this, there is no need to advocate humanitarligations towards the

ian intervention as the basis for such actions
so strong.
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Michael Schmitt
It is

important that Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 not be inter-

preted as use of force authorizations, which they clearly were not.

would seem

to

somehow imply

ists for

al

in

The law

of self-defense

the answers necessary for determining whether the right to act ex-

all

the United States as well as the international community. Security

Council Resolution 1373
is

so

that the Security Council needs to act before

the right of self-defense matures and can be exercised.
provides

To do

is

relevant

on the

issue of whether or

not the Taliban

compliance with their obligations under international law to remove the

Qaeda

threat

on the

territory that

it

controls.

The

resolution though, was

not needed before the right to act in self-defense could be invoked by aggrieved states.

Christopher Greenwood

The

self-defense case for the use of force by the

Afghanistan

is

Americans and

their allies in

an extremely powerful one and should not be watered down in

any way by trying to squeeze interpretations out of Security Council Resolutions or referring to
stan.

This

is

humanitarian law

a classic

example of how

as the basis for intervention in

to undercut a strong case.

a supporter of humanitarian intervention,

particularly

I

Afghani-

Although

I

am

do not believe that Afghanistan is

good example of this. Instead of straining to understand actions

a

in

Afghanistan as for humanitarian purposes, we should instead stay focused on
the self-defense reasons for such actions.
If a
its

neutral state allowed a belligerent to conduct military operations from

territory or

from

ing belligerent

is

waters and refused to put a stop to that, then the receiv-

entitled to take military action in the neutral's territory to

put a stop to them.

had been

its

If

sheltering,

the neutral state intervened to protect the belligerent

then

it

present case, this argument

exposed
is

its

own armed

it

forces to attack. In the

particularly strong as the Taliban regime

was

subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations beforehand for their sup-

The Taliban made

would resist vigorously any attempt by any part of the international community to deal with
the al Qaeda presence in their territory. This is an important point as we do
not want to give credence to a theory that as soon as any state has a group of
terrorists which have operated from its territory, it exposes itself to armed attack. That very broad brush approach opens up the most horrific possibilities
because at some time or other virtually every state however hard it had tried
otherwise, had ended up with terrorists operating from its territory.
port for al Qaeda.

it

crystal clear that they
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Regime Change In Iraq

Robert Turner

Saddam Hussein's non-nuclear options are the options that truly frighten me.
As we all know, Saddam Hussein is trying to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems. However, he is also playing with smallpox that is immune to known
cures as well as with the bubonic plague. Saddam does not stop there either; he
playing with

is

all

ing fingerprints

As

sorts of biological systems that could

and that could cause

long ago as October 1990

Hussein and

continue to

I

international peace

is

I

a

major

loss of life

way.

feel that

10

Attacking regime

clearly not "assassination" but

for targeting

The consequences
there

is

killing of

elites

who

Saddam
threaten

instead a legitimate act

itself of.

The same

argu-

and eliminating Osama bin Laden.

of military action in the Middle East are frightening, as

the very real possibility that conflict with Iraq

is

around the world.

advocated the intentional

of self-defense which the United States should avail

ment can be made

be spread without leav-

may

spread and ignite

Time

the entire region. However, the penalties for inaction are even greater.
is

not on our

side.

The

best

way

for the

United States to deter Saddam and

procurement of weapons of mass destruction

his

by presenting a united front

is

with the world community that demands the unfettered access of

UN

weap-

ons inspectors.

One viable justification for attacking Iraq might well be
for assistance

a request

from

Israel

under Article 5 1 given that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly ad-

mitted to not only encouraging people to engage in terrorism, but to providing

who commit

money

to pay the families of people

liciting

such acts against the sovereign territory of Israel violates international

law and

Israel

and

its allies

suicide bombings. Clearly, so-

are entitled to act in defense of Israeli citizens.

Moreover, given that the

UN

Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and

1991 remain valid, the conditions contained in them have not been met by

Saddam

Hussein, and since

Saddam Hussein continued

to aggressively pursue

the development of weapons of mass destruction in violation of international
law,
Iraq.

it

seems clear that sufficient authority

Saddam Hussein

and I believe

it is

is

legal for the

Saddam Hussein

end the threat

10.

Robert

F.

regime change in

acting aggressively, in violation of international law,

that threat. Furthermore,
against

exists to effect a

I

as

world community to use force against Iraq to stop

also believe that

an individual

if

it is

that

is

legal to specifically use force

the best

method

available to

to world peace.

Turner, Kitting Saddam: Would

it

be a Crime?.,
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Michael Schmitt
There is a colorable argument that an international armed conflict currently
exists with Iraq and that the conflict is merely in a state of ceasefire. Given this,
to the extent that Iraq has in some form materially breached the ceasefire
agreement then recommencement of hostilities would be appropriate. This position certainly has merit.

Yoram

Dinstein

Under the jus in bello, there is nothing inherently wrong in the targeting of enemy combatants. Enemy military personnel can be attacked either collectively
or individually. Saddam Hussein, being the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi
forces,

ously,

is

a legitimate military objective for attack by the

such an attack

—

like all

combatants on the American

other attacks

side,

i.e.,

—has

United States. 11 Obvi-

to be carried out by lawful

members of the armed

forces wearing

uniform, carrying their arms openly, etc.

Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus in Bello, in LEGAL
and Ethical Lessons ofNatcs Kosovo Campaign (Andm Wall ed., 2003) (Vol. 78, US
Naval War College International Law Studies).
1 1

.

See
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Unlawful Combatancy

Yoram Dinstein

1

Combatants and Civilians

nder the jus in

bello,

combatants are persons who are either members

J

^^x

—

armed forces (except medical and religious personnel) or irrespective of such membership
who take an active part in hostilities in an inter2
national armed conflict. The jus in bello posits a fundamental principle of
distinction between combatants and non-combatants (i.e., civilians). 3 The
goal is to ensure in every feasible manner that inter-state armed conflicts be
waged solely among the combatants of the belligerent parties. Lawful combatof the

—

enemy combatants or military objectives, causing death, injury
and destruction. By contrast, civilians are not allowed to participate in the
ants can attack

1.

Professor

Naval
2.

Yoram Dinstein

War College,

See A.P.V.

is

the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law,

US

Newport, Rhode Island.

ROGERS

& P. MALHERBE, MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

29 (ICRC, 1999).
3.

See Advisory Opinion

REPORTS

226, 257.

on

Legality of the Threat or

Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996]

I.C.J.

Unlawful Combatancy

As

fighting.

a

complementary norm,

civilians "enjoy general protection against

dangers arising from military operations." 4
It is

not always easy to define what an active participation in

notes. Sometimes, the reference

is

hostilities de-

to "direct" participation in hostilities. 5 But

much light on the extent of participation
who gathers military intelligence in enemy

the adjective "direct" does not shed
required. For instance, a person

controlled territory and a driver delivering

ammunition

to firing positions are

generally acknowledged as actively taking part in hostilities (although merely
assisting in the general

war

effort

does not suffice)

6
.

A civilian may convert himself into a combatant.

In fact, every combatant

nobody is born a combatant. In the same vein, a combatant may retire and become a civilian. But at any given point a person is either
a combatant or a civilian: he cannot (and is not allowed to) be both at the
same time, nor can he constantly shift from one position to the other.
Whether on land, by sea or in the 'air, one cannot fight the enemy and remain a civilian. Interestingly, this general norm first began coalescing in the
law of sea warfare. By the time of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, Article 1
proclaimed: "Privateering is, and remains, abolished." 7 Privateers were private
is

a former civilian:

persons

(at

times

known

as corsairs,

tained official letters of marque from a government, allowing

enemy merchant
it

ships.

8

As

who

not to be confused with pirates)

them

ob-

to attack

the language of the Declaration of Paris indicates,

merely confirms the abolition of privateering as "an already established

ation" under customary international law.
ultimately adjusted to proscribe parallel

9

The law

of land (and

air)

situ-

warfare

modes of behavior.

Combatants can withdraw from the hostilities not only by retiring and becoming civilians, but also by becoming hors de combat. This can happen either by choice (through laying down of arms and surrendering) or by force of

4-

Protocol Additional to the

Geneva Conventions of 12 August

1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, reprinted in THE
Laws of armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, resolutions and Other
DOCUMENTS 621, 651 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds., 3rd ed., 1988) (Article 51(1))
[hereinafter LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT].
LAWS OF
5. See ROGERS & MALHERBE, supra note 2, at 29. Cf. Article 51(3) of Protocol
Armed Conflict, supra note 4, at 651.
I,

ROGERS

& MALHERBE, supra note

6.

See

7.

Paris Declaration Respecting

4, at
8.

29.

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

supra note

787, 788.

See Ulrich Scheuner, Privateering, 3

1120-1121
9.

2, at

Maritime Law, 1856,

Id.

(R.

Bernhardt

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

ed., 1997).

at 1122.
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circumstances (by getting wounded, sick or shipwrecked).
is

hors de combat and

falls

enemy

into the hands of the

is

A combatant who

in principle entitled

war means denial of liberty, i.e., detention for the duration of the hostilities (which may go on for
many years). However, that detention has only one purpose: to preclude the
further participation of the prisoner of war in the ongoing hostilities. The detention is not due to any criminal act committed by the prisoner of war, and he
to the status of a prisoner of war. Being a prisoner of

cannot be prosecuted and punished "simply

for

having taken part in

hostili-

ties." 10

While his liberty is temporarily denied, the decisive point is that the
life, health and dignity of a prisoner of war are guaranteed. Detailed provisions
to that end are incorporated in Geneva Convention (III) of 1949. 11
Lawful and Unlawful Combatants
Entitlement to the status of a prisoner of war

emy

—

is

—upon being captured by the en-

vouchsafed to every combatant, subject to the conditio

The

sine

qua non

between lawful and unlawful
combatants complements the fundamental distinction between combatants
and civilians: the primary goal of the former is to preserve the latter. 12 The jus in
bello can effectively protect civilians from being objects of attack in war only if
and when they can be identified by the enemy as non-combatants. Combatants
"may try to become invisible in the landscape, but not in the crowd." 13 Blurring
the lines of division between combatants and civilians is bound to result in cithat he

is

a lawful combatant.

vilians suffering the

distinction

consequences of being suspected

as covert

combatants.

Hence, under customary international law, a sanction (deprivation of the
leges of prisoners of war)

is

ian in order to mislead the

imposed on any combatant masquerading

enemy and avoid

An enemy civilian who does not take up
ticipate actively in the hostilities,
life,

health and dignity (as

his personal liberty

is

is

arms, and does not otherwise par-

guaranteed by the jus in bello not only his

done with respect

to prisoners of war), but

GC III]

reprinted in

even

which cannot be deprived (through detention) without

ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR:
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS
Geneva Convention

as a civil-

detection.

10.

11.

privi-

(III)

A

STUDY

IN

82 (1976).

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949 [hereinafter

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

supra note 4, at 423.

12. See Theodor Meron, Some Legal Aspects of Arab Terrorists' Claims to Privileged Combatancy,
40 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET 47, 62 (1970).
13. Denise Bindschedler- Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts, THE LAW OF

ARMED

CONFLICTS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,

1,

43 (1971).
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cause. But a person
a civilian

is

not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of

and the helmet of

a soldier.

A person who engages

by night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by day,
ian nor a combatant.

Upon

He

is

in military raids

is

civil-

an unlawful combatant.

being captured by the enemy, an unlawful combatant

combatant (and unlike

neither a

a civilian)

—

is

—

like a lawful

subject to automatic detention. But in

contradistinction to a lawful combatant, an unlawful combatant

fails

to enjoy

the benefits of the status of a prisoner of war. Hence, although he cannot be

executed without

trial,

he

is

susceptible to being prosecuted

and severely pun-

ished for any acts of violence committed in the course of the hostilities in

which he has participated. The legal position was summed up by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the Quirin case of 1942 (per Chief Justice
Stone):

agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction
between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations
and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful
[b]y universal

combatants are subject to capture and detention

as prisoners of war

by opposing

Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
military forces.

tribunals for acts

which render

With the exception of the

last

their belligerency unlawful. 14

few words,

this

is

an accurate

reflection of the jus

in bello.

What can

unlawful combatants be prosecuted and punished for?

Quirin judgment refers to

The

and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which render their belligerency unlawful." Admittedly, sometimes the act
which turns a person into an unlawful combatant constitutes by itself an of"trial

fence (under either domestic or international law) and can be prosecuted and

punished

as

proceedings

such before a military tribunal. But on other occasions the

may be conducted

before regular courts and,

more

judicial

significantly,

they are likely to pertain to acts other than those that divested the person of
the status of lawful combatant.

Even when the

act negating the status as a

combatant does not constitute a crime per se (under either domestic or
international law), it can expose the perpetrator to ordinary penal sanctions
(pursuant to the domestic legal system) for other acts committed by him that
are branded as criminal. Unlawful combatants "may be punished under the inlawful

ternal criminal legislation of the adversary for having

14.

Ex

parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,30-31 (1942).
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in violation of its provisions (e.g., for murder),

war crimes under international law."

tute

At bottom, warfare by

its

even

these acts do not consti-

if

15

very nature consists of a series of acts of violence

homicide, assault, battery and arson) ordinarily penalized by the criminal

(like

codes of

countries.

all

Richard Roe

When

(a soldier

a

combatant, John Doe, holds a

rifle,

aims

it

at

belonging to the enemy's armed forces) with intent to

and causes Richard Roe's death, what we have is a premeditated homicide fitting the definition of murder in virtually all domestic
penal codes. If, upon being captured by the enemy, John Doe is not prosecuted
for murder, this is due to one reason only. The jus in bello provides John Doe
with a legal shield, protecting him from trial and punishment, by conferring
kill,

pulls the trigger,

upon him the

status of a prisoner of war. Yet, the shield

condition that John

Doe

is

a lawful

combatant.

If John

available only

is

Doe

on

acts as he does be-

yond the pale of legal combatancy, the jus in bello simply removes the protective shield. Thereby, it subjects John Doe to the full rigor of the enemy's
domestic legal system, and the ordinary penal sanctions provided by that law
will become applicable to him.
There are several differences between the prosecution of war criminals and
that of unlawful combatants. 16 The principal distinction is derived from the

War

active or passive role of the jus in bello.
serious violations of the jus in bello
in bello refrains

With unlawful combatants,

itself.

from stigmatizing the acts

mantle of immunity from the defendant,

criminals are brought to

as criminal. It

who

is

trial for

the jus

merely takes off a

therefore accessible to penal

charges for any offence committed against the domestic legal system.
also

It is

trial),

noteworthy

unlawful combatants

tion without
cally

trial.

mentioned

war criminals (who must be brought

that, unlike

may

simply be subjected to administrative deten-

Detention of unlawful combatants without

as

an option

to

in the Quirin case (as

trial

was

specifi-

quoted above), and the

option has indeed been used widely by the United States in the war in Afghanistan (see infra).

Detention of unlawful combatants
Israel,

ants

passed by the Knesset in 2002.

also the subject of special legislation of

17

This Detention of Unlawful Combat-

Law defines an unlawful combatant

directly

15.

is

—

as

anyone taking part

in hostilities against the State of Israel,

who

—

is

directly or in-

not entitled to

Rosas, supra note 10, at 305.

16. See Yoram Dinstein, The Distinction between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 103-116 (Essays in Honour of Shabtai

Rosenne, Y. Dinstein
17.

ed., 1989).

See Detention of Unlawful

Combatants Law, 2002, 1834
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[S.H.] 192.
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Geneva Convention (III). 18 Detention is based on
of the chief of staff of the armed forces, on grounds of state secu-

prisoner of war status under

the decision
rity,

but

subject to judicial review by a (civilian) district court (both

it is

ini-

and every six months thereafter). The law emphasizes that detention is
just one option, and that an unlawful combatant can equally be brought to
20
An important point addressed by the law is the
trial under any criminal law.
maximum duration of the detention. An unlawful combatant can be held in
detention as long as the hostilities of the force to which he belongs have not
been terminated. 21
19

tially

The Entitlement

Article

1

Annexed

War Status under Customary
International Law

to Prisoner of

Customs of War on Land,
of 1899 and Hague Convention (IV) of

of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and
to

Hague Convention

(II)

1907, proclaims:
[t]he laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:

also to militia

1.

To

2.

To have

3.

To

4.

To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 22

be

commanded by

a person responsible for his subordinates;

a fixed distinctive

carry arms openly;

emblem

recognizable at a distance;

and

Article 2 adds a provision entitled "Levee

en masse," which reads

in the revised

1907 version:
It] he inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops

without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article

18.

Id.

(Section 2).

19.

Id.

(Sections 3, 5).

20.

Id.

(Section 9).

21.

Id.

(Sections 7-8).

22.

Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of

Convention

(II)

of 1899 and

Hague Convention

(IV)

supra note 4, at 63, 75.
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if

they respect the

23

Article 3 prescribes further:
consist of combatants

if

Dinstein

u

[t]he

armed

forces of the belligerent parties

and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the en-

emy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war." 24 As

who

are not

may

employed by the armed

forces, yet

far as civilians

accompany them,

Article 13

stipulates:

who

army without directly belonging to it, such as
newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers and contractors, who fall into
the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, are entitled
[individuals

follow an

to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate

from the military authorities of the army which they were accompanying. 25

The Hague formula
tions for lawful

combatancy:

fixed distinctive

dance with the

thus establishes four general

emblem,

(i)

(iii)

—and cumulative—condi-

subordination to responsible

carrying arms openly,

and

jus in bello. In the special setting of a

command,

(ii)

a

conduct in accor"levee en masse," condi(iv)

and (ii) are dispensed with, and only conditions (iii) and (iv) remain
valid. These provisions of the Hague Regulations (like others) "are considered
to embody the customary law of war on land." 26
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 retain the Hague formula, making it
even more stringent. Article 4(A) of Geneva Convention (III) sets forth:
tions

(i)

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging
to

one of the following
(1)

categories,

who have

fallen into the

power of the enemy:

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict,

as well as

members

of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2)

Members of other

militias

and members of other volunteer corps,

including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their
territory

is

including

own

territory,

even

if this

occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,

such

organized

resistance

movements,

fulfil

the

following

conditions:

23.

Id. at

24.

Id.

75-76.

at 76.

25. Id. at 79.
26. See G.I.A.D. Draper,

The

Status of Combatants

Y.B.INT'LL. 173, 186(1971).
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and
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Question of Guerilla Warfare, 45 BRIT.
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(a)

commanded by

being

of

that

a

person

responsible

for

his

subordinates;
(b) that
(c)

of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

that of carrying arms openly;

(d) that

of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and

customs of war.
(3)

Members

of regular

armed

forces

who profess

allegiance to a

government

or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

who accompany

armed forces without actually being
members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
(4)

Persons

members

the

thereof, such as civilian

annexed model.
(5)

Members

of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the

merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict,
who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions
of international law.
(6)

Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory,

enemy spontaneously

who on

the approach of the

take up arms to resist the invading forces, without

having had time to form themselves into regular armed

units,

carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

This language

is

provided they

27

Geneva Convention (I) 28
4(B) of Geneva Convention (III) goes

replicated in Article 13 of both

and Geneva Convention (II). 29 Article
on to create two further categories of persons that should be treated as prisoners of war: one relating to occupied territories (members of armed forces who
have been released from detention in an occupied territory and are then

27.
28.

Geneva Convention
Geneva Convention

III, art. 4,
(I)

for the

in

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

supra note 4, at 430, 431.

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and

Sick in

1949, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 373, 379-380.
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note

Armed Forces in the Field,
29.

4, at

401, 408.
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and the other pertaining

forces of belligerents

who

to neutral countries

(members of

reach neutral territory and have to be in-

terned there as required by international law). 31 Article 4(C) states that nothing in the above provisions affects the status of medical personnel

and

who, under Article 33 of Geneva Convention (III) cannot be
taken prisoners of war, but may be retained by the Detaining Power with a
chaplains

32

view to assisting prisoners of war. 33

The

and foremost category of persons entitled to the status of prisoners
of war covers members of the armed forces of the belligerent Parties, including
all their different components. These are the regular forces of the belligerents.
It

first

does not matter what the semantic appellation of regular forces

(they

is

may

under the technical designation of militias); how they are structured; whether military service is compulsory or voluntary; and whether the

function,

e.g.,

armed forces or consist of reservists called to action.
The distinction is between regular forces of all types, on the one hand, and irregular forces in the sense of partisans or guerrilla forces, on the other.
On the face of it, the Geneva Conventions do not pose any conditions to
the eligibility of regular forces to prisoners of war status. Nevertheless, regular
units are part of standing

from meeting the cumulative conditions binding

forces are not absolved
irregular forces.

naturally
ted.

The

There

simply a presumption that regular forces would

is

meet those conditions. But the presumption can
issue

came

Mohamed

to the fore in the

Privy Council held (per Viscount Dilhorne) that
that a person belongs to the regular

the status o{ a prisoner of war.

34

armed

The

definitely

Ali case of 1968,
it is

where the

not enough to establish

forces, in order to

Privy Council

be rebut-

guarantee to him

pronounced that even

members of the armed forces must observe the cumulative conditions imposed
on irregular forces, although this is not stated expressis verbis in the Geneva
Conventions or in the Hague Regulations. 35 The facts of the case related to Indonesian soldiers who at a time of a "confrontation" between Indonesia and

—

30. This special category

makes

it

"impossible for an occupying

Power to deprive

prisoners of war

of the benefit of the convention through the subterfuge of release and subsequent arrest."

Raymond

Yingling

& Robert Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM.

405-406 (1952).
31. Geneva Convention III,
32.

Id.

at 432.

33.

Id.

at

34.

Mohamed

35.

Id.

at

art.

4(B), in

J.

INT'L L. 393,

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 43 1-432.

442-443.
Ali v. Public Prosecutor, [1969]

1

449-450.
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Malaysia

—planted explosives
wearing civilian

while

sia)

in a building in Singapore (then a part of Malay-

The

clothes.

committing an act of sabotage while not

The

prisoner of war status.

members of the armed

forces

in

confirmed

the

a regular soldier

uniform loses the entitlement to a

—concerning German
uniforms when on sabotage
had landed by submarine) —

earlier Quirin

who

Council

on the ground that

appellants' death sentence for murder,

36

Privy

judgment

took off their

mission in the United States (where they

a

is

to the

effect. 37

same

The second

Geneva Conventions
and the like, however they call

category of prisoners of war under the

pertains to irregular forces: guerrillas, partisans

themselves. This

is

the most problematic category, given the proliferation of

such forces in modern warfare. The Geneva Conventions repeat the four

Hague conditions verbatim. However, two
from the chapeau of Article 4(A)
party to the conflict.

One more

organization,

(2): (v)

condition

Geneva Conventions:

text of the

(vii)

additional conditions are implied

is

and

(vi)

belonging to a

distilled in the case

law from the

lack of duty of allegiance to the De-

taining Power.

Each of the four Hague conditions, and the additional three conditions, deserves a few words of explanation:

The

first

condition

—

signed to exclude the possibility of activities
as "franc-tireurs")

forces
is

is

on

their

own. The operation of small units of

irregular

permissible, provided that the other conditions are fulfilled, but there

no room

—

—

is

—

emblem recognizable at a
predicated on two elements. The emblem in question must meet
of having a fixed distinct

the dual requirement of distinction
force using

—

John Doe or Richard Roe especially in
cannot legitimately conduct a private war against the

for individual initiatives.

an occupied territory
enemy.
The second condition
distance

—

commander is deof individuals (known in French

of subordination to a responsible

it)

and

fixity (to wit,

by ceaselessly changing

emblem

its

(i.e., it

the force

distinctive

is

must

identify

and characterize the

not allowed to confuse the enemy

emblem). The most obvious fixed

dis-

armed forces is that of a particular uniform. But irregular armed forces need not have any uniform, and suffice it for them to possess
a less complex distinctive emblem: part of the clothing (like a special shirt or
tinct

of regular

particular headgear) or certain insignia. 38

36.

Id.

at

451-454.

Ex parte Quirin, supra note 14, at 35-36.
JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY III: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 60 (1960).
37.
38.
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emblem must be worn throughout every

military opera-

which the combatant takes part (throughout means
from start to finish, namely, from the beginning of deployment to the end of disengagement) and the emblem must not be deliberately removed at any time in
tion against the

in

,

the course of the operation. 39

as training or administration)

tions

its

language. Thus,

emblem

must be reasonably

interpreted.

draw attention to

to military operations (such

.

condition of having a fixed distinctive

owing to

dis-

40

that the distinctive

to

combatants are not bound to wear the

emblem when discharging duties not linked

tinctive

The

Still,

it is

emblem

not easy to

be recognizable

will

fully

raises a

number of ques-

understand the obligation

at a distance.

The

phraseology

Combatants seeking to stay alive do not attempt
themselves. On the contrary, even soldiers in uniform are

prone to use camouflage. This

a legitimate ruse of war, 41 as long as the

is

combat-

ant merely exploits the topographical conditions: the physical as distinct from the

demographic landscape of civilians. 42 Another question
fare.

Needless to

say, if the

emblem, that emblem
is

is

germane to night war-

combatant does not carry an illuminated

distinctive

not be recognizable at a distance in the dark. Again,

will

it

important that the terse and imperfect wording would not overshadow the

thrust of the condition,

so

must

which

is

crystal clear. Just as regular forces

irregular forces use a fixed

emblem which will distinguish them

—from

nary circumstances and in a reasonable fashion

The

issue

is

wear uniforms,

—

in ordi-

the civilian population.

not whether combatants can be seen, but the lack of desire on their

part to create the false impression that they are civilians.
It

should be added that

a tank
for

—and,

when combatants go

to (or from) battle in a vehicle or

similarly, if they sail in a vessel or fly in

an

aircraft

—

it is

not enough

each individual person to carry the distinctive emblem: the vehicle or other
identified. 43

By the same token, the external
marking of the vehicle or platform does not absolve the combatants on board
from having their personal distinctive emblems. As for members of the crew of a
platform must

itself

be properly

military aircraft, there

(non-binding) 1923

39.

Howard

Levie

ed.,

Levie,

a specific provision to that effect in Article 15 of the

is

Hague Rules of Air Warfare, where

explained that this

is

PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 47 (Howard

S.

1978), (Vol. 59,

US

Naval

War

College International

it is

Law

Studies).

WALDEMAR SOLF, Article 44, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
40.

CONVENTIONS OF 1949

241, 252 (M. Bothe et

41. Article 37(2) of Protocol

I,

in

al. eds.,

1982).

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

42.

Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 13, at 43.

43.

DE PREUX, supra note

38, at 60.
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supra note 4, at 645.
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required in case the
craft."

members of the crew "become separated from

their

air-

44

The

third condition

—of

mean

the second. Does this

carrying arms openly
that a combatant

is

—

brings up similar issues as

barred from carrying a hand-

hand grenades in a pouch? The question is patently rhetorical. Once more, what counts is not the ambiguous language but the gist of the
condition. A lawful combatant must abstain from purporting to be an innocent civilian, with a view to facilitating access to the enemy by stealth. He
must carry his arms openly in a reasonable way, depending on the nature of
the weapon and the circumstances at hand.
gun

in a holster or

The

fourth condition

—conduct

in

—

accordance with the jus in bello

key to lawful combatancy. Unless a combatant

he

enjoying

benefits. 45

its

These are the
tions.

Hague

original

As mentioned, the

Conventions:

The

fifth

condition

the

willing himself to respect the

when

estopped from relying on that body of law

jus in bello,

is

is

is

conditions, endorsed by the

desirous of

Geneva Conven-

following additional conditions are derived from the

—

organization

—

actually reinvigorates the

first

condi-

somewhat different way. Lawful combatants must act within a hierarchic framework, embedded in discipline, and subject to supervision by upper
echelons of what is being done by subordinate units in the field.
tion in a

The

sixth condition

—belonging

to a party to the conflict

—got

a practical

expression in the 1969 judgment of an Israeli military court in the Kassem
case. 46

Here

a

number of people who belonged

to

an organization

calling itself

the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" crossed the Jordan River

from the East Bank (the Kingdom of Jordan) to the West Bank
pied territory) for sabotage purposes.
rity offences,

(Israeli

occu-

When captured

they claimed entitlement to

and charged with secuprisoners of war status. The Israeli

must belong to a party to the con
47
Since no Arab government at war with Israel had assumed responsibilflict.
which was indeed illegal in the
ity for the activities of the Popular Front
Kingdom of Jordan the condition was not fulfilled. 48 The judgment was criticized by Georg Schwarzenberger on the ground that the Geneva Conventions
Military Court held that irregular forces

—

—

44.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923,

art. 15, in

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

supra note 4, at

207, 209.
45. See Levie, supra note 39, at 50-51.
46. Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 INT'L L.
47.

Id.

at 476.

48.

Id.

at

R

477-478.
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were not meant to

limit the
49

Dinstein

scope of lawful combatancy under preexisting

Geneva Conventions,
the premise was that the Hague conditions apply only to combatants acting on
behalf of a state party to the conflict. 50 It is evident that the members of an independent band of guerrillas cannot be regarded as lawful combatants, even if
rules of international law.

However, even

prior to the

they observe the jus in bello, use a fixed distinctive emblem, and carry their

One way

arms openly.

government

is

—

is

can, of course, argue whether Palestinian

belonged at the time to a party to the conflict. But the con-

irreproachable.

The seventh and
Power

One

necessary." 51

is

guerrillas factually

dition itself

or another, "a certain relationship with a belligerent

condition

last

—of

non-allegiance to the

Detaining

not specifically mentioned in the Geneva Conventions, and

rived from the case law.

The

principal authority
52

is

is

de-

the 1967 Judgment of the

which captured Indonesian paratroopincluded a number of Malays convicted and seners
landing in Malaysia
tenced to death for having unlawfully possessed arms in a security zone. The
question on appeal before the Privy Council was whether they were entitled
to prisoners of war status. The Privy Council held (per Lord Hodson) that
nationals of the Detaining Power, as well as other persons owing it a duty of
Privy Council in the Koi case,

—

in

—

allegiance, are not entitled to such status. 53 This

was viewed by the Privy

54

Although the condition
does not appear in the text of Article 4(A), the Privy Council found other
provisions of Geneva Convention (III)
specifically Articles 87
and
55
100
in which it is clearly stated that prisoners of war are not nationals of
the Detaining Power and do not owe it any duty of allegiance. 56
Council as a rule of customary international law.

—

—

The requirement of nationality (or allegiance) has to be approached carefully. The fact that a combatant belonging to state A
captured by state B is
a national of state C, does not make any difference. A German soldier in the

—

—

French Foreign Legion was entitled to

49.

Georg Schwarzenberger, Human

252(1971).
Lester Nurick

50.

Rights

a prisoner of

war status

and Guerrilla Warfare,

1

ISR. Y.B.

in the Indo-

HUM.

RTS. 246,

& Roger Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla Forces under the Laws of War, 40 AM.

J.

INT'LL. 563, 567-569(1946).
51.

Bindschedler- Robert, supra note 13, at 40.

52.

Public Prosecutor v. Koi, A.C. 829 (1967).

53.

Id.

at

856-858.

54.

Id.

at

856-857.

55.

Geneva Convention III,

arts.

87

& 100, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 460,

464.
56.

Koi, supra note 52, at 857.
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China War. But such a soldier would not have been
if fighting in a war against Germany.

The Koi

Geneva Convention

(III),

same

status

Under

case occasions also a question of the law of evidence.

(para. 2) of

cle 5

entitled to the

should any doubt

Arti-

arise as to

whether certain persons belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article
4, they enjoy the Convention's protection until their status is determined by a

competent tribunal. Opinions in the Privy Council were divided as to whether
the mere allegation by a defendant that he is a foreign national generates
doubt in accordance with Article 5: the majority held that that was the legal
position, but a minority dissented. 57 The more central issue is that of the bur-

den of proof. The minority opined that the burden of proof lies on the defendant, who must show that he is entitled to prisoner of war status (and
consequently that he is not a national of the Detaining Power). 58 The majority
did not address the point. But the correct position apparently is that, once a
defendant persuades the court that he is a member of the enemy armed forces,
the burden of proof that he owes allegiance to the Detaining Power (and is
therefore not entitled to prisoner of war status) falls on the prosecution. 59 Incontestable, the defendant first has to establish that he is a member of the enemy armed forces.
It is

not easy for irregular forces to observe cumulatively the seven condi-

tions catalogued or

—

for that

matter

—even the core

four

Hague

conditions.

These conditions are actually patterned after the operations of regular forces
(to which they do not explicitly allude). Regular forces are organized, are subject to hierarchical discipline, and naturally belong to a party to the conflict;
they have a proud tradition of wearing uniforms and carrying their arms
openly; they are trained to observe the jus in bello; and the issue of allegiance
scarcely arises. However, with irregular forces (to whom the conditions expressly refer), the position

the difficulty to

emblem and

is

not so simple. Even

meet both the

(ii)

carrying arms openly)

the essence" of guerrilla warfare.

ments of World

War

II

did not

60

and
is

(iii)

if

other problems are ignored,

conditions (of a fixed distinctive

blatant, "since secrecy

Most of the partisan

fulfil all

and

surprise are

move-

(resistance)

the cumulative conditions.

61

From

a

855, 865.

57.

Id. at

58.

Id.

59.

Richard Baxter, The Privy Council on

at 864.
the Qualifications of Belligerents,

63

AM. J.

INT'L L. 290,

293 (1969).
60.

Richard Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency':

Spies, Guerrillas,

and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT.

Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 328 (1951).

61

Jean Pictet, The

New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims,

462,472(1951).
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practical standpoint,

many

tantamount to committing
cerned." 62

believe that "obedience to these rules would be
suicide, as far as

these are the

Still,

Dinstein

most

guerrillas

would be con-

norms of the Hague Regulations, the Geneva

Conventions, and customary international law.

Under the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, and customary
international law, the only time that the cumulative conditions are eased

is

en masse." It must be accentuated that this category applies only
to the inhabitants of unoccupied areas, so that there is no "levee en masse" in
occupied territories. The idea (originating in the French Revolution 63 ) is that
that of "levee

at the point of invasion

— and

in order to forestall

occupation

— the

civilian

population takes arms spontaneously, without an opportunity to organize.

This

and

an extraordinary situation

is

as

an interim stage

—

which for a short while
no need to meet all seven cu-

in the course of

in the fighting

— there

is

mulative conditions to the status of lawful combatancy.

The Hague Regula-

and Geneva Conventions enumerate only two cumulative conditions:
carrying arms openly and respect for the jus in bello (conditions (iii) and (iv)).
It follows that there is no need to meet the two other Hague conditions of subordination to a responsible commander and using a fixed distinctive emblem
(conditions (i) and (ii)). Given the postulate that there was no time to orgations

nize,

condition

(v)

is

inapplicable. Condition (vi)

civilian population resists invasion, the

conflict

is

moot.

On

the other hand,

tionality (or allegiance)

is

also irrelevant:

when

problem of belonging to a party to the

it is

arguable that condition

(vii)

is

bound

of na-

remains in place. In any event, the transitional phase

of "levee en masse" lapses ex hypothesi after a relatively short duration.
three things

the

One

of

to happen: either the territory will be occupied (despite

the "levee en masse"); or the invading force will be repulsed (thanks to the

en masse" or to the timely arrival of reinforcements); or the battle of
defense will stabilize, and then there is ample opportunity for organization.
Both the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions equate the position of certain civilians
employed by or accompanying the armed forces to
that of lawful combatants as far as prisoners of war status is concerned. Evidently, the fact that a civilian is employed by or accompanies the armed forces
does not turn him into a combatant. Hence, the question of the fulfilment of
most of the cumulative conditions does not arise. Yet, in all instances condi"levee

—

tion (iv)

62.

Gerhard von Glahn, The

HUM.
63.

24

must be regarded

—

as

paramount: anybody seeking the privileges of the

Protection of

Human

Rights in

Time of Armed

Conflicts,

1

ISR. Y.B.

RTS. 208, 223 (1971).

On the origins of the institution, see Walter Rabus, A New Definition of the
NETH

INT'L

L.

REV. 232 (1977).
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jus in bello

must himself respect the laws from which he proposes to

Condition

(vii)

Should the

civilian bear light

of nationality

—or

arms

allegiance

—

benefit.

also relevant to civilians.

is

for self-defense,

condition

(iii)

relating to

carrying the arms openly will apply.

Who

should observe the seven conditions: the individual or the group of

which he

is

a

member? The

The assumption

is

not arise with respect to regular troops.

issue does

that these forces collectively

fulfil all

the conditions, and to

John Doe but not
an entire army. In the Mohamed Ali and Koi cases, there was no doubt that
members of the armed forces of Indonesia generally wear uniforms and do not
owe allegiance to Malaysia, although the defendants in the dock failed to meet
these conditions (and were therefore denied prisoners of war status). However, where irregular forces are concerned, the question whether the conditions of lawful combatancy are met may relate both to a guerrilla movement
collectively and to each of its members individually. The answer to the questhe extent that there

tion

is

doubt in the concrete case,

it

affects

contingent on the various conditions.

is

The

addressee of conditions

(v)

(i),

and

(vi) is clearly

the group collectively,

and not any of the members individually. It is necessary to ascertain that the
group as a whole is organized, has a responsible commander and belongs to a
party to the conflict. Should that be the case, the
plied to

members

all

rected at each

member

link of nationality
tions:

(ii),

(iii)

o( the group.

is

and

64

The

same yardsticks must be ap-

reverse applies to condition

(vii), di-

of the group rather than the group as a collective: the

determined individually. In between are the other condi-

(iv).

Condition

(ii)

on

a fixed distinctive

emblem

requires

some preliminary action on the part of the group, which must adopt its identifying emblem; if it does not do that, no member of the group is capable of meeting the condition. Still, even if the group adopts a fixed distinctive emblem,
that does not mean that John Doe will use it at the critical time (just as the de-

Mohamed Ah'
If John Doe fails to do

fendants in the

case did not wear their uniforms at the critical

time).

that, his

misconduct does not contaminate the

entire group, but the personal consequences are liable to be dire.

As

for conditions

the jus in bello

—

(iii)

on

a

(iv)

—

carrying arms openly and observance of

the present writer believes that the correct approach

their fulfilment should be

secondarily

and

group

monitored primarily on an individual

basis.

That

is

to say,

if

basis

is

that

and only

observance of these conditions

comes to a test in reality, John Doe has to answer for his
actual behavior. However, if no opportunity for such individual verification
in the individual case

64- See Draper, supra note 26, at 196.
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—

presents itself

for instance,
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when John Doe

is

captured in possession of arms

but before setting out to accomplish any hostile mission
tablish

how

—

it is

possible to es-

the group behaves in general and extrapolate from the collectivity

to the individual. If the group as a

whole has

a record of disrespect for the jus

John Doe prisoner of war status. Conversely, if the group as a whole generally acts in compliance with the jus in
bello, John Doe should be allowed to benefit from doubt. It has been contested
even if John Doe actually observes the jus in bello he should not be
that
deemed a lawful combatant when the group as a whole generally acts in
breach of that body of law. 65 This is unassailable in extreme cases, like al
in bello, there

no need

is

to accord

—

—

Qaeda. But

if

should be judged on the merits

comrades

members of the group is uneven, John Doe
of his own case and not on the demerits of his

the conduct of the

at arms.

The Legal Position under Protocol

The

legal position

is

radically

I

of

1977

changed pursuant to Additional Protocol

I

of

1977. Article 43 of the Protocol promulgates:
1.

The armed

armed

forces of a Party to a conflict consist of organized

groups and units which are under a

conduct of its subordinates, even

if

command

that Party

is

responsible to that Party for the

represented by a government or

an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces
subject

an internal disciplinary system which,

to

inter

alia,

Members of

the

armed

shall

be

enforce

shall

compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed
2.

forces,

conflict.

forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical

personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are

combatants, that
3.

Whenever

is

to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.

a Party to the conflict incorporates a paramilitary or

enforcement agency into

its

armed forces

it

armed law

shall so notify the other Parties to the

conflict. 66

By

itself,

Geneva

Article 43 appears to follow in the footsteps of the

rules, as reflected in

customary international law. Indeed,

four of the seven conditions for (lawful) combatancy: condition

the existence of a

condition

65. See
66.

id.

(iv)

command

I,

its

it

reaffirms

concerning

subordinates;

about compliance with the rules of the jus in bello; condition

at 197; see also

Protocol

responsible for the conduct of

(i)

Hague and

art.

43, in

Meron, supra note

12, at 65.

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,
167

supra note 4, at 647.
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the need for organization and discipline; and condition

(v) stressing

taining to the need to belong to a Party to the conflict.

Unfortunately, Article 44 goes
1.

Any

combatant,

adverse Party shall
2.

While

much

further:

as defined in Article 43,

who

falls

into the

law applicable

combatant of

in

power of an

be a prisoner of war.

combatants are obliged to comply with the

all

(vi) per-

67

armed

rules of international

conflict, violations of these rules shall

be a combatant

his right to

or, if

he

falls

not deprive a

into the

power of an

adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in

paragraphs 3 and
3.

4-

In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects

of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian

population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in

armed conflicts where, owing

to the riature of the hostilities

cannot so distinguish himself, he
that, in

shall retain his status as a

such situations, he carries

his

an armed combatant
combatant, provided

arms openly:

during each military engagement, and
during such time as he
military

visible to the adversary while

he

deployment preceding the launching of an attack

in

is

is

engaged

which he

in a
is

to

participate.

Acts which comply with the requirements of

this

paragraph shall not be

considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph
4-

1

(c).

A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet

the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his
right to be a prisoner of war, but

equivalent in

all

he

shall, nevertheless,

respects to those accorded to prisoners of

Convention and by

this Protocol.

The

5.

is

tried

and punished

Any combatant who

in the case

where

any offences he has committed.

into the

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 505, 517 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds.,

67. See Jean de Preux, Article 43,

1977

Convention

power of an adverse Party while not
military operation preparatory to an attack shall not

falls

engaged in an attack or in a

for

war by the Third

protection includes protections equivalent

to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third

such a person

be given protections

ICRC, 1987).
168

Yoram

Dinstein

be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior

forfeit his rights to

activities.

This

6.

article

war pursuant
This

7.

without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of

is

to Article 4 of the

article

is

Third Convention.

not intended to change the generally accepted practice of

States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the
regular,

uniformed armed units of a Party to the

mentioned

in Article 13 of the First

members of the armed

forces of a Party to the

In addition to the categories of persons

8.

and Second Conventions,

all

conflict.

conflict, as defined in Article

43 of this Protocol,

under those Conventions

they are

if

Second Convention, shipwrecked

wounded

at sea or in

shall

be entitled to protection

or sick or, in the case of the

other waters. 68

The language of this verbose text is quite convoluted, not to say obscure.
But when a serious attempt is made to reconcile its disparate paragraphs with
one another, a

distressing picture emerges.

Article 43, Article 44(2) does
dition (iv):
(i.e.,

whether or not

in

away

—

Notwithstanding the provision of

and purposes

—with con-

jus in bello, all

combatants

for all intents

compliance with the

those taking a direct part in hostilities) are entitled to the status of lawful

combatancy and

to the attendant privileges of prisoners of war. Paragraph (3)

of Article 44, while paying

lip

service to the principle of distinction, retains

only a truncated version of condition

(iii):

the duty to carry arms openly

is

re-

and to the preliminary phase of dethe launching of an attack, while being visible to

stricted to the duration of the battle itself

ployment in preparation for
the enemy. The issue of visibility to the enemy is complex, implying that if the
combatant neither knows nor should know that he is visible, the obligation
does not apply. 69

naked eye or

it

It is

not clear whether

also includes observation

visibility is

determined solely by the

by means of binoculars and even

in-

no agreement as to when deployment begins: at the original assembly point (from which the combatants
proceed to their destination) or only moments before the attack is launched. 71
But these and other points are quite moot, since in a most enigmatic
fra-red equipment.

70

More

significantly, there

is

—

68. Protocol
69.

I,

art.

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 647-648.
Article 44, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,

44, in

See Jean de Preux,

note 67, at 519, 535.
70.

See Solf, supra note 40, at 254-255.

71.

See

DE PREUX,

supra note 69, at 534-535.
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fashion 72
ers of

on

— Paragraph

war

(4)

mandates

that, albeit technically deprived of prison-

must be accorded every protection conferred
terms of practicality, condition (iii)
however

status, transgressors

prisoners of war. Thus, in

circumscribed

—

is

—

vitiated by Article 44.

the sole reference to

it is

made

in

As

condition

far as

Paragraph

concerned,

(ii) is

an intention to

(7), articulating

not affect the practice of wearing uniforms by regular armies. Thereby, Article

44 only underscores the elimination of condition
namely,
is

when

(ii)

where

really counts,

it

irregular forces take part in hostilities. In fact, the

consequence

"to tip the balance of protection in favor of irregular combatants to the detcivilian." 73 In the final analysis,

riment of the regular soldier and the
civilians

who

will suffer. "Inevitably, regular forces

harshly and with less restraint

if

would

if

captured."

they believed that their opponents were free

and

the

seven

cumulative

are onerous for irregular forces.

to alleviate the conditions to
(iii)

their

74

As pointed out above,
combatancy

the

more

treat civilians

to pose as civilians while retaining their right to act as combatants

POW status

it is

Hence,

some extent. For

it

conditions

of lawful

would have made sense

instance, conditions

(ii)

and

could become alternative rather than cumulative in their application,

considering that

when one

dant. 75

pendulum

is

fulfilled

the other

may be looked

at as

redun-

44 has swung from one extreme to the
other, reducing ad absurdum the conditions of lawful combatancy. The out-

come

Still,

is

the

in Article

that, for contracting parties to the Protocol, the general distinction

between lawful and unlawful combatants becomes nominal
Objections to the
reasons

why

new

regime created in Article 44 are

the leading military power of the day

clines to ratify Protocol
reflect

legal

I

(while recognizing that

customary international law), 76 and

by an array of other

in value.

among

— the United

many

of

this negative

its

the key

States

—

de-

other provisions

assessment

is

shared

states.

Ruth Lapidoth, Qui a Droit au Statut de Prisonnier de Guerre?, 82 REV. GNR'L DE DROIT
INT'L PUBLIC 170, 204 (1978).
73. Guy Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case against Ratification of Additional
Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 129 (1985-1986).
74. Abraham Sofaer, The Rationale for the United States Decision, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 786
72.

See

(1988).
75.

See W.J. Ford,

Members of Resistance Movements, 24

NETH

INT'L

L.

REV. 92, 104 (1977).

INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, JA-422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 1 1 (2003).
76.

See
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War

Afghanistan

in

waged by the United States and several allied counfollowing
tries against the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda terrorist network
raises multiple issues germane to the
the armed attacks of 1 1 September 2001

The war

in Afghanistan,

—

—

status of lawful/unlawful
1.

The

first

problem

combatancy:

relates to the standing of

hand, the Taliban regime

much as 90% of the

as

Taliban

—on the eve of the war—was

territory of Afghanistan.

fighters.

in

On

the one

de facto control of

On the other hand,

the regime

was unrecognized by the overwhelming majority of the international community.

This lack of recognition does not by

itself alter

the legal position of com-

batants under customary international law. According to Article 4(A)(3) of

Geneva Convention (III), members of regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government unrecognized by the Detaining Power (the paradigmatic case being that of the "Free France" forces of General

World War

II,

unrecognized by Nazi Germany

77
)

De Gaulle

in

are entitled to prisoners of

inasmuch as the underlying idea is the equivalence of armed
forces of recognized and unrecognized governments, the latter
no less than
the former
are bound by the seven cumulative conditions of lawful
combatancy. The proper question, therefore, is not whether the Taliban regime was recognized, but whether the Taliban forces actually observed all
war

status. Yet,

—

—

these conditions.

In light of close scrutiny of the war in Afghanistan by the world media

— and,

in particular, the live coverage by television of literally thousands of

Taliban troops before and after their surrender

—

it

is

undeniable that,

and
possibly meeting other conditions of lawful combatancy, they did not wear
uniforms nor did they display any other fixed distinctive emblem (condition
whereas Taliban forces were carrying their arms openly (condition

(ii)).

(iii))

Since the conditions are cumulative, members of the Taliban forces

war under the customary international law criadmit of no exception, not even in the unusual circum-

failed to qualify as prisoners of
teria.

These

criteria

stances of Afghanistan as run by the Taliban regime.

To

say that "[t]he

Taliban do not wear uniforms in the traditional western sense" 78
leading, for the Taliban forces did not

wear any uniform

in

quite mis-

any sense

Western or Eastern (nor even any special headgear that would

DE PREUX,

is

single

at

all,

them out

supra note 38, at 62.

77.

See

78.

Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus

in Bello in

70 (2002).
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from

civilians). All

regime
blem.

—

If

The

armed

forces

— including those belonging

are required to wear uniforms or use

some other

to the Taliban

fixed distinctive

em-

they do not, they cannot claim prisoners of war status.

legal position

seems singularly clear to the present

some observers appear

writer.

But since

doubt in the matter (perhaps because the
case of governmental forces not wearing any uniform is so extraordinary), the
to entertain

(Second Paragraph) of Geneva

issue could be put to judicial test. Article 5

Convention

(III)

enunciates:

whether persons, having committed a belligerent
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection o{
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal. 79
Should any doubt

arise as to

Ex abundante cautela, the United States might be well advised to have the status
of Taliban forces determined by a competent tribunal. A competent tribunal
for this
2.

purpose can be a military commission. 80

The

Qaeda

legal position of al

fighters

must not be confused with that of

Taliban forces. Al Qaeda fighters constitute irregular forces. They easily
isfy

the requirement of belonging to a Party to the conflict (condition

reality, in

times

the relations between

when

it

the reverse. Incontrovertibly,

(iii)).

Afghanistan

its

the Taliban regime there were

al

tail

Qaeda

command

with subordination to

hostilities in

Qaeda and

members

However, apart from the

is

a well-organized group (condition

structure (condition

(i)),

and

in the

carried their arms openly (condition

fact that al

Qaeda

(like

the Taliban regime)

has declined to use a uniform or possess a fixed distinctive
(ii)),

(vi)): in

was wagging the dog," in other words,
(Afghanistan) belonged to al Qaeda rather than

appeared that "the

that the party to the conflict

(v)),

al

sat-

emblem

(condition

the group has displayed utter disdain towards the jus in bello in brazen
(iv). 81

Al Qaeda's contempt for this paramount prerequisite qualification of lawful combatancy was flaunted in the execution of the
original armed attack of 9/1 1. Not only did the al Qaeda terrorists, wearing civilian clothes, hijack US civilian passenger planes. The most striking aspects
disregard of condition

79.

80.

Geneva Convention III, art. 5,
See Kenneth Anderson, What

in

LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

to

Do

Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy
Base, 25

HARV.

J.L.

81. See Christopher

supra note 4, at 432.

Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified
on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval

with Bin Laden and Al

& PUB. POL'Y 591, 619-620 (2002).
Greenwood,

International

Law and

AFF'S 301, 316 (2002).

172

the

'War

against Terrorism,' 78 INT'L

Yoram

Dinstein

of the shocking events of 9/11 are that

(i)

the hijacked planes (with their ex-

plosive fuel load) were used as weapons, in total oblivion to the fate of the ci-

on board; and (ii) the primary objective targeted (the World
Trade Center in New York City) was manifestly a civilian object rather than a
military objective. 82 The net result was a carnage in which some 3,000 innovilian passengers

cent civilians

lost their lives.

No

group conducting attacks in such an egre-

gious fashion can claim prisoner of war status for

fighters

.

Whatever the

which may exist with respect to the entitlement oi Taliban
prisoners of war status, there is
and there can be none as regards

lingering doubt
forces to

its

—

—

Qaeda terrorists.
3. The al Qaeda involvement raises another issue. Whereas the Taliban
forces were composed of Afghan (and some Pakistani) nationals, al Qaeda is
an assemblage of Moslem fanatics from all parts of the world. Most of them are
apparently Arabs, but some have come from Western countries, and there
were at least two cases of renegade American nationals. Without delving into
al

the question of how the United States should have handled the situation from

domestic

the standpoint oi

its

the salient point

that,

is

—

under the

constitutional

and criminal

—

legal system,

jus in bello, irrespective of all other consid-

nobody owing allegiance to the Detaining Power can expect to be
treated as a prisoner of war (condition (vii)).
4. The constraints of the conditions of lawful combatancy must not, however, be seen as binding on only one party to the conflict in Afghanistan. As
the hostilities progressed, it became all too evident (again, thanks to the ubiquitous TV cameras) that some US combatants
CIA agents in the field, and
conceivably others were not wearing uniforms while in combat. It must be
underscored that observance by even 99% of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict of the seven conditions of lawful combatancy
including the condition relating to having a fixed distinctive emblem, such as a uniform (condition (ii))
does not absolve the remaining 1% from the unshakable obligation
to conduct themselves pursuant to the same conditions. Consequently, had
any US combatants in civilian clothing been captured by the enemy, they
would not be any more entitled to prisoner of war status than Taliban and al
erations,

—

—

—

—

Qaeda
5.

fighters in a similar situation.

Perhaps "the primary focus of debate and controversy" in

been the detention of

On

al

Qaeda

terrorists transferred

this field

has

by the United States

Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives
Under the Current jus in Bello, LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN,
(Andru Wall ed., 2003) (Vol 79, US Naval War College International Law Studies).

82.

the principle of military objectives, see
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from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay (on the island of Cuba). 83 Since unlawful

combatants are not entitled to prisoners of war

against conditions of detention in
ever,

it

Guantanamo

status,

most

criticisms

are beside the point.

How-

must be understood that^assuming that the detainees are not

charged with any crime in judicial proceedings

—detention

(as a purely ad-

on beyond the termination of hostilities: hosregards Taliban personnel; hostilities in which al

ministrative measure) cannot go
tilities

in

Qaeda

is

Afghanistan as

involved in the case of

its

incarcerated fighters.

Conclusion

Unlawful combatancy

is

a matter of great practical significance in present-day

international law. Unlawful combatants

may be

tried for violations of ordinary

may also be detained without trial (as long as the hostilto whom they belong 'go on) The seven cumulative conditions

domestic laws and they
ities

by the force

.

oi lawful combatancy are
ply demonstrates, the

unlawful combatants
basic

rule

no doubt

need
is

for

stringent.

as the

Afghanistan case am-

maintaining the distinction between lawful and

as imperative as ever.

Otherwise, compliance with the

of distinction between civilians and combatants would be in

jeopardy.

83.

But

Anderson, supra note 80,

at 621.
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The Laws

of War in the

War on Terror

1

Adam Roberts 2
Introduction

T

he laws of war

—the
—have

parts of international law explicitly applicable in

armed conflict
a major bearing on the "war on terror" proclaimed and initiated by the United States following the attacks of 1 1 Septem-

They

ber 2001.

address a range of critical issues that perennially arise in

protection of civilians,

movements, including discrimination in targeting,
and status and treatment of prisoners. However, the ap-

plication of the laws of

war

ticularly problematical.

Because of the character of such operations, different in

campaigns against

1.

Copyright

terrorist

© Adam Roberts, 2002,

Force and the Laws of War, 44

Fox,

2003. This

SURVIVAL

December 2002.

1

is

been par-

a revised version of Counter-terrorism,

(Spring 2002), 7-32.

It

Armed

incorporates information

am grateful

for help received from a large number of people
Dana Allin, Dr. Kenneth Anderson, Dr. Mary-Jane
Colonel Charles Garraway, Richard Guelff, Commander Steven Haines, and Professor Mike

available

who

in counter-terrorist operations has always

up

to 15

1

read drafts, including particularly Dr.

Schmitt; participants at the Carr Centre conference on "Humanitarian Issues in Military

Washington DC, 7-8 March 2002; and participants at the US Naval War College
conference on "International Law & the War on Terrorism," Newport, RI, 26-28 June 2002.
Versions of this paper have also appeared on the website of the Social Science Research Council,
Targeting,"

New York, at http://www.ssrc.org.
2. Sir Adam Roberts is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University
and Fellow of

Balliol College.

He

is

co-editor, with Richard Guelff (District of

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

(Oxford and

New York:

Columbia

Oxford University

Bar), of

Press, 2000).
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of

War

War on Terror

in the

important respects from what was originally envisaged in the treaties embodying the laws of war, a key issue in any analysis
is

applied by the belligerents, but also

stances of the operations.

ways in which,

not just whether or

how

the law

relevance to the particular circum-

its

not just the conduct of the parties that merits ex-

It is

amination, but also the adequacy of the law

wars involving a

at the actual events of

is

rightly or wrongly, the

itself.

Thus

there

terrorist adversary,

law

is

is

a

and

need to look
at the

many

considered to have a bearing on

them.

The

present survey critically examines not only certain statements and ac-

tions of the

of the

US administration,

Red Cross (ICRC) and

ian and

human

rights issues.

of war impinge on policy,

but also those of the International Committee

certain other bodies concerned with humanitar-

While touching on many ways in which the laws
the main focus is on the following four core

questions.
1

Are the laws of war, according

to their specific terms, applicable to

counter- terrorist military operations?
2.

In the event that counter-terrorist military operations involve

uations different from those envisaged in international agreements

laws of war, should the attempt

still

sit-

on the

be made to apply that body of law to such

situations?
3.

Are captured personnel who

rorist organizations entitled to

POWs,

considered to be

are suspected of involvement in ter-

prisoner-of-war

(POW)

status? If they are not

does the law recognize a different status, and what in-

ternational standards apply to their treatment?

count

4. Is

there a case for a revision of the laws of war to take into ac-

the

special

circumstances

of

contemporary

counter-terrorist

operations?

The answers

to these questions

may

vary in different circumstances.

The

US-led "war on terror" involves action in many countries, with different legal
and factual contexts. By no means does all action against terrorism, even if
part of the "war

armed

on

terror," involve military action in

conflict of the kind in

The war's most prominent

which the laws of war

any form,

let

alone

are formally applicable.

and the focus of this
survey, is the coalition military action in Afghanistan that commenced on 7
October 2001 and still continues. While certain phases and aspects of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM involved an international armed conflict, unquestionably bringing the laws of war into play, other phases and aspects are more
military manifestation to date,

debatable with respect to the application of this body o{ law.
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The

laws of war are not the only body of law potentially relevant to the con-

and counter-terrorist actions. For example, in many
cases terrorists acts would indeed be violations of the laws of war if they were
conducted in the course of an international or an internal armed conflict.
However, because they frequently occur in what is widely viewed as peacetime, the illegality of such acts has to be established first and foremost by reference to the national law of states; international treaties on terrorism and
sideration of terrorist

and other relevant parts of international law (including parts
of the laws of war) that apply in peacetime as well as wartime, for example the
rules relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and certain rules relating
related matters; 3

human

to

rights. All of these legal categories are relevant to

the attacks of

1 1

consideration of

September. For example, the attacks constitute murder un-

der the domestic law of states, and at the same time can be regarded as "crimes
against humanity," a category

which encompasses widespread or systematic

murder committed against any

civilian population. 4

3.

For texts of treaties and other international documents on terrorism, and useful discussion

thereof, see

1997). For

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL

more recent

treaties

and

LAW

(Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory

eds.,

UN resolutions see the information on terrorism on the UN

website, at http://www.un.org.

Crimes against humanity, defined in the Charter and Judgment of the International Military
fully defined in Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute

4.

Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1945-46, are more

of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force
include any of the following acts

when committed

as part of a

on

1

July 2002.

These crimes

widespread or systematic attack

directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Extermination;

(c)

Enslavement;

(d)

Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
fundamental rules of international law;
(e)

(f)

Torture;

(g)

Rape,

sexual

sterilization, or
•

(h)

slavery,

enforced

prostitution,

liberty in violation of

forced

any other form of sexual violence of comparable

pregnancy,

enforced

gravity;

Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on

political,

racial,

national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... or other grounds that are universally

recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i)

Enforced disappearance of persons;

(j)

The crime

of apartheid.

U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court,

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)
Rome Statute] The Rome Statute does not apply retroactively and the United States

[hereinafter

.
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In an effort to answer the questions posed in this introduction, this survey

is

divided into six parts.
1.

2.

3.

of War
Counter-Terrorist Military Operations
War in Afghanistan

The Laws

4.

Prisoners

5.

Further Development of International
Conclusions

6.

page
178

The Laws

The laws of war

of

184
191
208
225
227

Law

War

and "international humanitarare embodied and interpreted in a variety

(also referred to as "jus in bello"

ian law applicable in

armed

conflict")

of sources: treaties, customary law, judicial decisions, writings of legal specialists,

military

manuals and

resolutions, of international organizations.

Although

some of the law is immensely detailed, its basic principles are simple: the
wounded and sick, POWs and civilians are to be protected; military targets
must be attacked in such a manner as to keep civilian casualties and damage to
a minimum; humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel must be respected;
neutral or non-belligerent states have certain rights and duties; and the use of
certain weapons (including chemical weapons) is prohibited, as also are certain
other means and methods of warfare. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions
the treaties that form the keystone of the modern laws of war
are concerned largely with the protection of victims of war who have fallen into the

—

—

hands of an adversary,

as distinct

from the conduct of military operations. 5

become a party to this treaty. For a detailed treatment of US opposition to
the ICC, see John Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's
Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 186 (2000); Michael Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001
5. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. These four conventions are all reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed., 2000) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR]; and in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
has stated

its

intent to not

)

;

COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

(Dietrich

Schindler and Jiri Toman eds., 3rd ed. 1988). Treaty texts are also available at the International
Committee of the Red Cross website, at http://www.icrc.org/eng (Jan. 3, 2003).
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Treaties

and

on the laws of war

between

states,

experiences and interests, including those of their armed

reflect their

forces.

are the product of negotiations

For centuries these

have had an important function

With

in military operations.

the subject of controversy,

rules, albeit frequently

in the policies

and practices of states engaged

respect to international coalitions involved in

combat, given the needs of the members to harmonize their actions on a range

Even

of practical issues, these rules have long had particular significance.

in

which their formal applicability may be questionable, they have
sometimes been accepted as relevant guidelines.
situations in

Scope of application
The laws of war have a scope of application that

is

not limited to wars between

They apply in a wide, but not infinitely wide, variety of situa1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 1 specifies that the

recognized states.
tions. In the

parties "undertake to respect

and

Common

in all circumstances." 6

application, specifies that the

to ensure respect for the present

Article

if

which deals

Conventions "apply to

of any other armed conflict which

Contracting Parties, even

2,

may

directly with scope of

cases of declared war or

between two or more of the High

arise

the state of war

all

Convention

is

not recognized by one of them,"

indicating that the existence or non-existence of a declaration of war, or a for-

mal

state of war,

mon Article 3

is

not necessary for the application of the Conventions.

contains certain

minimum provisions

Com-

to be applied in the case of

armed conflict not of an international character, concentrating particularly
on treatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities. 7 Certain other

6.

For an authoritative account of the origins and meanings of

Kalshoven, The Undertaking
Ripening Fruit, 2 Y.B. INT'L
7.

Common Article

to

HUM.

3 of the

Common

Article

Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances:

1,

see Frits

From Tiny Seed

L. 1999, at 3-61 (2000).

Geneva Conventions provides

in part that:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory

of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
apply, as a
(1)

minimum, the
laid

down

their

hostilities,

including

all

this

forces

circumstances be treated humanely, without

any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or

To

members of armed

arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,

detention, or any other cause, shall in

any other similar

to

following provisions:

Persons taking no active part in the

who have

bound

faith, sex, birth or

wealth, or

criteria.

end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any

place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
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agreements, especially those concluded since the early 1990s, apply in non-international as well as international

The

armed

conflicts.

been drawn in the laws of war between international and non-international armed conflict has come under
distinction that has traditionally

challenge in the post- 1945 era. This

is

not only because many wars have

in-

and international war, but also because of the
nature of counter-terrorist operations. These have aspects that are similar to a
civil war, particularly as they typically involve governmental forces combating
non-governmental groups; but they may not meet all the criteria (such as the
volved elements of both

civil

holding of territory by insurgents) required for the application of parts of the

law governing non-international armed conflict; and they can also have as-

more closely akin to international war, especially if the terrorists
operate in armed units outside their own countries.
Application of the law is not necessarily dependent on formal designation
of a conflict as international or non-international. In some instances, as indicated below, the UN Security Council or particular belligerents have deemed
the rules governing international armed conflict to be applicable even to a
largely internal situation. The US armed forces have indicated their intention
to observe the rules governing international armed conflicts, even in situations that may differ in certain respects from the classical model of an interstate war. The Standing Rules of Engagement issued by the US Joint Chiefs of
pects that are

Staff spell this out:

Law of War during military operations
no matter how the conflict may be characterized

U.S. forces will comply with the
involving armed conflict,

under international law, and

will

comply with

its

principles

and

spirit

during

all

other operations. 8
(a)

violence to

life

and person,

in particular

murder of

all

kinds, mutilation, cruel

treatment and torture;
(b)

taking of hostages;

(c)

outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d)

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous

judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by

court, affording
civilized peoples.

the judicial

all
.

.

.

GC III, supra note 5, art. 3; DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 245.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr 3 121. 01 A Standing rules of Engagement

See
8.

FOR U.S. FORCES, ENCLOSURE
identical statement
replaces. See

CJCS

OCT.

A

1994).

(A)

had appeared

A-9

in the

INSTR, 3121.01

[hereinafter

Standing

CJCS INSTR 3121.01A].

ROE of 1

A similar but not

October 1994, which

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR

number of other US military-doctrinal statements
armed conflict.

forces will always apply the law of
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FORCES (1

this

U.S.

are equally definite that

US

Adam
In certain inter-state conflicts,
saries

showing

managed

Roberts

Western armed

forces,

at best limited respect for ethical

and

engaging with adverlegal restraints,

to observe basic rules of the laws of war. This

was the case

have

in the

1991 Gulf War, in which Iraq mistreated prisoners, despoiled the environ-

ment and had
or biological

warned in brutally clear terms not to engage in chemical
attacks and terrorist operations. The US-led Gulf coalition
to be

sought to observe the law not because of any guarantee of reciprocity, but because such conduct was important to the ethos of the armed forces; and because

it

contributed to the maintenance of internal discipline, and of domestic

and international support. Similar conclusions could be drawn from the 1999
Kosovo War. In short, practice has provided some evidence in support of the
legal position that reciprocity with one adversary in one particular conflict is
far

from being a necessary condition

Whether

all

for observing the laws of war.

aspects of counter-terrorist operations

fall

within the scope of

application of the laws of war will be explored further in Part 2 below.

Jus ad bellum and jus in bello

armed conflict, including one against terrorism, it is important to distinguish between the legality of resorting to force and the legality of the way in
which such force is used. In strict legal terms, the law relating to the right to resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law governing the actual use of
force in war (jus in bello) are separate. The jus in bello applies to the conduct of
belligerents in international armed conflict irrespective of their right to resort
to the use of force under the jus ad bellum. As regards the jus ad bellum issues
raised after 1 1 September, my own views are in favor of the legality, and indeed
overall moral justifiability, of the military action in Afghanistan. However, this
survey's focus is on the jus in bello aspects of the US-led military operations.
Despite the lack of a formal connection between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, there are certain ways in which they interact in practice, especially in a
war against terrorists. By observing jus in bello, a state or a coalition of states
In any

may

contribute to perceptions of the justice of a cause in three related ways.

First, in all military

operations, whether or not against terrorists, the percep-

tion that a state or a coalition of states

is

observing recognized international

standards

may

Second,

the coalition were to violate jus in bello in a major way, for example

if

contribute to public support domestically and internationally.

by the commission of

atrocities, that

would be

the adversary forces, arguably providing
force. Third, in counter-terrorist

in military operations

is

them

likely to

advance the cause of

a justification for their resort to

campaigns in particular, a basis

often a perception that there
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between the types of actions engaged in by terrorists and those enby their adversaries. Observance of jus in bello can form a part of that

distinction

gaged in

moral distinction.

However, the

jus

ad bellum rationale that armed

hostilities

have been

initi-

ated in response to major terrorist acts can raise issues relating to the application of certain jus in bello principles.

whether there

one

side

is

is

Two such

issues are explored here:

first,

scope for neutrality in relation to an armed conflict in which

fighting in the

name

of opposing terrorism; second, whether those

responsible for terrorist campaigns can be viewed as exclusively responsible for
all

the death and destruction of an ensuing war.

The

right of states to be neutral in

ciple of the laws of war.

an armed conflict

is

a long-standing prin-

Events of the past century, especially the obligations

imposed by membership of international organizations, have exposed problems in the traditional idea of strictly impartial neutrality and have led to its
modification and even erosion. In many conflicts there were states which,

even while not

belligerents,

pursued policies favoring one

side, for

joining in sanctions against a state perceived to be an aggressor.

Charter, by providing for the Security Council to require

all

example

UN

The

states to take cer-

added to the erosion of traditional conthose cases in which the Security Council has

tain actions against offending states,

cepts of neutrality, at least in

been able to agree on
tance of

may

new forms

a

common course of action

(e.g.,

sanctions).

The impor-

of non-belligerence, distinct from traditional neutrality,

help to explain the emergence of terms such as "neutral or non-belligerent

powers" in post- 1945 treaties on the laws of war. 9 In many recent episodes,
cluding the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War,
force by a coalition has

when

the use of armed

been combined with the application of general

sanctions against the adversary state, the scope for traditional
neutrality has indeed

survived.

As

been

(i.e.,

on War

in Afghanistan, the

UN

impartial)

limited, but certain forms of non-belligerence

outlined below in Part 3

in-

have

"war on

ter-

ENDURING FREEDOM would confirm that in certain armed conflicts, particularly when the UN Security
Council has given approval to one party, the scope for neutrality may be limror"

which began

in

2001 with Operation

ited or non-existent.

9.

See

GC III, supra note 5, at articles 4(B) (2)

and 122. See

other States not Parties to the conflict" in 1977

also the references to "neutral

Geneva Protocol

I

and

Additional to the Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, Articles 9, 19, 31 opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1
[hereinafter

GP I],

reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 419,
182

supra note
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Can

those

who

initiated terrorist

Roberts

campaigns be held responsible

death and destruction of an ensuing war?
for resorting to

war under the

jus

for all the

When fighting terrorism is

ad bellum, there

is

the basis

sometimes a tendency

for

the general indignation caused by terrorist attacks to affect adversely the im-

plementation of jus in

belio. It

is

sometimes argued that because the

started the war, they are responsible for

December 2001,
Donald Rumsfeld

all

the subsequent horrors. In early

US

discussing civilian casualties,
said:

"We

terrorists

did not start this war.

Secretary of Defense

So understand,

responsibil-

every single casualty in this war, whether they're innocent Afghans or

ity for

innocent Americans,
a view,

if it

rests at the feet of the al

Qaeda and

the Taliban." 10

Such

implies that the peculiar circumstances involved in the jus ad

bellum might override certain considerations of jus in bello in the war that
lows, has

no

fol-

basis in the law.

Proportionality
"Proportionality"

is

ing the use of force.

a long-established principle that sets out criteria for limit-

One of its meanings

relates to the proportionality of a mili-

compared to a grievance, and thus constitutes a further link
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum. It involves a complex balance of considerations, and it would be incorrect to interpret this principle to imply a right of
tit-for-tat retaliation. For example, it would be legally unjustified for a military
response to a terrorist act to have the objective of killing the same number of
people, and there was no suggestion or indication that this was a coalition obtary action

jective in Afghanistan.

Nor does

this principle

prevent a response from taking

into account a range of issues not limited to the size of the initial attack. 11

The other main meaning of proportionality relates to the actual conduct of
ongoing hostilities. As a US Army manual succinctly interprets it, "the loss of
and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained." 12
This meaning of proportionality (which is not directly linked to jus ad bellum)
life

is

10.

often difficult to apply in armed conflict, especially in counter-terrorist

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

available at
11.

In

News Conference

Pentagon (Dec.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/tl2042001_tl204sd.html (Nov.

4,
6,

2001),

2002).

an assessment of the events of 2001, Christopher Greenwood has argued that

"proportionality in self-defence looks forward.
to the threat

it is

The

U.S.

test

is

whether the force used

is

proportionate

designed to meet, not to the events of the past." See Christopher Greenwood,

Law and the "War Against Terrorism," 78 INT'L AFF'S 2, 313-314 (April 2002).
DEFT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 41 Ouly

International
12.

at the

1956) [hereinafter

FM

27-10].
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may, but does not necessarily, limit the use of force to the same

amount of force

employed by an adversary. It exists alongside
the principle of military necessity, which is defined in the US Army manual as
one that "justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which
are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon
level or

as possible." 13

The

as that

principle of proportionality

necessarily in conflict, with the current

overwhelming use of force

minimum

cost in terms of

is

therefore in tension, but not

US military doctrine, which favors

in order to achieve decisive victory quickly

US

casualties.

the

and

at

14

Counter 'Terrorist Military Operations
Counter- terrorism has been defined

as "offensive military operations

designed

15

Such operations, including those
resulting from the events of 1 1 September, may involve inter-state armed conflict as principally envisaged in the laws of war: in such cases that body of law
applies straightforwardly. However, such operations can also involve conflict
with other characteristics a fact that helps to explain why the laws of war
have often proved difficult to apply in them. Six factors, all relating to the nato prevent, deter

and respond to terrorism."

—

ture of the opposition, point to potential problems in the application of the laws

of war in counter-terrorist operations:

Neither

•

all

operations, even

constitute

armed

terrorist

when

activities,

nor

all

counter-terrorist

they have some international dimension, necessarily

conflict

between

states. Terrorist

movements themselves

generally have a non-state character. Therefore, military operations
state

and such

a

military

between

a

movement, even if they involve the state's armed forces acting

13. Id. at para. 3. A subsequent official US exposition of the principle states: "Only that degree
and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or
complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life and physical

may be applied." ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, para. 5-2 (A. Thomas and J. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol.
73, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
resources

14.

For a brief discussion of United States and

15.

By

contrast,

"antiterrorism" has

NATO strategic doctrine, see

been defined

as

pages 191-208 infra.

"defensive measures to reduce the

INTERNATIONAL AND
Operational Law Dep't, the judge Advocate General's School, U.S. army, JA-422,
Operational Law Handbook (2003), at 312-3 [hereinafter OpLaw Handbook]. This
vulnerability of individuals

annual

publication

is

and property

available

at

Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf (Nov.

to terrorist attacks." See

https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/
14, 2002).
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outside

its

own

territory, are

scope of application of the

armed

range of provisions regarding international

full

1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva

conflict in the

Protocol

not necessarily such as to bring them within the

I.i6

may assume the form of actions by a
operating within its own territory; or, more rarely,

Counter-terrorist operations

•

government against forces

may be

government perceived

actions by opposition forces against a

committing or supporting

terrorist acts. In

both these cases, the conflict may

have more the character of non-international armed conflict (that
as distinct

to be

is,

civil

war)

from international war. Fewer laws-of-war rules have been formally

applicable to civil as distinct from international war, although the situation

now changing
In

•

in

some

many cases,

is

respects.

the attributes and actions of a terrorist

movement may not

come within the field of application even of the modest body of rules relating to
non-international armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions
application.

the core of these rules, but says

is

The

conflict, the

principal subsequent agreement

1977 Geneva Protocol

II, is

little

about the scope of

on non-international armed

based on the assumption that there

is

and organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise control over a part o{ its territory, and
carry out sustained and concerted military operations. The protocol expressly
does not apply to situations of internal disturbance and tension, such as riots,
and isolated and sporadic acts of violence. 7
a conflict

between a

state's

armed

forces

1

Since terrorist forces often have

•

little

regard for internationally agreed

rules of restraint, the resolve of the counter-terrorist forces to observe

may

also be

them

weakened, given the low expectation of reciprocity and the

tendency of some part of the public under attack to overlook any breaches by
their
•

own

A

forces.

basic principle of the laws of

war

that attacks should be directed

is

against the adversary's military forces, rather than against civilians. This
principle, violated in terrorist attacks specifically directed against civilians,

16.

In ratifying the 1977

Geneva Protocol I

in 1998, the

the term "armed conflict" denotes "a situation which

United Kingdom made a statement that

is

not constituted by the commission of

ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation." See

note
17.

9, reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

1977 Geneva Protocol

II

can

at 510, supra

note

GP

I,

supra

5.

Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

Armed

Conflicts, art.

at 481, supra note 5 [hereinafter

185
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1,

reprinted in
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apply in counter-terrorist operations, because the terrorist

movement may not be composed

of defined military forces that are clearly

distinguished from civilians.
•

Some

captured personnel

may not meet
Convention

the criteria for

who

are

POW

members of

status as set out in

(The question of prisoners

III.

a terrorist organization

is

1949 Geneva

discussed in greater detail

below.)

These

six factors reflect

the same underlying difficulty governments have in

applying the laws of war to

viewed

as criminals,

factor above

all

civil wars,

namely, that the opponent tends to be

without the right to engage in combat operations. This

explains why, despite the progress of recent decades,

many

governments are doubtful about, or opposed to, applying the full range of rules
applicable in international armed conflict to operations against rebels and
terrorists.

For at least 25 years, the United States has expressed a concern, shared to

some degree by

certain other states, regarding the whole principle o( thinking

and other irregular forces in a laws-of-war framework. To refer
to such a framework, which recognizes rights and duties, might seem to imply
a degree of moral acceptance of the right of any particular group to resort to
about

terrorists

acts of violence, at least against military targets. 18 Successive

tions

US

administra-

have objected to certain revisions to the laws of war on the grounds that

they might actually favor guerrilla fighters and terrorists, affording them a status that the

United States believes they do not deserve. The strongest expres-

sion of this view was a letter o{ 29 January

1987 explaining why the

administration was not recommending Senate approval of 1977

The

Geneva

Pro-

mentioned that granting combatant status to certain irregular forces "would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other
irregulars attempt to conceal themselves." It indicated a concern that the protocol

I.

letter

would endanger US soldiers, and stated in very general terms that "the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded that a number of the provisions of
the protocol are militarily unacceptable." United States repudiation of the
visions

protocol would be an important

move

against "the intense efforts of terrorist

organizations and their supporters to promote the legitimacy of their aims and

and evidence that the concern about the hazards of coping with
terrorism in a laws-of-war framework is not new, see ADAM ROBERTS, TERRORISM ANT
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 14-15 (Lawrence Freedman et al. eds., 1986).
18.

For

fuller discussion,

186

Adam
practices." 19

Whether

all

this

Roberts

was based on

a fair interpretation of

1977

beyond the
scope of this survey. The key point is the US concern which has not
changed fundamentally in the years since 1987 that the laws of war might be
misused by some in order to give an unwarranted degree of recognition to

Geneva Protocol

I

is

the subject of impassioned debate that

—

—

guerrillas

and

is

terrorists.

Application of the law in previous operations
In

many

counter-terrorist campaigns since 1945 issues relating to the obser-

vance or non-observance of basic rules of law, including the laws of war, have
perennially been of considerable significance. This has been the case both

when

campaign has been part of an international armed
conflict, and when such a campaign has been a largely internal matter, conducted by a government within its own territory, in a situation which may not
cross the threshold to be considered an armed conflict. In such circumstances
the laws of war may be of limited formal application, but their underlying principles, as well as other legal and prudential limits, are important. Within functioning states, terrorist campaigns have often been defeated through slow and
patient police work (sometimes with military assistance) rather than major military campaigns; for example, the actions against the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy in the 1970s.
The British military and police operation against "Communist Terrorists"
in Malaya after 1948 is an example (in a colonial context) of a long-drawn-out
and patient counter-terrorist campaign that was eventually successful. One of
a counter-terrorist

the key military figures involved in that campaign, Sir Robert
tilling five basic principles

Thompson,

dis-

of counter-insurgency from this and other cases,

wrote of the crucial importance of operating within a properly functioning domestic legal framework:
Second
is

principle.

The government must function

in

accordance with law. There

a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism

and with

guerrilla

actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the

processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for
the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to

19.

Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, 1977

Geneva Conventions of

Geneva Protocol I Additional

to

August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflict, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at III (1987),
reprinted in 81 AM J. INT'L L. 910-912 (1988).
the

12
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be treated as an outlaw anyway.
period,

it

will create

more

an

Terror

morally wrong, but, over a

this

is

practical difficulties for a

The United Kingdom's
land, although in

War on

in the

government than

it

solves. 20

long engagement against terrorism in Northern Ire-

essentially internal situation, provides

on

one precedent

for

whose
status is contested. This was one of many conflicts in which those deemed to
be "terrorists" were aware of the value, including propaganda value, of making
claims to POW status. While denying that there was an armed conflict
whether international or otherwise, and strongly resisting any granting of
POW status to detainees and convicted prisoners, the United Kingdom did
come to accept that international standards had to apply to their treatment.
The minority report of a UK Commission of Inquiry in 1972 which led to this
conclusion is an interesting example of asserting the wider relevance, even in
an internal conflict, of certain international legal standards, including some
from the main body of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 21 The UK government's acceptance of this approach was only a decision, not a complete soluaffording treatment based

certain international rules to prisoners

tion to a matter that continued to be contentious.

Questions about the status and treatment of prisoners, some of
considered as

terrorists, also arose

US

during the

whom

were

involvement in Vietnam. In

1967-8, the United States took a judiciously inclusive approach to the matter

when
nel,

it

issued directives to classify Viet

and certain Viet Cong

irregulars, as

Cong main

POWs.

force

POWs

Geneva Convention
if

III.

Viet

Cong

local force person-

This was despite the existence of

doubts and ambiguities as to whether these forces met
of 1949

and

all

irregulars

the criteria in Article 4

were to be

classified as

captured while engaging in combat or a belligerent act under arms,

"other than an act o{ terrorism, sabotage, or spying." There was provision for establishing tribunals, in accordance with Article 5 of the

20.

Geneva Convention,

to

ROBERT THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: EXPERIENCES FROM

MALAYA AND VIETNAM,

52 (1966). From 1957 to 1961 the author was successively Deputy
Secretary and Secretary for Defense in Malaya. As his and other accounts make clear, in the
course of the Malayan Emergency there were-certain derogations from human rights standards,
including detentions and compulsory relocations of villages.
21.

Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Consider Authorized

Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism,
Stationery Office, London, 1972, at 1-2 and 11-23.
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determine, in doubtful or contested cases, whether individual detainees were entitled to

POW status.

One example
raeli

22

of a counter-terrorist military campaign, the 1982-2000

Is-

presence in Lebanon, shows the importance of legal restraints in counter-

terrorist operations,

and the hazards that can attend

a failure to observe

them.

This episode has certain similarities to the case of Afghanistan in 2001-2002,
as well as

was

some obvious

differences. Israel's

June 1982 invasion of Lebanon

explicitly in response to "constant terrorist provocations," including,

since July 1981, "150 acts of terrorism instigated by the

and Jews

PLO,

originating in

and elsewhere: in Athens, Vienna,
Paris and London." Israel said that if Lebanon was unwilling or unable to prevent the harboring, training and financing of terrorists, it must face the risk of
Lebanon, against

Israelis

counter-measures. 23

The

in Israel

invasion led to the attacks

on the inhabitants of

Sabra and Shatila refugee camps outside Beirut in September 1982 by
local co-belligerents, the

Israel's

Lebanese Phalangists. At the lowest estimates, sev-

hundred Palestinians in the camps, including many women and children,
were killed. This event aroused strong opposition internationally, and also in
Israel. The Israeli authorities established a Commission of Inquiry, which concluded that, while the Phalangist forces were directly responsible for the
slaughter, Israel bore indirect responsibility. 24 During the whole period of Israeli military involvement in Lebanon, the treatment of alleged terrorist detainees also caused controversy. Israel opposed granting them POW status on
the grounds that as terrorists they were not entitled to it. The detainees were
held in very poor conditions in notorious camps, including al-Khiam (run by
the Israeli-created South Lebanese Army) and al-Ansar (run by the Israel
eral

22.

Two key directives issued by US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on the question of

POW

eligibility for

status are (1)

Annex A,

Detainees," part of Directive no. 381-46 of 27

March

1968, "Inspections

reprinted in

62

AM.

J.

and

Investigations:

"Criteria for Classification and Disposition of
December 1967; and (2) Directive no. 20-5 of 15
Prisoners of War - Determination of Eligibility,"

INT'L L. 755, at 766-75 (1968).

Yehuda Blum, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, Speech before
the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2292 (1981). The
Security Council unanimously demanded an end to all military activities and a withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Lebanon in Resolutions 508 and 509 of 5 and 6 June 1982 respectively. See
S. C. Res. 508, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/508/(1982); and S. C. Res. 509, U.N.
23.

See

SCOR, 37th

U.N. Doc. S/509/(1982).
24. See Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Final Report
53-54 (1983) [hereinafter Kahan Report], reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 3, at 473 (1983).
Sess.,
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presence in Lebanon received exten-

in Israel,

and cost many

lives

among

Defense Forces, their adversaries and the civilian population.

rael

with a unilateral

Israeli

withdrawal in

May

ended

may be

particu-

cannot be neglected. Some
past campaigns have been instructive. In

larly difficult in counter-terrorist operations,

observe legal restraints in

It

Is-

2000.

Past evidence suggests that while the application of the law

failures to

the

it

military operations with the purpose of stopping terrorist activities, there has

been a tendency for counter-terrorist forces to violate basic legal restraints.
There have been many instances in which prisoners were subjected to mistreatment or torture. In some cases, excesses by the government or by inter-

vening forces supporting the government may have had the unintended

effect

of assisting a terrorist campaign. Applying pressure on a government or army
to

change

its

approach to counter-terrorism, to bring

it

more

into line with the

laws of war and human-rights law, can be a difficult task.
In a counter-terrorist war, as in other wars, there can be strong prudential

considerations that militate in favor of observing legal standards, which are increasingly seen as consisting of not only domestic legal standards, but also in-

ternational ones,

including those embodied in the laws of war. These

considerations include securing public and international support; ensuring
that terrorists are not given the propaganda

gift

of atrocities or maltreatment

by their adversaries; and maintaining discipline and high professional standards in the counter-terrorist forces; and assisting reconciliation and future

Such considerations may carry great weight even in conflicts, or particular episodes within them, which differ from what is envisaged in the formal
provisions regarding scope of application of relevant treaties. These considerpeace.

ations in favor of observing the law

there

is

may be important

reciprocity in such observance by

However,
rules will

it is

not

realistic to

all

irrespective of

whether

the parties to a particular war.

expect that the result of the application of such

be a sanitized form of war in which civilian suffering and death

is

eliminated.

25.

In a case concerning detainees in Ansar Prison

judgment on 11

May

on which the

Israeli

Supreme Court

issued a

1983, the Israeli authorities asserted that the prisoners were "hostile

foreigners detained because they belong to the forces of terrorist organizations, or because of
their

connections or closeness to terrorist organizations."

status,

Israel,

while refusing them

POW

claimed to observe "humanitarian guidelines" of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV on

civilians.

For details of the case see 13 ISR. Y.B.

HUM.
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War

Afghanistan

in

In wars in Afghanistan over the centuries, conduct has differed markedly from

had a civil war dithe laws of war; and guerrilla

that permitted by the written laws of war. These wars always

mension, traditionally subject to fewer rules in
warfare, already

endemic

in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, notori-

ously blurs the traditional distinction

heart of the laws of war.

Some

between

and civilian that is at the
example regarding the killing

soldier

local customs, for

of prisoners and looting, are directly contrary to long-established principles of
the law. Other customs are different from what

not necessarily a violation of

it:

for

is

envisaged by the law, but are

example, the practice of soldiers from the

defeated side willingly joining their adversary rather than being taken prisoner.
In some cases, conduct has been consistent with international norms: for ex-

ample, the

ICRC had

access to

some

prisoners during the Soviet intervention.

been limited.
the implementation of the laws of war posed a problem

Overall, however, compliance with the laws of war has

From

the

Operation

start,

ENDURING FREEDOM.

26

for

Difficult practical issues facing the coali-

tion included: the problem of conducting operations discriminately against
elusive enemies; the possibility that adversary forces might mistreat or execute

coalition prisoners; the possibility that

some enemy personnel

facing capture

might be reluctant to surrender their weapons, and that they might not meet

POW

need for humanitarian relief operations during ongoing war; and maintenance of order (and avoidance of looting
and revenge killings) in liberated towns. These problems were exacerbated by
the character of the coalition's local partner, the Northern Alliance. 27 The
the criteria for

number

26.

status; the urgent

of different forces involved,

many of which were under

The name Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was announced

the

command

by Donald Rumsfeld at a press

News Conference
Pentagon (Sep. 25, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/
t09252001_t0925sd.html (Dec. 28, 2002). Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, he said, was not the

conference on 25 September 2001. See Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
at

the

"umbrella phrase" for the entire anti-terror campaign, but referred to a "broad, sustained
multifaceted effort."

It

has been used to refer to the coalition military operations in and around

Afghanistan that began on 7 October 2001. Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM

does not

encompass the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan,
mentioned below.
27. "Northern Alliance" is a colloquial term for the "United Islamic Front for the Salvation of
Afghanistan." This organization was formed in 1996-7. See Afghanistan and the United Nations
Gan.
Gan.

6,
6,

2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml

2003).
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of local warlords, and the lack of clear structures of authority, decision-

making and

military discipline within them, militated against the implementa-

tion of international norms.

The

war ensured that many of these issues
were heavily publicized. Reporters operated close to, and even in front of, the
front lines, sending back reports and high-resolution pictures as events unfolded. Up to the end of January 2002, more reporters died while covering the
war in Afghanistan than non-Afghan coalition military personnel. 28 As in
other

active role of the

modern wars,

germane

media

in this

the press played a critical role in repeatedly raising matters

to the laws of war.

This part deals mainly with the war in Afghanistan after the beginning of

major

US military action there on 7 October 2001.

It

cannot explore

all

the

is-

sues relating to the laws of war that have cropped up in regard to Afghanistan.
It

considers the applicability of the laws of war to the various aspects of this

armed

and then
the war: bombing; gas; and hu-

conflict generally, glances at the limited scope for neutrality,

surveys three specific issues that were raised in

manitarian assistance and refugee matters. Prisoners are considered in Part
Applicability of the laws of

An

war

armed

to the

4.

conflict

—

armed conflict in Afghanistan principally between the Taliban and
Northern Alliance forces had been going on for many years before the events
of 1 1 September 2001. The UN Security Council had called on both parties to
comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Like a
similar resolution on Bosnia six years earlier, a 1998 UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan reaffirmed:

—

that

all

parties to the conflict are

bound

to

comply with

international humanitarian law and in particular the

their obligations

under

Geneva Conventions of 12

August 1949 and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave
breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such
breaches. 29

28.

Eight reporters died in the period October-December 200 1 several of them due to banditry rather
,

than military operations. Interview with Nik Gowing,
29.

UN Security Council Resolution

1193, U.N.

SCOR, 53d

Res. 764 of 13 July 1992
Sess.,

Sess.,

BBC World Television Reporter Qan. 26, 2002).

1193 of 28 August 1998, passed unanimously. See S. C. Res.

C

U.N. Doc. S/l 193/(1998). Identical wording had been used in S.
See S. C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th

on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

U.N. Doc. S/764/(1992). This wording did not

viewed these wars

as international

to be observed in them.

wars to have the

full

Nor did

it

armed

conflicts,

necessarily

but

it

did

mean

mean

that the Security Council

that international standards

had

indicate that the Council considered any prisoners taken in these

status of prisoners of war; but

treatment in accord with international standards.
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it

implied that they should receive

humane

Adam Roberts
The

reference to grave breaches would appear to suggest that the Security

Council viewed

all

the rules of the 1949

Geneva Conventions

as applicable,

Common Article 3,

which deals with civil war. Thus, three years
before it became directly involved, the United States as well as other powers
viewed the laws of war as applicable to the Afghan conflict.
Like the period of Soviet intervention of 1979-89, and indeed wars in many
countries in the period since 1945, the armed conflict in Afghanistan from
and not

just

October 2001 can perhaps be best characterized as "internationalized civil
war." This is not a formal legal category, but an indication that the rules per7

taining to both international and civil wars

pects and phases of the conflict.

Major aspects of the war
ter.

in

may be

applicable in different as-

30

Afghanistan have been international in charac-

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the

UN

Security Council

adopted Resolution 1368, recognizing the right of individual or collective

self-

defense and condemning international terrorism as a threat to international

peace and security. This and the more detailed Resolution 1373 recognized
the international dimensions of the struggle against terrorism. 31 During the

period October-December 2001, there was an international armed conflict

between the US-led coalition on the one side, and the Taliban and al Qaeda
on the other. Following the fall of the Taliban regime, and the accession to
power of the Afghan Interim Authority on 22 December 2001, the coalition's
role was essentially that of aiding a government but in a struggle that was at
least partly international. Even after the convening of the Loya Jirga in Kabul
in June 2002 and the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Government
on 19 June, coalition (including Afghan) forces were engaged not only against
Taliban or other mainly Afghan forces, but also against certain non- Afghan
forces, especially al Qaeda. Despite the fact that al Qaeda lacked the structure
of a state, the continuing hostilities with

it

could

still

be understood as part of

an international armed conflict. This coalition military action was separate
from the assistance to the government in maintaining security in Kabul and
surrounding areas through the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF); 32
30. See Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International

Armed

Conflicts:

Case Studies of

Kampuchea and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 1 at 145-61 (Fall, 1983).
31. S.C.Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001) and S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
32. ISAF was established in Afghanistan in January 2002 on the basis of UN Security Council
Resolution 1386 of December 20, 2001, passed unanimously. See S. C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 53d
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001). Details of the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and

Afghanistan,

the

Interim Administration,

plus

annexes,

are

isafmta.doc (Nov. 15, 2002).
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available

at

http://www.operations.mod.uk/
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On

of

War

in the

War on

the technical legal question as to which of the main laws of war trea-

were formally binding on the belligerents

ties

Terror

in the international

armed

between the US-led coalition and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in
October-December 2001, the 1907 Hague Convention IV On Land Warfare
conflict

on all states
Afghanistan and the main

applied because of its status as customary law, thereby being binding

whether or not

parties to the treaty. In addition,

members of the international coalition were parties to the following agreements:
Geneva Protocol on Gas and

•

the 1925

•

the 1948 Genocide Convention; and,

•

the four 1949

Some

Geneva Conventions.

of the states involved were, or later became, parties to certain addi-

tional agreements. 33

framework

treaty

Bacteriological Warfare;

However, the above-named

treaties provide the basic

for considering the application of the

commenced

law in the armed con-

October 2001. In addition, rules of customary international law applied. Apart from the provisions of customary law embodied in
flict

that

in

the agreements indicated above, certain provisions of

Geneva Protocol

including 1977

As

I,

some

later agreements,

are accepted as having that status.

Afghan war, some but not all of the provisions of the agreements listed above apply. The 1907 Hague Land War Convention's Article 2 indicates that the convention and its annexed regulations
apply only to wars between states. The 1925 Geneva Protocol is not formally
applicable to civil wars. 34 The 1948 Genocide Convention is considered to apply to non-international as well as international armed conflict. In the 1949
Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 lists certain minimum provisions for
humane treatment of those taking no active part in hostilities that are to be
applied in non-international armed conflict. However, the UN Security
33.

regards civil-war aspects of the

On

1 1

Mines. See

Meeting"

"UN Committed
(Sep.

16,

2002),

=4724&Cr=mines&Crl=
34. Afghanistan
biological

Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel
Ridding World of Landmine Threat., Annan tells Treaty

September 2002, Afghanistan acceded

is

weapons

to

available

(Nov.

8,

in the

1975. See Convention

2002).

1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which

on

it

ratified

and Toxin Weapons and on
in

their Destruction,

Apr.

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,

not yet a party to the 1993 Chemical

1972, 26
5, at

Weapons Convention, which it signed on

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened tor
800 (1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention!,

14 January 1993 but has not ratified. See

signature January 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.

10,

supra note

Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical

available at

on 26 March

the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted
is

http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr. asp.'NewsID

at

nonetheless bound by the complete prohibition on possession and use of

Bacteriological (Biological)

137. Afghanistan

to the

http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_frameset.html (Nov.
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Council's 1998 resolution had called for application of the
tions

more

Geneva Conven-

generally.

Following the events of 11 September 2001,

when

it

was evident that an

armed conflict between the coalition and the Taliban regime was likely, the
ICRC, consistent with its general practice, sent messages to certain governments reminding them of their obligations under international humanitarian
law. Unfortunately these messages contained some debatable interpretations
of the law. They put less reliance on binding treaty law than on provisions of
1977 Geneva Protocol I, to which neither the United States nor Afghanistan
was a party, and not all of the provisions of which that were cited can plausibly
be claimed to be "recognized as binding on any Party to an armed conflict," as
the messages optimistically asserted. Furthermore, in the first of what would
be many clashes between humanitarian bodies and national governments in
this crisis, the ICRC messages to the US and UK governments stated: "The
use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the provisions of International
Humanitarian Law." Although beyond the scope of this survey, this was undoubtedly wrong as a statement of law. Following strong US objections a revised text was sent to the US government, in which the offending wording was
changed to the bland formula: "On the subject of nuclear weapons, the ICRC
confirms its position as expressed in its Commentary on the 1977 Additional
Protocols." 35 In its message to the Afghan authorities the ICRC indicated that
the civil war in Afghanistan was governed primarily by the provisions applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 36 This reflected the ICRC view that
there were two conflicts in Afghanistan (Coalition v. Taliban; and Taliban v.
Northern Alliance) to which two different branches of law applied. However,
this was a surprising stance in view of the strong view about the application of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the situation in Afghanistan that had been
expressed by the UN Security Council in August 1998. The ICRC subsequently issued some public statements on the application of the laws of war in
this crisis, reminding all the parties involved
the Taliban, the Northern Alliance and the US-led coalition of their obligations to respect the law, and
stating that the ICRC was continuing a wide range of activities inside Afghanistan. One ICRC statement was explicit that "combatants captured by enemy
forces in the international armed conflict between the Taliban and the US-led

—

—

Memorandum from ICRC to Governments of the US and the UK (Sep. 28, 2001). This
memorandum was amended and corrected on October 5 by the ICRC. See Memorandum from
ICRC to Governments of the US and the UK (Oct. 5, 2001).
36. See Memorandum from ICRC to Government of Afghanistan (Sep. 2001) (unpublished
35.

See

memorandum).
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accordance with the Third Geneva Convention,"

implying that other aspects of the war in Afghanistan did not

rise to

the level

of international armed conflict, and that captured personnel in that aspect of
the war would have a different and perhaps lesser degree of protection. 37

November

In

ICRC communicated

2002, the

to concerned countries

its

conclusions that from 19 June 2002 onwards, the armed conflict in Afghanistan was

ered by
the

no longer an

Common

armed conflict but an internal one, covof the 1949 Geneva Conventions rather than by

international

Article 3

more comprehensive regime of the conventions

sion was not persuasive.
certain

non-Afghan

This conclu-

appeared to ignore the continuing involvement of

It

Qaeda, inside Afghanistan, and the
terrorist attacks world-wide of that and

forces, especially al

possible continued involvement in

other bodies operating in Afghanistan;
lier

as a whole.

it

failed to

note the implications in ear-

UN Security Council Resolutions that the conflict was international, and/

or that the

Geneva Conventions were applicable

a departure

from previous

ICRC

to

it;

and

its

issuance

marked

practice of adopting a low profile approach to

the legal characterization of situations with characteristics of both international

and internal armed

conflict. 38

Lack of scope for neutrality
The circumstances of the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban were such that
little or no room was left for states to adopt a policy of traditional (i.e., impartial)
neutrality, the stresses on which in wars in the twentieth century were already
noted above. The lack of scope for neutrality was especially marked because al
Qaeda operates in numerous states, and all states have been required by the UN
to take a range of measures against it. The resolution passed by the UN Security
Council in 1999 on the subject of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,

37.

Press Release 01/47,

ICRC, Afghanistan: ICRC

calls

on

all

parties to conflict to respect

international humanitarian law (Oct. 24, 2001), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/iupList74/OE80282COA643B05C1256B6600607EOO (Nov. 12, 2002).
38. See ICRC, Aide-Memoire to US (Nov. 19, 2002) (Similar messages were addressed to
Afghanistan and other concerned countries). This communication made no reference to UN
Security Council Resolutions that might suggest the possibility of a different conclusion about
the status of the conflict and the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. With
questionable legal logic, it asserted that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions no longer
provided a legal basis to continue holding without criminal charge persons who had been

October 2001 and 19 June 2002, and that if these persons are
criminal charges must be brought against them. On previous ICRC

captured in Afghanistan between
to be kept in captivity,

7

caution regarding the categorization of conflicts, see Gasser, Internationalized Non-International

Armed

Conflicts, supra

note 30, at 157-159.

196

.

Adam

Roberts

condemning its support of terrorism and its refusal to hand over Osama bin
Laden, had already required all states to take action against the Taliban and
against Osama bin Laden and associates. 39 The UN Security Council's resolutions of 12 and 28 September 2001 required all states to take a wide range of actions against terrorism. 40 In his 20 September address to Congress, President
George W. Bush framed the obligations on states in blunter and more US centered terms:

Every nation, in every region,
us, or

you are with the

now

has a decision to make. Either you are with

terrorists.

From

continues to harbor or support terrorism

this

will

day forward, any nation that

be regarded by the United States as

a hostile regime. 41

It is

evident that the scope for traditional neutrality was implicitly under-

stood by the Security Council, and explicitly proclaimed by the United States,
to be very limited in the overall counter-terrorist campaign. Naturally,
states, including Iran,

Laden"; and not
rectly. It

all

some

proclaimed that they were "neither with Bush nor bin

states

would be absurd

were willing to

assist

the US-led military action di-

to claim that all forms of non-belligerence are dead,

but the particular understanding of neutrality in the written laws of war
ther called in question by the character of the "war

on

is

fur-

terror."

Bombing
The development by US and allied forces of techniques of bombing that are more
accurate than in previous eras has improved the prospects of certain
paigns being conducted in a

39. See S. C. Res. 1267,

SCOR,

manner that is compatible with the

U.N. SCOR, 54th

Sess.,

air

cam-

long-established

U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999). See

also S. C. Res.

SCOR, 53d
U.N.
Sess.,
Doc. S/JL 193/(1998), which, in addressing the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, refer
to the problem of terrorism and call upon states to take specific actions, most notably to end the
supply of arms and ammunition to all parties to the conflict.
40. See S. C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001) and S. C. Res. 1373,
U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
4 1 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 1347-1351 (Sep. 20, 2001), available at http://
frwebgate. access, gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi?dbname=2001_presidential_
documents&docid = pdl7se01_txt-15 (Nov. 12, 2002). The peroration added that God is not
neutral between freedom and fear, justice and cruelty.
1076, U.N.

51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1076/(1996); and S. C. Res. 1193, U.N.
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laws-of-war principle of discrimination; 42 and with the more specific rules about
targeting
tocol

—

rules

This

I.

is

a

which themselves have changed, not least in 1977 Geneva Promomentous development in the history of war, yet its effects, es-

pecially as regards operations against terrorists, should not be exaggerated, as

it

cannot guarantee either success or no deaths of innocents. Precision-guided

weapons

are generally better at hitting fixed objects, such as buildings, than

ing objects that can be concealed, such as people
still

mov-

and tanks. Civilian deaths

will

occur, whether because certain dual-use targets are attacked, because of the

close proximity o( military targets to civilians, or because of faulty intelligence

and human or mechanical

errors. In addition,

malevolence and callousness can

on the wrong places or people. A further problem with the
new type of US bombing campaign is that, in the eyes of third parties, it can easily
look as if the United States puts a lower value on the lives of Iraqis or Serbs or Afghans than it does on its own almost-invulnerable aircrews: a perception which
can feed those hostile views of the United States that help to provide a background against which terrorism can flourish.
Announcing the start of military strikes against Afghanistan on 7 October
2001, President Bush stated: "[t]heir carefully targeted actions are designed to
disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the
military capability of the Taliban regime." 43 The principle that the bombing of
Afghanistan should be discriminate was frequently repeated. On 2 1 October,
General Richard B. Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said:
still

lead to attacks

we want

So we plan every military
target with great care. We try to match the weapon to the target and the goal is,
one, to destroy the target, and two, is to prevent any what we call "collateral
damage" or damage to civilian structures or civilian population. 44
[t]he last thing

From

the start of the campaign in Afghanistan, the United States was par-

ticularly sensitive

42.

The

targets,

are any civilian casualties.

about accusations that

principle of discrimination,

which

is

it

acted indiscriminately. In late

about the selection of weaponry, methods and

includes the idea that non-combatants and those hors de

combat should not be

deliberately targeted.
43.

President George

(Oct.

7,

2001)

W. Bush, Address to the Nation, 37 WEEKLY COMP.

available

at

PRES.

DOC

1432-1433

http://frwebgate. access. gpo.gov/cgi-in/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_

presidential_documents&docid = pd 15oc01_txt-9.pdf (Nov.

12, 2002).

44. Interview by George Stephanopoulos of Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers

This

Week

(ABC

television broadcast, Oct. 21, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Oct2001Ztl0222001_tl021jcs.html (Nov.

12, 2002).
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October Rumsfeld accused the Taliban and al Qaeda leaders of both causing
and faking civilian damage: "they are using mosques for command and con-

ammunition storage, and they're not taking journalists in to show
they grab some children and
that. What they do is when there's a bomb.
some women and pretend that the bomb hit the women and the children." 45
What truth there was in all this remains difficult to determine.
About 60% of the 22,000 US bombs and missiles dropped in Afghanistan
were precision-guided: the highest percentage in any major bombing campaign. If, as reported, only one in four bombs and missiles dropped by the
United States on Afghanistan missed its target or malfunctioned in some way,
the 75% success rate was higher than that achieved in the 1991 Gulf War and
the 1999 Kosovo War. 46 This was a remarkable achievement.
The bombing aroused much international concern. There were reports of
many attacks causing significant civilian casualties and damage. Accuracy in
trol, for

.

.

hitting the intended target area did not itself necessarily eliminate such prob-

lems.

An ICRC

warehouse

in

Kabul was

on 16 and 26 October,

hit twice,

leading to serious questions about failure to ensure that target
erly

prepared and, after the

first

were prop-

amended. 47 The

well-publicized disaster,

sode was subsequently investigated by the Pentagon.

lists

Some

48

epi-

later incidents

were even more serious. For example, according to press reports over a hundred villagers

may have

and neighboring

45.

(Nov.
46.

villages

Secretary of Defense

available at
12,

died in bombings on

1

December 2001
not

in eastern Afghanistan,

Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks

outside

ABC TV

far

of

Kama Ado

from the cave

Studio (Oct. 28, 2001),

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/tl0292001_tl028sd3.html Oct. 28, 2001

2002).

See Eric Schmitt,

A

Nation Challenged: The Bombing; Improved

Afghan Air War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

9,

2002, at A- 16 (reporting

on an

US Accuracy

Claimed

in

uncited, detailed Pentagon

assessment).
47. See,

e.g.,

Vernon Loeb

Pentagon Cites

"Human Error in the

2001,atA16.
48. See Vernon Loeb,

WASH. POST,
19,

"exceeded

A14. See

also Breaking

News (CNN

Hit Afghan Convoy,

television broadcast,

Mar.

indicated that numerous clerical errors had led to the mistaken
in charge of the air

his authority in ordering the strike" of

"No

May Have

that a preliminary Pentagon investigation into the bombings

US commander

the target had been placed
separate

at

CNN reported

ICRC warehouse

bombings, that the

Red Cross Compound Mistakenly bombed;
Targeting Process" After Second Mishap, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,

"Friendly Fire" Probed in Death; Airstrike

Mar. 30, 2002,

2002) in which

of the

& Rajiv Chandrasekaran,

on

a

"No

campaign,

Strike List" at the Pentagon,

Strike List" maintained by the

US

Lt.

Gen. Charles Wald, had

26 October, and that a key issue was that, while
Central
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Command

was inadvertently

in

Tampa,

Florida.

left off

a
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complex
leaders,

at

US

On

Tora Bora. 49
aircraft

War

of

1

in the
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an operation to hunt Taliban
around the hamlet of Kakrak. Ac-

July 2002, during

attacked four villages

cording to reports, this episode followed the

firing of guns at

two wedding par-

and resulted in killing over 50 people and injuring over 100. This led to
another Pentagon investigation. 50 In several cases, bombings led to casualties
ties,

among

coalition forces: while this

uncommon

armed

in

conflicts,

bombing can produce
identified.

is

not a laws-of-war issue as such, and

is

not

further confirms the fact that precision

it

intended target

terrible disasters if the

is

incorrectly

51

It is difficult

number of civilian
Afghanistan. As in the 1991 Gulf

to arrive at a reliable estimate of the overall

deaths caused directly by the bombing in

and 1999 Kosovo wars, the Pentagon has been reluctant
Whereas Iraq in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1999 had reasonably

to issue figures.
effective systems

of official record-keeping in place, Afghanistan in 2001 did not.

As

a result of

these factors, estimates of Afghan civilian deaths have been unofficial.

mid-December 2001
made by Professor Marc Herold of the University of New Hampshire. 52 There
were substantial grounds for doubt about his methodology; and his figure,
almost certainly a serious over-estimate, was later modified. 53 In response to
Controversy was caused by an estimate of 3,767

49. See,

e.g.,

Richard Lloyd Parry

INDEPENDENT, Dec.

2,

as of

& Justin Huggler, Village Air Raid: Error or an act of terror?, THE

2001, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story= 107928,

(Nov. 13, 2002).
50.

Dexter

2002,

at

Flaws

Filkins,

Sec.

1,

p.

1,

in

U.S. Air

col.

5,

War

Left

available

Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TIMES,

at

Jul.

21

http://query.nytimes.com/search/abstract?res =

F40813F83D5C0C728EDDAE0894DA404482 (Nov. 13, 2002).
51. On 13 September 2002 two US pilots who mistakenly bombed and killed Canadian troops in
Afghanistan on 18 April 2002 were charged - the
"friendly fire" deaths,

52.

THE

Marc W. Herold,

Comprehensive

A

TIMES, Sep.

& Richard Cleroux,

Accounting

(Dec.
13,

19,

US pilots

US

pilots in

charged over

2002, at 16.

Dossier on Civilian Victims of

AfghanDailyCount.xls (Nov.
53.

14,

criminal charges against

first

connection with the events in Afghanistan. Katy Kay

2001),

at

US

Aerial

Bombing of Afghanistan:

A

http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/

2002).

Criticisms of Herold's methodology included the following: (I)

the total figures were not transparent.

The author

has informed

The

me

calculations leading to

that the

December

figure

was not intended to suggest total accuracy. (2) Unavoidably, in view of time constraints, the
study relied heavily on media reports, some of them extremely dubious. (3) Some incidents were
counted twice in the December total, e.g., due to different place names being used in reports. (4)
In some instances al Qaeda deaths, and possibly Taliban deaths, may have been reported as
civilian deaths.

On

the other

hand

it is

probable that some civilian casualties of bombing

went unreported and were thus omitted from the report. For a strong critique, see Jeffrey C.
Isaac, Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan: The Limits of Herold's "Comprehensive Accounting"
Qan.

10,

2002), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/docs/doc.htm, (Nov. 13, 2002). In

August 2002 Herold stated that "the

figure for the

October
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Herold's

December

estimate, Rumsfeld stated in an interview

on 8 January

2002:
there probably has never in the history of the world been a conflict that has been

and with such measure, and care, and with such minimal
collateral damage to buildings and infrastructure, and with such small numbers
of unintended civilian casualties. 54

done

as carefully,

In 2002 a

number of reports based on

on-site examinations gave a

thoritative, but incomplete, picture. In July the
results of a

New York Times

more au-

published the

review of eleven of the "principal places where Afghans and hu-

man rights groups

claim that civilians have been killed."

sites "airstrikes killed as

many

as

400

civilians."

55

It

found that at these

A principal cause was poor

September a San Francisco-based human rights group, Global
Exchange, estimated on the basis of a survey conducted in Afghanistan that
"at least 824 Afghan civilians were killed between October 7 and January
2002 by the US-led bombing campaign." 56 A Human Rights Watch report on
intelligence. In

civilian casualties in

Afghanistan

is

in preparation.

While even an approximate figure for civilian casualties of the bombing in
Afghanistan may never be known, it appears certain that the number of civilian deaths in the period October-December 2001 was far more than the 500
in Yugoslavia during the war over Kosovo in 1999, and probable that it was
over one thousand. The question then is how this was possible given that
twice the percentage of precision-guided munitions was used and the overall
number of weapons dropped was much less. Of the many possible factors meriting investigation, two were the imperfections of the intelligence/targeting

between 2,650 and 2,970 civilian deaths," and that "between 3,125 and 3,620 Afghan civilians
killed between October 7 and July 31." Marc Herold, Counting the Dead, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 8, 2002, at 17.
were

54. Interview of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
available at

(CSPAN

television broadcast, Jan. 8, 2002),

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ian2002/t01082002_t0108sd.html (Nov. 13, 2002).

55. Filkins, supra note 50. This included reference to the

immediately

Masuda Sultan survey mentioned

infra.

Masuda Sultan et al., AFGHAN PORTRAITS OF GRIEF: THE CIVILIAN/INNOCENT
Victims of US bombing in Afghanistan (2002), at 3, available at http://
56.

See

www.globalexchange.org/septemberll/apogreport.pdf (Nov.
report was based

emphasizes that

on

"it

a survey conducted by a 5-person

was impossible

for

13, 2002).

This short (16-page)

team between March and June 2002.

the figure of 824 "represents only a portion of civilian casualties." Finally, the report called

US Government

to establish

It

our survey to be exhaustive and comprehensive," and that

an Afghan Victims Fund.
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at 3, 6.
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combatants

—both of which

are ge-

neric problems in counter-terrorist operations.

In legal terms, the incidence of civilian deaths per se does not always constitute a violation, absent other factors regarding the

circumstances of such

deaths. Wilful killings and intentional attacks against the civilian population
as

such or against individual

illegal.

not taking part in

hostilities are clearly

Geneva Protocol I, Article
on commanders to exercise care to spare

57, spells out a posi-

civilians

In addition, the 1977

tive obligation

objects.

civilians

and

civilian

57

There are strong reasons
Afghanistan due to the

to believe

US

US bombing were

statements that civilian deaths in

pear to have resulted from errors of various kinds,
avoidable

One

damage."

"collateral

Some of the deaths apand some may have been un-

unintended.
cause

October-December 2001 may have been the
riod of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan,

of

civilian

casualties

fact that, in a legacy

many Taliban

in

from the pe-

military assets

were

located in towns, where they were less vulnerable to raids from rural-based
guerrillas,

but where they were of course closer to civilians

who

risked getting

While much of the bombing has been discriminate,
questions have been raised about whether all appropriate measures have been
taken to reduce civilian casualties and damage. Even if much of the civilian
death and destruction is not a violation of the law, the resulting adverse public
perception risks harming the coalition cause.
The air campaign in Afghanistan confirmed the lesson of earlier campaigns,
especially the war over Kosovo in 1999, that there is tension between current
US and NATO strategic doctrine and certain international legal provisions
on targeting. The 1977 Geneva Protocol I, Article 52(2), opens with the
u
words: [a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives." It goes on to
hit in

bombing

attacks.

indicate the types of objects that might constitute military objectives. This

some difficulties, and has been the subject of interpretative
number of states. 58 The United States, although not bound

provision presents
declarations by a

by the Protocol, has indicated that
fore the

perts

57.
58.

accepts this article. 59 However, even be-

it

United States involvement

in Afghanistan, a

legal ex-

had expressed serious concerns about the provision. For example, Major

GP
GP

I,
I,

supra note
supra note

9, at art.
9, at art.

5 at 450. Declarations

57.

52(2) reprinted

made by

states that

in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

have a bearing on

their understanding ot this article

include those by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland,
the United Kingdom.
59.

number oi US

Id.

at

OpLaw Handbook,

500-51

1.

supra note 15, at 11.
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Italy,

Netherlands, Spain, and
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Jeanne Meyer, co-editor of the

US

Army's Operational Law Handbook, stated

that this article "tries to constrict the use of air

power

to the specific tactical

hand" and "ignores the reality that a nation's war effort is
composed of more than just military components." While not suggesting total
rejection of the provision, she urged the United States to "resist the pressure
60
In general, the United
to accept restrictive interpretations of Article 52(2)."
States is anxious to retain some legal justification for attacks on certain targets
that may not themselves be purely military, but which may, for example, conmilitary effort at

tribute to the military effort or constitute key parts of a regime's infrastructure.

undermine the US bombing effort
in Afghanistan in its most intense phase in October-December 2001? Its success against the Taliban would suggest not, but there were indications that the
concern had serious effects. It was reported that the United States had deliberately slowed the pace of the campaign, and increased the risk to the people
executing it, because of legal restraints and moral values. It was also stated
that war planners frequently chose not to hit particular targets, even if they
were militarily important, and pilots allegedly complained of lost opportuniDid the concern over

ties.

civilian casualties

Yet the planners could not reveal their reasoning for ruling out certain

would give the adversary "a recipe book for not being bombed."
The issue of civilian casualties also became ammunition for inter-service bat61
tles, particularly for Army arguments in favor of "boots on the ground."
In addition to the direct casualties, there were also, inevitably, indirect casualties of the bombing. These appear to have come into two categories. First,
the bombing caused thousands of Afghan civilians to flee their homes. 62 Some
died in the harsh conditions of flight and displacement. Second, the use of
cluster bombs led to immediate and longer-term civilian casualties. Cluster
bombs are air-dropped canisters containing numerous separate bomblets that
disperse over a given area. The bomblets, which are meant to explode on impact or to self-deactivate after a specific period, can cause particularly severe
problems if they fail to do so. There have been objections to their use, principally on the ground that they have a tendency, like anti-personnel landtargets, as

mines,, to

60.

it

kill

people long after the conflict

is

over. Reports from

Kosovo and

Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting
Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 166, 181 (2001).
William M. Arkin, Fear of Civilian Deaths May Have Undermined Effort, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,

Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing

the Will of the

61.

2002, at A12, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-01 1602milmemo.story

(Nov.
62.

13,

On

2002).

those

who

fled

October-November 2001,

from

the

fighting and bombing
and accompanying text infra.

intense

see notes 74-75
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elsewhere have confirmed the general seriousness of the problem. 63

The UN's

Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) estimates that 1,152 cluster bombs were dropped by the United States, leaving up to 14,000 unexAccording to the US State Department in July
2002, "the clearance of cluster munitions is being achieved at a rate faster
than anticipated. All known cluster munition strike sites have been surveyed
where access is possible and are in the process of being cleared." 65 As the law
ploded bomblets as a

result. 64

stands, there has

been no agreement to outlaw cluster bombs, and while they

are not illegal per

se,

ity

their use does raise questions regarding their compatibil-

with fundamental principles of the laws of war. They are certain to be the

subject of further pressures to limit or stop their use, or to ensure

more

effec-

tive safeguards against later accidental detonations.

A further issue concerns the use of bombing in the hunt for Taliban and al
Qaeda personnel

following the

fall

December

of the Taliban regime in early

2001. In the preceding phase, bombing had been used primarily in support of

Northern Alliance
held

cities.

Once

frontal operations

this

was achieved, a

main Talibangood deal of the bombing was directed
aimed

at capturing the

remnant al Qaeda mountain redoubts. It was also directed against
Taliban and al Qaeda forces and their leaders, but many incidents were
reported in the press in which those killed were apparently neither. The
reports drew attention to the difficulty of distinguishing between civilians and
against

these forces.

They

terrorist wars: to

enforcement once
a

also raised the question of broader significance in counter-

what extent can bombing remain an appropriate form of
a state

new government

that

is,

is

to a greater or lesser degree,

opposed to the

terrorists?

At

under the control of
that point, can the

focus be transferred to other forms of police and military action that
less likely

than bombing to cause civilian casualties? Here, the

legal

may be

argument

on the discriminate use of ground force merges into a
practical argument that only such means can prevent the escape of the forces
being targeted. United States civilian and military officials are reported to
have concluded that Osama bin Laden had been present at the battle for Tora
for greater reliance

ICRC, in the year after the NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo ended
in June 1999, more than 400 people were killed or injured by unexploded bomblets. See Ragnhild
Imerslund, In Action, When Toys Kill, Another Challenge in Kosovo, ICRC MAGAZINE, 2000
63.

According

available at

64.

to the

http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2000_2/Kosovo.html (Nov.

Richard Norton-Taylor, Afghanistan Littered with 14,000 Unexploded Bomblets Says

GUARDIAN, Mar.
65.

13,

US

2002).

UN, THE

23, 2002, at 18.

Department of State, Fact

Sheet: U.S.

Humanitarian Demining Assistance

to

Afghanistan

Qui. 30, 2002), available at http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/12274.htm (Nov. 13, 2002).
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commit ground troops against him
in this mountain battle was the gravest error of the war. 66 Whether or not this
conclusion is correct, it does appear that the reliance of the United States on
bombing and its reluctance to put its own troops in harm's way may have
enabled Taliban and al Qaeda leaders to escape.
Bora in December 2001, and that

failure to

Gas

One

long-standing prohibition in warfare

is

the rule against use of gas and bac-

methods of warfare. The United States repeatedly expressed concern that al Qaeda might be preparing to use such methods in terrorist attacks.
In addition, there were a few situations in Afghanistan in which there could
have been pressures for the United States to use gas. When, in 1975, the United
States had ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it had indicated that it considered that certain uses of riot-control agents in armed conflict did not violate the
protocol. 67 In early December 2001, Rumsfeld was asked at a press conference if
the United States might use gas in the hunt for Taliban and al Qaeda personnel
in mountain caves in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld's response contained no denial:
teriological

Well,

I

noticed that in Mazar, the way they finally got the dead-enders to

out was by flooding the tunnel.
last

hard core

al

necessary to do.

Humanitarian

If

Qaeda

And

elements.

finally

And

I

they

came up and surrendered,

guess one will do whatever

people will not surrender, then they've

and refugee issues
Humanitarian relief and refugee issues impacted upon
in Afghanistan.

come

made

the
it

their choice.

is

68

relief

all

phases of operations

The need for humanitarian relief is particularly likely to arise in

counter-terrorist operations against a

weak

or failed state, because such states

breed conditions in which, simultaneously, terrorist movements can operate

and

human misery and refugee flows can occur. The fact of a war beterrorists, while it may affect the mode of delivery (since land con-

large-scale

ing against

voys

may be

provision of

vulnerable to seizure) does not affect the law applicable to the
relief.

The

basic obligations of the various parties to

Gellman and Thomas E.
WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2002, at Al.
66. Barton

67.

Ricks, U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight,

OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note

68. Interview by

Tim

15, at

15-16.

Russert of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

television broadcast, Dec.

2,

an armed

(NBC Meet

the Press

2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/

tl2022001_tl202mtp.html (Nov.

13, 2002).
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and protect humanitarian relief operations are embodied in
1949 Geneva Convention IV, on civilians. 69
The US government put heavy emphasis on air-dropping of supplies. Announcing the start of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, President Bush stated:

conflict to assist in

"[a]s

we

we

strike military targets,

to the starving

and suffering

will also

drop food, medicine and supplies

men and women and

children of Afghanistan." 70

United States forces air-dropped considerable quantities of aid
time as the major bombing operations took place. In the
of the campaign
livered.

71

more than one

Some human

rights

first

same

at the

twenty-five days

million "humanitarian daily rations" were de-

and humanitarian agencies expressed

worries about the air-dropping of food.

They were doubtful

specific

of the value of

air-

dropping supplies compared to the previous deliveries overland, and were

concerned that the yellow wrapping of the food packages could lead Afghans
to mistake yellow cluster bomblets for them.

More

generally, they

tant to the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes, be

of supplies from the

resis-

the dropping

it

or shipping goods in military convoys to distribution

air,

They tended

points.

were

to be critical of the

bombing campaign generally, and
and obstacles to their relief and de-

concerned also about the aggravated risks
velopment work that resulted from the military operations, especially

The

in

view

bombing pause issued by the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in October was indicative of
the tension between some agencies and the US government. 72 In any event,
the collapse of the Taliban regime in early December 2001 and its replacement by the interim administration facilitated, but by no means guaranteed,
of the onset of winter.

69.

See

GC IV, at arts.

430-436. See

also

GP

I

13-26
arts.

unrealistic call for a

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at
9, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
supra
note
1 7, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
18,

reprinted in

69-71, supra note

WAR, supra note 5 at 324-5; GP II art.
OF WAR, supra note 5, at 491. The issue
survey

as,

problems

of humanitarian relief is only touched

on

briefly in this

while of critical importance in Afghanistan, only to a limited extent does

it

raise

specific to counter-terrorist military operations.

W.

70.

President George

71.

Figures for humanitarian daily rations dropped in Afghanistan were given in

Bush, Address to the Nation, supra note 43.

many Pentagon

Gerry Gilmore, Air Campaign Continues Against Taliban, Terrorist Targets

news briefings. See, e.g.,
(American Forces News Service, Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.defenseliiik.mil/news/
Oct2001/nl0082001_200110085.html (Nov. 14, 2002); and Kathleen T. Rhem, Fighters, Bombers,
Not Only Planes Flying in Afghanistan (American Forces News Service, Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/nl0312001_200110314.html (Nov.
72.

Interview with

Interview with

UN

UN

High Commissioner for Refugees

High Commissioner for

14, 2002).

(Irish radio broadcast,

Oct. 12, 2001);

Refugees (BBC-1 Breakfast with Frost

broadcast, Oct. 14, 2001).
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the secure delivery of aid by land routes.

A wide range of countries and organi-

zations took part in the provision of aid. 73

The

refugee problem was of massive proportions and could

ground

stituted a possible

for action

As

over Afghanistan.

itself

have con-

of the beginning of

September 2001 there were about 3.5 million Afghan refugees in neighboring
countries, mainly Pakistan and Iran. The intense hostilities and bombing in
October-December led to an additional 200,000 or more fleeing from Afghanistan, as well as in an increase in the

sons (IDPs) by perhaps half a million.

and refugees from, Afghanistan

bombing on

the

civilians

The subsequent

who

all

testified

number of internally

Many

displaced per-

of the internally displaced

in,

eloquently to the disastrous effects of

their property. 75

return of refugees to Afghanistan was

started in January 2002,

Not

and

74

when 3,000

on

a colossal scale. It

per day began returning to Afghanistan. 76

returned in 2002 chose to stay. By December some 300,000 were

reported to have returned to Pakistan, disappointed by insecurity and eco-

nomic hardship. 77 However, a total of 1.8 million Afghans had returned, 1.54
million of whom had come from Pakistan and resettled in Afghanistan in 2002.
Playing a major role, the UNHCR reported in September that this was the

73.

On

the delivery of humanitarian aid after the collapse of the Taliban regime, see,

Secretary of Defense
15,

2002),

Donald Rumsfeld and General

available

at

Franks,

DOD News Briefing

e.g.,

(Aug.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/t08152002_t0815sd.html

2002); and, Jim Garamone, Humanitarian Success Story In Afghanistan (American

(Nov.

14,

Forces

News

Service, Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/

n01182002_200201185.htm (Nov.
74.

Tommy

Figures current to Dec. 3

REFUGEES BY NUMBERS,

1,

14,

2001 in

2002).

UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 2001 ED. OF

available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ (Nov.

14,

2002).
75.

See, e.g.,

television

border.
76.

See

THE DlSPOSSESED

documentary

The camp was

is

(documentary film by Taghi Amirani, Nov.-Dec. 2001). This

about the Makaki

initially

Camp in Nimruz Province near the Afghan-Iranian

under Taliban and then Northern Alliance control.

UNHCR Spokesman, UNHCR Press

Briefing at Palais des Nations,

2002), available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ (Nov. 14, 2002); and
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Report No.

wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ (Nov. 14, 2002).

At

37 G an

-

29,

Geneva G an

-

25,

UN Office for the

2002), available at http://

that time there were also

movements of

ethnic Pashtun from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
77.

Deutsche

Presse

Agentur

Report

wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ (Jan.

6,

of

December

2003).
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2002,

available

at

http://
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desh.

78

War in

of

the

30 years

Some non-governmental

—

charities

War on

since the creation of Bangla-

i.e.,

and

Terror

NGOs were

critical

of the pres-

The principal improvements that cremovement of people back to their country

sure to encourage refugees to return. 79

ated the conditions for this vast

end of the Taliban regime
in December 2001, and the ending of a years-long drought. Observance of humanitarian norms during the war in Afghanistan may have played some part, esresulted from the conclusion of major hostilities, the

pecially insofar as

it

helped to limit the amount of destruction caused by the

bombing.
Prisoners

From

November 2001,

late

the status and treatment of prisoners taken in the

"war on terror" (most but not

became the

all

of whom had been captured in Afghanistan)

subject of major international controversies.

three inter-related issues:

Afghanistan in

late

first,

These centered on

the extraordinary events relating to prisoners in

2001; second, the broader debate about the legal status and

treatment of prisoners taken in the "war on terror" generally, including those
held at Guantanamo; and third, the question of possible judicial proceedings
against prisoners for pre-capture offenses. This part looks at these three issues
in turn.

(It

does not look at the court cases in several countries in which related

questions have been raised.)

Prison disasters in Afghanistan

on one event: the killing o( a large
number of Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners who had been taken at Kunduz at
around the time of its fall on 23-24 November 2001, and who were then involved in the revolt at Qala-e Jhangi Fort near Mazar -e-Sharif in the period 25
November-1 December. There had been very little sign of serious preparation
international attention focused

Initially,

for

handling prisoners.

The

precise chain of events leading to the revolt has yet

to be established, but the causes appear to include the following

Some

of the prisoners were fanatical soldiers, for

whom

heady mix:

the whole concept of

surrender would be anathema; the arrangements for receiving, holding and

78.

Ron Redmond,

UNHCR

Press Briefing at Palais des Nations,

available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/

Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan Press

(Nov.

(Dec.

14,

Geneva

(Sep. 3, 2002),

2002); Nigel Fisher,

2002)

UN

at

http://

Hunger and Death: Aid Agencies Fear for

Families

Briefing

12,

available

www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf.
79.

See, e.g.,

Persuaded

to

Jonathan Steele, Going
Leave Refugee Camps,

Home

to

THE GUARDIAN,
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Apr.
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them were ad hoc and then casual; there was a failure to communicate to them that they would be treated in accord with international standards;
a number of them had not surrendered all their weapons; they were held in a
place where there was a large store of weapons, to which they gained access;
some of them, according to reports, feared that they were about to be killed, so
had nothing to lose by revolt; and some feared interrogation by those whom
they understood to be CIA operatives, which changed the situation from an
Afghan/Afghan equation. 80
The revolt at Qala-e Jhangi Fort was a desperate struggle in which not only
many prisoners, but also a number of Northern Alliance troops in charge of
the fort, died. United States bombing, and sharp-shooting by UK special
processing

forces, played a part in the defeat of the uprising. Public discussion in the

United Kingdom and elsewhere focused on the events at the

fort,

including

the question of whether the force used to quell the rebellion was excessive.

If

the situation was as desperate and threatening as reports indicated, the use of
force

how

was hardly

surprising. Public discussion could

prisoners should be received

and dealt with. The

more

usefully focus

on

real causes of the disas-

There were failures to think the issue through, to make proper preparations, and especially to
disarm all prisoners. The mix of Afghan and outside involvement in the handling of the prisoners may have further contributed to the outbreak of the
ter

were in the period before the prisoners arrived

at the fort.

revolt.

Other reports about treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners, especially
at Sebarghan in northern Afghanistan, confirm that the overall approach of
the Northern Alliance was defective. By late December there had been numerous reports of prisoners dying in shipping containers and Afghan captors beating their detainees. The ICRC was reported as expressing concern that it had
been able to register only 4,000 of the 7,000 prisoners that the United States
said it and its Afghan allies had in custody. 81 Long after most of the prisoners

80.

Much valuable evidence about the outbreak and course of the prison revolt at Qala-e Jhangi

Fort has emerged, including particularly video records. See,
Prisoners; Video Vividly Captures Prelude to Fortress Revolt,

81. See,

e.g.,

Carlotta Gall, Long Journey

to

e.g.,

Carlotta Gall, Traces of Terror;

N.Y. TIMES

(Jul. 16,

Prison Ends in Taliban Deaths:

2002), at A15.

Many

Suffocated in

HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 2001, at 4; Babak Dehghanpisheh et
al., The Death Camp of Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 2002, at 16-25; and Rory Carroll,
Afghan jailers beat confessions from men, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 28, 2001, at 13.
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in violation of international

standards. 82 International inquiries into these events are ongoing.

Whether

the United States and

its

coalition partners

had any influence

over Northern Alliance actions in such basic matters as protection of prison-

—and,

—

whether they used it is open to question. Some US statements indicated that there could have been such influence. In his Pentagon
press briefing on 30 November, Rumsfeld indicated
in general terms, not in
ers

if so,

connection with the prisoner question
fluence with the forces with which
[w]e have a relationship with

all

it

—

—

that the United States does have in-

operated in Afghanistan:

of those elements

on the ground.

We

have

provided them food. We've provided them ammunition. We've provided

air

We've provided winter clothing. We've worked with them closely. We
have troops embedded in their forces and have been assisting with overhead
support.

targeting

and resupply of ammunition.

It's

a relationship. 83

Legal status and treatment of prisoners generally

Within the Pentagon

it

was recognized

as early as

September 2001 that

in the

forthcoming military action questions relating to the legal status and treatment
of prisoners could be difficult.

An unpublished document circulated by the US

Air Force's International and Operations Law Division contained the main

would continue to be influential: terrorists were to
be treated as "unlawful combatants;" it was "very unlikely that a captured terrorist will be legally entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions;"
however, there was a "practical US interest in application o( Law o{ Armed
outlines of an approach that

Conflict principles in the context o( reciprocity of treatment of captured per-

As

sonnel."

regards treatment

upon

capture,

a terrorist is captured, Department of Defense members must at the very least
comply with the principles and spirit of the Law of Armed Conflict ... A
if

82.

Dexter

2002, at

Filkins,

3,000 Forgotten Taliban, Dirty and Dying, INT'L

HERALD TRIBUNE,

83.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace,

30,

2001),

(Nov.

Mar.

15,

1.

14,

available

2002).

at

DOD News Briefing

(Nov.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/tll302001_tll30sd.html

Compare an

earlier

statement of British Prime Minister Tony

Blair,

who when

asked on 13 November, also in general terms, "what sanctions do we have over the Northern
Alliance?" replied "None." Prime Minister

Tony

Blair, Press Briefing

2001), available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page3852.asp (Nov.
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US military
of a POW. 84

suspected terrorist captured by
protections of but not the status

personnel

will

be given the

Consideration of the legal status and treatment of prisoners taken by the

US-led coalition must begin with the distinction that has been drawn between

Qaeda. As indicated below, one key factor in determining the lawfulness of a combatant and therefore the entitlement to participate directly in hostilities, is the affiliation of the combatant to
a party to the conflict. The Taliban had a material connection to a state (Afthe two

main groups: Taliban and

al

Qaeda did not. A possible complicating factor is that in
non- Afghan units appear to have fought alongside Taliban forces

ghanistan), whereas

al

some cases
and may have been under

which would strengthen a claim to
POW status. In certain cases it may be difficult to determine whether an individual should be considered Taliban or al Qaeda, or belongs in some other
possible category. At Guantanamo there has evidently been a tendency to
classify only Afghan prisoners as Taliban. All non- Afghans (some of whom
were arrested outside Afghanistan) appear to have been classified as al Qaeda.
However, it may be doubted whether all foreigners drawn to support an Islamic cause in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere, and who ended up in
Guantanamo, were necessarily members of al Qaeda.
The basic rules for determining who is a lawful combatant entitled to POW
status are in Article 4 of 1949 Geneva Convention III (the POW Convention).

This

their control,

states, in part:

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one o{ the following categories,

who have

fallen into the

power of

forces of a Party to the conflict as well as

members

the enemy:
(1)

Members of the armed

of militias and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2)

Members

of other militias and

members of other volunteer

corps,

including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their
territory

is

including

occupied, provided

such

organized

that

resistance

such

own

militias

movements,

territory,

even

if this

or volunteer corps,
fulfil

the

following

conditions:

84.

Memorandum from the International and Operations Law Division of Headquarters, US Air

Force on the

Summary of Legal

Issues Relevant to Terrorism Incidents of

21,2001).
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War on

commanded by

being

of

(a) that

of

Terror

person

a

responsible

for

his

subordinates;
(b) that

of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

that of carrying arms openly;

(c)

(d) that

of conducting their operations in accordance with laws and

customs of war.
(3)

Members

of regular armed forces

who profess

allegiance to a

government

or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4)

who accompany

Persons

the

armed

forces

without actually being

members thereof. provided that they have received authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that
.

.

purpose with an identity card. 85

The

question as to whether, in order to qualify for

a state's regular
ticle

armed

forces

all

POW status, members of

have to meet the four conditions

listed in

Ar-

4(A)(2) specifically in respect to members of militias and resistance

movements

not pursued here.

is

The

general assumption has been that states'

regular forces should as a matter of course observe these conditions. 86

assumption could be challenged,

this general

it is

widely agreed that

Even if
members

of a state's forces must meet certain criteria. For example, they should wear

uniforms

when

involved in military action

views as applying even to
gly.

87

There

uments

also

is

a rule that the

commando forces and

United States

airborne troops operating sin-

an obligation on parties to a conflict to supply identity doc-

to all their personnel liable to

However

—

the criteria for

become POWs. 88

POW status are interpreted, states have often de-

ployed certain personnel such as spies in a manner that does not meet the
teria,

knowing that

or treated as

85.

See

if

they

POWs; and

GC III, supra note 5,

fall

into

enemy hands they are

cri-

unlikely to be viewed

they have also deployed certain personnel whose

at art. 4.

Committee of the Red Cross, 3 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, COMMENTARY 48 Qean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter
Commentary III]; Howard S. Levie, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 36-38 (Howard S Levie ed., 1978) (Vol. 59, US Naval War College International
86.

International

Law

Studies).

87.

FM 27-10, para 63, supra note 12.
GC III, art 17 and art. 4(A)(4), supra note 5.

88. See

that civilian contracted personnel

(who played

Afghanistan in 2001-2) would appear to qualify for
authorization.

There

is

Article 4(A)(4), quoted above, indicates

a significant part in the

operations in

POW status provided that they have formal

not a requirement that they wear uniform.
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is

Roberts

debatable.

With

respect to the operations in Af-

ghanistan in 2001, an argument could possibly be
tion personnel did not

US

made

meet one of the conditions:

for

that

some

example, members o{

forces (including special forces or forward air controllers),

uniform or fixed sign and not carrying arms openly. Such

United States
granting of

if

not wearing

a

possibilities give the

a potential interest in avoiding restrictive

approaches to the

POW status and treatment.

All lawful combatants,

the rights set forth in the
for the

US or coali-

mere

fact of

if

captured, are entitled to

Geneva Convention

III.

having participated directly in

POW

status

and

of

They cannot be punished
hostilities,

but they can be

tried for violations of the detaining power's law, or of international

cluding the laws of war) that they

all

law

(in-

may have committed. 89

Questions regarding the status of a variety of detainees

who may

fail

to

meet one of the above criteria are not new. In previous wars, POW status was
seldom given to those involved in resistance activities against occupation, or
in cases of alleged terrorism. On the other hand, some captured personnel
who arguably failed to meet one criterion or another applicable at the time
were viewed

as entitled to

POW status.

A procedure for determining who
status,

is

90

a lawful

is

addressed directly in two treaties.

Convention

III,

combatant, entitled to

The

first

of these, 1949

POW

Geneva

provides in Article 5 that, in cases of doubt, prisoners shall be

POWs

been determined by a
competent tribunal." This Article does not specify who has to have the doubt,
nor the nature of the "competent tribunal." However, the general principle is
clear and is accepted in US official manuals. For example, the US Army manual states unequivocally: "When doubt exists as to whether captured enemy
personnel warrant continued
[prisoner of war] status, Art. 5 Tribunals
91
must be convened."
treated as

"until

such time

as their status has

POW

The second
combatant

treaty to address the procedure for determining

1977 Geneva Protocol

is

1949 Convention
89.

Id.

camp

at arts. 99-104.

discipline

who do

Ill's

is

not have

provisions

The

I.

on the

who

is

a lawful

Article 45 contains elaborations of
status of detained persons.

It

suggests

separate subject of sanctions in respect of offenses against prison

covered in Articles 89-98. As regards judicial proceedings against detainees

POW status, see text at notes
who has

113-122

infra.

on the law relating to POWs, suggests
that being of a different nationality from that of the army in which they serve would not prevent
combatants from having POW status, but he is more doubtful about spies and saboteurs when
not operating openly and in uniform. See Levie, supra note 86, at 74-84.
91. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 22; see also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note
13, at paras. 11.7 and 12.7.1.
90. Professor

Howard

Levie,

written extensively
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that a detainee has "the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial tribunal," but allows for considerable leeway in the proce-

POW

dure by which a tribunal could reach a decision about
possibilities that the

and

also in

proceedings could take place

The

status.

an

after a trial for

offense,

camera in the interest of state security, are not excluded. This

cle recognizes in plain

are entitled to

language that not

all

who

those

arti-

take part in hostilities

POW status, but they are entitled to certain fundamental guar-

antees discussed further below.

The

uncertainties regarding the status and treatment of people

volved in hostile activities in various ways, but

POW

common

plicitly create

term,

is

to

meet the

are in-

criteria for

muddled terminology. "Unlawful combatant,"

status, are reflected in

the most

who fail

who

The

generally used in this paper.

treaties that im-

the category do not offer any satisfactory term to describe such

The US Supreme Court,

judgment in the July 1942 case, Ex
Parte Quirin, used the terms "unlawful combatant" and "unlawful belligerent,"
apparently interchangeably, to refer to one who, "having the status of an enpersons.

emy

in

its

upon the

belligerent enters or remains, with hostile purpose,

territory of

the United States in time of war without uniform or other appropriate
of identification."
thority as the

not meet the

92

One term advanced

in the early 1950s

most appropriate to cover

POW criteria

is

a

by a respected au-

wide range of combatants

"unprivileged belligerents"

—

means

who do

a term that carries

the important implication that such persons while not meeting the criteria for

POW status, have not necessarily committed a definite violation of the laws of
war. 93 In current

US

—

manuals four terms "unprivileged belligerents,"
"detainees," "unlawful combatants" and "illegal combatants"
are used, again
apparently interchangeably, to refer to those who are viewed as not being

members

military

—

of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and not having the right

to engage in hostilities against

nology

is

not in

itself a

an opposing

party. 94

The

variety of the termi-

major problem. The key element of confusion in the de-

bate was the tendency, especially marked in the press in late 2001 and early
92.
93.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 4-16 (1942) [hereinafter Quirin].
The classic article on the subject is by Richard Baxter. See Richard

R. Baxter, So-called

"Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.

His key conclusion

is

that this large category of hostile conduct

is

not per

323-45 (1951).

se violative

of any

and
punishment by the enemy, for example under the enemy's own laws and regulations. In the years
since he wrote this, many terrorist acts have been prohibited in international law, so the category
is not necessarily appropriate for those suspected of involvement in terrorism.

positive prohibition of international law, but

94.

note

OPLAW HANDBOOK,

it

does expose those engaging in

supra note 15, at 12, 22, see also

13, at para. 12.7.1.
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supra
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2002, to refer to such terms as "unlawful combatants" and "battlefield detainees" as

if

they were entirely new, were freshly invented by the

US government,

and were completely outside the existing treaty framework.
The ICRC and others have argued that detained persons who do not qualify for

POW status

(i.e.,

those often called "unlawful combatants") should be

and treated in accord with the 1949 Geneva Convention
IV. This view would appear to be in conformity with the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention:

viewed

as civilians

Ipjersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given

any manner

the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
nationals.

Pictet's

who

moment and in

whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in

Power of which they

are not

95

Convention may appear to confirm that those
POWs must be viewed as civilians when it refers to:

commentary on

are not classified as

a general principle

which

this

is

embodied

in all four

Geneva Conventions

of 1949.

Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he

war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is
no 'intermediate status'; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. 96
is

either a prisoner of

Further ammunition for

Geneva Protocol

I.

view can be found in Article 50 of 1977

this

However, the view

is

rooted in the terms of relevant treaties.

open

to several objections that are

(I) It is in

tension with the specific

terms of Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, which excludes from
the Convention's protection certain persons, namely nationals of neutral and
co-belligerent states;

the Convention
ality living in

95.

is

and

it is

likewise in tension with Pictet's statement that

"on the one hand, persons of enemy nation-

basically about

1949 Geneva Convention IV, Article

combatants,

on the

the territory of a belligerent State, and

if denied

4, first

other, the

paragraph. For a strong assertion that

enemy

POW status, must be considered as civilians, see Hans-Peter Gasser, 'Acts

of Terror, "Terrorism" and International Humanitarian Law,' International Review of the Red
Cross, vol. 84, no. 847,

September 2002,

at p. 568.

He

emphasizes that "civilian detainees

suspected of having committed a serious crime can and must be put
96.

International

Committee of the Red

PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS

COMMENTARY 51

IN

Cross, 4

TIME OF

trial."

GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE

WAR TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR,

(Jean S. Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter
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in the

inhabitants of occupied territories." 97 (2)

War

The

on Terror

Geneva Conventions,
Common Article 3, acknowledge that in civil wars detainees may have a different status from that of POW or civilian. (3) The 1977 Geneva Protocol I,
Articles 45 and 75, acknowledges that even in international armed conflicts

may have

certain detainees

a status that

is

four 1949

distinct

from those of

POWs

and

under the 1949 Geneva Conventions III and IV. (4) It risks eroding
the key distinction between combatants and civilians that is fundamental to

civilians

Geneva Protocol I, Article 48.
The fact that certain detainees taken in the "war on terror" may be denied
status as either a POW or a civilian does not mean that they have no legal
rights. The provisions of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
the laws of war, and

is

reflected in the 1977

although not specific to this category of person and formally applicable only in
non-international armed conflict,

be applied to

all

much more

who is not entitled

directly:

minimum

.

.

.

shall

protection of Article 75 of this Protocol."

Geneva Protocol

have the

The

under other

all

those

who do

right at

US

I,

US

US

Id.

98.

On

rules

a party to 1977

articles

articles.

However,

connection

articles in

The omission may

Geneva Protocol

general sensitivity to the 1977

doubts about certain provisions of these

97.

is

policy that they should be implemented. 99

have repeatedly omitted to mention these

mention the

minimum

not benefit from more favorable treatment

with the treatment of prisoners held in the "war on terror."
reflect the

times to the

the rules in Articles 45 and 75 are relatively uncontroversial

long-standing

officials

all

rules.

Geneva Protocol
it is

part in

said Article 75 elaborates a

Although neither the United States nor Afghanistan
and

I

and who does not ben-

range of fundamental guarantees that are intended to provide
of protection for

guarantees to

"Any person who has taken

to prisoner-of-war status

from more favorable treatment

efit

as

detainees. 98 In addition, Article 45 of 1977

addresses the matter
hostilities,

may be viewed

I

Nonetheless the

or specific
failure to

appears odd: reference to Article 75 would have been an

at 45.

the broad scope of application of

Common

Article 3, see,

e.g.,

Commentary

IV, supra

note 96, at 36, 40.
99. Articles 45

and 75 are among the many articles of GP

I

(supra note 9) that the United States

views as "either legally binding as customary international law or acceptable practice though not
legally binding." See

OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra

note 15, at 11.
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obvious way of indicating that the treatment of the detainees was
international legal framework.

still

within an

100

After the status and treatment of prisoners taken in Afghanistan became

urgent in

November 2001,

public statements of the

US government were con-

on one point. By referring to these prisoners generally as "battlefield detainees" and "unlawful combatants" the United States signalled its
unwillingness to classify al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners as POWs. However,
sistent

it

and

clear

was slow to give detailed reasoning, and to indicate the principles to be

lowed in the handling of the detainees.

whether the

ICRC would have any

taken to the

US

I

naval base at

On

1 1

January 2002,

access to the prisoners

Guantanamo Bay

in

when asked

who had

Cuba, Rumsfeld

think that we're in the process of sorting through precisely the right

handle them, and they

will

be handled in the right way.

They

will

fol-

just

been

stated:

way

to

be handled

not as prisoners of war, because they're not, but as unlawful combatants. The, as

do not have any rights under
have indicated that we do plan to, for the most
part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva
Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate, and that is exactly what we
I

understand

it,

technically unlawful combatants

the Geneva Convention.

We

have been doing. 101

numerous expressions oi concern in the
United States and internationally about the status and treatment of detainees,
and about the risk that US conduct would lead to a global weakening of the
POW regime. 102 There were also intense disagreements within the US administration. 103 The situation was made worse by the Pentagon's seemingly inept
issuance on 19 January 2002 of a photograph showing bound and shackled
prisoners, heads and eyes covered, kneeling before US soldiers at
Guantanamo. The photographs, which showed a transitional processing stage
during the prisoners' arrival, became a misleading symbol of how the
Guantanamo camp was being operated.
In the following weeks there were

US publications to note the potential applicability and value of Article 75
was by Lee A. Casey, David Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram. See Casey et al., Detention and
Treatment of Combatants in the War on Terrorism (Fed. Soc. L.
Pub. Pol. Studies, 2002) This
article was published in early 2002, before the White House announcement of 7 February.
100.

One

of the few

&

101. Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld,

DOD News

.

Briefing Qan. 11, 2002), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ian2002/t01112002_t0111sd.html (Nov. 14, 2002).
102. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Europeans Take Aim at U.S. on Detainees, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2002, at 4.
103. See Thorn Shanker and Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse
Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
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Certain conciliatory gestures were

in the

War on Terror

made by

the

US administration.

Interna-

Committee of the Red Cross officials started interviewing detainees at
Guantanamo on 18 January 2002, and were able to establish a permanent
tional

presence there. Rumsfeld's above-quoted suggestion that unlawful combat-

under the Geneva Convention was modified when, on 22
January, he recognized that "under the Geneva Convention, an unlawful
ants have

no

combatant

rights

entitled to

is

House, in the
[t]he

first

humane

treatment." 104

major policy statement on the

detained at

is

announced:

issue,

manner

consistent with the principles of

Geneva Convention of 1949.

Geneva Convention
Qaeda detainees.

President has determined that the

Taliban detainees, but not to the

Al Qaeda
group.

As

White

treating

consistent with military necessity, in a

The

7 February, the

and will continue to treat all of the individuals
Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and

United States

the Third

On

is

al

not a state party to the Geneva Convention;

such,

its

members

government, Afghanistan

is

Taliban

the

a party to the

a foreign terrorist

POW status.

are not entitled to

Although we never recognized

it is

applies to the

as

the

legitimate

Afghan

Convention, and the President has

determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of

Geneva Convention, however, the Taliban detainees do not

the

qualify as

POWs.
Therefore, neither the Taliban nor

al

Qaeda

detainees are entitled to

POW

status.

Even though the detainees
provided with

The

many

are not entitled to

POW

privileges, they will be

POW privileges as a matter of policy.

1Cd

Fact Sheet, while containing numerous detailed assurances about the

treatment of the detainees at Guantanamo, indicated that they would not
ceive certain specific privileges afforded to
III,

re-

POWs by the Geneva Convention

including:

104. Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld,

DOD News

Briefing, (Jan. 22, 2002), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01222002_t0122sd.html (Nov.
105. Office of the
(Feb.

7,

2002),

13.html (Nov.

14,

White House
available

at

14, 2002).

Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at

Guantanamo

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/2002C2'"-

2002).
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•

access to a canteen to purchase food, soap and tobacco

•

a

•

the ability to have and consult personal financial accounts

•

the ability to receive scientific equipment, musical instruments, or sports

monthly advance of pay

outfits. 106

This United States refusal to grant these particular privileges was justified

many

in terms of the security risk posed by

guards and to each other.

detainees at

Guantanamo

to their

A specific indication of this kind can be compatible

with an overall approach of respect for a legal regime, and can also contribute

change

to

in that regime.

The

caused no outcry, and

refusal of these privileges

parts of the 7 February statement reassured international opinion.

However, the
spects.

The

earlier part of the

recognition that the

statement was incoherent in certain

Geneva Convention

III

re-

did apply to the

Taliban, followed by the blanket statement that the Taliban did not qualify as

POWs, had
tion. In his

the confusing appearance of simultaneous admission and retrac-

accompanying statement, the White House Press Secretary

why

cated the reason
[t]o qualify as

have to have

the Taliban detainees failed to qualify as

POWs

indi-

POWs:

Qaeda and Taliban detainees would
They would have to be part of a military
have worn uniforms or other distinctive signs

under Article

4, al

satisfied four conditions.

would have to
visible at a distance; they would have to have carried arms openly; and they
would have to have conducted their military operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
hierarchy; they

The Taliban have not
population

effectively distinguished themselves

of Afghanistan.

Moreover,

they

have

not

from the

civilian

conducted

their

operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, they have

knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful
the

al

terrorist objectives o(

Qaeda.

Al Qaeda

an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state
party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the
Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to
status under the treaty. 107
is

POW

The privileges cited are outlined in GC III, supra note 5,

106.

Id.

107.

White House

at 2.

2002), at 1-2, available at Lexis, Federal

News

Service (Jan.

219

6,

64-5 and 72.
White House (Feb.

arts. 28, 60,

Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing at the

2003).

7,

The Laws

The argument about
tions

which are

of

it

in the

War on

Terror

the Taliban appears to assume that the four condi-

listed in Article

"other militias" and resistance
Taliban; and

War

4(A)(2) specifically in respect of members of

movements must

necessarily apply to the

then proceeds to interpret the four conditions

becomes one

that support for "unlawful terrorist objectives"

in

such a way

basis for denial of

POW status. As for the al Qaeda detainees, although certain of the stated reasons for not applying the Convention to

them

are well founded, the particular

argument that because al Qaeda is not a party to the Convention it cannot
benefit from it is far from correct. There was a curiously legalistic streak in an
approach which put such emphasis on the purported distinction between the
Taliban and al Qaeda detainees yet saw no practical consequences: "No dis-

made

good treatment given to the al-Qaida or the
Taliban."
A striking feature of the statement is its avoidance of any hint of
doubt about status: none of the detainees, even the Taliban ones, could possibly qualify as POWs. In keeping with this, nothing was said about the tribunals provided for in Article 5 of 1949 Geneva Convention III and Article 45 of
1977 Geneva Protocol I. A further notable omission was the absence of refertinction will be

in the

108

ence to Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol. Despite certain merits, the

ment was

US

state-

and less reassuring, than it could have
been. Expressions of international concern regarding the status and treatment
of detainees in Guantanamo and elsewhere continued.
In response to the White House statement of 7 February, the ICRC Press
Office in

less technically proficient,

Geneva maintained

its

position that "people in a situation of interna-

tional conflict are considered to be prisoners of

nal decides otherwise." 109
its

war unless a competent

The ICRC emphasis on

tribu-

POW status contrasted with

statements in respect of prisoners in the wars in the former Yugoslavia in

1991-5: in these wars, which were partly internal but also had an international
dimension, the

ICRC

generally avoided status questions,

and variously used

such terms as "captured combatants," "prisoners" and "detainees." 110 The

ICRC

statement in respect of prisoners taken in Afghanistan

cord with Article 45 of 1977 Geneva Protocol

108.

Id.

109. See

I,

is

arguably in ac-

but went well beyond Article 5

at 3.

ICRC,

Press Release,

Geneva Convention of

Prisoners of

War

(Feb. 9, 2002), available at

http://www.icrc.org/ (Nov. 14, 2002).
110. See ICRC Compilation of Press Releases and Communications to the Press by the ICRC:
Former Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 2 July 1991-20 March 1998 (1998) (bound collection of photocopied texts on file

with author).
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which makes the more modest stipulation

III,

that in cases of doubt prisoners shall be treated as

press

of unprivileged or

Geneva Convention

is

combatant. Since the category of unprivileged

illegal

erent has a long history,

col

Presumably, there

no doubt in the first place. In some statements
spokesmen went so far as to deny the existence oi a legal category

could be cases in which there

ICRC

POWs.

III,

is

implicit in the criteria for

and

is

explicit in Article

POW

bellig-

status in 1949

45 of 1977 Geneva Proto-

these statements were not well founded and they were modified in the

I,

course of 2002.

Amnesty

The same

International in

basic stance, with the

same weaknesses, was taken by

London and Human Rights Watch

in

New York.

111

These positions may have reinforced the reservations of the US administration
about the advice they were receiving from outside bodies.
The fundamental US position that many of the detainees taken in Afghanistan should not be accorded the status of POWs appears to have been based

on three main

practical considerations: the

first

related to conditions of de-

tention of prisoners, the second to their release, and the third to the conduct
of judicial proceedings.

On

conditions of detention, a main concern was that 1949

vention

famously states that

III

date of birth and serial number.

POWs

are only obliged to give names, rank,

The United

112

Geneva Con-

States was anxious to obtain

more information from the detainees. There is nothing
Convention that precludes questioning on other issues and whether a
considerably

in the
differ-

ent classification actually improves the prospects of securing accurate infor-

mation

The United

debatable.

is

more segregated from each
harm, than

full

other,

observance of

States also wished to keep the detainees

and with
all

the

less

POW

means of committing
Convention's articles would

access to

provide.

Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Bush Policy Endangers
HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 2002, at 7. See also Amnesty
International Memorandum to US Government on the Rights of People in US Custody in
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay (Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/
111. See,

e.g.,

American and Allied Troops, INT'L

(Nov. 14, 2002).
112.

GC III,

supra note 5,

questions, nor does

it

art. 17.

prohibit the

This rule does not mean that a POW cannot be asked other
POW from providing other information. In March 2002, Jakob

Kellenberger, President of ICRC, pointed out that there

is

nothing in humanitarian law to stop a

want to
do anything to people to make them
a non-issue." Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC Rejects Talk of Geneva Conventions Review,

prisoner being questioned, but that he could not be forced to answer. "If he does not

answer, that
speak.

It is

is

his right.

Under any

system, you cannot

Reuters-Geneva (Mar. 21, 2002).
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As

of

War

in the

War on

Terror

Geneva Convention III codifies a practice
that is normally pursued after a war
releasing and repatriating POWs. Any
such release of all the detainees from the "war on terror" would pose three
problems. First, there may not be a clear end of hostilities: while the war in Afregards release of prisoners,

—

ghanistan

may be concluded

United States or other
ond, unlike

POWs

in

at a definite date,

it

may be decades

can declare that the "war on terror" is over. Seca "normal" inter-state war, some of the prisoners constates

cerned might continue to be extremely dangerous after
training, their motivation to

commit

control over them. Third, their

tal

before the

them back, except perhaps

release, given their

and lack of governmencountries of origin might refuse to accept
acts of terrorism,

as prisoners.

Judicial proceedings

As

regards judicial proceedings in respect of pre-capture offenses, from early

on

war the United States reportedly intended to prosecute a number of al
Qaeda and Taliban leaders, including Osama bin Laden if captured. However,
in the

it is

unclear that the point of detaining the prisoners in

them.

113

Insofar as the possibility of trials

is

pears reluctant to pursue the procedure laid

which

specifies that

any sentence of a

Guantanamo

is

to try

envisaged, the United States ap-

down

in

Geneva Convention

III,

POW must be "by the same courts ac-

cording to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of
the Detaining Power." 114

through the normal
garding the normal

US
US

If,

following this provision, cases were handled

military courts, there could be problems, especially remilitary procedures for appeals. 115 Moreover,

members

capture offense was of a type that would result in

of the detaining power appearing before a civil court, then

above-quoted terms of the Convention that a

of the
it is

if

a pre-

armed

forces

implicit in the

POW could appear before a civil

thorough and perceptive account of Camp Delta

Guantanamo datelined 10 October
2002, Joseph Lelyveld suggests that it is a holding camp for detainees who are not likely to be
released or tried soon, and many of whom may be relatively minor figures who were in the wrong
place at the wrong time. Joseph Lelyveld, In Guantanamo, 17 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 7,
1

13. In a

at

2002), at 62-68, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15806 (Nov. 30, 2002).
1

14.

GC III, supra note 5, at art.

far as trials for

discipline issues

is

addressed in Article 82.)

Unfortunately, Pictet
115.

102. This appears to be the relevant article of the

Convention so

crimes committed before capture are concerned. (The distinct subject of

The normal

fails

Commentary

III,

supra note 86, at

to consider pre-capture crimes other than

appeal procedure for

US armed

forces

is

POW

406 and 470-1.

war crimes.

through the appellate court of each

then through the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and then on to the US
Supreme Court. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RULES FOR COURT
MARTIAL 1203-1205 (2000).

service,
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Such standard procedures, US officials feared, could provide opportunities for al Qaeda suspects and their lawyers to prolong legal processes and attract publicity. There was also concern that in cases involving defendants with
no documents and no willingness to collaborate with any of the procedures,
and where evidence might be largely based on intelligence sources, it could be
difficult to provide evidence that met high standards of admissibility, and
court.

equally high standards of proof of direct personal involvement in terrorist activFurther, al

ities.

Qaeda might

learn valuable information from evidence in

example about its vulnerability to intelligence gathering.
It was because of such fears about normal judicial procedures that the administration made provision for trial by military commissions. There are nu-

open

court, for

merous precedents

for

such provision: for example, President Roosevelt's

Proclamation of 2 July 1942, bluntly entitled "Denying Certain Enemies Ac-

United States." 116 In

cess to the Courts of the

the case of Ex Parte Quirin the
ness of the Proclamation. 117

its

decision of 31 July 1942 in

US Supreme Court ruled in favor of the

The

current status of such legal precedent

yond the scope of this survey. President Bush's Military Order of
2001 provides

for the option of trying certain

commissions operating under special
It

lawful-

accused

rules. It applies

specifies that individual terrorists, including

13

terrorists

only to

is

be-

November
by military

non-US

citizens.

members of al Qaeda, can be

detained and tried "for violations of the laws of war and other applicable

and that the military commissions would not be bound by "the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." It also contains some extremely
brief provisions for humane conditions of detention, and provides for the Secretary of Defense to issue detailed regulations on such matters as the conduct
laws,"

of proceedings of the military commissions. 118
President Bush's Military Order was the subject of considerable legal and
political

debate in the United States and elsewhere as to

practicability

116.

and

The

advisability.

controversy

Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United

2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5,103 Qui-

2,

1942).

On

this

constitutionality,

its

about

the

military

States, Proclamation

and other cases of

US

No.

established military

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR:
Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions 18-26, 46-48
commissions, see

(updated Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7951.pdf

(Nov.

14,

2002).

117. Quirin, supra note 92, at 6.
118. Military

Order of 13 November 2001

Citizens in the

War Against Terrorism,

-

Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain

sees. 1(e), 1(0, 3, 4(b), 4(c),

66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov.

16, 2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/multidb.cgi
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Non-

(Nov.

14, 2002).

The Laws

of

War

War on

in the

Terror

commissions was part of a larger debate about which particular approach to
the prosecution and trial of alleged terrorists should be pursued. Possibilities
that were raised in public discussion included
tional courts, a

UN

US

federal courts, foreign na-

ad hoc international criminal tribunal, a coalition-based

criminal tribunal, and a special Islamic court. 119

The

controversy about the proposed military commissions abated somewhat

over time.

On 30 November 2001, the President's Counsel offered several assur-

ances, including that military commissions are one option, but not the only op-

On

tion. 120

March 2002

21

the Pentagon issued the long-promised detailed

on the conduct of proceedings of the projected military commissions, the terms of which went some way to meet the expressions of concern regarding President Bush's Military Order of the previous November. 121 As far as
the laws of war are concerned, a key issue (not explicitly addressed in the Pentagon document) is whether the provisions regarding the trial procedure conform
regulations

with the ten recognized principles of regular judicial procedure outlined in 1977

Geneva Protocol
tus.

Article 75,

I,

The Pentagon's detailed

which

relates to persons

not entitled to

POW sta-

regulations appear to conform with almost

all

these

which is that "a convicted person
and other remedies and of the time-

principles apart, arguably, from the final one,
shall

be advised on conviction of his judicial

which they may be exercised." 122
A problem regarding the prisoners held by the United States is the uncertainty regarding whether and when they will be tried, and whether they will be
limits within

held indefinitely or released. Nearly 600 suspects of
ties are

many

different nationali-

held at Guantanamo, but at the time of this writing, there

119. For a useful exploration of these

and other

possibilities, see

FOR PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS (US

is

no

sign of

DAVID SCHEFFER, OPTIONS

Institute of Peace,

Nov.

14, 2001).

120. President's

Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, Address to American Bar Association Meeting,

(Nov. 30, 2001)

cited in

121.

AM. SOC.

INT'L L.

NEWSLETTER,

DOD Military Commission Order No.l

Certain Non-United States Citizens In the

-

at 12

(Nov-Dec 2001).

Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of

War Against Terrorism

(Mar. 21, 2002), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (Nov.

14,

DOD Military Commission]. For a response claiming that these procedures,
of international law,

Commissions: The

highly problematic,

are

Ad Hoc

DOD Rules

see Jordan

of Procedure Courting

J.

Paust,

Illegality,

23

2002)
if not

[hereinafter

per se violative

Antiterrorism

MICH

J.

Military

INT'L

L.

677

(Spring 2002).
122.

GP

trial

Review Panel

I,

supra note

appeal procedure.
counsel,

to

9, at art.

The Pentagon's detailed regulations provide
defense can make written submissions, not for a

75 (4) (j).

which the

A further reservation about the

who would

for a post-

full-blown

regulations concerns the role of the defense

be excluded with the accused from closed sessions, at which only an

"assigned" defense counsel would be present

counsel or the accused. See

who would

be forbidden to speak with the co-

DOD Military Commission, supra note
224

119, at 8, 14.

Adam Roberts
the military commissions becoming operational.

cated that the judicial process

may have

The United

States has indi-

to wait until after "the

war on

terror

is

Their
which distant point the detainees may be tried or released.
indefinite detention, without any charge or trial, would violate fundamental
standards of human rights and be hard to justify. Yet when the main problem
with potential suicide bombers is not what they have done, but what they

won,"

123

at

might do in the future, the resort to judicial procedures does not address the
essence of the problem.

Further Development of the

The phenomena

of global terrorism

Law

and the response

thereto, while by

no

means wholly new, pose many challenges to existing legal provisions, from matters as large as the meaning of "armed conflict" to those as detailed as the conditions of detention. Thus it is not surprising that there were several
suggestions that the existing laws of war might need to be revised, updated, supplemented or reinterpreted to take into account new forms of conflict. The case
for

such reconsideration, which basically arose in connection with the war in

Afghanistan and the many related
elsewhere, especially the

2001-2.

In

February

issues,

may have been

numerous cases of Palestinian

2002,

following

the

furor

reinforced by events
suicide

over the

bombings
detainees

in
at

Guantanamo, Pierre-Richard Prosper, the US Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues, stated: "[t]he war on terror is a new type of war not envisioned
when the Geneva Conventions were negotiated and signed." 124 He also said at
that time: "[w]e should look at all international documents to see whether they
are compatible with this

Such suggestions

moment

in history." 125

that the law might

four obvious lines of criticism. (I)

need to be revised are vulnerable to
In several statements on the matter, Am-

what particular revisions might be
made to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. (2) There was naturally a suspicion in
certain humanitarian organizations that suggestions that existing law was out
of date or irrelevant to the terrorist problem might be a way of trying to evade
bassador Prosper gave

little

indication of

123. War Crimes at Large Ambassador Richard Prosper Address in London (Sep. 20, 2002) cited in
Owen Boycott, Guantanamo Britons Still a Threat, says US, THE GUARDIAN, Sep. 21, 2002, at 23.
124. War Crimes at Large Ambassador Richard Prosper Address at the Royal Institute of

International Affairs in
125.

London

(Feb. 20, 2002).

Kim Sengupta and Andrew Buncombe, Change Geneva

Rules of Warfare Legal Foundation for the

Combat for 140

Years,

Convention Rules, Says Bush Envoy

Red Cross has Helped Maintain Humanity and Dignity

THE INDEPENDENT,

Feb. 22, 2002, at 1-2.

225

in

The Laws

obligations to

of

War

in the

implement existing law

War on

fully. (3)

Terror

Proponents of change

failed to

mention that the negotiators at Geneva in 1949 had addressed a closely related issue, namely the activities of resistance movements during the Second
World War, and that Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention III are

among

the provisions that already reflect

this. (4)

There was

also a failure to

had already been made to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Proponents of change were notably reluctant to mention even the title of 1977 Geneva Protocol I although it constitutes the most

mention

in this context the revisions that

important actual updating of the 1949 conventions.

It

contains the clearest

which many terrorist
movements engage, such as attacks on civilians. It also introduces some constructive provisions that are germane to the "war on terror." Such provisions
that the United States has in principle accepted include those on targeting,
and on the treatment of detainees who do not qualify as POWs.
Although such criticisms have considerable force, the fact is that the law is
bound to evolve in response to the new problems of a new age. Much of that
prohibitions in the laws of war of certain actions in

evolution

may

take the form, not of

new

conventions, but rather of evolving

some of which may have, or acquire, the status of customary law.
However, some oi the legal evolution may involve international conferences.
Of the many issues related to the "war on terror" that could come up in any

state practice

exploratory process with a view to further change in the law, five of the candidates for consideration could be:

of war;

(b)

the conditions of application oi the laws

(a)

the classification and treatment of detainees;

of responding to suicide bombers

mal means, and whether

who

reprisals

interpretation of the rules

on

is

legitimate

means

by definition cannot be deterred by nor-

can ever be

justified in this context; (d) the

targeting in the light o( the experience oi recent

wars in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and
includes but

(c)

(e)

remnants of war, a problem that

by no means restricted to cluster bombs, and

subject of separate negotiation in a

UN

framework

in

is

in

any case the

Geneva.

Partly because of the salience oi such issues, there continued to be

demand for an

some

exploration of how the law relates to certain aspects of contem-

porary conflicts. In September 2002 the Swiss Foreign Ministry announced
that

it

on the

"wishes to support an informal process and provide a space for debate

and development of international humanitarian law in
light of the new and evolving realities of contemporary conflict situations."
Representatives of certain governments and international bodies, as well as independent experts, were to be invited to contribute to an informal meeting to
be held in January 2003. Cautiously, the Swiss note announcing this stated
reaffirmation

that one of the purposes of the exercise was "if necessary, the consideration ot
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Adam
the development of

new

general and imprecise.

rules."

The

Roberts

potential topics listed were at this stage

126

Conclusions

There are ample grounds

for questioning

whether military operations involving

action against terrorists constitute either a new, or a wholly distinct, category of
war.

The coalition operations

in Afghanistan,

and the

larger

war against

terror-

Many forms

ism of which they are a part, are not completely unlike earlier wars.

of military action and issues raised are similar to those in previous military operations,

and concern

issues already addressed by the laws of war.

Events in Afghanistan have confirmed that there are particular

A war that has as a

in applying the laws of war to counter-terrorist operations.

many awkward

purpose the pursuit of people deemed to be criminals involves
issues for

which the existing laws of war are not

use of local forces as proxies (a

common

a perfect

difficulties

fit.

In addition, the

feature in counter-terrorist wars)

which major powers fail to exercise responsible
control over their local agents, whose commitment to the laws of war may be
slight. More fundamentally, any war against a grand abstraction, as the "war
on terror" undoubtedly is, risks creating a mentality in which adversaries are
seen as dehumanized, and the cosmic importance of the struggle may be
risks creating a situation in

thought to outweigh mundane

However,

legal or

humanitarian considerations.

treating, or appearing to treat, the

law in a cavalier manner

risks

new problems. If a major power is perceived as ignoring certain basic
norms, this may have a negative effect within a coalition, or on enemies. It may
involve severe risks to any of its own nationals who may be taken prisoner. It
may also affect the conduct of other states in other conflicts. In that wider
creating

sense, the principle of reciprocity in the observance of law retains

its

value.

In particular, the United States' handling of questions relating to the treat-

ment and

status of prisoners has caused widespread

concern and

those under Northern Alliance control,

regards

around the time of the rebellion

at

practical

policy

US

positions were de-

not qualify for

The

prisoner issue

126. See Diplomatic Note, Switzerland-US, Sep. 13, 2002. See also
to

POW status,

and procedures were poorly presented, and

did not appear to be fully thought-out.

a Meeting

arrangements,

also subsequently,

fensible, especially that certain prisoners did

US

As

Mazar -e-Sharif and

were inadequate. More generally, although many key
pects of

criticism.

Re-examine the Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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in

some cases

—always

Unknown Author,
6,

2002, at sec.

as-

1,

sensitive

Swiss Call
15.

The Laws
anyway

—was

of

War

in the

War on

especially significant in this war:

if

Terror

the coalition were perceived

have treated prisoners inhumanely, or to have regarded

to

their status

treatment as being in an international legal limbo, there would be

and

risks of a

general weakening of the prisoner regime, including for any coalition personnel taken prisoner in the ongoing

war on terrorism. The handling of this

issue

was a potential threat to coalition unity. The controversies over the prisoner
question had a special resonance because of the concern of other countries

had been moving towards unilateralism

that the United States

generally,

wide range of matters. In

this perspective, fairly or unfairly, the

reluctance to accept the

full

application of 1949

on

a

United States

Geneva Convention

III

to

those particular prisoners was seen as one more example of a selective ap-

proach to international law.
In the course of the

first

year of its "war

on

terror,"

and

especially in the early

handling of prisoner issues in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo, the Bush Administration's expression of policies 'on certain laws-of-war issues

hesitant

and

unskillful. It

would be easy to

was

at times

attribute this to the administration's

alleged general ideological hostility towards international agreements.

more weight. The United States had a
record of concern stretching back decades about the ways in which international humanitarian law has been developing, especially as regards terrorism,
and also in regard to the rules on what is a legitimate target. The administration
ever,

was

some other explanations may

How-

carry

right that certain aspects of the law, including aspects of the

were not appropriate

treatment of alleged

for the

terrorists. Part

POW regime,

of the explana-

tion of the administration's failure to handle the particular question of the status

of detainees effectively

may

lie

quite simply in the fact that

it

was

proceeding in a reactive manner. In addition, there appears to have been insufficient consultation

Whatever the
sionalism of the

with the military's

defects of the

US armed

and beyond the United

own

legal specialists.

Bush Administration's response, the

forces,

profes-

coupled with the effect of criticism within

and practice on the prisoner issues
This evolution has been ad hoc and

States, led to policy

evolving in a generally sensible direction.

incomplete. In general, there have been no major public doctrinal statements

from the
ror"

US government on how

the laws of war apply to the "war

on

ter-

—perhaps because the application of those laws can indeed be compli-

cated and policy-makers do not wish to foreclose options.

This war occasioned a greater degree of tension between the United States

on the one hand, and

international humanitarian and

the other, than any of the wars of the post-Cold
certain laws-of-war issues by the

ICRC and
228

War

human
period.

rights bodies

The handling

on
of

various other humanitarian

Adam
organizations

about the

US

left

much

It

was natural that they should be nervous

administration's view of international humanitarian law and that

they should press for
prisoners.

to be desired.

Roberts

full

implementation of that law, especially in relation to

However, they were on

legally

dubious ground

when

the United States to view detainees as being entitled to be
insistence that
civilians.

if

a

POWs, and

on

in their

POW status then they must be classified as

they were not given

They missed

they pressed

major opportunity to point out publicly the relevance of

certain provisions of 1977 Protocol

to persons not entitled to

I

POW status.

It

was odd and out of character for the ICRC to deny the applicability of the law
governing international armed conflict to certain aspects of the Afghan conflict
including the phase from June 2002 onwards. Overall, the stance of such bodies,

while leading to certain useful clarifications of US policy,
regrettable effect of reinforcing

US

may

also

have had the

concerns (well publicized in debates about

the International Criminal Court) about zealous international lawyers standing
in unsympathetic

judgement on the actions of US

forces.

Returning to the four questions set out at the beginning of

this survey, the

foregoing account suggests these responses:
First,

according to a

lating to the

strict interpretation

main treaties reformally and fully ap-

of their terms, the

conduct of international armed conflict are

plicable to counter-terrorist military operations only

when

those operations

have an inter-state character. Where counter-terrorist operations are simply
part of a civil war, the parties
to civil wars.

part of an

Where

armed

apply, as a

minimum,

the rules applicable

operations are simply part of a state's policing, and not

conflict

war are not formally

must

such as to bring the laws of war into

play, the laws of

in force.

Second, in counter-terrorist military operations, certain phases and situa-

may

what was envisaged in the scope of application and other provisions of the main treaties on the laws of war. They may
differ from the provisions for both international and non-international armed
tions

conflict.

well be different from

Recognizing that there are

difficulties in

applying international rules

in the special circumstances of counter-terrorist war, the attempt

should nevertheless be

At

the very least,

principles

it

made

to apply the law to the

can and

maximum extent possible.

has considerable value as a blueprint or template that the

embodied in the laws of war should be applied

situations. This conclusion

is

in a wide variety of

reinforced by decisions of commissions of in-

quiry, certain resolutions of the

UN

Security Council,

some doctrine and

and considerations of prudence. In the "war on terror," while there have been shortcomings in the interpretation and application of existing law by governments and by
practice of states (including the United States),
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humanitarian organizations,

of

War

much

in the

War on

Terror

of what has been done has been within the

framework of the law and has confirmed

its

relevance.

Third, although the great majority of prisoners taken in

qualifying for
flicts,

POW status,

war are viewed

in a counter-terrorist war, as in other

as

armed con-

there are likely to be individuals and even whole classes of prisoners

who

do not meet the treaty-defined criteria for such status. A procedure outlined
in the 1949 POW Convention and in US military manuals is that in case of
doubt about their status such people should be accorded the treatment, but
not the status, of a POW until a tribunal convened by the captor determines
the status to which the individual is entitled. However, in a struggle involving
an organization that plainly does not meet the criteria (and especially where,
as with al Qaeda, it is not in any sense a state) it may be reasonable to proclaim
that captured members cannot be considered for POW status. In cases where
it is determined that certain detainees are not POWs, they may be considered
to be "unlawful combatants." It is doubtful whether such persons should be
classified as "civilians." However, there are certain fundamental rules applicable to their treatment, including those outlined in Article 75 of 1977

Geneva

and there is a tradition of applying basic norms of the POW regime.
Any prisoner, whether classified as a POW or not, can be tried for offenses, inProtocol

I;

cluding those against international law.
Fourth, there

is

a case for consideration of further revision of the existing

law. Suggestions that the existing laws of

war are generally out of date

face of the terrorist challenge are wide of the mark.

law has played, and

will

However

in the

imperfect, the

continue to play, an important part in influencing the

conduct of the "war on

terror."

There has neither been

a serious suggestion

that the existing legal framework should be abandoned, nor substantial pro-

an alternative set of rules. However, some modest evolutionary
changes in the law can be envisaged, for example regarding conditions of apposals for

and treatment of detainees, the difficult problem
of how to respond to suicide bombers, the problems of targeting, and possible
new rules regarding remnants of war. The application of the law to non-interplication, the classification

national armed conflicts

is

another area in which there has been

much

devel-

and more may be anticipated. Some changes in some of
these areas may require a formal negotiating process. Some, however, may be
achieved indeed, may have been achieved by the practice of states and in-

opment

since 1990

—

—

ternational bodies, including through explicit and internationally accepted

derogations from particular rules that are manifestly inappropriate to the

cir-

hand; and also through the application of rules in situations

sig-

cumstances

at

nificantly different

from inter-state war.
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Commentary

Charles Garraway

All new

1

warfare operates to stress existing law. This

and every

conflict occurring over the last several

new type of warfare involved in "the war on terrorism"

is

is

true for every

hundred

years.

war

The

no exception. Caution

should be taken, however, not to throw out the existing regime but instead we
should study and analyze these stresses for such stresses are not necessarily
fatal.

There

is

always a danger, amply demonstrated over the

decisions being taken

and then followed by

creates further dangers as

ing law. For example,

it

may

we have

last

few months, of

legal justifications.

This in

lead to conflicting reinterpretations of exist-

discussed the differences between Europe and

the United States. However, despite these differences, the end result
exactly the same.

The

departing point

their conclusions since they

itself

is

in

how European

have different

is

often

countries arrive at

drivers, different legal regimes

(both national and international), different cultures, and different populations. It follows occasionally then, that the

action

may be

European

legal justifications for

an

quite different from that of the United States. This of course

1. Colonel Charles Garraway is currently serving
Kingdom, advising on issues of international law.

in the Ministry of

Defence of the United
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then two, or more competing

as there are

legal jus-

Undoubtedly, states on both sides of the Atlantic would benefit

from more consultation and coordination before particular positions are
adopted.
I

agree with Professor Dinstein that existing law

presented today.

adequate

also agree that the principle of distinction

is

for the issues

fundamental

when determining combatant status. However, I do not
with Professor Dinstein on everything. The law of armed conflict is de-

and absolutely
agree

I

is

vital

signed to have a greater degree of flexibility than national law because law, in

many

on the

respects, always focuses

quirement

for built in flexibility so that

last conflict to

The

last conflict.

the

new

we can

Accordingly, there

is

a re-

apply the law designed for the

situation.

armed

been based on traditional forms of armies. I am talking here about regular armed forces. In some
parts of the world today though, we are returning almost to the Middle Ages
and seeing feudal types of armed forces with warlords raising their own forces
in

definition of

much

the same

way

forces has for generations

as the

barons did against King John. Accordingly, the

notion of a structured, disciplined armed force
of some states today.

The

is

not reflected in the militaries

question regarding these forces then becomes one of

and treatment under the law of armed conflict.
Should these forces be treated as militias and therefore be defined as combatants under the Hauge Regulations, Geneva Conventions, and their Protocols or as something else? Must we re-interpret what is meant by the term
"armed forces?" Professor Dinstein chooses a tried and true method in determining that the Taliban are not members of the armed forces of a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions and are therefore not entitled to
the protections and privileges of combatancy. I, however, believe that there is
grave danger in the position that has been taken that no Taliban members are
entitled to prisoner of war status once captured as this position may rebound
on the developed countries of the world in future conflicts. It seems somewhat
strange to have an armed conflict in which one side, by definition, is made up
status

entirely of "unprivileged belligerents."

Regarding the presentation of Professor
because a war

is

Adam

Roberts,

started by a state, that state does not

everything occurring during the course of the war.
applied in the current "war

portionate here

is

on

agree that simply

become

responsible for

further agree that force

must be proportionate in nature. Procontext to the way it is used when dis-

terror"

used in a different

I

I

cussing pure jus in bello concepts of course.
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Charles Garraway

Terrorism occupies the zone between criminal law and the law of armed
conflict.

Sometimes terrorism

is

one or the other of these realms.
one where substantial overlap exists be-

solely within

However, the current situation is
tween the two competing and somewhat conflicting legal regimes. When such
an overlap exists, there is also the very real danger of gaps in coverage between
the two systems.

An

ad hoc approach to interpreting treaty obligations

is

one method dem-

The danger with such an approach is that your standing to
protest the treatment of your own service members is weakened when you do
not apply the Geneva Conventions to those who seem to fall within them. A
onstrated

perfect

lately.

example of

this

is

US

the

position

on the "detainees" held

in

Guan-

tanamo Bay, Cuba. As we all know, prisoners of war are subject to the rules
and regulations of the armed forces of the detaining party. This would
ordinarily mean trial by courts-martial. However, in the same way that service
personnel cannot ordinarily be tried by military courts for pre-enlistment
fences, so prisoners of

war

will

of-

not be subject to court-martial jurisdiction for

offences prior to their capture. 2 This principle seems to force states back to

However, the United States
has clearly stated that it will use military commissions and not prosecutions in
its federal courts. Using military commissions is entirely consistent with the
law of armed conflict provided they apply to all who commit war crimes, of
whatever nationality. It seems that this issue may have been misapprehended
when the issue of the designation of Taliban members as prisoners of war or
their civil courts for jurisdiction over detainees.

detainees

initially surfaced.

would just like to quote from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing
Rules of Engagement, dated January 15th, 2000: "U.S. Forces will comply with
the law of war during military operations involving armed conflict no matter
Finally

how

I

the conflict

ply with

its

may be

principles

characterized under international law and will com-

and

spirit

during

all

operations." 3

That

commanders and to soldiers. I think those
we move away from them at our own peril.

clear instruction to

sensible

2.

and that

See generally

Geneva Convention

III

in

a simple

and

instructions are

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,

1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Chap.
Sanctions, reprinted

is

Ill -

Penal and Disciplinary

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts and Richard GuelfT

eds.,3rded., 2000) at 243.

CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR 3121.01 A STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR U.S. FORCES, ENCLOSURE (A) A-9, (15 Jan 2000).

3.
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Leslie

T

he

first

issue to be considered

Green

in Bello

1

when examining

the impact of the law oi

on the war against terrorism is the nature of that war.
Immediately after the September 1 1th attacks, President George W. Bush declared that we were now involved in a "war against terrorism
the first war oi
2
the twenty-first century." Moreover, President Bush subsequently declared
that those "who are not with us are against us," thus negating any possibility
that those failing to see eye to eye with him could claim to be neutrals as would
armed

conflict

—

be the case

if

Green

this

a traditional war. 3

Prima

Professor Emeritus of International

1.

Leslie

2.

President George

is

were

W.

Bush, Remarks by

The

facie,

the President's statement

Law at the University of Alberta, Canada.
Upon Returning to the White House

President

(Sep. 16, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html,

(Sep. 23, 2002).
3.

President George

Labor (Oct.

4,

W.

Bush, Remarks by the President to the Employees of the Department of

2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1004-

8.html (Sep. 23, 2002). Note that the concept of neutrality

with a

is

markedly changed when dealing

UN Security Council Resolution calling upon all member nations to use force

to achieve

a certain objective. In this instance, the traditional concept of neutrality does not apply.

Panel

II

Commentary

—Jus

in Bello

implied that any state not supporting the United States would be considered an

"enemy" of the United States.
A major difficulty with the President's approach is that the attacks of September 1 1th, organized by non-state actors, were not the acts of a state triggering the traditional notion of self-defense against an act of aggression or a
breach of the peace as outlined in Article 51 of the

UN

Charter. 4 Tradi-

and in accordance with the normally understood rules of international law, war is an armed conflict conducted by the organized armed forces
of two or more contesting states. After the events of September 11th, there
was no opposing "state" upon which to declare "war." In other words, the
President's statement that "we are at war" seemed more to be political rhetotionally,

ric,

possessing certain similarities to the language used in the past in relation

to the "war against poverty" or the "war against drugs."

The fundamental
is

difference in this case from these other "wars" though

the determination of the United States to resort to armed force and to pur-

sue and destroy or bring to justice the offenders identified as
al

Qaeda

terrorist

group led by

Osama

members of

bin Laden. This group had

its

the

head-

quarters in Afghanistan, a state governed by a de facto administration

known

as the Taliban.

The Taliban was not

the actual government of Af-

ghanistan but instead was a group in possession of much of the territory of Afghanistan.
the

UN

The

only government of Afghanistan legitimately recognized by

was the Northern Alliance. In

fact,

the Taliban administration had

achieved only minimal recognition as the government of the country, only
gaining official recognition of such status by Pakistan and two other Muslim
states. 5

Shortly after the United States began

its

operations, even those states

recognizing the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan with-

drew

their recognition. 6

When the Taliban

authorities rejected a

bin Laden and his leading
States for
4.

U.N.

trial

that they capture

henchmen and hand them over

to the

and punishment, the American authorities decided

Charter an.

The two other

demand

to

Osama
United
engage

51.

Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan
on September 11th were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates severed ties with the Taliban very quickly after September 11th.
Pakistan did not do so until November 22, 2001. See Pakistan Shuts Down Taliban Embassy,
USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/attack/2001/ll/22/
5.

states recognizing the

taliban-embassy.htm#more (Sep. 23, 2002).
6.

Id.

7.

President George

W.

Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct.

7,

2001) (transcript

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1007-8.html) (Sep. 23, 2002).
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Leslie

in self-help, invading Afghanistan. 7
sort to the Security

This action was undertaken without

re-

Council but did receive general international support from

Qaeda made it clear that their terror
campaign was not necessarily restricted to American targets. Given that the
United States decided to use force against not only al Qaeda but also the
a variety of states, particularly after al

Taliban administration,

it

might have been presumed that the law of armed

conflict regarding prisoners of war

and the application of the principles of dis-

and proportionality would come into play.
The attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were clear
threats to the sovereignty and security of the United States. While it may be
argued that the attack on the World Trade Center was primarily directed
against private, non-governmental interests and thus not prima facie aimed at
the state, this cannot be the case as regards the Pentagon. The attack on the
Pentagon was clearly aimed at the very heart of American governmental processes, thus constituting a threat to the very existence of the state. Such an attack clearly entitled the United States to expect authorities of states in which
tinction

them out.
opened the way for the

the perpetrators or their supporters reside to cooperate in seeking

The

failure of the

Taliban administration to do so

Such self-help, though, would be limited
Qaeda bases and any Afghan organization clearly associated

United States to engage in
solely against al

with

al

Qaeda

self-help.

or supporting al Qaeda.

The

authority to target the Taliban ad-

ministration itself would require proof of a close relationship between the

and al Qaeda.
At the same time that the United States was beginning its attacks, it was
building a coalition of nations. Propaganda by al Qaeda and previous terrorist
Taliban

itself

acts directed against

US

embassies as well as a

US

warship

made

it

clear that

the events of September 11th were part of a continuum. Intelligence reports

suggested that similar attacks were likely to follow, making

US

Such

it

easier for other

upon the principle of collective self-defense, including the right of preventive and even anticipatory self-defense. Within this coalition, however, some issues developed
as to. the application of the law of armed conflict to certain personnel.
While the United States never declared "war" as such, the bombing and
subsequent land offensive by it and allies such as Canada and the United Kingdom amounted to an armed conflict within the terms of the Geneva
states to support the

Geneva Convention III

efforts.

states

based their

efforts

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,

8.

See

2,

6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.

135

[hereinafter

GC

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds.,
243 [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR].
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III]

3rd

art.

reprinted in
ed.,

2000) at
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Conventions of 1949. 8 This seems particularly to be the case regarding Taliban
members and installations under the control of the Taliban. Once operations
evolved to the point that they were directed at

Qaeda and at the replacethe Geneva Conventions be-

al

ment of the Taliban with the Northern Alliance,
came relevant. Despite the absence of a declaration of war, the actual fact oi
conflict was enough to invoke the fundamental principles of the law of armed
conflict, particularly those of proportionality

By Article

2,

common

to

all

even

conflict

if

which may

the state of

war

is

distinction.

four Conventions:

the present Convention shall apply to

armed

and

all

cases of declared

war or of any

other

between two or more of the High Contracting Parties
not recognized by one of them. The Conventions shall also
arise

all cases of total or partial occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
even if the said occupation meets with no resistance. Although one of the
Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. 9

apply to
Party,

In accordance with the normal law concerning treaties, the Taliban admin-

would be bound in the same way as the Northern Alliance, against
which it would be considered a rebel authority, with its forces entitled to the
same rights and subject to the same duties as the forces of the legitimate
Afghan government, the Northern Alliance. It might have been expected
istration

that allies of the legally recognized authority capturing Taliban personnel

would hand such captives over to the Northern Alliance for trial or detention,
as was the customary practice of the United States in its participation in hostilities on behalf of the Republic of Vietnam. In this case, however, the United
States treated all captives, whether supporters of the Taliban or al Qaeda, as
potential terrorists.

This ignored the fact that while the Taliban authorities might, due to their

Qaeda personnel, constitute a legitimate
target, it does not follow that every member of the Taliban forces falls within
the same category. Ample evidence exists to indicate that many of the rank
and file Taliban were orthodox, if not fundamentalist, followers of Islam who
failure to

cooperate in seeking out

al

had taken up arms only against the Northern Alliance.
As a consequence of this policy, the United States announced that it was
not going to treat any captive or detainee as a prisoner of war, nor apply to
9. Id. (italics

10.

added).

Ari Fleisher, Press Briefing, Office of the Press Secretary

(Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020128-l l.html#prisoners%20down%20in

%20Guantanamo%20Bay

(Sep. 24, 2002).
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them the protection of Geneva Convention III relating to the treatment of
prisoners of war. 10 Not all coalition members of the US campaign favored this
policy, as the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany registered concerns
about the lack of adherence to the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War

(GC

III).

11

Despite these protests, the United States refused to consider any

detainees as potential prisoners of war.
Article 4 of the
[pjrisoners of

who have
(1)

Convention provides

war

.

.

.

are persons belonging to

fallen into the

Members

Members

one of the following categories,

power of the enemy:

of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as

militias or volunteer corps
(2)

in part that:

members of

forming part of such armed forces.

of other militias and

members of other volunteer

corps, including

those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and

operating in or outside their

own

territory,

even

this territory

if

is

occupied,

provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance
(a)

movements,

that of being

(b) that
(c)

fulfill

the following conditions:

commanded by

a person responsible for his subordinates;

of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

that of carrying arms openly;

(d) that

of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and

customs of war.
(3)

Members

of regular

armed

forces

who

profess allegiance to a

an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

11.

at

government or

12

Odds over Cuban Camp, THE SCOTSMAN, 1, Jan. 21, 2002, available
http://news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm7id = 75 1 62002 &rware=HYRBHPXMUZMV&CQ_
See, e.g., Coalition at

CUR_DOCUMENT=4

(Sep. 24, 2002); Rocks, stones found in

cells

-

War

on Terror Letters

to

a

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28, 2002, available at LexisNexis, Major World
Newspapers (Sep. 24, 2002). The United States changed this initial approach on February 7,
2002 when the Office of the Press Secretary released a fact sheet stating that "ft] he President has
Missing Son,

determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al
Qaeda detainees" but that "[u]nder the terms of the Geneva Convention, however, the Taliban
detainees do not qualify as
entitled to

POW

status." Office of the Press Secretary, Fact

Guantanamo, February

7,

20020207-13.html (Sep.
12.

See

GC

III,

POWs" and "therefore neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees are
Sheet

-

Status of Detainees at

2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/

24, 2002).

supra note 8 at

art. 4.
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makes no reference
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to parties to the

the conflict. Paragraph 3

is

Convention, but

significant for those

re-

opposing

Qaeda members since it expressly refers to the forces
of an authority unrecognized by a captor. As to paragraph 2, it seems that various Taliban units were under a proper command and may have been wearing a
the Taliban or seeking

al

wore a black head-covering of a similar type. These
Taliban supporters carried their arms openly and it is not known whether they
distinctive insignia as they

complied with the laws and customs of war as there were no

land opera-

real

tions allowing for this to be studied.

Further coalition problems arose regarding the actions of the United States

when

studying other articles of this convention. Article 5 provides:

[t]he present

the time they

Convention shall apply to the persons
fall into the power of the enemy and

referred to in Article 4 from

and

until their final release

repatriation.

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal. 13

To

been undertaken by the United
take place in the future. The United

date, not a single Article 5 hearing has

States,

nor are such hearing

likely to

States has taken the position that such hearings are not required for Taliban

Qaeda members as they fall so clearly outside the scope of Article 4 that
there can be no question but that they are not entitled to the protection of the

or al

Convention.
Additionally, although the United States has
special military

commissions

take place. In fact,
clear

what

crimes,

if

14.

GC III, supra note 8

This

is

it is

establishing

for the trial of these "detainees," trials

no charges have even been made

Guantanamo Bay have

13. See

announced

have yet to

public. Finally,

any, the majority of Taliban

it is

un-

members detained

at

actually committed.

at art. 5.

particularly true for those allies

who have

ratified

Additional Protocol

I

which

increases the types of people considered to be lawful combatants and imposes additional

on holding powers. See, e.g., 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
obligation

Armed

Conflicts, reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
240

supra note 8 at 419.

Leslie

Green

This policy of refusing to treat detainees as required by the Third Geneva

Convention has caused problems for US allies such as Canada and the United
Kingdom. 14 By way of example, though Canada has not declared war, its policy
is that its forces will at all times observe the law of armed conflict as recog-

As debate developed

Canada as to the application of the
Third Geneva Convention to detainees, Taliban members captured by Canadian Forces were turned over to the United States. 16 Such transfer was clearly
in breach of Canadian obligations in Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convennized by Canada. 15

tion

which provides

in

that:

war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power
which is a Party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied
itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the
Convention.
[I]f that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the
Convention in any important respect, -the Power by whom the prisoners of war
were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take
[pjrisoners of

.

.

effective

.

measures to correct the situation or

prisoners of war.

shall request the return of the

Such requests must be complied

Though no Protecting Power existed in this case,

with. 17

the United States had

made it

would not apply the protections of GC III to these detainees. Nevertheless, no Canadian request for the return of these prisoners was ever
made, 18 causing an apparent breach of GC III by Canada.
A singular lesson exists from these problems. As situations like these develop where a need exists to take combined action outside the umbrella of the
clear that

UN,

it

great care should be taken as early as possible to agree

will effectively deal

upon

policies that

with these types of issues to the satisfaction of all coalition

members.

15.

See

Code

of Conduct for

1999, p. 2, available at

CF

Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, October 20,

http://www.dnd.ca/jag/jag_pdf_docs/codeconduct_chlto3_e.pdf

(Sep.

24,2002).
16.

See

Tim Naumetz,

available at LexisNexis,
17.

GC III,

art. 12,

Prisoner Furor Dogs Grits,

CALGARY HERALD,

Major World Newspapers (Sep.

p.

Al

Qan. 30, 2002),

24, 2002).

supra note 8.

18. Interestingly, the

United Kingdom transferred personnel

falling into the

hands of its forces

operating in Afghanistan to the Northern Alliance, as the legitimate government of that
country, which was entitled to treat such persons in accordance with

might

be.
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Tony Montgomery

T

he principle of distinction

is

a fundamental

armed conflict. Attackers must adhere

gets for destruction.

commentary

is

What

that this

1

to this principle in selecting tar-

is

not appropriately stressed in the literature and

same

principle applies to the defender as well as to the

attacker. Routinely, the enemies of the

United States

—the Saddam Husseins,

—place

equipment

the Slobodan Milosevics, and the Taliban

middle of protected areas containing
tion of the law of

component of the law of

armed

civilians.

conflict yet the

As

is

military

well

known,

this

United States constantly

is

in the

a viola-

finds itself

struggling with such difficult targeting issues because of these illegal acts by the

enemy. 2
Cloaking such targets behind

and

civilians

in protected places does not,

however, deprive the target of its military

utility.

sponsibility of the defender to segregate

such military targets from

civilians

the Deputy Staffjudge Advocate for the

US Special

1

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Montgomery

Operations
2.

is

Greater discussion of the

re-

Command.

See 1977

Geneva Protocol I Additional

to the

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International

Armed Conflicts,

opened for signature Dec.

12, 1977, 1125U.N.T.S. 1, art. 51(7), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam
Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed., 2000) thereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF

WAR]

at 419.
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who engage

in the business of

targeting.

On September
cate for the

US

member of the Office of the Staff Judge AdvoOperations Command. Recognizing that the terrorist

I

was

a

on September

1

1th would quickly elicit a response from our

began searching for use of force parallels that might apply.
we found that proved to be of great utility was an article dealing with the

nation,

One

1th,

Special

acts perpetrated

my

1

office

Many might denounce any sort of similarity
Global War on Terrorism. I suggest, however,

use of force in guerilla warfare. 3

between

guerilla

war and the

that the concepts are far

more

similar

From an application of force
sions. Our first conclusion was

than

dissimilar.

my office came

perspective,

that our forces should apply the law of

conflict in the face of the events of September

1

1th.

when our

US

the law of

armed

and are comfortable ad-

public support of military operations

forces adhere to the law of

armed

armed

United States forces have

familiarity with these laws; they train using these laws

hering to them. Secondly,

to several conclu-

is

stronger

US adherence to
of US allies. These

conflict. Lastly,

conflict also helps ensure the support

were provided to our commander explaining why the

US

response to the

armed conflict.
Another controversial area we have been facing is the requirement

at-

tacks should comply with the law of

uniforms while conducting military operations in Afghanistan.

ponent of receiving the
Conventions

is

that,

privileges accorded a lawful

amongst other

to

wear

A critical com-

combatant by the Geneva

things, the individual wears a "fixed dis-

tinctive sign recognizable at a distance." 4

The mission o( US
when directed, deploy

special operations forces

to

is

to plan, prepare for,

conduct unconventional warfare, foreign internal

defense, special reconnaissance and direct actions in support of

US

US

national

There are many
Special Operations Command and each force

policy objectives within designated areas of responsibility.

types of forces within the

and

has a different focus and mission.

Some

5

of our forces are designed for large

and will always be in uniform while conducting operations.
Others, however, have mission profiles that require smaller groups to conduct
scale operations

3.

Ken Brown, Counter -Guerilla Operations: Does

REV. 123 (1997).
See Geneva Convention

4.

(III)

5.

supra note

2, at

Law of War Proscribe Success?, 44 NAV.

L.

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6

U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,

LAWS OF WAR,

the

234.

10 U.S.C. §167(2000).
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art.

4(2) (b), reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE

Tony Montgomery
more unconventional

types of warfare.

These

sorts of operations often will re-

quire our forces to live with the indigenous force conducting the campaign.

In Afghanistan, this was the Northern Alliance.

photographs broadcast by the media, many
credibility,

adopted

at least

Northern Alliance. Our
requirement

for

forces, to

clear in the

blend in and to gain

worn by members of the
provided advice within our command on the

some

office

US

As was made

parts of the uniform

our forces to wear a fixed, distinctive insignia in compliance

with the Geneva Conventions.
tional reasons our forces

Our

advice was that although for good opera-

might need to adopt some of the uniform of the

Northern Alliance, they must still have some type of insignia distinctive to the
United States. Judging from the photographs displayed by the media, this is
still an issue needing resolution. Our office continues to believe that wearing
this fixed distinctive insignia is required by the Third Geneva Convention and

more than it does to identify them as targets.
One final thought based on comments I have read and heard today has to
do with the relevancy of the existing laws of armed conflict and the US commitment to comply with those laws. The United States has recently withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; will not ratify the Rome Statute
enacting the International Criminal Court; has interpreted the Third Geneva
Convention to not require Article 5 tribunals for determining the status of deoperates to protect our forces

tainees currently confined in

Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba;

on the use of nuclear weapons; and has announced
sponse to threats to our security.

The

is

reviewing our policy

a policy of

preemptive

re-

events of September 11th truly did

one do not believe we yet understand the magnitude
of that change. The basis for the modern laws of war was after a time of great
horror and reflect the thinking of that time. Have times changed to the point
that those rules, restrictions, inhibitions are no longer sufficient? Or, is it simply that the United States needs a set of rules for its activities, with everyone
else following the old rules? Whatever the case, the United States will continue to protect its citizens and sovereignty.
change

things.

And,

I

for
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Yoram

Dinstein

The jus

as

—Jus in Bello

Overlap Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus

bellum and the

jus in bello are

no overlap between them.
bellum)

II

may conduct

of

First

hostilities in

all,

two

in Bello

distinct bodies of law,

and there

is

the aggressor (pursuant to the jus ad

an impeccable way from the standpoint of

the jus in bello, and the state resorting to self-defense (under the jus ad bellum)

may conduct

hostilities in a

manner incompatible with

sometimes the same party is held accountable
ad bellum) and

the jus in bello. True,

for flagrant aggression

(under the

most horrendous war crimes (in violation of the jus in
bello). The paradigmatic case is the Nazi record in World War II. But even
here, let us not forget that the Nazis were not the only ones who disregarded the

jus

jus in bello.

The

for the

Soviet

march

to Berlin in 1945

by hundreds of thousands of cases of rape of

was regrettably accompanied

German women. These

breaches of the jus in bello do not diminish one iota from the fact that

Germany

that invaded the

USSR

Consequently, responsibility for
jus

was

Operation BARBAROSSA in June 1941.
the war of aggression (in conformity with the

ad bellum) was incurred exclusively by the Nazis.

lateral

—which

—has

ad bellum and in the jus in bello

body of law. In the context of the

l.

it

in

Secondly, the issue of proportionality
jus

grave

1

damage

to civilians

is

of consequence both in the

a totally different

jus in bello, proportionality

meaning

1945 (2002)

each

denotes that col-

must not be excessive compared

Anthony beevor, The Fall of Berlin,

in

to the military

Panel

II

Discussion

—Jus

in Bello

advantage anticipated in the attack. This requires a balancing act between the
expected casualties among combatants and

bellum
in

concerned, there

is

an armed attack and

However,

if

we

is

civilians. Insofar as the jus

also a balancing act

in a defensive

are talking about

armed

between

ad

casualties sustained

reprisal carried out in response.

war of self-defense

in response to

an armed

at-

no such balance is required. The best example is that
Harbor and the Pacific War. The Japanese attack of 7 December

tack of a critical nature,
of Pearl

1941 was of critical significance, since

it

altered the entire strategic situation

Hence, it justified the American declaration of war in selfdefense. As we all know, by the time the Pacific War was over, there was no
proportion between the number of American casualties sustained in Pearl Harbor (or for that matter thereafter) and the countless Japanese losses throughout the war and especially towards the end (when Japanese cities were
pulverized by both conventional and unconventional weapons). The issue of
proportionality in losses and counter'-losses was irrelevant under the jus ad
bellum. Once the Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor justified a war of self-defense
on the part of the United States, that war could be fought as it was to the
finish, irrespective of total numbers of casualties.
in the Pacific.

—

—

Adam Roberts
I

believe there

comes

is

some overlap between

to the impact that they

jus

ad bellum and jus in bello when

have in public debate. They are not

separate watertight compartments. Charles Garraway put

when he quoted from

the

US

it

position that these
that there

is

Standing Rules of Engagement that

two areas be completely confused with each

On
Yoram

which

ad bellum, the jus in bello be observed.

some degree of overlap occurring
the

Power

in entirely

particularly clearly

crucially important that irrespective of the circumstances in
gins, irrespective of the jus

it

it

remains

a

It is

war benot

my

other, merely

inevitably in public debate.

of the Security Council

Dinstein

In accordance with the

UN Charter, members of the organization are bound to

carry out decisions of the Security Council, especially in matters affecting peace

when the

and

security. 2 In practice,

it is

acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 3 this

2.

3.

U.N. Charter,
U.N. Charter,

Security Council states in a resolution that

arts. 25, 48.

arts.

39-51.
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binding. Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter proclaims that, in the

event of a conflict between the obligations of member states under the Charter

and

their obligations

The upshot is
state

treaty, the

Charter obligations prevail.

when the Security Council creates obligations for a member

that,

thorough a

under any other

legally

binding decision, the state has to observe the Security

Council decree irrespective of any other conflicting obligation. The conflicting
obligation

may be

derived from the

Geneva

or

Hague Conventions governing

the law of armed conflict. Notwithstanding their venerated status, these instru-

ments must give ground to any obligation based on the Charter. This actually
happened in 1990, in the Gulf War with Iraq, when the Security Council imposed a blockade going beyond the general rules regulating blockade in armed
conflict. The Security Council had the authority to do this by virtue of Article
103 of the Charter.

On the Nature
Yoram Dinstein
Unlike pirates who
within a state.

of the Current Conflict in Afghanistan

on the high seas, terrorists always operate from
They may mount their attack against targets in the same state or
operate

they can use their bases in that state for attacks against other states. International law obligates a state not to allow
for attacks

by

terrorists against

its

territory to

another state.

inate the terrorists, that does not

be used as a springboard

If the local state

mean that the

in unable to elim-

aggrieved state must

sit idly

by.

In the absence of effective action by the local state, the aggrieved foreign state

may send an expeditionary force

where the terrorists have their bases, with a view to taking them out. But then all action must be
directed against the terrorists, and not against the local government.
The question in Afghanistan was not simply whether the United States
could enter its territory in order to eradicate al Qaeda. The question was
whether the United States could target only al Qaeda fighters on Afghan soil
into the territory of the state

members of the Taliban forces. In my opinion, the Taliban opened
themselves up to an American use of force because the regime ratified the actions of al Qaeda of 11 September 2001. Between September 11th and Octo-

or also

ber 7th, the United States tried to persuade the Taliban to extradite bin

Laden and otherwise disassociate themselves from al Qaeda. The Taliban ignored this pressure and refused to cooperate with the United States despite
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the warnings by the United States and the strong language used in Security

Council Resolution 1373. 4 Thereby the Taliban regime aligned

Qaeda and turned

its

own forces

self-defense against the

An

into legitimate targets for

armed attacks of September

with

al

American action

in

itself

11th.

analogy for this type of retroactive ratification by a government of the

misdeeds of non-state actors can be found in Iran in 1979. The Ayatollah's

gime in Iran in 1979

—

just

re-

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in

like

2001

—endorsed unlawful

tors.

In 1979, that unlawful action consisted of the takeover of the

action against the United States by non-state ac-

bassy by militant students. In 2001,

it

was the

al

US em-

Qaeda outrages of September

both instances, the original armed attack was carried out by fanatics

11. In

without the apparent advance approval of the local government

(the

Ayatollah's and the Taliban, respectively). But in both instances, the local

government assumed

full responsibility for

the armed attack, and exposed

counteraction by way of self-defense. In the case of Iran, the

self to

teraction was ineffective. In the case of Afghanistan, the

US

US

it-

coun-

counteraction

brought an end to the Taliban regime.

On
Yoram
Using

Shielding Military Targets with Noncombatants

Dinstein

civilians to shield military targets

jus in bello. the question

is

is

clearly a very serious violation of the

whether, in light of the presence of the

human

must abort an attack against the military tarmind the expected high number of civilian casualties which is

shields, the other belligerent party
get,

bearing in

likely to ensue. In

my

opinion, in such instances, the proportionality principle

(which forbids excessive collateral damage to
the usual manner.
the high

That

is

lateral

Much more

number of

to say,

civilians)

need not be applied

latitude has to be given to the attack, because

civilian casualties

is

deliberately induced by the

enemy.

an attack that would otherwise be unlawful due to excessive

damage

to civilians

abuse of the law.

in

col-

would be permissible when caused by the enemy's

When shielding

a military target with civilians, the blood of

the civilians will normally stain the hands of the defending rather than the
attacking side.

4-

Resolution 1373 required, amongst other things, that states shall "refrain from providing any

type of support ... to entities or persons involved in terrorist attacks." See S. C. Res. 1373,

SCOR,

56th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001)
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Law

of

in Bello

Armed

Conflict

Adam Roberts
There currently exists a problem with certain areas of the law of armed conflict.
This may partly be a problem of some international agreements concluded with
considerable pressure from non-governmental organizations and international

governmental organizations that have considerable support from
ers

but about which major powers that

There

reservations.
ously.

I

is

may have

to engage in

legal reform-

war have strong

a possible disjunction there that needs to be taken seri-

am not suggesting that

the existing body of law

is

perfect.

For example,

Geneva Protocol I are extremely long and comprehendespite the recent movement by negotiators to attempt to

the UK's reservations to
sive.

And in my view,

limit reservations to treaties

such

as the International

posterous to prohibit reservations.
able to

make

reservations in

Criminal Court,

it is

pre-

Any major military power should and will be

some form. However, suggesting

that there

is

a

need for completely new law dealing with terrorist operations may be too much;
a more evolutionary kind of approach based on the practice of states in customary international law

may be more

appropriate.

Unprivileged Combatants

Yoram

Dinstein

Civilians

who choose

to act as

combatants without wearing uniforms

(or other

emblems) do not commit war crimes. But they expose themselves to attack as combatants, and, most significantly, they are deemed unlawfixed distinctive

combatants and therefore are not entitled to the status of

ful (or unprivileged)

prisoners of war.

Absent that

status, they

can be detained or put on

mestic courts for ordinary crimes such as murder, assault, or arson.
rule applies to

combatants

who

trial

by do-

The same

out of uniform, do not carry their arms

fight

The latter rule determines the fate of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters
(currently in Guantanamo Bay and other places of detension). But it is equally
true of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives and other Americans

openly, etc.

who

participated in hostilities in Afghanistan out of uniform.

Had

they been

captured by the enemy, they would have not qualified for protection under the

Geneva Convention

The

(III)

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

decision to forego protection pursuant to the jus in bello

may be

delib-

There

is

a cost/benefit calculus,

and the CIA probably reached the con-

clusion that

it

was willing to run the

risk (especially since, in

erate.

Afghan reputation

in terms of

any event, the

compliance with the Geneva Convention in
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regards to prisoners of war leaves a lot to be desired). There are other in-

stances in which risks are deliberately assumed in view of the constraints of

known to
concentrate fire on members of the medical personnel in the field, who are
wearing the distinctive armband of the Red Cross (or its equivalent). A numsome armed

the situation. For example, in

enemy

conflicts, the

is

ber of armed forces therefore instruct their medical personnel to remove their

armband. There

nothing wrong with such instructions, but

must be borne
in mind that the consequence is liable to be loss of protection under the
Geneva Conventions. 0( course, once they remove their armbands and lose
is

the protection afforded by the Conventions,
nel

may

of the medical person-

combatants (actively participating in
neither seeking nor dispensing any protection from attack.

as well

hostilities),

behave

members

it

as full-fledged

Charles Garraway
I

am

not convinced that a medic 'can actually give up his protection.

He

may choose not to wear the armband that indicates that he is protected under
the Geneva Conventions but the fact remains that if he is a medic engaged in
full-time medical duties,

ventions.

The

he

is

entitled to the protections of the

difficulty arising

tion for the enemy.

However,

from not wearing an armband
if

the

enemy knows he

acting as a medic, despite the fact that he

is

one of distinc-

medic and he is
Red Cross armband,

is

not wearing a

is

Geneva Con-

a

he may not be targeted.

An issue related to this which causes much concern is that of the definition
of combatants.

As you know, combatants

are by definition permitted to take a

and it seems that many states are taking a narrower and narrower view of what it means to take a direct part in hostilities in
an effort to save costs by using civilians in positions historically filled by members of the armed forces. This issue is a fundamental one and should be further
studied to determine what exactly is meant by taking a direct part in the
direct part in the hostilities

hostilities.
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XIII
The

Legality of Maritime Interception/

Interdiction Operations Within

the

Operation

Framework of

ENDURING FREEDOM

Wolff von Heinegg

ENDURING FREEDOM

Object and Purpose of Operation

W:

hile

Operation

1

ENDURING FREEDOM

covers a wide set of measures

against international terrorism, the naval forces deployed to the

Horn of Africa and in the sea areas around
to

fulfil.

Their assignment covers inter

the

Arab peninsula have

a clear task

alia

•

control of sea traffic in the area;

•

guaranteeing the freedom and safety of navigation;

•

protection of endangered vessels;

•

disruption of supplies for terrorist groups, especially by preventing others

from supporting and financing international terrorism;

1

.

command and

and

•

elimination of terrorist

•

capture of international terrorists for the purpose of prosecuting them.

Wolff von Heinegg

(Oder), Germany.

is

training facilities;

a Professor of International

Law

at Europa-University in Frankfurt

The Legality

The

of

MIO

OEF

in

sound knowledge of the geography and of those
present in the sea area concerned. The naval units, therefore, have to precisely and comprehensively monitor sea and air traffic. Intelligence collection
tasks presuppose a

and surveillance by means of the electronic and other equipment on board
such warships does not create any significant

legal problems, since

equipment

interfere with the rights of other states. If such

is

it

does not

used during pas-

sage in the territorial sea of another state, in principle, the prohibitions found
in Article 19 of the

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

(hereinafter

LOS

2

Convention) must be observed. Activities "prejudicial to the peace, order or
security of the coastal state" are, however, to some extent modified by the inherent right of self-defense found in both Article 5

customary international law. As soon

as there

a concrete threat against the vessel or

its

titled to take all

2.

Article 19 of the

so long as

it is

of the

UN

Charter and

reasonable grounds to believe

is

personnel

exists,

the warships are en-

measures necessary to neutralize or eliminate the threat.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that "[p]assage

is

innocent

not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Passage

prejudicial to peace,

good order or security of the coastal

any of the following

activities:

(a)

1

state includes a foreign ship

any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,

engaging in

territorial integrity or political

independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b)

any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;

(c)

any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of

the coastal State;
(d)

any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;

(e)

the launching, landing or taking

on board of any

aircraft;

(0

the launching, landing or taking

on board of any

military device;

(g)

the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the

customs,

fiscal,

immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;

(h)

any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to

(i)

any fishing

(j)

the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(k)

any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other

facilities
(1)

this

Convention;

activities;

or installations of the coastal State;

any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

on Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), art.
Phillip Trimble, international Law Selected
553 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS].

See U.N. Convention

Barry Carter and
(2001), at
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Within

a foreign territorial sea, replenishment at sea

Article 19(g) of the

thorized

it.

LOS

to

Convention, unless the coastal state expressly au-

All other activities, not listed in Article 19

ted. Importantly, coastal states

their passage in

would be contrary

advance or to

UNCLOS

may not require warships
make that passage subject

are permit-

to notify

them of

to prior consent. 3

This, a fortiori, holds true for transit passage through international straits, such
as in the Strait of

The purpose

Bab

el

Mandeb.

of this article

is

not to analyze each o{ these

Instead, the emphasis of this article

is

on the

basis for,

and

issues,

however.

legality of,

maritime

interception/interdiction operations.

Legality of Maritime Interception/Interdiction Operations

Given that flag states exercise exclusive jurisdiction over "their" vessels in
sea areas beyond the territorial sea of third states, the question arises as to
whether coalition members in the Global War on Terror may interfere with
such vessels

if

Moreover, even

the flag state has not consented or has expressly objected.
if

the flag state

terdiction operations

(MIO)

is

obliged to tolerate maritime interception/in-

against

its

shipping, the applicable legal regime

must be understood for such operations. This is particularly true today as although MIO is currently being conducted by the United States and coalition
members in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the UN Security Council has
neither imposed such an obligation on flag states nor expressly authorized the
United States and its coalition members to conduct such operations.
Legal Basis For

What

then

members conin support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM? It must first be em-

is

duct of MIO

MIO

the legal basis for the United States and coalition

phasized that international law permits interference with foreign ships, their

cargo and their crew/passengers only when:

upon in Jackson Hole on 23 September 1989 the former Soviet
Union and the United States emphasized that "the provisions of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with respect to traditional uses of the oceans, generally
constitute international law and practice and balance fairly the interests of all States." See 89
DEPT. STATE BULL. 25f. (December 1989), reprinted in 14 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, at 12
(December 1989).
3.

In their joint statement agreed
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OEF

a treaty rule exists that expressly provides for interference such as in the

•

case of piracy 4 or severe pollution of the marine environment, 5 or
the interfering state finds

•

armed

conflict.

itself in a special situation, i.e., in

an international

6

In the latter situation the parties of the conflict are not limited to

visit,

and capture of only enemy vessels. Rather, according to the law of
maritime neutrality, 7 each state party may also take measures against vessels
flying the flags of third/neutral states to include visit and search, capture, and
in exceptional circumstances, even to the destruction of those vessels. 8 As
long as these measures conform with the law of naval warfare and with the law
of maritime neutrality, flag states must tolerate them. The reason for this requirement stems from the merging in certain aspects of the law of peace and
the law of war. Given the existence of the UN Charter, the following considersearch,

ations are

now

decisive:

In the absence of a Security Council resolution affirmatively identifying the
aggressor state,

it

remains essential, in view of the continuing object and pur-

pose of international law to secure international peace and security, to pre-

vent the escalation of an ongoing international armed conflict. This purpose
See LOS Convention, supra note 2, at art. 105, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED
DOCUMENTS at 582. Note, however, that the customary definition of piracy is broader than that
agreed upon in the LOS Convention. See A. P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 63 INT'L L. STUD 305,

4.

337 (1988). For measures that may be taken against pirates, see S.P. Menefee, Foreign Naval
Intervention in Cases of Piracy: Problems and Strategies, 14 INT'L J. MARINE AND COASTAL L. 353
(1999).
5. See, e.g.,

LOS

Convention, supra note

Law

Selected documents at 621.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
eds.,

al.

2,

INTERNATIONAL
Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations

at art. 220, para. 6, reprinted in

See also,

1982,

A COMMENTARY, Vol. IV, at 301

1991); T. Treves, Intervention en haute-mer

et

navires etrangers,

(Dordrecht et

XLI ANNUAIRE

francais de Droit international 651 (1995).
6. For the measures that may be taken against (neutral) merchant vessels see SAN REMO
Manual on International Law applicable to armed Conflicts at Sea. paras. 59,
67, 118, 146 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. See also, W.
HEINTSCHEL v. HEINEGG, SEEKRIEGSRECHT UND NEUTRALITAT IM SEEKRIEG, at 363, 483,
567, 582 (Berlin 1995) [hereinafter SEEKRIEGSRECHT UND NEUTRALITAT IM SEEKRIEG].
7. The exact status of the traditional law of neutrality is far from clear. On the one hand, there

On

the other hand, the scope of applicability

Still,

with regard to the maritime aspects of the

are overlaps with political concepts of neutrality.

(only in a "war" strictu sensul)

is

highly disputed.

law of neutrality some rules and principles have developed that are met by wide agreement. See,
e.g.,

Helsinki Principles

on the Law of Maritime

Neutrality, in 68 INT'L L.

ASSOC. REP. 497

(1998) [hereinafter Helsinki Principles).

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at paras. 67, 1 18,
NEUTRALITAT IM SEEKRIEG, supra note 6, at 567, 582.
8.

Cf.
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includes limiting and preventing the involvement of third states and their nationals,

This indeed

is

the main objective of the law of maritime neutrality.

On

the one hand, according to that law, the parties to the conflict are, in princiobliged not to interfere with neutral vessels and aircraft.

ple,

On

the other

hand, neutral vessels and aircraft are prohibited from contributing to the warfighting efforts of one party to the disadvantage of the other party to the conflict.

9

If

neutral vessels and aircraft violate these rules designed to serve their

protection, they lose their protected status. 10

According to the law of maritime neutrality, the parties to the conflict are
entitled to monitor neutral shipping and neutral aircraft in order to verify if
they are abiding by the prohibitions on non-neutral service. Flag states must
tolerate these measures 11
ties to

and possess very limited means

to prevent the par-

the conflict from interference.

Importantly, the foregoing principles only apply in international armed
conflicts. In cases of inner disturbances

parties

may

not,

beyond

their

own

and of internal armed

territorial sea, interfere

conflicts the

with foreign ship-

ping and aviation, unless the measures taken are in conformity with the law of
the sea or with other rules of international law. 12

9. See generally Chap. 7, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US
Naval War College International Law Studies) [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT].

10.

In this context,

two situations must be distinguished: Neutral

in the hostilities or being integrated into the

vessels actively participating

enemy's command, control and information system

are legitimate military objectives in the sense of Article 52, para. 2 of Additional Protocol

I

and

the corresponding customary law. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International

Armed Conflicts, Articles 52(2), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter
GP I] reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelffeds.,
3rd ed., 2000), at 419 [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR]. Thus, such vessels
may be attacked and sunk without prior warning. If, however, neutral merchant vessels merely
assist the enemy, by, e.g., transporting contraband, they may only be captured and, if further
,

preconditions are

fulfilled,

they

may

note

9, at para. 7.10.

seized according to the law of prize. If the latter vessels resist capture

also be considered legitimate military objectives. See

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra

Such measures include the stopping, visit, search and diversion (for the purpose of search) of
merchant vessels. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at para 118; Helsinki Principles, supra
1 1

note 7 at 5.2.1.
12.

Hence, the

legality of

measures taken by France during the Algerian

doubtful. For an evaluation see L. Lucchini, Actes de contrainte exerces par

au cours

des operations en Algerie, XII

la

crisis is at least

France en Haute

Mer

ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

803-822 (1966).
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present situation of the war on terrorism can be characterized as nei-

ther an internal nor an international

armed

conflict strictu sensu.

An

interna-

armed conflict presupposes that at least two states are involved and
though the United States has been (and most probably is and will be) the victim of acts of international (transborder) terrorism that can be equated to an
armed attack in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter, there (still) is no
other state to whom these acts can be attributed. While it might have been
tional

possible to attribute certain terrorist activities to Afghanistan or the Taliban

regime in the past, in view of the changed circumstances,
sible.

Therefore,

prohibited

MIO directed

if it is

against the shipping of third

not based upon the consent of the

mented against the express will of the flag state.
no treaty rule expressly providing for MIO.
Analogizing
tional

MIO

terrorists

no longer posstates seem to be

this

is

flag state or if imple-

Clearly, this

is

true as there

is

to anti-piracy measures does not help either. If interna-

could be considered pirates in the sense of the

LOS

Convention, every state would be entitled to take measures against them

in

beyond the sovereignty of their state. However, this would presuppose that terrorists have taken control over a respective ship, a rather rare scenario. More importantly, however, is the absence of such an established
sea areas

analogy in international law

—

insofar as there exist special rules explicitly

dealing with international terrorism and
juris

of states that the rules

rorism.

on piracy

it is

impossible to detect an opinio

are applicable to acts of international ter-

13

However, such tortured constructions are not necessary in concluding that
current MIO performed by the United States and its coalition partners in and
around the Persian Gulf states

is

legal.

Recall that by Resolution 1368 the Se-

curity Council:

calls

on

all

organizers

States to

work together urgently

and sponsors of these

to bring to justice the perpetrators,

terrorist

attacks and stresses that those

responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and

sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. 14

An example of how that could be achieved is the

—

Nyon Agreement by which certain
attacks by unidentified submarines were considered acts of piracy. See Nyon Agreement, 181
L.N.T.S. 137-40, 151, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman
eds., 3rd ed. 1988) at 887, 889. For an analysis of the Nyon Agreements, see L.F.E. Goldie,
Commentary on the 1937 Nyon Agreements, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE. A COLLECTION
OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES, 489 (N. Ronzitti ed., 1988).
14. S. C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001).
13.
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In Resolution 1373 the Security Council

more

is

precise by deciding that

all

states shall, inter alia,

[p]rohibit their nationals or

making any

any persons and

funds, financial assets or

entities within their tenitories

economic resources or

from

financial or other

related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons

who

commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such

commit

or attempt to

tenorist acts, of entities

persons;

(a)

.

.

.

Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities

or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of

members of

terrorist

groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to

terrorists;
(b)

Take the necessary

commission of

steps to prevent the

terrorist acts,

including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of
information;
(c)

Deny safe haven

acts, or
(d)

to those

who finance,

plan, support, or

commit

terrorist

provide safe havens;

Prevent those

who

finance, plan, facilitate or

commit

terrorist acts

from

using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or
their citizens;
(e)

Ensure that any person

who

participates in the financing, planning,

preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

is

brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such

terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in

domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the
seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(g)

Prevent the

controls

.

.

.

movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border

and controls on issuance of identity papers and

and through measures

This implies, for example, that states

and

may not

15
.

.

.

(knowingly) allow their nationals or

aircraft to transport international terrorists

and goods that are designed

to further acts of international terrorism. If they obtain

15.

S.

documents,

for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent

use of identity papers and travel documents;

ships

travel

C. Res. 1373, para. Id, 2a, 2e, U.N.

SCOR,
261

56th

Sess.,

knowledge of such

U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
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they must take the necessary preventive or suppressive measures.

activities

willingly abstain

tions

MIO

of

under the

measures

if

flag state

from such measures they are not only in breach of their obliga-

UN Charter but may also become legitimate targets of self-defense

abstention

But even

If they

is

equated to permitting the

activities

concerned.

such private acts may not be attributed to another state or if the
unable to take the necessary measures according to Resolution

if

is

1373, abstaining from action would

have

still

to be considered a breach of in-

ternational law. In such cases third states are entitled, in lieu of the state with

primary responsibility for acting, to take the necessary measures to

requirements of Resolution 1373.

1373 to permit a

would be incompatible with Resolution

It

flag state to object to

MIO by claiming the right of the sover-

eignty or the lack of explicit consent.

As

dantly clear, international terrorism

is

security that

and

is

must be eliminated.

the Security Council has

it is

made abunand

a threat to international peace

Accordingly,

if

suspected of carrying international terrorists

ternational terrorists

cause

16

the

fulfill

on the high sea
or weapons destined to ina vessel

not necessary to inform the

is

flag state in

advance be-

such notice would jeopardize the effectiveness of the

requiring

international efforts against international terrorism in an intolerable way.

To

this point, this article

has dealt with situations in which

have knowledge of the presence of either
vessel or aircraft.
ify

The

whether there

is

terrorists or certain

all

participants

cargo on board a

question remains whether measures seeking simply to ver-

some involvement

in international terrorism

can also be

considered as in accordance with international law in cases where there
state counterpart. Recall in this context that vessels

and

is

no

aircraft regularly oper-

ate at great distance from the territories of their respective flag states. National
authorities are generally ignorant of the route, of the cargo

passengers

on

these vessels and aircraft.

formation, the information

may be

will the national authorities

Even

if

and of the identity of

they are in possession of this in-

inaccurate or

false.

Only

in exceptional cases

be in a position to control or otherwise verify the ve-

racity of a described route or of a passenger or cargo manifest.
sel

with international

terrorists

attacks like those seen

on board reaches

on September

1

its

If,

however, a ves-

point of destination, further

1th could be expected. States other than

the flag state are therefore entitled to prevent this as early as possible. This again
is

only feasible

must

16.

Id.

tolerate

at

if

the vehicles in question can be controlled. Hence, the flag state

such control measures because they merely serve the purpose of

preamble. See also S. C. Res. U.N.

SCOR, 55th

which the Security Council, inter alia, condemns
wherever and by whomever committed."
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Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/1269/(1999)
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countering international terrorism as effectively as necessary.
veals that the vehicle in question
tional terrorism or

capture,

As

may be

is

such control

re-

incorporated into the network of interna-

otherwise assisting

is

If

it,

all

further adequate measures, such as

taken.

far as the transport

of weapons to Somalia

ensues from Resolution 1356.

Council "reiterates to

all

17

In paragraph

1

is

concerned

a special feature

of that resolution, the Security

States their obligation to

comply with the measures

imposed by Resolution 733 (1992), and urges each State to take the necessary
steps to ensure full implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo."
Although the second part of this paragraph speaks to measures states are
obliged to take in the sphere of their national jurisdiction,

lows from the

first

part that Resolution 733

18

nonetheless

fol-

fully in force

and

it

continues to be

applicable. Paragraph 5 of this resolution states:

that

all

States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace

and

stability in

Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on
deliveries of

weapons and

decides otherwise.

One means

military

equipment to Somalia

Council

19

of implementing this weapons embargo

measures provided

until the

all

for in

is

through the national

paragraph 5 of Resolution 733. After

national measures an arms embargo would not

all,

make much sense.

without such
Still,

in order

comply with Resolution 733, states need not merely confine themselves
to national measures. According to Resolution 733 they are to implement a
"complete" and "general" embargo. Hence, embargo measures must not only
to fully

cover

all

against

arms, weapons and the like (complete), but must also be directed

all

actual

and potential

suppliers (general)

obligation by controlling the sea

and search any

and

vessel or aircraft that

in the transport of

air traffic to
is

.

If a state

Somalia,

complies with this

it is

allowed to stop

reasonably suspected of being engaged

arms because only by such control can a "general" embargo

be effectively implemented.

A feasible understanding of Resolution 733, given

the wide meaning of "implement" then, authorizes states to conduct

MIO

weapons destined

coalition

for Somalia. Accordingly, the

United States and

its

partners are not restricted only to measures against vehicles flying their
flags or

bearing their

C. Res. 1356, U.N.

own

markings.

SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1356/(2001).
SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/733/(1992).

17.

S.

18.

See S. C. Res. 733, U.N.

19.

Id.

at para. 5.
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be inclined to subscribe to such an interpre-

tation of Resolutions 1356 (in connection with Resolution 733)

the Security Council has neither authorized

member states

MIO

explicitly

to tolerate such interference with their

and 1373

as

nor obligated

merchant shipping and

However, even if this position is not shared by the rest of the
world, MIO by the United States and its coalition partners would continue to
be legal provided it was done as part of the exercise of these states' rights to incivil aviation.

dividual

and

collective self-defense.

Clearly, the

UN

Security Council, by expressly reaffirming the right of

defense in the context of the terrorist attacks on the United States in

its

self-

Resolu-

and 1373, has acknowledged the so-called Anglo-American concept
of self-defense, 20 i.e., a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and
of the customary inherent right of self-defense. In his press statement of 8 Octotions 1368

ber 2001 the President of the Security Council, Richard Ryan, declared:
[t]he

members of

the Security Council took note of the letters that the

representatives of the United States and of the United

Kingdom

sent yesterday

to the President of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 5

1

of the

United Nations Charter, in which they state that the action was taken in
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense
following the terrorist attacks in the United States of 1 1 September 2001.

The permanent representatives made it clear that the military action that
commenced on 7 October was taken in self-defense and directed at terrorists
and those who harboured them. They stressed that every effort was being made
and that the action was in no way a
people of Afghanistan, Islam or the Muslim world.
to avoid civilian casualties,

The members

strike against the

of the Council were appreciative of the presentation

United States and the United Kingdom.

made by

the

21

Hence, self-defense is permitted not only in situations where a state, either with

armed forces or in some other way attributable to it, attacks another state
but also where armed force is used against a state from outside its borders even
its

when
20.

that use of force cannot be attributed to another state. 22 This situation

C/. Alberto Coll,

AM. SOC.
21.

The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses

to Terrorism,

81

PROC

INT'L L. 297, at 305 (1987).

Ambassador

to the

UN

Richard Ryan, President of the Security Council, Press Statement

(Oct. 8, 2001).

The same position is taken by T. Bruha
VEREINTE NATIONEN, 161, at 165 (2001).
22.

& M. Bortfeld, Terrorismus und Selbstverteidigung, 5
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can be labelled a self-defense situation in a material sense only. Although this
interpretation might exceed the wording of Article 51 UN Charter, it does not
exceed the inherent,
This

is

customary, right of self-defense.

i.e.,

confirmed by the reactions of the international community in the

termath of the September

1th attacks.

1

On

12 September the

af-

North Atlantic

Council stated:
Council agreed that

[t]he

determined that

if it is

abroad against the United States,

it

shall

this attack

was directed from

be regarded as an action covered by

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against
one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an

attack against

them

all.

23

Moreover, the Organization

(OSCE)

24

and Cooperation in Europe
obviously consider the United
the right of self-defense, to com-

Security

for

as well as the majority of states

States as the state

most entitled, according to

bat international terrorism by

necessary means.

all

Resolutions 1368 and 1373 must be understood in this broad sense. In the

wake of September

11th, the Security Council has not by

firmed the right of self-defense.
policy in case that in

some

is

has

it

reaf-

pursued some kind of stockpiling

distant or near future the direct involvement of a

foreign state can be proved.

fense

Nor

chance twice

The

express reaffirmation of the right of self-de-

contingent on the character of the terrorist attacks themselves. This

not based on the amount of damage done or
attacks did not originate from

US

lives lost,

is

but instead because the

and could be carried out only due
to the transnational character of the terrorist network. This network not only
operates world-wide but it is also able to evade control by the authorities of
the state in which it resides.
It can not be excluded that in some cases, state authorities acquiesce in the
territory

planning, organizing and execution of terrorist acts. In view of the special character of the al

Qaeda network,

identify a state against

which

it

was not necessary

for the Security

self-defense measures could be taken, for this

form of international terrorism

is

far different

from the context of

sponsored" terrorism or of a "classical" armed attack. This does not

23.

NATO

"state-

mean

that

Press Release 124 (Sep. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/

p01-124e.htm (Nov. 21, 2002).
24OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No.
Dec.

Council to

1,

Combatting Terrorism

(MC(9). DEC/1,

4, 2001), available at http://www.osce.org/events/mc/romania2001/documents/files/mc_

1007474752_o.pdf (Nov. 21, 2002).
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used in identifying and evaluating these are no longer of relevance.

Armed attacks and sheltering terrorists may be very different and
may not necessarily trigger the right to self-defense. 25 However,
clearly instances

where

acts of international terrorism

therefore

there are

can be attributed to an-

other state.

Although no state currently exists against which the terrorist acts can be
attributed and that therefore could be the legitimate object of measures taken
in self-defense, the potential target states of international terrorism are not

obliged to adopt a wait-and-see policy until there
(direct)

involvement of a foreign state or even

To

occur.

the contrary, the United States and

tled to take all

is

sufficient

evidence of the

until further terrorist attacks
its

coalition partners are enti-

measures reasonably necessary to prevent such attacks

as early

Such measures do not merely include the capture of international terrorists and of weapons or other goods destined for
them. The United States and coalition partners may also control international
and

as effectively as possible.

shipping and aviation in order to verify the innocent status of such shipping

and
ity.

Of course, MIO

aviation.

26

are governed by the principle of proportional-

Accordingly, they can be based upon the right of self-defense only

if

there are sufficient intelligence indicators of the integration of the affected vehicles into conspiracies to

commit, or acts

of,

international terrorism. Indis-

criminate implementation and enforcement of

would be disproportionate and not

justified

MIO

covering vast sea areas

by the right of self-defense.

If limi-

tations such as these are observed, affected states are obligated to tolerate

these measures. Moreover, there
third states as
fense.

Were

it is

is

no need

for prior

approval or consent of

neither feasible nor compatible with the right of self-de-

this the case, the

inherent right to self-defense would be subju-

gated to the will of third states. Article 5

1

of the

UN Charter provides no basis

for

such an understanding. Interestingly, no state has yet objected to the

ity

of MIO in the framework of Operation

The

validity of the

above findings

is

legal-

ENDURING FREEDOM.

confirmed by the parallels between the

given situation and an international armed conflict at sea. In such a conflict
irrelevant

whether one of the parties violated the

25. See Military
I.C.J.

14, at

and Paramilitary Activities

in

jus

ad bellum.

27

it is

Instead, each

and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

v.

US), 1986

104 (1986), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm

(Nov. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]
26.

For the validity of the principle of proportionality in the context of self-defense and for

further references, see A. Randelzhofer, Article 51,

KOMMENTAR,
27.

See

CHARTA DER VEREINTEN NATION EN

Simma ed., 1991).
SEEKRIEGSRECHT UND NEUTRALITAT IM SEEKRIEG,
at note

37

(B.

266

supra note 6, at 86.
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party

is

entitled to verify by appropriate control measures, like visit

whether neutral merchant

and

vessels

spective enemy's war-fighting efforts.

civil aircraft are

According

contributing to the re-

to the law of maritime neu-

neutral states are obligated to tolerate these measures in order to prevent

trality,

an escalation of the

conflict

and

in order to

neutral merchant vessel

is

meet the

a

incorporated into the enemy's intelligence system.

30

if

further measures are taken, such as

merchant vessel has no

flag state of the

interests of the parties to

when

the conflict. 29 This also holds true

The

28

and search,

right to interfere or to otherwise

prevent a belligerent from capturing or even sinking the vessel.

While the current
as there

is

from an international armed conflict insofar

situation differs

no "enemy

state," this

not sufficient grounds to remove the duty of

is

third states to tolerate interference with their
tion. In

an international armed

merchant shipping and

conflict that obligation exists for the

that the parties to the conflict have decided to take such measures.

civil avia-

mere reason

As long as

the

Security Council has not authoritatively identified one of the belligerents as the
aggressor, the duty of toleration persists.

A fortbri this must hold true

if

the Secu-

Council has expressly affirmed the existence of a self-defense situation even

rity

though there

is

no

which the attacks can be

state to

For these reasons the United States and
establish maritime interdiction areas,

i.e.,

its

attributed.

coalition partners are entitled to

to restrict access to certain sea areas for

the shipping and aviation of third states. 31 These areas should not be confused

with safety zones 32 because they are not primarily designed to serve the safety of

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 5, para. 118; Helsinki Principles, supra note 6, at 5.2.1.;
POLITAKIS, MODERN ASPECTS OF THE LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE AND MARITIME

28. See

G.P.

NEUTRALITY,

at

529 (1998) [hereinafter

SAN REMO MANUAL,

29.

MODERN
30. See

ASPECTS, supra note

SAN REMO MANUAL,

SEEKRIEG, supra note

MODERN

ASPECTS].

5, para. 118; Helsinki Principles, supra note 6, at 5.2.1.;

28, at 529.

supra note

6, para.

67;

SEEKRIEGSRECHT UND NEUTRALITAT IM

6, at 5.2.1.

For the equivalent of such zones in the law of naval warfare see

31.

note
32.

supra note

5, para.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra

105.

Such safety zones

are sometimes labelled "naval vessel protection zones." See,

Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas, 33 C.F.R. § 165 (2002). See also
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 7.8, which provides that:

e.g.,

Regulated

ANNOTATED

may establish
and may prohibit

[w]ithin the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a belligerent
special restrictions

upon the

activities of neutral vessels

and

aircraft

altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area.
vicinity of naval operations

is

that area within

which

The immediate

area or

hostilities are taking place or

belligerent forces are actually operating.

The

legality

of such safety zones

Law on Sea Power at

is

undisputed. See, inter

168 (1975); G.P. Politakis,
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alia,

D.P.

Modern

O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF
Aspects, supra note

26, at 104.
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a warship or unit but to instead facilitate the identification of vessels
craft or to prevent international terrorists or

weapons destined

for

and

air-

them from

getting access to the area concerned. Hence, the legal basis of maritime inter-

diction areas

and

is

to be found in Resolution 1373

collective self-defense.

Note

and

in the right of individual

also that according to

make

tional law they are entitled to temporarily

areas for military and security purposes.

33

customary interna-

exclusive use of restricted sea

However,

it

follows from the princi-

ple of proportionality that the exact coordinates of the sea areas affected as

well as the measures to be taken there have to be published in advance

by a Notice to Mariners/Airmen. Moreover, foreign ships and

aircraft

—

e.g.,

may only

be prohibited from entering the area as long as doubts persist about their identity,

their cargo, their crews,

evant information or

warning

all

if

and

their passengers. If they refuse to give the rel-

they continue their journey regardless of a prior

necessary measures

may be taken

against them.

Legal Restrictions

The United

States

and

its

more than simply
and the law of mari-

coalition partners are limited by

the principle of proportionality however.

If

the jus in bello

time neutrality are understood as an order of necessity, international law provides for situations in which two or

more

states consider themselves unable to

adhere to the prohibition on the use of force, 34 then the legal restrictions

down in that order of necessity, a fortiori, must be observed in situations

33.

Cf.

J.

Astley

Ch. E.
( 1997)
;

laid

that

& Michael Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 AF. L. REV.

Pirtle, Military

OCEAN DEVELOPMENT

Uses of Ocean Space and the

&. INT'L L. 7 (2000); R.

do

1

19

Law of the Sea in the New Millennium, 3

Wolfrum,

Military Activities

on

the

High Seas:

What are the Impacts of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea?, in THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENIUM at 501 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie Green eds., 1998)
(Vol. 71, US Naval War College International Law Studies). It may be added that the list of high
seas freedoms in Article 87, paragraph

1

of the

LOS Convention is not exhaustive. Accordingly,

these freedoms also include the use of the high seas and of

Moreover

it is

clear

areas for military purposes.

from the second sentence of that paragraph that freedom of the high seas

not only "exercised under the conditions
of international law." See
areas (including

EEZ

EEZ

laid

down by

this

Convention" but

LOS Convention, supra note 4, at art.

areas)

is

87.

The

is

also "by other rules

military uses of high seas

governed by customary international law, by the law of naval

warfare and by the law of maritime neutrality. Accordingly, and since military exercises
traditionally

have been conducted

in those sea areas,

such uses are generally acknowledged to be

part of customary international law.
34.
Prize

W. Heintschel v. Heinegg, The Current State of International
ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, 5-34 (H.H.G. Post ed.,

For this characterization see

Law, INTERNATIONAL

1994).
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not yet amount to an international armed conflict

strictu sensu. i5

Hence, when

conducting MIO, states are obliged to comply with the international
legal

minimum

requirements of the law of naval warfare and of the law of maritime

neutrality.

To

begin with, they have to distinguish between state vessels and aircraft

on the one hand and other

vehicles

on the other hand. State

and

vessels

air-

immunity and may not be interfered with unless they
pose an imminent threat. That immunity is extended to merchant vessels
travelling under the convoy of a warship. Therefore these merchant vessels
are, in principle, exempt from the exercise of the right of visit and search. 36
However, the commander of the accompanying warship is obliged to provide
37
all information as to the character of the merchant vessel and its cargo.
If not travelling under convoy, foreign merchant vessels may be required to
craft enjoy sovereign

provide

information necessary to verify their identity, their destination,

all

and

their route, their crews, their passengers

vide this information, or

if

their cargo. If they refuse to pro-

they otherwise try to evade identification,

all

mea-

and information may be
taken against them. Here again, the principle of proportionality applies. Accordingly, the use of armed force is admissible only as an ultima ratio measure;
weapons may only be employed if there are no other means to stop the vessel
or to prevent it from escape. Regularly, a warning shot fired away from the vessures necessary to enforce the duty of identification

sel will suffice. If not,

The

35.

forced to stop by a shot into the rudder.

International Court of Justice, in the Corfu

referred to

armed

may be

it

Hague Convention VIII

conflict. See

Channel and

Corfu Channel (Merits) (U.K.

v.

Alb.),

[hereinafter Corfu Channel] Nicaragua Case, supra note 25 at
;

to the Laying of Automatic

Hague

VIII].

in the

of 1907 although in both cases there existed

1

1949

I.C.J.

Nicaragua Case,

no international

4 (Apr.

9,

1949)

Convention Relative
1907, 36 Stat. 2332 [hereinafter

12. See also

Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18,
The principles laid down in Hague VIII were characterized by the ICJ

as "certain

general and well recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even

more exacting

peace than in war." See Corfu Channel at 22; Nicaragua Case at 112. Hence,
the ICJ also seems to take the position that the rules and principles of the jus in bello mark the

final limits

in

of what

is

tolerable

under international law.

Annotated Handbook,

supra note 9, para. 7.6.; Federal Ministry of Defence of
the Federal Republic of Germany, humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts MANUAL (ZDv 15/2), para. 1141 (Bonn, 1993); R. W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND
NEUTRALITY AT SEA, at 334 (1957); M. DONNER, DIE NEUTRALE HANDELSSCHIFFAHRT IM
BEGRENZTEN MILITARISCHEN KONFLIKT, at 174 (Kehl A.R. et al., 1993); CH. ROUSSEAU, LE
DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES, at 431 (1983); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6 at paras. 120,
36.

"The right of neutrals to convoy is recognized. Consequently, neutral States have the
accompany commercial ships flying their own or another neutral State's flag by

127.

right

to

their

warships." Helsinki Principles, supra note
37.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note

7,

at 6.1.

6, at para.

120(d).
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when

Stricter legal restrictions apply
civil aircraft

it

in

OEF

comes

to the use of force against

and

that are also obliged to identify themselves

said information. In

force

MIQ

view of the vulnerability of

must be limited to warning shots

a terrorist activity.

The

the use of armed

aircraft,

as long as there

is

to provide the

no

clear evidence of

only means available of using force

is

to require the

aircraft to land. 38
If,

according to intelligence information, there are reasonable grounds to

believe that a

them, or

if

merchant

all

is

transporting terrorists or goods destined to

doubts persist as to the truth of the information provided by

master, a boarding

take

vessel

team may be sent on board the merchant

measures necessary to

clarify the

circumstances

may

vessel that

(e.g.,

its

examination of

documents and search of the vessel). The members of the boarding team may
be armed in order to be able to defend themselves against attacks. If the initial
suspicion proves true or

of the responsible

where

a

if

circumstances cannot be clarified to the satisfaction

commander, the

thorough search

will

diversion order, the boarding

mand and
will

control.

Note

vessel

may be

be conducted.

If

diverted to a port or sea area

the master refuses to obey the

team may capture the

vessel by taking over

that in the majority of cases, search

be practically possible only with the master's consent,

com-

on the high

when

seas

the circum-

no other difficulties are encountered. Absent
these conditions, the vessel must either be diverted or allowed to continue its
journey. In view of the considerable economic losses involved, a diversion
must be in strict accordance with the principle of proportionality. Mere suspistances are easily clarified, and

if

cion of involvement with terrorist activities will generally not suffice. Rather,
the grounds for suspicion must be clear and reasonable which presupposes suf-

The same

ficient intelligence information.

capture.
sists visit

The

legality of capture

and search because

these measures.

If

limitations apply with regard to

cannot be doubted

it is

a

means

if

the merchant vessel re-

to enforce the obligation to tolerate

the master has complied with his obligations, however, cap-

encroachment on the flag state's sovereignty, is justified only
where there is strong suspicion of the commission of an offense.
With respect to individuals on board who are suspected of being internature, as a severe

tional terrorists or

who

are suspected of having assisted international terror-

ism in some other way and with regard to cargo that
international terrorists, specific rules and principles
ists

38.

may be taken

prisoner to prosecute

them

is

bound

for

groups of

must be observed. Terror-

for their illegal actions.

They

For the special protection of civil aircraft against the use of armed force see Convention on

International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec.

U.N.T.S. 6605 and

SAN REMO MANUAL,

7,

1944,

art. 3,

supra note 6, at para. 153.
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may be taken
one of its

to a court of the capturing warship's flag state or to a court of

allies.

39

If

Taliban members are captured, there

is

a presumption of

on behalf of, or with the consent of, the
de-facto government of Afghanistan. They remain liable, of course, for all
crimes they have committed. They may, however, not be prosecuted and tried
their participation in the hostilities

for

having taken part in the

(POW)

of war

status.

40

Moreover, they are entitled to prisoner

hostilities.

The mere change

in

government does not

nullify ex

tunc the authorization or consent of the predecessor. If those taken prisoner

members of al Qaeda they are entitled to POW status only if they had been
part of the Afghan armed forces or if they had otherwise "belonged" to Afghanistan as a party to the armed conflict. If neither of these conditions can be
are

ruled out the presumption or rule of doubt laid

Geneva Convention

III

comes

take place. 41 Nevertheless
ticipation in, or

39. Transfer of prisoners to

an

in Article 5(2) of

and an Article 5 tribunal must
does not preclude punishment for par-

into operation

POW status

commitment

down

of international terrorism. 42

of, acts

ally will,

however, pose considerable problems

if

the states

concerned are bound by different rules of international law, especially with regard to the

legality

of the death penalty.
40. According to Article 4 A of Geneva Convention III of 12 August 1949 relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War not only members of the regular armed forces are entitled to POW
status but also members of militias and volunteer corps either "forming part of such armed forces"

"members of regular armed forces
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power."
See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, art. 4, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]. Editor's Note—The US
Government has taken the position that the Taliban are not entitled to POW status since the
Taliban was never the legitimate government of Afghanistan and Taliban members do not meet
the four part test found in Article 4 of GC III. See GC III at art. 4; see Statement by White House
or "belonging to a Party to the conflict." Also protected are

who profess

allegiance to a

Press Secretary Ari Fleischer (Feb.

41

•

fallen

7,

2002).

whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such

"Should any doubt

arise as to

persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has

been determined by a competent tribunal."

Id.

at art. 5. This provision

is

generally accepted as

customary international law based, in part, on the reaction of the international community and the

media

to the treatment of the detainees in
I

who

is

...

hostilities

Guantanamo

Bay. For states parties to Additional

of 1977 a further obligation applies. According to Article 45 of this protocol, "a person

Protocol

.

not held as a prisoner of war and
.

.

shall

have the

is

to be tried ...

for

an offence

arising out of the

right to assert the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial

and to have the question adjudicated." GPI, supra note 10, at art. 45.
42. However, according to Article 85, GC III "prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits
tribunal

of the present Convention."

GC III, supra note 40,
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Weapons, ammunition and other

MIO

military

in

OEF

equipment destined

for interna-

tional terrorists or supply goods as well as everything serving for the financing

of international terrorism, including drugs or other prohibited goods,

may be

captured and seized. Other objects and cargo have to be returned to the

owner.

Captured vessels (and

sufficient proof that they are

national terrorists.

As

may also be seized as soon as there exists
owned by al Qaeda or some other group of inter-

aircraft)

for the rest

it

criminal law whether their confiscation

provides no clear rule

had been used

on

depend on the respective national

will

is

possible or not. International law

that question unless the vessel or aircraft concerned

in a terrorist attack or

had

actively resisted visit

and search or

diversion. Therefore, in case of doubt, these vehicles should be returned to
their

owners

respective

if

a

participation

in

terrorist

acts

cannot be

—

or within the

established.
If

MIO are conducted beyond the territorial sea of third states

territorial sea

with the approval of the coastal state

—

their legal basis derives

from the right of individual and collective self-defense as long
strictions referred to

above are observed. Would a

ship also be entitled to enter the territorial sea

consent and
ists

tried to

if

a

merchant

as the legal re-

US warship or an allied warif

the coastal state did not

vessel suspected of transporting international terror-

evade capture by taking refuge,

for

example, in the

territorial sea

of

Somalia? From the perspective of the law of the sea that operation, in view of
the territorial sovereignty of Somalia, would be
fied.

Here again a plea of

might pose a problem insofar

However,
as the in-

Somali authorities would perhaps not be sufficient to establish the

activity of

attributability necessary to legitimize actions

is

taken against that

state. Still,

the

becomes evident if the
again considered. According to that law neutral

pursuing such a vessel into the

law of maritime neutrality
states are

unless exceptionally justi-

self-defense could serve as a justification.

self-defense as traditionally understood

legality of

illegal

territorial sea

under an obligation to take the measures necessary to terminate any

violation of the law by

one of the

belligerents, especially

if

that belligerent

makes use of the

neutral's territorial sea as a base of his military operations. If

the neutral state

fails

unwilling to do so

may

the opposing belligerent,

use such force as

violation.

43.

—

43

to terminate the violation

is

strictly

if

SEEKRIEG, supra note

6, at

supra note

it

because

it is

unable or

certain preconditions are met,

necessary to respond to the threat posed by the

Note that the behavior of the neutral

San Remo Manual,

—be

6, at para. 22;

505.
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to a direct

and

war

attributable contribution to the enemy's

would become

that were the case that state

fighting efforts. If

a party to the conflict.

The law

of

maritime neutrality would be replaced by the jus in bello.
In any event, the measures taken within neutral territorial seas must be restricted to the termination of the violation. Resolution
states to prevent

and suppress within

terrorism as well as
that

is

their territories

all

1373 obligates

acts of international

in support of international terrorism.

all activities

either unwilling or unable to

all

comply with these obligations

A state

violates in-

ternational law. This also holds true where, as in Somalia, the state has failed.

Hence, there are good reasons that exceptional situations

like the

present

limited actions taken within foreign territorial seas in order to capture inter-

national terrorists and weapons destined for
tional law

the coastal state

if

is

them

are justified by interna-

unwilling or unable to take the measures

necessary according to Resolution 1373.

Conclusion

As

seen,

DOM

MIO conducted within the framework of Operation ENDURING FREE-

can be based upon the

additionally,

right of individual

on Resolution 1373 of the

UN

and

collective self-defense and,

Security Council. Third states are

obligated to tolerate the control measures taken against their shipping

and

tion by the United States

has

made

its

coalition partners.

sufficiently clear that self-defense

tributable to a given state. Rather,

digm can

it

is

The

UN

and

avia-

Security Council

not restricted to armed attacks

at-

has acknowledged that a self-defense para-

armed
countermeasures. This, however, does not mean that the United States and its
coalition partners are free to interfere with foreign shipping and aviation at their
will. They must observe the limitations imposed upon them by the law of naval
warfare and by the law of maritime neutrality. This corpus of international law
must be observed in spite of the fact that there exists no international armed conflict strictu

exist

sensu.

without

a

state

being

the

Respect for these requirements

only thus can the support of the international

is

potential

object

of

of utmost importance because

community

in the fight against in-

ternational terrorism be maintained.

Oi course,

in

view of the varying treaty obligations and in view of different

concepts of self-defense, a multinational operation like
is

a difficult task.

The most

draw multinational

rules of

common minimum

legal

ENDURING FREEDOM

promising way to cope with these

difficulties

is

to

engagement in order to ensure that at least the
denominator that is so important for international

political support operates effectively.
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XIV
The

Limits of Coalition Cooperation in the

War on Terrorism

Ivan Shearer
The Wide Range

1

he events of September
ings of revulsion,

even

11,

1

of Issues

2001 revealed deep and widespread

feel-

in unlikely quarters, against the indiscriminate

use of violence to achieve political ends. National leaders throughout the

world condemned the
solidarity with the

terrorist attacks in the

American government and

other media were equally condemnatory.

was

swift: resolutions

The

The

world's press

and

reaction of the United Nations

states to suppress terrorism

all

bringing terrorists to justice.

in Afghanistan

tions Security Council.

and

to cooperate in

2

military operations carried out by the

its allies,

people.

of broad reach and specific content were passed directing

measures to be taken by

The

United States and expressed their

were not

Although

United States and a number of

specifically authorized

justifiable as

by the United Na-

an exercise of the

right of self-

defense, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter oi the United Nations, the
failure of the

1.

Ivan Shearer

is

United States to seek such authorization retrospectively,

as

the Challis Professor of International Law, University of Sydney, Australia

U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001); S. C. Res. 1373,
U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001); S. C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
U.N. Doc.S/1377/(2001).
2.

See, e.g., S.

C. Res. 1368,

The Limits

of Coalition Cooperation in the

War on

Terrorism

envisaged by Article 51, raises both political and legal questions. This paper
will not,

however, be concerned with these issues

— the

jus ad

they are dealt with elsewhere in this publication. 3 Moreover,

probable that the future war against terrorism
stances where a state has admitted

and has refused

to take effective

will

bellum

it is

—

since

perhaps

less

be conducted in circum-

responsibility for harboring terrorists

its

measures against them. As a consequence,

traditional jus in bello issues will not frequently arise in the familiar context of
battlefield conditions,

such as in Afghanistan, where operations were con-

ducted against regular forces as well as
if

at

all,

The

rather by
issues

terrorists,

but

may

call for application,

way of analogy.

most

likely to arise are

states in the early warning,

those relating to the cooperation between

hunting down, and bringing to justice of terrorists.

There is unlikely to be a clearly delineated battlefield where terrorists conduct
open armed operations or hide in caves. Their shadowy operations will be directed under the cover of apparently innocuous business or other entities located in unsuspecting host countries. They will move easily between countries
on valid or false documents. Financial transactions will take place under
seemingly innocent cover, or through informal means. Intelligence and communications networks
Since there

is

will

operate using freely available public

facilities.

nearly universal recognition of the threat to international

and of the need for cooperation in their
suppression, it follows that an effective response must lie in the hands of the
many nations comprising the international community. That response must
be multilateral and multilayered. It must not be left entirely to the states directly affected by terrorism, still less to the most powerful among them, above
all the United States. There must be a coalition of states. This coalition will no
doubt consist of an inner circle of closely allied states, and a perimeter of othor not at all
allied, which acknowledge the dangers to
ers, more loosely
themselves of failing to cooperate to meet the global challenge of terrorism.
Differences in their policies, laws, human and material resources, and in the
efficiency of the exercise of their governmental powers, will call for considerpeace and security posed by

—

ation.

Whether

terrorists

—

these differences constitute impediments to the effectiveness

of the war against terrorism, and thus call for elimination, or whether they
constitute legitimate constraints or sensitivities, and thus call for respect,

is

the topic of this paper.
It is

taken as a given that international law

ning process in any actions against

3.

terrorists

See Chapters VIII-XIII supra.
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is

an

integral part of the plan-

and that

it

constitutes the only

Ivan Shearer

which to measure the legitimacy of the actions
some quarters to see international law as an un-

yardstick the world has against

taken. There

is

a

tendency in

due restraining factor

to be set aside in times of crisis.

tude strike at the heart of civilized values;

it

4

Not only does

this atti-

ignores the very real opportunities

afforded by the concessive rules of international law to allow effective action
to be taken against terrorists in a principled fashion
lic

which upholds world pub-

order.

Particular reference will be

made

and policies of
of the United States and a coalition

in this paper to the laws

an example of a close ally
the war against terrorism.

Australia, as

partner in

National

Laws With

Respect

To Terrorism

In the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, states are presently free to adopt their

Many have no

own definitions

for the purposes of their

domestic law.

defined crime of terrorism, as such, in their laws, but

all

have

laws respecting most of the constituent elements of terrorism, such as murder,

manslaughter, violence against the person, criminal damage to property, and
threats

and conspiracies

to

commit crimes of violence.

In enacting anti-terrorism laws, states will generally note the definitions of
terrorism contained in international conventions to

which they are

parties or

to agreed definitions adopted by authoritative international bodies. Unfortunately, a universal definition of terrorism has
as witnessed by the lack of consensus

Draft International Convention

Nations.

The

5

proved to be

difficult to

achieve

found in the attempted definition in the

on Terrorism,

presently before the United

core definition of the crime in that draft

is,

however, not in

doubt as Article 2 of the Draft Convention provides:
1.

Any

person commits an offence within the meaning of

that person, by any means, unlawfully
(a)

and

this

Convention

if

intentionally, causes:

death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

Former Australian Permanent Representative to the UN and head of the UN Special
Commission on Disarmament in Iraq Ambassador Richard Butler, quoted US Undersecretary of
State John Bolton, as having said in 2000 when discussing the International Criminal Court that
"[t]here is no such thing as international law, only national sovereignty." Richard Butler, The
supine leading the blind," THE AUSTRALIAN, June 14, 2002 at 13.
5. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 5 1/2 10 of
17 December 1996, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc A/5 7/33. (2002), available
at http://ods-dds-ny.un.Org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/248/l 7/PDF/N02248 1 7.pdf?OpenElement
(Jan. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Draft International Convention on Terrorism].
4.

277

The Limits

(b) serious

War on

of Coalition Cooperation in the

Terrorism

damage to public or private property, including a place of public
government facility, a public transportation system, an

use, a state or

infrastructure facility, or the environment; or
(c)

damage

(b)

of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic

when

to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph

the purpose of the conduct, by

its

nature or context,

is

1

loss,

to intimidate a

population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or
6

abstain from doing any act.

The

difficulty that

has arisen, and that so

remains to be resolved

far

through continuing negotiations, concerns the qualifying provisions of draft
article 18 of this

convention. In one version, that article would exempt from

categorization as terrorism the activities of armed forces during

governed by international humanitarian law, and

Member

posed by the

would exempt the

armed

conflict

in the other version, pro-

States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

activities of the parties to

situations of foreign occupation."

7

The

an armed

conflict, "including in

basis of the disagreement in the con-

tinuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians

is

obvious.

9

Both the United Kingdom and Australia have already adopted
8

a

domestic

law definition of terrorism with the Australian definition largely following the

UK model.
"for the

It

requires as

an element of the offense that the act be committed

purpose of advancing a

political, religious or ideological cause." It also

excludes from the definition acts that consist of advocacy, protest, dissent or
labor disputes.

For the purposes of domestic law, an internationally accepted definition of

and when it eventuates, will be of crucial importance. In the constitutional systems of some states, the definition in the Convention will operate directly as domestic law upon its ratification and promulgation by the state
parties. In other constitutional systems, especially those of the English common law inheritance such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, the
terrorism,

if

6. Id. at art. 2.

Article
7.

Id.

8.

See

2,

Note

paragraphs

that the precise definitions of the property
1

(b)

and

1

(c) are

contained in Article

and

institutions

mentioned

in

of the Draft Convention.

at art. 18.

And- terrorism, Crime and

printed in

Security Act, 2001,

CURRENT LAW STATUTES, 2000

(Sweet

c.

See Criminal

Code Act,

c. 1, pt.

5.3 d. 100 (Austl.).

278

11 §

1

(UK). The version of

this

Act

& Maxwell eds., 2000) contains annotations

which trace the history of the definition from the troubles
and Lloyd Commissions, to the present.
9.

1

in

Northern

Ireland,

from the Diplock

Ivan Shearer

Convention definition

will require

possibly also adaptation to

In the meantime, in

meet

many

adoption and incorporation by statute, and

local circumstances.

countries,

new

laws are being introduced or

drafted in order to give the police, or intelligence agencies, increased powers

and question not only those suspected of terrorism but also those
who may be thought to have relevant information. Bills currently before the
Australian Parliament, for example, would give to the Australian Security and
Intelligence Organization (ASIO), an organization not previously invested
with coercive powers, the power to obtain a warrant to secretly detain persons
to detain

suspected of terrorism or those thought to possess information about terror10

ists.

It is

also

proposed that the Attorney-General be given power to pro-

scribe certain organizations. 11

Members and

supporters of those organizations

could be jailed for up to 25 years.

The

definition of terrorism in domestic law, or the applicability under do-

mestic law of other denominations of offense to terrorist acts, will have particular implications for jurisdiction

and extradition.
Jurisdiction

International law recognizes the jurisdiction of states to prescribe and enforce
their criminal laws subject to certain conditions. 12

The

very wide power to pre-

Permanent Court of International Justice
in the Case of the SS. Lotus (1927), 13 must now be regarded as somewhat narrower in extent, especially since the decision of the present International Court
of Justice in the Case of the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) (2002). H It must now be regarded as essential to prescriptive jurisdiction that there be some nexus or linking point between the
legislating state and the reprehended activity that is supported by the positive
scribe laws, seemingly allowed by the

10.

The Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment

Bill after

passing both the Australian

Howard-.

The

Bill will

(Terrorism)

House and Senate was not approved by Prime Minister John

be reconsidered in the 2003 Parliament. See Paul Sheehan, PM's Doubled-

dissolution Trigger Finger

must be Itching over

ASIO

Bill,

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec.

16,

2002, at 13.

Amendment (Terrorism) Bill, No 65, 2002 (Austl.).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

11.

See Security Legislation

12.

See generally A.L.I.

STATES,

§ 432, at pgs. 232,

Case

235-238 (1987).
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.

13.

S.S. Lotus

14.

See Case of the Arrest

(Fr. v.

Warrant of

A) No. 10 (Sep. 7, 1927).
2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo

(ser.

11 April

v.

Belgium), 41 I.L.M. 536 (2002), available at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/

icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-04_cobe_200202 14-htm
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practice of other states. 15 In any event, the

power

War on

Terrorism

to enforce validly prescribed

dependent upon physical custody of the offender or upon the
of extradition from another state having custody.
laws

is

availability

States have jurisdiction to prescribe the applicability of their criminal laws

upon the following
(a)

The

generally recognized bases:

territorial basis of jurisdiction. States

have jurisdiction to prescribe

laws governing activities occurring in their territory, or in places assimilated to
their territory,

such

as ships

and

aircraft of their nationality. It

is

an accepted

extension of this basis of jurisdiction that states also have jurisdiction over

elements of which occur outside their territory but which are com-

fenses,

pleted, or

have

The

(b)

effect, or are

intended to have

effect,

within

Whether

states are also justified in international

over those
ity" basis

(c)

it.

16

nationality basis of jurisdiction. States have jurisdiction to pre-

scribe laws governing the activities of their citizens

form.

of-

who commit

of jurisdiction)

wherever they occur.

law in asserting jurisdiction

offenses against their citizens (the "passive nationalis

disputable. State practice in the matter

is

not uni-

17

The

protective principle of jurisdiction. States have jurisdiction to pre-

scribe laws governing the activities of those

damage

who would

assault

its

existence or

18

Accepted examples include planning an invasion of the territory or the overthrow of its government, counterfeiting its currency, and breaching the fiscal, immigration, sanitary and customs laws
applicable against inbound vessels in the contiguous zone under the internaits

essential interests.

tional law of the sea. Extensions, however, to interests that are not shared by

the international community, such as the protection of the national religion

through blasphemy laws, or the reputation of national rulers ("slander against
the state") will not be widely recognized.
(d)

The

universality principle of jurisdiction. States

have jurisdiction

to

prescribe laws that correspond to offenses regarded by international law as

Adolf Eichmann, 36 1.L.R. Rep. 5 (D.C. Jm., 1961) [hereinafter Eichmann].
v. US, [1991] 1 A.C. 225 (P.C.).

15.

See, e.g., Israel v.

16.

See Liangsiriprasert

17.

United States law recognizes

taking.

See,

e.g.,

this basis

Hostage Taking Act

comprehensive basis a

Bill

Code Amendment. This

§

of jurisdiction for certain purposes,

2001,

18

U.S.C

§

1203

(2002).

e.g.,

On

hostagea

more

The Criminal
Criminal Code Act,

has been introduced into the Australian Parliament:

bill

has

now been enacted

as Division

104 of the

1995, available at http://search.aph.gov.au/search/ParlInfo.ASP?action=browse&Path=Legislation/

Current + Bills + by + Title/Criminal + Code + Amendment + (Offences + Against + Australians)

+ Bill+2002&Start=3&iGD#top
18.

Can.

See Eichmann, supra note 15, at

10, 2003).

5.
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crimes by the law of nations.
there

have

is

The

historic instance

is

doubt, because of the difficulty in establishing

crystallized as

Beyond that
whether definitions

piracy.

customary international law. Strong candidates

for inclu-

sion in the category, however, are slavery, crimes against humanity, genocide,

planning and conducting a war of aggression, and war crimes.
Instead of leaving the development of crimes against international law, and
the concomitant universality of jurisdiction over them, to the evolutionary
processes of customary law, the trend since 1948 has been to define offenses
against international law in international conventions.

ber of these. 19

The

There are a

jurisdiction prescribed by these conventions

universal in the sense that any state

may

large

num-

not truly

is

prosecute, as in the case of piracy.

Instead they prescribe a variety of jurisdictional bases for prosecution and a

duty on the state actually having custody of the offender to either prosecute
the offender

itself

or extradite to another state having jurisdiction

the bases set out. This duty

is

on one of

described as out dedere out judicare (punire) (the

duty to extradite or to prosecute).

It

might therefore be described

as a "quasi-

must be a linking point beeven though that might merely

universality" basis of jurisdiction, because there

tween the offense and the prosecuting

state,

be the fortuitous presence of the offender in the territory of the state that

first

and detains the offender.
Note that many of the above conventions incorporating the aut dedere aut

finds

judicare formula are related to particular forms of terrorism.

The

latest of

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998, incorporates the same formula. 20
The Draft Comprehensive International Convention on Terrorism, under
negotiation in the United Nations, also incorporates the aut dedere aut judicare
these, the International

19.

See,

e.g,.

Convention

Armed Forces in the

Field,

for the

Aug.

Amelioration of the Condition of the

12, 1949, Art. 2, 6

;

12, 1949, 6.

Sick in

U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.

3 1 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.

Wounded and

Wounded,

Sick,

and Shipwrecked

U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 thereinafter GC III]; Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (1971); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027, and in
24 I.L.M. 535 (entry into force for United States on Nov. 20, 1994)
20. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, GA Res. 52/164
85;

T.I.A.S.

(Dec. 15, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998)
[hereinafter Terrorist

(ratified

Bombings Convention]
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principle. 21 In addition to the states

ant to the Convention

— the

whose

War on

jurisdiction

Terrorism

must be assured pursu-

territorial state, the state of nationality of a vessel

or aircraft affected, and the state of nationality of the offender

— the following

optional bases of national jurisdiction are also prescribed:

(a)

The

offence

committed by a

is

stateless person

who

has his or her habitual

residence in the territory of that state; or
(b)

The offence

is

of the conduct or

committed wholly or partially outside
its

intended effects constitute or result

the commission of an offence set forth in article
(c)

The

offence

The

offence

is

its

territory, if the effects

in,

within

its

territory,

2;

committed against a national of that

state; or

committed against a state or government facility of that state
abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that
(d)

is

state; or
(e)

The

'

offence

is

committed

an attempt to compel that

in

state to

do or

to

abstain from doing any act; or
(f)

The

offence

is

government of that

committed on board an
state.

The Relevance

aircraft

which

is

operated by the

22

of International

Norms

of

Human

Rights

In the treatment of suspected terrorists after their detention, states are

by the international norms of
Declaration of

Human

human

States

bound by

The

Covenant on

and 147 other
it

—

Civil

22.

provisions of the Universal

for the greater part

and

— the

provisions of the

Political Rights of 1966.

states are parties to the latter instrument

also as a treaty instrument.

The United
and

are thus

23

following provisions of the Universal Declaration are especially rele-

vant to the treatment of suspected

21.

The

Rights, 1948 are regarded as declaratory of generally

binding international law, as are
International

rights.

bound

See Draft International Convention
Id., art.

terrorists:

on Terrorism, supra note

5, at art. 11.

6(2).

ofHuman Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights]; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 1991 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976, ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
23.

See Universal Declaration
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"No one

Article 5.

shall

be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-

grading treatment or punishment." 24
Article 9.
ile."

"No one

shall

be subjected to arbitrary

arrest,

detention or ex-

25

Article 10. "Everyone

is

entitled in full equality to a fair

and public hearing

by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights

and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." 26
Article 11. "(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." 27
These provisions are confirmed and expanded in articles 7, 9, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 28
Do these provisions impose extraterritorial obligations on states? Article 2
(1) of the Covenant obliges each state party to respect and to ensure the rights
recognized in the Covenant "to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction." Is the word "and" to be read conjunctively or disjunctively?

The

latter

appears to be the preferred reading.

The Human Rights Committee

established under the Covenant, has determined that this article "does not

imply that the state party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations

commit upon the territory of
another state, whether with the acquiescence of the government of that state
or in opposition to it." 29 The Committee has also had occasion to address the
same point in its observations on Belgium's periodic report:
of rights under the Covenant which

its

agents

The Committee is concerned about the behaviour of Belgian soldiers in Somalia
under the aegis of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNSOM II), and
acknowledges that the State Party has recognized the applicability of the

24.

See Universal Declaration of

Human

Rights, supra note 23, art. 5.

25. Id. at art. 9.
26.

Id.

at art. 10.

27.

Id.

at art. 11.

28. See

ICCPR, supra note 23, arts. 7, 9, 14.
Ruben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm.

no. 12/52, Report of the Human Rights
GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 176, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981); digestedin
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND COMMENTARY (S. Joseph et al. eds., 2000), at 59-60 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
29. See Sergio

Committee, U.N.

COVENANT]. As noted by these authors, the separate reasoning in this case of Committee
Member Christian Tomuschat is most persuasive. A similar conclusion was reached by the

Human

Rights

Committee

13/56, Report of the

in the case of Celiberti

Human

de Casariego

Rights Committee, U.N.

U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).
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GAOR,

v.

Uruguay. See

36th

Sess.,

Comm' No.

Supp. No. 40,

R.

at 185,

The Limits
Covenant
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investigation.

of Coalition Cooperation in the

respect

this

opened

and
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War on

files

for

Terrorism

the

purposes

of

30

would thus appear to be the case that states, in their operations against
terrorists, cannot avoid their obligations under international human rights law
by detaining suspects in offshore facilities. "Jurisdiction" means effectively
"within the power of." In battlefield conditions, where it is not immediately
obvious who are lawful combatants and who are criminals, the law of the
Geneva Conventions, 1949, must obviously apply as a lex specialis. But in cases
It

not covered by the Geneva Conventions, international

human

rights law

applies.

norms of human rights apply only in
normal circumstances and not in relation to terrorists, whose very aim is the
violation of the human rights of others and the destruction of institutions
in
many cases, transparent and democratically accountable institutions. The
Covenant recognizes this by the inclusion, in Article 4, of a right of derogaIt

may be argued

that the international

—

tion,

but in

strictly limited

emergency which threatens the

In time of public

1.

existence of which

circumstances. Article 4 states:

is

officially

life

of the nation and the

proclaimed, the States Parties to the present

Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that

such measures are not inconsistent with their other

obligations under international law

and do not involve discrimination

solely

on

the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2.

No

may
3.

be

derogation from articles

made under

Any

6, 7,

8 (paragraphs

1

and

2), 11, 15,

16 and 18

this provision.

State Party to the present

Covenant

availing itself of the right of

derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present

Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, of the provisions from which

it

has derogated and of the reasons by

it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation. 31

which

30. See
Parties

Human
Under

Rights Committee, 64th Sess., Consideration of Reports Submitted by State

Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc.

CCPR/C/79/Add.99

www.hri.ca/fortherecordl998/documentation/tbodies/ccpr-c-79-add99.htm
reprinted in

31.

See

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT,

ICCPR, supra note

supra note 29, at 62.

23, art. 4.

284

available at http.//
(Jan.

11,

2003);

Ivan Shearer

The

provisions of Article 4 have been the subject of considerable elabora-

and interpretation. The Human Rights Committee itself issued a General
Comment on the article in 200 1; 32 in 1984 the International Law Association
tion

adopted the Paris

Emergency;

33

Minimum

ICCPR.

Human

Rights

Norms

in a State of

and, in 1985 a group of experts in international law adopted the

Siracusa Principles

Common

34

Standards of

on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions
to these formulations

is

in the

the invocation of the principle of

proportionality of the measures in derogation, and the requirement that they

be withdrawn as soon as the emergency has passed.
It

will

be seen that the threshold of justification

paragraph

1.

is

set

high by the terms of

For countries such as the United States or Australia, there would

be an understandable reluctance to declare a state of emergency, even after

such catastrophic events as those of 11 September 2001, for fear of spreading
panic in the community, or of appearing to confess the inability of the govern-

ment

to take effective

measures against

terrorists

within the existing law.

The

more widely and frequently to justify
such a step. 35 Nevertheless, certain measures have been taken in relation to
suspected terrorists arrested in the United States, and those detained in Afghanistan and other places, without a declaration so far of derogation under
the Covenant. Special powers of arrest and detention in relation to suspected
danger should have manifested

32. See

U.N. International

itself

Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Addendum, General

General Recommendations Adopted by

Comment No.

29, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5/Add. 1 (Apr.
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/Genlrev5addl_E.pdf (Jan. 12, 2003).

18,

2002) available at http://

THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
EMERGENCY (1984), reprinted in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072 (1985).
33.

See

34. See

The

International

Siracusa

Principles

Covenant on Civil and

Quarterly l (1985).
35. The United Kingdom had

IN

A STATE OF

on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions
Political Rights, arts.

29-32, reprinted

availed itself in the past of the

in 7

in

the

HUMAN RIGHTS

power of derogation under the

Covenant, but only in respect of the
terrorist acts

territory of Northern Ireland, notwithstanding that sporadic
were being committed elsewhere in the United Kingdom. On 18 December 2001,

however, the United Kingdom gave notice of derogation for the whole of the United Kingdom by
reason of a general public emergency following the events of September 11, 2001.
declaration referred to the enactment of the

An ti- terrorism,

The

Crime and Security Act, 2001, but

was limited to a derogation from article 9 of the Covenant in relation to extended powers of arrest
and detention of foreign nationals where there is an intention to deport. See And- terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, 21-23 (Eng.) (detailing the new law of the United Kingdom
for dealing

with suspected international

terrorists,

through certification, deportation, and

detention), available at http://www.legislation.hmso .gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024-htm Qan.
12,

2003).
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terrorists are currently

being considered by the Australian Parliament. 36 There

a question therefore

whether these measures are compatible with the Cove-

is

nant, in the absence of a formal declaration of derogation.

Extradition of Terrorists

It

has long been accepted that there

is

no duty

in

customary international law

to grant extradition of accused or convicted criminals at the request of another
state.
eral,

A duty to extradite

or they

is

imposed only by

may be contained

scribed above in

which the

(out dedere aut judicare)

treaty.

These

treaties

may be bilat-

in multilateral treaties, especially of the type de-

parties are

bound

to either extradite or prosecute

.

Existing extradition treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, between

many

countries already cover in substance the offenses

commonly regarded

as

pertaining to terrorism. There are gar3s in that coverage, however, both geo-

and substantively. For those countries whose power to grant extradition depends on the existence of an applicable treaty the treaty network may
have become neglected or have fallen behind in its recognition of new types of
offenses, such as terrorism. For those countries whose laws permit them to
grant extradition without a treaty, on an ad hoc basis, and subject to a demonstration of criminality under the laws of both the requesting and the requested
states (the rule of dual criminality), those laws may similarly have fallen begraphically

hind current needs.

Two

frequently encountered exceptions to extradition found in treaties

and national laws are a prohibition of the extradition by a state of its own
zens, and the exception of politically motivated offenders.

The

prohibition of extradition of citizens

legal systems of civil

law countries.

It

is

a rule deeply

derives from

entrenched in the

Roman Law and exchanges

duty of obedience that the citizen owes to the state a duty of the state

for the

not to deliver up a citizen to a foreign jurisdiction. Countries of the
law tradition recognize no such restriction. In

tween

citi-

civil

citizens

is

law and

made

common

many

common

extradition treaties be-

law countries, therefore, the refusal to extradite

discretionary, so that the civil law position

while giving an opportunity to the

common

can be maintained

law country to refuse by way of

The result is a mismatch. Civil law countries allow for prosecution
of their own citizens for crimes committed anywhere in the world, as is recognized in international law by the nationality principle of jurisdiction. With few
reciprocity.

36. See note 10 supra

and accompanying

text.
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common law countries

exceptions, the

ciple of jurisdiction. This
lish

common

remain attached to the

attachment goes back to the

earliest

territorial prin-

days of the Eng-

law and the institution of trial by jury; crime was local because

could be presented by a grand jury and judged by a petty
of local citizens.

The

extradition of one of

the offender in the

result
its

can be that where a

citizens by

common

way of reciprocity,

composed only

jury,

common

it

law country refuses

there

no power

is

law country, and a failure of justice

may

to try

result. 37

no way around this difficulty. The non-extradition
of citizens is a principle even embedded in the constitutions of some countries.
It is unlikely that any international convention on terrorism would succeed in

There would appear

to be

setting aside that principle. Perhaps only the

could do

so, as

it

United Nations Security Council

did in relation to those charged with the Lockerbie

inci-

dent. 38

The exception from

extradition of political offenses and of persons who,

extradited, might suffer prejudice at their trial
gion, nationality or political opinion

dition treaties

is

on account of

if

their race, reli-

almost universally recognized in extra-

and national extradition

laws. 39 Terrorism

As

is

an example par

back as the 19th century,
doubts began to be voiced about protecting individuals from extradition who
excellence of a politically motivated offense.

far

had committed indiscriminate or cruel crimes for a political motive. Anarchists were held to be outside the rule and therefore extraditable. Attempts to
exclude the rule against the extradition of such individuals failed in the Hague
(1970) and Montreal (1971) Conventions

on

hijacking and sabotage of air-

However, the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, 1977, expressly set aside the rule 40 and the current Draft
craft, respectively.

37.

Ivan Shearer, Extradition

in

international Law 94-131

(1971)

[hereinafter

Shearer].
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. US; Libya v. UK) (Request
38. See Case

for the Indication of Provisional

Measures), 1992

I.C.J. 3. [hereinafter

Lockerbie Case].

SHEARER, supra note 37, at 166-193.
40. See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Eur. T.S. No. 90 Qan. 27, 1977),
available at http://conventions.coe.int (Jan. 13, 2003). The Convention requires that none of the
39.

following offenses shall be regarded as political for the purposes of extradition: crimes under the
international conventions regarding hijacking

and sabotage of aircraft, hostage

taking, attacks

bomb, grenade,
use endangers persons." Attempts or

against internationally protected persons, or "an offense involving the use of a
rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel

bomb

if

this

may

complicity in the above offenses are also excluded. Optionally, under article

2,

states parties

regard any act of violence against the person, or any act against property

if

the act created a

collective danger to persons, as not qualifying as a political offense.
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Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, being considered by the United Nadoes so

tions,

also.

Within some

states, the

ventions require, as

is

may be
of Australia. The

domestic law

the case

in

advance of what the con-

extradition laws of Australia

exclude from the application of the political offense exception offenses established

under the international conventions concerning the hijacking of

craft,

sabotage

of aircraft,

hostage taking, and torture.

41

genocide,

internationally

protected

Regarding countries to which

air-

persons,

this provision

is

may not be invoked in respect
person of a Head of State or Head

applied specifically by regulation, the exception

of the murder, kidnapping or attack on the
of

Government of a

country, or the taking or endangering of

life

being an of-

fense "committed in circumstances in which such conduct creates a collective

danger, whether direct or indirect, to the lives of other persons." 42 However, a
general exception of terrorism from the category of political offenses in Australia's
It

extradition laws has not yet been effected.

thus emerges that the non-extradition of citizens rule constitutes the

greater continuing handicap to the surrender of a terrorist offender to a re-

questing state.

The

national state of the offender, not being the state where

the act occurred or had

its effects, is

entitled to prosecute but might

do so un-

der evidentiary handicaps, or without diligence. That state might indeed be

most reluctant to undertake the task of prosecution, where local sympathies
lay with the offender, or where the state felt intimidated by the prospect of
possible retaliation against itself by associates of the offender. In such cases,

if

the International Criminal Court were invested with jurisdiction over the offense,

it

would be

a relief to be able to

cede the case to that Court.

Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council

on 28 September 2001, did not attempt

tradition as such, but laid

down

to impose a duty of ex-

several important obligations ancillary to the

extradition process. Paragraph 2 of the resolution, adopted under Chapter VII

of the Charter and under the heading "Decides" (which triggers
fect for all

UN),

Members

of the

UN,

as prescribed in article

includes the following subparagraphs:

41.

See Extradition Act, 1988, § 5 (Austl).

42.

Id.
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Decides also that

(e)

all

States shall

Ensure that any person

.

.

.

who

participates

in

the

financing,

planning,

preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

is

brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against

them, such

domestic

terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in

laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of

such
(f)

terrorist acts;

Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with

criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or

support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their
possession necessary for the proceedings. 43

The phrase

in subparagraph (e) "is brought to justice"

seems to comprehend

the out dedere autjudicare principle without explicitly saying so.
that domestic laws be enacted to

under national law serves

make

The

injunction

terrorist acts, as such, distinct offenses

as a necessary precondition to the full application of

the dual criminality requirement of extradition law.

Paragraph three of the resolution, in which the Security Council "Calls

upon

all

States to

a decision, but
this

paragraph

is

.

.

.", is

not binding under

article

25 of the Charter, not being

nonetheless a directive that has weight. Subparagraph

calls

upon

states to ensure that "claims of political

(g)

of

motivation

are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of al-

leged terrorists." 44 This relatively

weak provision

reflects the failure of previ-

ous efforts in multilateral conventions, such as the hijacking and sabotage of
aircraft

conventions, to exclude the political offense exception to extradition

altogether.
itly

On the other hand, the political offense exception has been explic-

excluded in the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist

Bombings (1998) 45 and in the current Draft Comprehensive International
Convention on Terrorism. 46
Another aspect of extradition of terrorists is revealed by the case of three
men accused of conspiracy with Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda group to

43. See S. C. Res. 1373, supra note 2.
44.

Id.

45. See Terrorist

Bombing Convention, supra note 20, art. 11.
Convention on Terrorism, supra note

which provides that
[e]ach State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate,
domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under
no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
46. See Draft International
(l

ethnic, religious or other similar nature."
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commit the bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania. They were arrested in the United Kingdom and held for
extradition to the United States.

No point could

have been taken that the

of-

have been excluded from extradiexpressly excepted from the category of political

fenses, being politically motivated, should

because terrorism

tion,

is

which extradition may not be given. 47 The point taken on behalf
of the accused on appeal to the House of Lords was that the alleged crimes,
having been committed in Kenya and Tanzania, were not committed "within
the jurisdiction" of the United States, as required by the applicable bilateral
treaty of extradition between the United Kingdom and the United States, and
the UK Extradition Act, 1989. The House of Lords held unanimously that
"jurisdiction" was a wide enough expression to comprehend extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the kind asserted by both the United States and the United
Kingdom in like cases. 48 Lord Hutton stated that:
offenses for

[m]y principal reason for forming

this

opinion

is

that in the

modern world

of

and crime proper effect would not be given to the
extradition procedures agreed upon between states if a person accused in a
requesting state of an offence over which that state had extra-territorial
jurisdiction (it also being an offence over which the requested state would have
jurisdiction) could avoid extradition on the ground that the offence was not
committed within the territory of the requesting state. 49
international terrorism

The Death Penalty
Still

another impediment to extradition of terrorists

among even otherwise like-minded
tries

states as to the

of the European Union, Australia,

ished the death penalty in their

own

is

death penalty. The coun-

Canada and

laws,

and

the difference in policies

New

will extradite to states,

the United States, which retain the death penalty, only

death penalty,

if

Zealand have abol-

on condition

such as
that the

imposed, will not be carried out.

In the case of In re Fawwaz, Lord Scott of Foscote in his separate opinion

noted that the Act of 1989 contained certain safeguards
nal whose extradition

is

47. Extradition Act, 1989,

c.

48. In re
49.

Id.

AlTawwaz

[2002]

sought.

1

Among

these was:

33, § 24 (UK).

A.C. 556; 41 I.L.M. 1224 (2002).

at para. 64.
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[h]e will not be extradited unless the

[UK] Secretary of State decides,

matter of discretion, to order that the extradition may proceed.
the settled practice, as

I

understand

it,

It

as a

has become

for the Secretary of State, in a case

where

the law of the extraditing state might subject the extradited prisoner

on

conviction to the death penalty, to require a guarantee that a death sentence

not be imposed

will

as

If,

is

(see

Soeringv.

UK (1989)

11

EHRR439). 50

an increasing number of

to be expected,

terrorists associated

with

the events of September 11, 2001 are arrested in countries outside the United
States, these differences in policies raise serious legal

The

legal questions will arise

and

political questions.

under the laws of the requested state and under

the terms of the applicable extradition treaties with the United States.
the death penalty

is

states there will be

available

Where

under the laws of both requesting and requested

no problem. But an increasing number of states have

abol-

ished the death penalty. This gives rise to the specter of discrimination: the

imposition of the death penalty

on a

terrorist extradited

from another country

depend upon whether conditions have been attached to the extradition,
as in Fawwaz. Presumably the United States would be in a position to enforce
those conditions, where terrorists are prosecuted under federal and not state

will

laws. 51

The political questions
explain to the people of

are obvious, but their answers are not.

New

York

City, or indeed the entire

that an extradited terrorist associated with the attack

Center can get a

maximum

of

life

How can one

United States,

on the World Trade

imprisonment, whereas an ordinary mur-

derer faces the death penalty?

Fair Trial Safeguards in Extradition
Extradition treaties do not usually contain provisions requiring the parties to

observe accepted standards of a

fair trial after extradition.

existence of a bilateral treaty, or a willingness to act

In the past, the very

on an ad hoc

basis,

have

acknowledgment of the respect the parties have for one
another's processes. Doubts have emerged, however, in recent years where
multilateral treaties containing extradition clauses are open to all states to ad-

been regarded

as tacit

may sometimes be

here.

It

50.

at para 121.

Id.

the case that the internal situation in a bilateral

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), 1998
37 I.L.M. 812 (1998); Breard v. Greene, 532 U.S. 371 (1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 824;
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. US), 1999 I.C.J. 9.

51.

See Case Concerning the

I.C.J. 99,
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partner state, once of an acceptable order, has deteriorated. There
that under the laws of some states

on the grounds

tion

that the

it is

difficult or

is

concern

impossible to refuse extradi-

human rights of the person extradited might be vi-

olated after return: the so-called "rule of non-inquiry." 52

To some

extent, the issue of fair

trial

safeguards overlaps with the protec-

The formula most often used is to the effect
that the extradition of a requested person may be refused if the requested state
has reason to believe that, if returned, the alleged offender may be punished,
tion accorded political offenders.

or suffer prejudice at his or her
political opinion.

trial,

on account of race,

religion, nationality or

On the other hand, if the issue of a fair trial arises in the con-

text of corruption or

incompetence

or of cruel or unusual punishments,

in the legal system of the requesting state,
it is

likely to

be dealt with through the ex-

ercise of the general discretion of requested states to refuse extradition in all

the circumstances of the case.

Where

unreviewable by a court in the requested

the exercise of that discretion

outcome

state, the

is

for the alleged of-

fender can be unpredictable.

A more principled manner in which the executive

discretion to refuse ex-

would be by reference, to
and Political Rights, which

tradition in such circumstances could be exercised

Article 14 of the International
sets

out

Covenant on

fair trial rights in detail.

Civil

Article 14 provides, inter

alia,

that "everyone

and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law." 53 There is an exception, however, of
shall

be entitled to a

fair

particular relevance in respect to the procedures proposed for the trial of terrorist suspects in

[t]he press

the United States:

and the public may be excluded from

all

or part of a

trial for

reasons

of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society,
or where the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the

extent

strictly

necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances

where publicity would prejudice the
rendered in a criminal case or in a

interests of justice; but

suit at

law shall be

made

any judgment

public except where

the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern

matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 54

Parts of this provision
siveness)
52.

(made somewhat turgid

have obvious implications

in

its

attempt at comprehen-

for the trial of terrorists.

On this question see John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition

with

Human

53.

See

54.

Id.

Rights,

92 AM.

ICCPR, supra note

J.

INT'L. L. (1998).

23, art. 14.
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In the case of Fawwaz, Lord Scott, after raising the question of the death
penalty, proceeded to another matter of concern: trial before special courts,

media have, over the past few weeks, carried reports of the intention of the
President of the US, acting under emergency executive powers, to establish
[t]he

non-US

military tribunals to try

The

citizens

who

are accused of terrorist offences.

offences with which these appellants are charged might well

fall

category of offences proposed to be dealt with by military tribunals.

within the

It is

reported

that the proposed military tribunals will be presided over by military personnel,

not judges,

be able to admit evidence that would not ordinarily be

will

admissible before a criminal court of law, and will be able to conduct the

trial

behind closed doors. The charges against the appellants that have led to the
extradition requests were laid before the US District Court for the Southern
District o{
will

New York.

If

the appellants are to be extradited

I

imagine that they

be tried before that court or some other Federal Court and not before a

military tribunal that will not
rules of evidence.

need to

in public

sit

and that need not observe the

55

Although another member of the House of Lords, Lord Hutton, expressly
dissociated himself from the remarks of Lord Scott, observing that the issue

had not been

raised in argument, 56 this consideration could clearly arise

on

a

future occasion.

The

The

International Criminal Court

opposition of the United States to the establishment and future operation

of the International Criminal Court
attitude of

many

of

its

well

known.

It

stands in contrast to the

Canada, and the

closest allies, including Australia,

United Kingdom, which have
to

is

examine the differences

all ratified

the

Rome

Statute.

in policies in this paper.

There

It is

are,

not proposed

however, two

points of relevance to the topic of terrorism.

In the

first

place, terrorism, as such,

the International Criminal Court.

At

is

the

not a crime within the jurisdiction of

Rome Conference,

states urging that

terrorism be designated a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court included
Algeria, India, Israel, Libya, Russia,

and Turkey. However, most delegations

were opposed. As one commentator has remarked, "An essential reason behind the resistance to the inclusion o( terrorism within the ICC's jurisdiction

55. See In re

56.

Id. at

Al-Fawwaz, supra note 48, at para. 121.

para. 93.
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The League of Arab States opposed
in the ICC Statute on the ground that

the fear of politicization of the ICC.

is

inclusion of international terrorism

international
as to

community has not been

be generally acceptable."

However,

able to define 'terrorism' in such a

the
the

way

57

seems that certain acts of terrorism might constitute a crime
against humanity, as defined in the Statute. On the face of it, the definition of

murder

in Article 7 of the

Rome

Statute would cover such acts as the destruc-

PanAm flight over Lockerbie,

tion of the

the

it

World Trade Center on September
For the purposes of

1.

following acts

Scotland, in 1988, and the attack on

11,

2001:

this Statute, 'crime against

when committed

as part of a

humanity' means any of the

widespread or systematic attack

directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
a)

murder;

.

.

.

For the purpose of paragraph

2.

a)

1:

/

'attack directed against any civilian population'

means

a course of

conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph

1

against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or

organizational policy to

commit such

attack. 58

In both cases there was a systematic 59 attack causing multiple deaths of civilians

an organizational policy by terrorist groups.
Whether such cases would be brought before the International Criminal
Court, and whether that Court would accept jurisdiction over them, remains
in furtherance of

to be seen.

It

may be

that, if current negotiations in the

United Nations suc-

ceed in producing a widely accepted and comprehensive convention on
rorism, a

new

ter-

category of crimes following the convention definition of

terrorism might be added to the

mechanism included

Rome

in that Statute.

The

Statute by

way of the amendment

existence of such a neutral forum for

the prosecution of terrorist offenses would have several advantages over

57.
58.

Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), 227.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9

See

(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (Jan. 13, 2003) [hereinafter

Rome

Statute].

While not defined in the Rome Statute, the term "systematic" is familiar to recent ad hoc
tribunals and was discussed in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sep. 2,
1998), which stated that: "systematic" may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources."
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 652 (May 7, 1997),
excerpted in 36 I.L.M. 908, § 6.4.
59.
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prosecution before the courts of the states most closely affected.

The most

im-

portant of these are the transparency and international character of the
Court's proceedings, and the credibility of

There
ICC, or

As

is

some

its

it

might in future

assert jurisdiction over

US personnel are more likely

US citizens.

UN

and other peace enforcement
than others to be exposed to the possi-

the almost always indispensable leader of

bility

and sentences.

force in the objections raised by the United States towards the

at least in so far as

operations,

findings

of maliciously inspired prosecutions for alleged war crimes.

The

principle

of complementarity, which gives primacy to the national courts of the alleged
offender, goes a long

sumes that

in

way towards meeting

that objection. This, of course, as-

such a case the United States would be willing at least to conduct

an investigation into the allegations. A negative finding would be accepted by
the Court as a bar to prosecution before it, unless the decision not to prosecute
in the national jurisdiction "resulted

from the unwillingness or the

the State concerned genuinely to prosecute."

inability of

60

Another protection built into the Rome Statute is that where a request is made
of a state for the surrender oi an accused person to the Court, the requested state
may not be required to "act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending state is required to surrender a person of that state to the Court, unless the Court can

first

obtain the coop-

eration of the sending state for the giving of consent to the surrender." 61

"sending state"

is

not defined, but

it is

The term

a term of art used not only to refer to the

state establishing a diplomatic or consular mission in another state ("the receiving
state")

but also the state which stations military personnel in another state under

arrangements of the nature of a status of visiting forces agreement. Thus
tary personnel stationed in Australia

US mili-

would not be surrendered by Australia

to the

Tribunal without the consent of the United States.

The United
resolution that

ICC

States introduced into the Security Council in June 2002 a draft

would have the

the personnel of

all

effect of excluding

missions, military

sanctioned by the United Nations.
60. See
61.

Rome

Id. at art.

62

and

This

is

from the jurisdiction of the

civilian,

engaged in operations

understandable.

A

Security

Statute, supra note 58, art. 17.

98(2).

U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/1422/(2002), which provides that consistent with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, "the
ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State
not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or
62. Editors note: This draft resolution resulted in S. C. Res. 1422,

authorized operations, shall for a twelve-month period starting

1

July

2002 not commence or

proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides
otherwise."
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Rome

Council resolution would, of course, "trump" the provisions of the
ute.

63

Less understandable

is

a draft

bill

Stat-

introduced into Congress, the Ameri-

can Servicemembers' Protection Act, which would authorize retaliatory
measures in the event that a US citizen were ever placed before the Court. 64
This

is

the kind of reaction that dismays America's

A

allies.

spirit

of

triumphalism, or American exceptionalism, serves to undermine the interna-

and

tional goodwill

spirit

of cooperation that alone can defeat the forces of

terrorism.

Conclusion

The

events of September 11th, 2001 have driven

home

cant issues impacting coalition operations continue to

the point that signifi-

exist.

These

issues, rang-

ing from the lack of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, to the

problems associated with jurisdiction and extradition of
that a truly effective response to terrorist acts

herent multilateral and multistate
in these areas to

effort.

terrorists, highlight

must be through an

Clearly there

is

much

effective, co-

still

to be

done

win the war on terrorism.

63. See Lockerbie Case, supra note 38.

64. Editor's note:

The American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, was
W. Bush on August 2, 2002. Section 7427 of the act

by President George
president to use
See

all

necessary

means

The American Servicemember's

signed into law
authorizes the

to free certain individuals from the jurisdiction of the

Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C.S. § 7427 (2002).
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Operations

Kenneth O'Rourke

I

well

remember the

Tommy

day, during

Operation

me

1

ENDURING FREEDOM,

that

and stated that intelligence indicated there were four vessels containing al Qaeda members departing Pakistani waters on their way to Northern Africa. His question was, what
are we authorized to do? My response was that we are within our rights to intercept them
with some quick coordination, maritime interception operations
(MIO) were born. I based my response primarily on Article 5 1 of the UN Charter and articulated that we had the right to intercept vessels containing terrorist leaders who represented an immediate threat to our country. Since this
initial intercept, I have heard many argue that maritime intercepts are nothing
more than piracy and interference with freedom of the high seas. Piracy it is
General

2

Franks called

into his office

—

not.

The

coalition

is

not interdicting every vessel on the high

seas,

nor stop-

ping every vessel at gunpoint. Interdiction measures are limited in nature and

1.

Commander Kenneth O'Rourke is a US Navy
for US Central Command.

judge advocate serving as the Deputy Staff

Judge Advocate
2.

General Franks

Command

is

the current

commander of

the

US

Central

geographic area of responsibility includes Afghanistan.

Command. The

Central

Panel

III

Commentary

—Maritime & Coalition Operations

designed to address a specific threat, including what

ultimately a threat even

is

to maritime safety.

There are

a

number

these operations.

many

Two

of legal authorities used by various nations to conduct

of the legal justifications for conducting

MIO

used by

of the coalition partners are the consent of the master and/or the con-

sent of the flag state to conduct a visit/search. In that regard, the United

has bilateral agreements with various countries permitting such

States

The

boardings.

belligerent right of visit

and search

is

yet another authority

some nations rely on. Of course, however, Article 5 1 of the UN Charter has
come to be accepted as the primary basis for undertaking such operations.
In this war on terror there is a nontraditional enemy. This war does not
have many of the characteristic associated with

enemy

that blends with civilians, a criminal

a traditional war.

enemy

There

in the case of al

is

an

Qaeda,

operating with an unrecognized sovereign, the Taliban. Neither of these ene-

mies operate within a recognized chain of command that conforms to the laws
of armed conflict, nor do they have traditional target sets such as military infrastructure

and armored vehicle formations

war. This "war"

is

tional combatants.

law of armed conflict.

is

a

new kind

of

and tradiwar fought applying international criminal law and the
Nontraditional measures may be required to respond to

unique in that

A

to engage. This

a blend of fighting criminals

it is

this threat.

For the time being, Article 5 1 provides the coalition with the necessary authority to engage in maritime interception operations against both the crimi-

nal and combatant elements of our enemy. This right to conduct operations in

may become attenuated over time, however,
legitimate state and al Qaeda goes into, no doubt

Afghanistan be-

"self-defense"

as

comes

temporary, hiding.

a

As time

passes, the question will

mediacy of the threat

exists

loom

larger

and

larger as to

and additional authority

is

whether the im-

needed. Perhaps the

authority to continue maritime interception operations against terrorist ele-

ments already

exists as a

matter of custom under international law. Will the

Article 51 justification fade and not provide adequate authority to continue

maritime intercept operations against

As we

all

know, Article 110 of the

Only time will tell.
Law of Sea Convention (LOS Con-

terrorists?

UN

vention) provides authority to exercise limited jurisdiction over foreign flag
vessels.

where

That

it is

is,

to undertake the right of

suspected that a vessel

is,

approach and

among other

298

visit in

things,

circumstances

engaged in piracy or

1

Kenneth O'Rourke

slave trade, or

when

the vessel

need more authority than

is

is

flagless. 3

provided by Article 51 of the Charter, similar to

that contained in Article 110 of the

from terrorism?

and needs
limits

-

I

Does the international community

LOS

Convention, to counter the threat

suggest that the additional authority already exists in custom

to be explicitly recognized. Application of Article 5

temporal limits and geographic

limits that are

1

has

its

natural

viewed by many to pre-

clude continuing maritime interception operations to thwart present and future terrorist threats.

It

may be

an internationally recognized crime that is
piracy and slavery and that additional authority is re-

recognize that "terrorism"
equally as abhorrent as

time for the international community to

is

quired to combat the threat.

Only the future holds the answer to a number of very important questions
related to the war on terrorism in a maritime environment. It remains to be
seen if the United States and coalition partners can continue to use Article 5
as the basis for maritime interception operations six months or a year from
now. Will it work over the entire globe or only close to Afghanistan? Will we
be able to approach vessels providing financial support to
planning a strike

six

terrorist

networks

months from now? Will these actions be acceptable under

an Article 5 1 self-defense concept or will new legal authority be required by
the international community? Have new legal authorities already been established in custom and practice treating vessels playing a part in terrorism like
vessels participating in slavery and piracy? Clearly, there are unknowns in the
future of the war on terrorism. The international community must address
these issues and provide the legal authorities necessary to continue to prosecute the war on terrorism in a maritime environment.

Convention on Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in
Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble, International Law Selected Documents

3.

See U.N.

(2001), at 553.
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Paul Cronan

W:

hile Australia

1

has not yet participated in maritime interception oper-

ations in support of the global

war on

terrorism, Australia has

been

involved in maritime interception operations in the Gulf of Arabia enforcing

UN

Security Council resolutions against Iraq for over ten years. Australia

strongly supports the Security Council sanctions enforcement regime

involvement in these operations

is

and

its

ongoing. Given our participation in such

maritime interception operations, Australia has been perfectly positioned to
closely observe the

conduct of maritime interception operations in support of

on terrorism. In my view, Australia would have few legal difficulties supporting these operations which have their legal basis in Article 5 1 of the
the global war

UN Charter. Ample legal authority exists for conducting such operations provided the essential elements of an Article 5
tainly preferable

to

have

a

1

operation are met. While

Wing Commander

Theatre.

Paul Cronan

cer-

United Nations Security Council Resolution

authorizing these interception operations, such authority

1.

it is

is

is

not necessary given

the Chief Legal Officer at Headquarters, Australian

Panel

III

Commentary

the existence of Article 5
this codification of the

1

—Maritime & Coalition Operations

and the customary international law

right preceding

inherent right of self-defense.

On the subject of significant coalition legal issues that confronted Australia
US-led military response

in the lead-up to deploying troops in support of the

to international terrorism, host nation basing arrangements was near the top

of the

list.

coalition,

Notwithstanding Australia's early agreement to support the US-led
it

took some time for Australia to put in place the necessary interna-

tional agreements to support the basing of Australian troops in the
East.

Most Middle East countries supported the United

States in

its

Middle

endeavors

to root out international terrorism from the region but negotiating basing

agreements takes time.
tial

What

quickly

became apparent was

that these poten-

host countries were fielding requests from a variety of nations to base peo-

ple, aircraft, ships, etc. in their territory.

Unlike Australia, the United States

and United Kingdom had pre-existing relationships with many of these countries and, accordingly had little difficulty activating existing or negotiating
new basing agreements. Australia had few pre-existing agreements with regional Middle East nations and it took time to negotiate relevant basing rights.
This directly impacted on the timing of the deployment of relevant Australian
Defence Force elements. The lesson for Australia then, and one it seems the
United States understands well, is that existing strategic relationships with
countries throughout Australia's sphere of interest

put such relationships in place only

From

when

is

preferable to trying to

the need arises.

a legal planning perspective, Australia

had

difficulties

deploying

its

where they could
best value-add to the operation. When the number of personnel deploying on
an operation are limited, it is often difficult identifying where and when legal
officers should be involved in the planning and operations process. In Australia's case, legal officers deploying on operations is a relatively recent phenomena. As the audience recognizes however, early identification and resolution
of key legal issues can save considerable time and frustration later on. Because
of this inability to position legal officers as desired and get them involved early
military legal officers

G u ^ge Advocates)

to those locations

in the coalition legal planning process, Australia tended to coordinate

its

rules

of engagement only with the United States (as opposed to the United King-

dom and Canada,
ment

process.

for

example) and only then very

Although these

ROE

seem

to be

late in the

working

ROE

fine for Australia

today, from a coalition legal planning perspective this approach

mended. Proper positioning of legal

officers early

lesson re-learned for Australia's military legal
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Neil

I

Brown

1

Qaeda and
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) is, with

he United Kingdom's participation in operations against
the Taliban (in support of

al

the exception of the contribution to the International Security and Assistance

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, pursuant to the right to self-defense codified in
Article 5

1

of the

ticipating in

UN Charter. In those operations, the United Kingdom

an extensive, US-led, multi-national coalition.

is

par-

No single set of co-

(ROE) exists for all states participating in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Each nation operates under its own national
ROE, for what are perfectly understandable reasons. After all, the ROE are
produced specifically for each mission, taking into account the threat, and it is
each nation's policy and its view of the relevant international law which will
define its national mission. Whereas for other coalition and combined operations, ROE are routinely shared, it seems more than likely, for reasons I will explain, that nations will, for the foreseeable future, keep a fairly close hold on the
alition

1.

rules

an judge advocate serving in the UK Royal Navy. During the
phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM he was assigned as a liaison officer to US

Commander

initial

of engagement

Central

Neil

Command.

Brown

is
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applying to their forces undertaking missions in what

often referred to

is

war on terrorism."
The history of the United Kingdom is one that speaks to our marked involvement in the Gulf of Arabia over a long period. After all, oil production in
as the "global

the Gulf region began in earnest to meet the need for

oil

to fuel the Royal

Navy's ships. In recent years, the United Kingdom has routinely deployed warships to the Gulf,

the Iran-Iraq

first

to

keep

War, and

oil

flowing through the Straits of Hormuz during

(apart from initial operations against Iraq following

the invasion of Kuwait) ever since then in support of

Resolution 665.

UN

Security Council

2

The Royal Navy's

been a tremendous operational strength, as has working with many of the same coalition members
while adjoined to the US Central Command. In the days following September
11th, this familiarity was also, I sense, something of a complication. It is perhaps inevitable that differences between missions not sharing the same legal
bases would not be immediately obvious, particularly when set against the political

ism.

familiarity with the region has

and media background presenting

The

fact that operations against al

under Article 51

war on terrorQaeda and the Taliban are conducted
a united front in the

as "collective self-defence" did

than the lawyers) to be significant

at the outset.

not appear to

many

(other

This only became an issue

UK ROE reflecting the precise scope of
the UK mission were compared to, for example, the US ROE reflecting the US
mission. The call to service lawyers that "there
an ROE issue," did not necessarily mean then that there
an ROE issue of the sort usually capable of res-

when

it

manifested in practice

when

is

is

commands, but represented instead a friction point
between different national policies and law. In the area of our coalition maritime operations this has been the background to much important and interolution between military

esting debate, especially in the area of terrorism.

The

UK approach to operations against al Qaeda and

the Taliban, both in

terms of law and policy, has permitted participation both in operations in Afghanistan and in simultaneous coalition maritime operations aiming to cap-

on the high seas, the latter as part of
of whose armed forces and other government agencies

ture, or deprive sea mobility, to terrorists

a coalition of states

all

have collaborated to ensure that the important

2. S.

C. Res. 665, U.N.

SCOR, 45th

Sess.,

issues

U.N. Doc S/665/(1990)

have been coordinated
calls

on

all

member

states to

"halt inward and outward maritime shipping to inspect their cargos and to ensure strict

implementation with the provisions" contained in
Res. 661,

U.N. SCOR, 45th

Sess.,

UN

Security Council Resolution 661. S. C.

U.N. Doc S/66 1/(1 990)

to cease all trade with Iraq.
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calls

upon member

states essentially

Neil

Brown

and addressed. That is not the same as saying that maritime operations are
conducted as part of a global war against terrorism.
Terrorism is not a new phenomena to the United Kingdom, indeed it has
been a part of our everyday
ally

been dealt with
is

and

of September 11th set

an armed attack
states

on

this

enforcement issue

as a law

many

with military support to

(albeit

Europe to be essentially a crimaccepted of course that the scale and character of the events

civilian authorities)
inal problem. It

decades. Terrorism has tradition-

lives for several

is

thought by

them

for the

in

apart and are properly assessed as amounting to

purposes of Article 5 1 of the

UN Charter, permitting

occasion to respond in self-defense with military force. In the

context of this operation, the law of armed conflict clearly overlaps with international and domestic criminal law and

worked hard

to understand

and

it is

we have

deconflict.

Defining terrorism as a universal crime

As

the effect of this which

is

a laudable goal but problematic.

Professor Shearer properly points out, "terrorism"

when defined

is

immedi-

ately susceptible to politicization. This has probably stifled attempts to agree

now. By way of example, I recently heard a Russian flag
officer, on extending his condolences and sympathy to the people of the
United States for September 11th, make clear that in his view the situation in
to a definition before

Afghanistan was identical to that faced by Russia in Chechnya. Without

on the

fall-

and all too easy phrase about "one man's terrorist being
another man's freedom fighter," this is a relevant example of the difficulty
which will be faced in developing an internationally acceptable definition that
ing back

will

trite

not be susceptible to political abuse.

Notwithstanding that offensive

UK operations in Afghanistan may be con-

ducted under Article 5 1 of the Charter, acting in collective self-defense with

way

which al Qaeda
and the Taliban are inextricably linked) operations are conducted under the
law of armed conflict, it has not appeared clear to me that the same could necessarily be said for the simultaneous maritime operations. There is no al Qaeda
Navy, nor is there an Afghan Navy. The terrorists, if they are at sea, may be on
the high seas or in the territorial seas of a third state, and if their vessels are
flagged at all will be in vessels which are also of a third state. The prospect of
the United States, and that in Afghanistan (given the

in

exercising belligerent rights in the current circumstances seems to
fore to be implausible.

And so it is my view that we have

erations under Article 5

1

may not

a situation

me

there-

where op-

avail themselves of the full range of rights

The effect
of this would be to say, for example, that although maritime units may use
force such as is necessary and proportional, they may be required to do so
usually available to belligerents in

an international armed
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within the peacetime rules and conventions which apply at sea, a case in point

being the United Kingdom's

fairly

As an example,

state consent.

conservative view of the doctrine of flag

the Royal

Navy

recently boarded a merchant

Channel on the basis of intelligence that the vessel was
who were armed with some sort of weapon which presented

vessel in the English

carrying terrorists

an imminent chemical or biological threat. 3 Recognizing that the boarding
could have occurred under an Article 5 1 basis of self-defense, the United
Kingdom nonetheless, and perhaps somewhat conservatively, requested and
received the consent of the flag state to board and search the vessel. While
Professor von Heinegg's concern that this approach might undermine the
continuing right to stop and search a vessel pursuant to Article 5 1 is noted, I
believe that the United Kingdom is simply not prepared to invoke the right of
self-defense for such boardings without seeking flag state approval unless that
is necessary and proportional in the operational circumstances, for example in
circumstances where a flag state would be unwilling or unable to give it and
the request would compromise the mission.
As noted earlier, the question arises as to how long coalition members can
in good faith continue to rely upon Article 5 1 as the legal basis for their use of

From

force.

a maritime perspective, existing peacetime law permitting war-

on the high seas is quite limited indeed. ArtiConvention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)

ships to board third party vessels
cle

110 of the

UN

provides only limited permission to board

when such

acts as suspected piracy,

and unauthorized broadcasting are taking place or the vessel is
state-less. 4 This is somewhat unsatisfactory, and one wonders whether, had
the LOS Convention been negotiated in 1992, Article 110 might have included powers to interdict drug traffickers, and whether in 2002 it might have
been extended to include terrorism. Professor von Heinegg touched on this
very important area of third party consent when he talked about it in terms of
slave trading,

3.

Unknown Author, Anti-Terror Teams

Intercept Ship, IRISH

LexisNexis Major World Newspaper (Oct.

1,

TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, available

at

2002).

U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), art. 110,
in BARRY CARTER AND PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED
DOCUMENTS (2001), at 553. Article 110 provides in relevant part that "[ejxcept where acts of
interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas

4. See

reprinted

complete immunity in accordance with

a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to
is

not

justified in

(a)

the ship

boarding

is

engaged

it

unless there

is

in piracy; (b) the ship

is

engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the
under

article 109; (d) the ship

or refusing to

show its flag, the

is

engaged in the slave trade;
flag State

without nationality; or

ship

is,

articles and,

reasonable ground for suspecting that:

in reality, of the
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(c)

the ship

is

of the warship has jurisdiction
(e)

same

though

flying a foreign flag

nationality as the warship."

Neil

Brown

which belligerents might exercise. To extend this right,
to belligerents where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a

tolerating the control

available

neutral vessel

is

subject to capture, to

cordance with Charter rights
its

subsequent resolutions),

is

member

(as verified

one

by the

states of the

UN

acting in ac-

UN Security Council in all of

thing. Indeed,

it is

not unreasonable to ex-

when
To take

pect and even require that third parties permit us to board their vessels
there

is

intelligence that Taliban or al

Qaeda members

are

on board.

example that there is a general right of visit and
search of third party vessels without such intelligence, is quite another.
that further,

and suggest

for
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Jean^Guy Perron

1

Canada has contributed a significant number of personnel and assets to
the global war

on

terrorism.

Over the

last several years,

Canadian war-

have conducted maritime interdiction missions to interdict shipping in
breach of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. However, such resoluships

tions

do not apply

ployed

it

in

Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Canada

de-

ships to conduct maritime interdiction operations for this operation

pursuant to the right of collective and individual self-defense contained in Article 5 1

of the

UN Charter.

Canada is considered
Qaeda.and such conflict

to be in
is

armed

conflict with the Taliban

and

al

not limited geographically to the territory of Af-

ghanistan but extends to the international waters of the high seas. Canadian

maritime operations searching for those
or

who

1

Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Guy Perron

.

are themselves such, were

is

termed

as the legal advisor to the

support the Taliban or

"visit

al

Qaeda,

and search" operations. These

Advocate General for the
Tampa, Florida in November

currently the Assistant Judge

National Capital Region (Ottawa) in Canada.

2001

who

He was

deployed to

Commander, Canadian Joint Task Force South West

Asia.

.
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and search operations were conducted pursuant to the principles
found in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Convisit

flicts

at Sea. 2

1

Canadian warships could also intercept other vessels pursuant to Article
10 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The point here

is

that while there are differing legal bases for conducting boarding operations,

}

the facts surrounding each such boarding must be carefully studied so as to ensure a legitimate basis for boarding exists in international law.

Recognizing that each state in a coalition

is

truly the master of

its

own

must be spent to harmonize ROE throughout the coalition
by sharing and deconflicting competing ROE and understanding the limitations and constraints each coalition member has on its missions. Still, harmonizing ROE in a coalition, although sometimes problematic, must remain a
priority. Each state will have a different interpretation of the application of international law. Operational factors relating to coalition member forces must
be considered and domestic and international policy considerations must be
adhered to. Two weapons systems provide good examples of the challenges in-

ROE, much

effort

herent in structuring

and

on

riot

ROE for coalition operations:

control agents.

Many states have

anti-personnel landmines

different rules

and

restrictions

make

policy reasons, domestic law, or international law that

based

the use of

these systems sometimes quite difficult to synthesize. However, working

through

this process

is

important for commanders as

the constraints and limitations

on assigning certain

it

helps

them understand

tasks to certain coalitions

units.

On a different matter, Canada too had difficulties getting its forces into the
theater of operations for Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM.

This demonstrated

the need for improving strategic partnerships with other states throughout the

world to improve
Finally,

it

is

this situation.

interesting to note the efforts that

Canada has undertaken

September 11th unfolded. In the area of anti-terror and
domestic legislation, the Canadian government passed federal legislation

since the events of

2.

See generally,

SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED

CONFLICTS AT SEA
Vessels [hereinafter
3.

(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995), Section

II

Visit

and Search of Neutral

SAN REMO MANUAL].

UN Convention on Law of the Sea, UN

Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982),

art.

110, reprinted in

Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble, International Law Selected documents,
(2001) at 553.
4.

See Anti-Terrorism Act, R.S.C.,

C-36 (Dec.

18,

2001); see

also,

Unknown Author,

Highlights

of Anti-Terrorism Act, available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27787.html

(Oct.

1,

2002) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Act]
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and convict terrorist groups. 4 This
Anti-Terrorism Act permits Canada to ratify the two remaining counter terrorism conventions it has signed but has yet to ratify. 5 Finally, the Canadian
Legislature has amended the Official Secrets Act 6 to address national security
permitting

it

to better identify, prosecute,

concerns pertaining to

terrorist related activities as well as the

dence Act to provide a new process
7

for dealing

5.

1

These two conventions

Evi-

with the disclosure of sensi-

tive information in judicial proceedings. Clearly,

events of September

Canada

Canada's response to the

1th have been quite measured and serious.

are:

The

International Convention for the Suppression of the

GAOR 6th Comm.,

54 Sess., 76th mtg., Agenda
Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (1999) and International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorism Bombings, G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess, U.N. Doc. A/52/164 (1998).
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N.

6.

See Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 4.

7.

Id.
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On the Abduction or Extradition of Terrorists
Ivan Shearer
Countries throughout the

common

law world draw a distinction between ob-

taining jurisdiction over individuals through

sion which violates international law

some type of government

and obtaining

collu-

jurisdiction through

happenstance over an individual. In the former case, such jurisdiction over a
person constitutes an abuse of process for the court to continue
case should be dismissed and the individual discharged.

obtained through happenstance, however,

trial

stands in marked contrast to that taken by the
States

ter

1.

v.

may

how jurisdiction

over the body of the defendant

it
is

and the

When jurisdiction

is

proceed. This approach

US Supreme

AlvareZ'Machain where the Court held that

trial

Court in United

effectively does not

obtained.

mat-

1

Editor's Note: After being indicted in the United States for the kidnapping

and murder of a

DEA agent, Humberto Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped by the Mexican police and flown to the
United States to be turned over to DEA agents. Defendant contested the jurisdiction of the
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the district
court. Upon government appeal to the Supreme Court, that Court reversed and remanded the
holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a criminal defendant, abducted to the
United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty does not acquire a defense to
federal district court

the jurisdiction of

US

courts simply by virtue of the abduction itself

when

the treaty does not

exclude that a party might resort to self-help for achieving the presence of an individual. 504
U.S. 655 (1992) at 662 thereinafter Machain].
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Wolff von Heinegg
I do not agree that the practice of irregular rendition has a proper place in international law. The violation of a nation's sovereignty by resort to self-help is unconscionable. Using armed force to conduct such an irregular rendition is
clearly a violation of international law.

Kenneth O'Rourke
United States courts have, on occasion, suggested that a defendant may
not be prosecuted if his presence is obtained in violation of specific terms of an
extradition treaty prohibiting abduction. 2
treaty

is

Where, however, an extradition

not violated and a defendant's presence

abduction, (commonly

known

ercised.

The

obtained through forcible

as irregular rendition) the

has consistently recognized that jurisdiction
3

is

propriety of irregular rendition

US Supreme

may nonetheless be
less clear,

is

Court

properly ex-

however, within the

international community, prompting the United States, as a matter of policy

not to resort to
ues to have

As

its

its

use.

Having

said that,

place, particularly in the

for international law,

prohibited and not a proper

I

I

believe irregular rendition contin-

war on

do not agree that

terrorism.

irregular rendition

mechanism for addressing

the proposition that Article 51 of the

UN

is

absolutely

terrorism. For example,

Charter would not permit the

United States to enter a country to conduct a rendition, or renditions,
matter of national self-defense

is

illogical. Certainly, if

as a

the United States could

have snatched Osama bin Laden to remove the threat to its peace and security, instead of engaging in a full blown attack on al Qaeda and the Taliban, it
would have done so and it would have been, if not more favorable as a means
of self-defense, at least a

means authorized under Article 51. It
state can resort to a full blown armed con-

less aggressive

seems incongruous to suggest that a
flict, invade another state as a matter of self-defense, but could not use a

lesser

means of force, such as an irregular rendition, to remove the threat. Clearly,
renditions to remedy criminal activity not amounting to a threat to the peace
and security of a state raise issues of sovereignty that many believe are not supported by international law. However, renditions to remedy threats to the
peace and security of an aggrieved state under Article 5 1 of the UN Charter
would be much preferable to full blown military action. Unfortunately, in the
case of addressing the terrorist network operating out of Afghanistan, the

United States was unable

2. See, e.g.,

United States

3. See, e.g.,

Ker

v. Illinois,

v.

to take this less severe course of action (snatch

Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1986).

119 U.S. 436 (1886); see

314

also

Machain, supra note

1,

at 669.
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and, as a result, needed to resort to armed hostilities

Laden and the Taliban who provided material support

to al

Qaeda.

Christopher Greenwood

Were

the

US government

to be asked

whether

it

were lawful

for the British

government to abduct Irish Republican Army suspects from America, the answer would be no. If this is true, then it must be equally true that it is not lawful
for the United States to abduct offenders who are otherwise not extraditable to
bring

them

to the

state to exercise

United States.
jurisdiction

its

It is

a clear violation of international law for a

on the

mestic law supports the subsequent

territory o( another.

trial

of such a person

from the question of whether jurisdiction
territory of another state.

in the case of someone

The

is

exists to seize that

fact that do-

entirely separate

person from the

There may perhaps be a self-defense exception to

such as bin Laden, but

this

is

this

very much the exception.

The normal remedy it seems for such an irregular rendition would be
turn of the person concerned as restoration of the status quo

is

the re-

the normal

remedy required by law. History provides an example of this type of remedy
where a group of British jailers from Gibraltar who were pursuing a suspect
managed to arrest him on the wrong side of the border with Spain. The suspect was ultimately returned to Spain to rectify the violation of Spanish sovereignty. 4

John Murphy
In United States

v.

Alvarez-Mocham, the issue before the Supreme Court was the

between the United States and Mexico. 5 The majority conclusion in this case was that given that the defendant's abduction was
not in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, the rule of Ker v. Illinois did not prohibit the trial of Machain in a US court

bilateral extradition treaty

for violations of the criminal laws of the

though, that

if

the majority had

come

United

It is

worth noting

to the conclusion that the extradition

treaty barred this abduction, then the defendant

returned to Mexico.

States. 6

The Machain Court

would have been released and

also parenthetically addressed the

sue of customary international law, noting that such an abduction

have been a violation of customary international law

4.

See In re Patrick Lawler in

5.

Machain, supra note

6.

Id.

at

669-70;

citing

1

at

Ker

1

Lord McNair International

669-70.

v. Illinois,

1

19 U.S. 436 (1886).
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may

is-

well

as a violation of the

Law Opinions

(1956) at 77-78.
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sovereignty of Mexico but that such a violation must properly be considered by

the executive branch and not the judicial branch. 7

Two final points
quent history of

of interest merit mention about this case.

this case tells us that the

for

Machain
damages.

Yoram
There

the subse-

government's case was ultimately

summary judgment. 8 Secondly,

dismissed pursuant to Machain's motion for
Dr.

First,

currently has civil litigation pending against the United States

9

Dinstein

is

a risk of confusing

two completely unrelated

One is whether or

issues.

not an act of abduction from abroad constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of
a foreign state. Undoubtedly, that

is

the case,

without the consent of the local government.

if

the abduction

A separate

issue

is

is

carried out

whether the

which acquired custody over an individual through such abduction (in
breach of the sovereignty of another state and therefore in breach of internastate

tional law)

swer

is

may

nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over the abductee.

The

an-

clear: jurisdiction exists.

On the one hand,

since the act of abduction

is

in violation of international

law, the abducting state incurs responsibility vis-a-vis the other state

sovereignty has been encroached upon.

On

whose

the other hand, the jurisdiction

of the abducting state vis-a-vis the person in the dock

is

not affected by the

The paradigmatic case is that of Adolph Eichmann. 10 As is
well known, Eichmann was abducted from Argentina, brought to Israel,
tried there, convicted, and executed. The matter was brought by Argentina
inter-state clash.

before the Security Council. 11 Interestingly enough, the Security Council,

7.

Id.

at

669-70.

1, at 669-70, rev'd and remanded to United States v. AlvarezMachain, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 1992), amended and remanded by sub nom. United
States v. Zuno-Acre, 44 F. 3d (9th Cir. Cal. 1995), post conviction relief denied in part, dismissed in

8.

See Machain, supra note

Supp 2d 1087 (CD.

Cal. 1988), affd by 209 F.

3d 1095 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000).
96 F.3d 1 246 (9th Cir. Cal. 1996) amended by 107 F.3d
696 (9th Cir. Cal. 1997), cert denied sub nom. Berellez v. Alvarez-Machain, 522 U.S. 814 (1997)
remanded by Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001).

part 25 F.
9.

See Alvarez-Machain

v.

United

States,

Adolph Eichmann, one of the key architects of the Holocaust, fled to Argentina after World
War II. Abducted by Israeli Mossad agents in 1960 (after a prolonged worldwide search), he was
put on trial for genocide and related crimes. See generally]. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT.
10.

Y.B. INT'L L. 181 (1962); L.C. Green, The Eichmann Case, 23

MODERN

REV. 507 (1960);
Breach of International Law,
L.

F.

in
Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABATI ROSENNE
407-422, 414 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).

11. See S. C. Res. 138,

U.N. SCOR, 15th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/138/(1960).
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demand
many re-

while acknowledging the breach of Argentinian sovereignty, did not

Eichmann

that Israel return

Eichmann's case

to Argentina.

is

in

US Supreme

Court on the underlying issue
was consolidated already in the 19th century in Ker v. Illinois. 12 The Court
held that personal jurisdiction is not affected by the improper manner in
spects unique. But the view of the

which a defendant

is

brought before a court.

Christopher Greenwood

Eichmann

is

far

from a paradigmatic case on the abduction of individuals from

the territory of another state.

no real counterpart

to

it

First,

is

was decided under an almost

that of the territorial sovereignty of the state where the abduc-

state of the international

Human

is

Today, the idea that the only violation in the

There

tion occurs, simply does not ring true.

the

an egregious case and there

is

today. Secondly, the case

entirely different world order.

posited case

Eichmann

Committee

Rights

This international

human

is

also a violation by the abducting

rights of the

abducted individual. 13 Indeed,

illustrated clearly this to

human right against abduction,

is

be the case in 198 1. 14

contained in another form

and detention contained in Article
Nine of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the
in the prohibition against arbitrary arrest

United States

is

a party. 15

International law today would not permit a state to exercise jurisdiction

over someone

two reasons. In a case like Machain, where
unlike Eichmann, the state from whose territory the man was abducted protested throughout, the normal principles of state responsibility require the abillegally seized for

ducting state to

12. See

Ker

make good

v. Illinois,

its

violation of the other state's sovereignty by

119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). Accord Frisbie

(1952) (no Constitutional prohibition

on

finding of guilt

when

v. Collins,

342 U.S. 519, 523

criminal defendant

is

forcibly

abducted)
13.

See Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand:

Should be Permitted, 31

Morgenstern, Jurisdiction
L. 265,

14-

See

270(1952).
Views of the

COLUM.

J.

L.

&

When State Sponsored Abduction of War Criminals

SOC. PROBS.

in Seizures Effected in Violation

Human

Rights

(1997)

12-14. See also Felice

of International

Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L

1

Committee on the Complaint of Lopez, 36 U.N.

Supp. No. 40, at 176-84, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981); See also
Seizures

25,

and

M. Cherif

Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7

59 (1979)

(forcible

abduction said to violate

human

GAOR,

Bassiouni, Unlawful

VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L

right to liberty

L.

and freedom from

arbitrary detention).
15.

See International

Covenant on

Civil

1992, 991 U.N.T.S. 171, 31 I.L.M. 645

and Political Rights, ratified by the United States in
(May 1992). Note that the United States does not

consider Articles 1-27 of the covenant as self-executing. See 138
1992).
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restoring the status quo. Secondly, under the international law in existence

today, the abducted individual possesses rights under

which,

if

The
ize

taken seriously, operate to ensure that he

events in Eichmann, are so peculiar to their

from them

is

a great mistake.

and happens to turn on

is

US

rights treaties

not abducted.

own

The Machain Court

a point of

human

facts that to general-

simply created bad law

law only. This case was argued and de-

veloped by the defense on the interpretation of a bilateral extradition treaty

and not on the proper grounds of violations of customary international law.
Accordingly, if someone is abducted from the United States by any other
country, and put on trial in that other country the United States would demand his return. No remedy less than this under international law would be
proper.

Yoram
I

Dinstein

disagree.

I

believe that

very dangerous to apply to extradition law

it is

essentially governs the relations

law.

As

far as

the individual

is

between

states

human right

of

human

rights

concerned, assuming that the state has jurisdic-

tion over him, he should appear before the court

has no

—concepts

—which

to be a fugitive from justice.

do so. He
If bounty hunters were to cap-

when summoned

to

would scarcely be challenged. Why
should the position be different if the abduction was carried out by state agents?
Evidently, all this is not relevant to the grievance to the state whose sovereignty
ture

and return him, the

legality of the act

has been disregarded by the abducting agents.

duction
let

may have

to

compensate or otherwise

The

state carrying out the ab-

satisfy the

aggrieved state. But

us not confuse the state with the individual.

Robert Turner
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Machain case, quite simply was in error and it was proper for the Supreme Court to correct this error in the law and
bring the decision into line with Ker v. Illinois. 16 The issue here is not whether
the state has remedies or not but instead, whether the defendant should be able

US courts of jurisdiction simply because of his abduction from
another state. One reason this line of reasoning remains important today is that
to deprive the

in the global
assist

war on terrorism, there are sometimes

the United States with intelligence

borders and

may be

may be

willing to

individuals operating within their

willing to surreptitiously permit a "cover abduction."

avoid angering other

16. See

on

states that

terrorists,

Machain, supra note

1,

at

946

such states must retain their

F.

2d 1466 (1991).
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publicly such alleged violations of their sovereignty. This

is

not to

say,

however,

that such individuals should go free. Accordingly, international law continues
to recognize that states

may engage

in the practice of irregular rendition.

Ivan Shearer

Our

on irregular rendition would not be complete without a reference to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v.
Toscanino. 11 In this 1974 case, the Second Circuit stated that if the abduction
was accompanied by more than just an abduction, in other words some violation of due process such as torture or other human rights violation, then the
Second Circuit would refuse to grant jurisdiction over the abducted person. 18
Accordingly, whether the jurisdiction would stand in the event of some additional harm to the abducted individual, other than the abduction itself, in US
courts is somewhat subject to debate.
case study

On
Neil

the Application of the

Law

of

Armed

Conflict

Brown

engagement (ROE) are a
combination of mission and threat. Clearly, the mission is defined by policy and
law. Threat is based on intelligence indicators and often the state of the world
order. Currently, the only mission in support of the global war on terror being
conducted by the United Kingdom that does not explicitly rely upon Article 5

Typically, the

of the

armed

forces are taught that rules oi

UN Charter as its basis for action

is

that of the

UK troops participating in

support of the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan

pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1386. 19

Oi

course, notwithstanding

any policy constraints imposed on our forces by ROE, they always possess the
right to self-defense.

Paul Cronan

From an Australian
basis for our

involvement in

17.

See United States v. Toscanino,

18.

Id.

19.

See S. C. Res. 1386, U.N.

we

on Article 5 1 as the legal
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The question

perspective,

are also relying

500 F.2d 267, 275 (1972).

SCOR, 56th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001). This resolution

provides for the establishment of the "International Security Assistance Force to assist the

Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so
that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in
a secure environment."
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must be asked though, is at what point does the authorization to use force
self-defense under Article 5 1 begin to wane? In other words, what happens if

that
in

our respective countries are not attacked or threatened with attack by
for the

terrorists

When does the inherent right to continue to use
How long, for example, can maritime enforcement

next several years?

force in self-defense end?

operations based on self-defense continue to be legitimately argued? This
difficult

question and while there exists today a continuing threat,

able that this threat will ultimately wane.

What

then

will

it is

is

a

conceiv-

be the basis for these

operations?

Jean^Guy Perron
Canadian participation

in

Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM

collective self-defense provisions contained in Article 5

1

is

also

of the

based on the

UN

Charter

and in customary international law. Clearly, our forces' operations are bounded
and constrained by the law of armed conflict and so our commanders and forces
must understand how these laws affect their ability to accomplish the given
mission.

Terrorism as a Criminal or International

Law

Problem

Charles Garraway

Up

until the last

few years, the international community recognized terrorism

as a matter of criminal law to be dealt with by

not to say that there were not
acts but rather that these acts

each

efforts to prohibit

state independently. This

broad categories of

once prohibited were

typically enforced

the courts of the states affected by them. During the
nitely since the events of September

1

last

terrorist

through

few years, and

1th, the international

is

defi-

view on terrorism

has changed from that of a criminal law matter to that of a law of armed conflict
matter. In

many

respects,

we

are

now

operating in a

for the legal application of deadly force against

capture and subsequent

trial.

Perhaps as

new paradigm which

such

terrorists

Commander Brown

and not

calls

their

indicated in his

comments, it would be wise to develop an interagency approach to this matter
and revise the existing criminal law tools to increase the powers available to address the difficult problem of global terrorism.
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Michael Newton

On

March

4,

Thomas Jefferson,

1801,

1

the newly inaugurated President

of the United States, took charge of a nation torn between the possi-

bilities

new century and the uncertainty caused by the changing face of
America was a new republic very much aware of its vulnerability, yet

of the

warfare.

facing the future with faith built

on dedication

to the dual pillars of peace

through justice and peace through strength. As President Jefferson rose to de2

liver his inaugural address,

America faced

a

new century

filled

with

new dan-

and unfolding challenges that threatened to erode the very foundations of
our liberty and collective peace. His inaugural message was rooted in our demogers

cratic values, yet articulated

tion of purpose

1.

and principle

Lieutenant Colonel

West

Point.

He may

Newton

is

an American vision to propel us forward

as a na-

in the international arena.
at the US Military Academy at
The opinions and conclusions of
author. They do not necessarily reflect

an Assistant Professor of Law

be reached at michael.newton@usma.edu.

this paper, as well as its flaws, are solely attributable to the

the views of the Judge Advocate General, the United States Military Academy, the United States
Army, the United States Department of State, or any other federal entity.

Robert

Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in Countering LowIntensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW2.

F.

INTENSITY CONFLICT, 44 (Alberto R.
International

Law

Studies).

Coll, et

al. eds.,

1995), (Vol. 67,

US

Naval

War College

International Criminal

Law Aspects

of the

War Against Terrorism

Summarizing the themes that would guide America through the uncertainties of a new era, President Jefferson began his speech by asserting the foundational principle of seeking "[e]qual and exact justice to all men, of whatever
state or persuasion, religious or political." 3 President Jefferson portrayed a

composed of nonnegotiable values that would combine
to form the "creed of our political faith" and serve as the touchstone for the future. 4 He pointedly told the nation that "should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the
road which alone leads us to peace, liberty, and safety." After over two hundred years, these remain in many ways the core objectives for which we strive,
albeit in a much more complicated and changed world.
The shock of the events of September 1 1 was a visceral kick to the consciousness of the world. Similar to the September 1972 kidnapping and mur"bright constellation"

5

der of nine

Munich Olympics, 6

the

Israeli athletes participating in

these

terrorist attacks

were one of those rare galvanizing events that resonated

across our globe.

The

America affected every

attacks directed against

Though

age group, religion, and corner of civilization.

phenomenon, the September

1 1

not a

new

rallying the support of the

campaign against the terrorist aggressors and exthe strategic campaign against terrorism, President Bush

for the

plaining his vision for

3.

is

attacks killed citizens of over 80 nations and

stunned the world by their scope and savagery. In

American people

terrorism

culture,

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
SPIRIT OF AMERICA 347 (1997).

WILLIAM J. BENNETT,

1801, reprinted in

THE
4.

Id.

Among

the other principles that Mr. Jefferson promulgated were,

peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with

none; the support of state governments in

all

all

nations, entangling alliances with

their rights, as the

most competent

administration for our domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks against anti-

republican tendencies:
constitutional vigour

abroad
reason:

.

.

.

— the preservation of the general government

(sic),

as the sheet

anchor of our peace

at

whole
safety

in

the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public

— freedom of

religion;

freedom of the

protection of the habeas corpus:

— and

trial

press;

and freedom of person, under the

by juries impartially selected.

5.

Id.

6.

This 1972 attack was in fact the catalyst for the creation of modern

policy structures. Vincent Cannistraro

ALEXANDER MUNSCH,

CONTROL 3,

its

home, and

16

and David C.

Bresett,

The

US

counter-terrorism

Terrorist Threat In America, in

TERRORISM/DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL

26(1998).
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returned perhaps unconsciously to the themes articulated by President Jeffer-

son over two centuries before. 7

On

September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a Joint Session of Conand perhaps the terrorist network was listening.
gress, aware that the world
The President declared, "we are a country awakened to danger and called to

—

defend freedom.

Whether we
tice will

Our

—

grief has

turned to anger, and anger to resolution.

bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, jus-

be done." 8 President Bush's declaration of this clear national goal was

met by the thunderous applause of the assembled Congress and audience
(which also included British Prime Minister Tony

Blair)

.

His words stirred

citi-

America to strengthen a communal resolve and rededicate a mutual commitment to the goal of justice. President Bush further declared that
the campaign against international terrorism 9 is more than just a fight to secure
zens across

7.

In another interesting and perhaps ironic parallel, President Jefferson was selected as the third

chief executive in the
elections in

US

wake of one of the most

history. Article

House of Representatives shall
the same number of electoral

II,

section

1,

contested and divisive presidential

bitterly

select the President by ballot

votes.

US

clause 3 of the

The House

if

Constitution specifies that the

more than one candidate amasses

of Representatives did not select President

TAYLOR, A UNIVERSAL
history of the united states of america embracing the whole period from the
Earliest Discoveries to the present Time 250 (1836).
and

Jefferson until after a lengthy debate

8.

President George

available

at

W.

thirty-five ballots. C.B.

Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 30, 2001;

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

2003). Secretary of State Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his

first

public

30,

(Jan.

comments made

from Lima, Peru:

A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, but
will deal

with

this tragedy in a

way
is

nation, a nation that believes in

itself.

See 18

U.S.C

.

.

that brings those responsible to justice.

sure that as terrible a day as this

BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR
9.

you can be sure that America
You can be
get through it because we are a strong
.

for us,

we

will

10 (2002).

§ 2331, providing that for the purposes of the federal criminal law, the

"international terrorism"

means

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to

human

life

that are a violation of the

criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation

committed within the

jurisdiction of the

(B) appear to be intended

if

United States or of any State;

-

(i.)

to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii.)

to influence the policy of a

(iii.)to affect

term

activities that

government by intimidation or coercion; or

the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territory jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend

national boundaries in terms of the

means by which they

are accomplished, the persons

they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators

operate or seek asylum.
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.

International Criminal

Law Aspects

of the

American freedoms because it is "civilization's
waged on behalf of all the people who "believe
ance and freedom." 10

War Against

Terrorism

fight" in the sense that
in progress

and

it

will

be

pluralism, toler-

Bush Administration has reshaped the machinery of government around the changed security environSeeking to achieve the goal of

justice, the

ment. For example, the National Security Strategy of the United States
focuses

on

attaining the goal of justice:

[i]n pursuit of

our goals, our

first

imperative

is

to clarify

what we stand

for:

the

United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right
and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no
nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their
children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence.

No

people

on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight
knock of the secret police. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the
state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women;
religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. n

Though
goals has

the concept of seeking "justice" to achieve core national security

been

a thread of

American

political dialogue

from the early days of

our Republic, the concrete form of that pursuit in practice retains an elusive,
often ephemeral, character. "Justice" as a

component of US

valued but vague objective. In the post-September

1 1

foreign policy

is

a

security environment,

no doubt that the inherent and sovereign right of self-defense permits
the United States to mete out "justice" using its military power. 12 However,
the holistic pursuit of justice embodies a parallel dimension of personal penal
there

is

responsibility. Pursuing personal criminal accountability against international

dynamic because of the
persistence of state sponsorship ranging from philosophical sympathy to active
operational support in the form of funding and official sanction for planning
and training within the territorial bounds of the state.
terrorists necessarily entails a

The

complicated

political

threats to national security presently posed by international terrorism

require a balance between personal

punishment of criminal perpetrators and

10.

Joint Session, supra note 8.

1 1

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 3

2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (Dec.
12.

See Jack

International

M.

Beard, America's

Law, 25 HARV.

J.

L. &.

New War

1,

(September

2002).

on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under

PUB. POL'Y 559 (2002).
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the use of military power to eliminate the threats posed by terrorists. International terrorism remains a national security

problem because

it

is

a

unique

form of transnational crime in which private actors seek to unravel the fabric
of civilized society and thereby undermine state, regional, and global security.

The

simple term "international terrorism" belies the reality that the deep-

seated ideological motives of participants in terrorist acts combine with political reality

and the interplay of seemingly insoluble root causes

haps the most

of

difficult

all

to

make

it

per-

the problems facing international society.

President Bush's vision reshaped the paradigm for punishing terrorists from an

on

mechanisms to address criminal conduct into a
war-fighting model. In that sense the war on terrorism is much more than a
politically convenient phrase. It is a new paradigm which requires an interface between effective judicial mechanisms capable of prosecuting those
perpetrators who are not eliminated or emasculated by the application of
exclusive reliance

judicial

military power.

This essay will argue that international crimes of terrorism should be handled domestically by individual states using existing criminal law mechanisms.

Rather than blindly heeding the
ization, the states of the

siren's

song of international institutional-

world should rededicate themselves to decisively ad-

dressing terrorist crimes using their sovereign forums.

unity arising from the ashes of the

nations of the world

now have

Bound by

World Trade Center and

a sense of

the Pentagon, the

a propitious opportunity to reconsider the ap-

propriate forums for addressing international crimes of terrorism. Calls for an

international criminal process to address terrorism assume the existence of

the discrete discipline termed international criminal law which in turn implies
a

normative superiority of internationalized mechanisms over domestic

fo-

rums. However, the existence of transnational terrorism and the cooperation
of nationals from a variety of nations in the planning and execution of terrorist

attacks does not

mean

that those crimes are properly punished in a supra-

national penal forum.

This essay superimposes the established framework for addressing terrorist
crimes against the arguments in favor of a newly created supranational judicial

forum; because the problem of transnational terrorism does not raise any

of the problems that have been previously addressed by the establishment of

an internationalized process, such a supranational forum is unnecessary and
could actually undermine the pursuit of justice. The current legal framework
is

a collage akin to a

patchwork

quilt of existing

norms and conventions that

seeks to prevent and punish specifically identified terrorist activities.
international

community has come together
327

to address the core

The

problem of

International Criminal

Law Aspects

of the

War Against

Terrorism

web of occasionally overlapping mulweb of conventional law 13 is built on the

transnational terrorism by negotiating a
tilateral

conventions. Although this

cornerstone of sovereign enforcement of applicable norms, the persistence of

community shows

transnational terrorism as a feature of the international
that the existing conventional framework
ertheless,

is

not a panacea. 14 This essay, nev-

concludes that the voluntary efforts of sovereign states to imple-

ment and enforce international norms would not be
the creation of a new superstructure of supranational
The Prospects

Modern

for

materially

enhanced by

justice.

an International Terrorist Tribunal

international law embodies a significant body of law and practice that

empowers domestic

states to adjudicate terrorist crimes.

Recent arguments,

however, have postulated that an internationalized enforcement mechanism

is

warranted simply by virtue of the international nature of the problems posed by
transnational terrorism. International law often evolves in response to per-

ceived weaknesses in the normative structure that are highlighted by current
events. 15 This

the pattern for the post-September

is

1 1

wave of thinking about

the linkage between international terrorism and an internationalized
cess.

ism,

Given the
it is

inability of

trial

pro-

domestic forums to eradicate transnational terror-

understandable that the aftermath of September

1 1

saw

a groundswell

of support for the creation of an international judicial forum to prosecute such

Even

acknowledge that national courts are the backbone for
the systematic prosecution of international terrorists, some scholars have
terrorists.

as they

pointed out that an international forum would "symbolize global justice for
global crimes." 16

13.

See infra notes 72 to 83.

14.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism.- multilateral conventions

(1937-2001) (2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism:
Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 83, 90 (2001).

A

Policy

&

15. See generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR
LAW SINCE 1945 (1994) (focusing on the historical
development of the law of armed conflict in response to the stimuli of world events, changing
technology, and the weaknesses of codified law as demonstrated by new types of conflicts) M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-87
;

(2d ed. 1999) (explaining the development of the law regarding crimes against humanity as a

world affairs and the development of human rights law).
Luncheon Address: Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, AnneMarie Slaughter, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 820 (2002) (comments based on a more detailed
explication found in Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 1 (2002)).
logical progression in response to
16.
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However,

this strain of

thought

is

merely the current incarnation of an

older set of discarded ideas. Despite nearly a century of discussion and debate,

the nations of the world have not agreed
rorism,

17

which

on

comprehensive definition of terthe obvious cornerstone of any international forum with ju-

is

a

from a

risdiction over transnational terrorist acts. States instead shifted

universal

and general approach towards cooperative

and

efforts to define

criminalize specific manifestations of terrorism through specific multilateral
treaties

which bind signatory

states to proscribe

and punish such

acts using

domestic systems.

As

a logical corollary, states

have repeatedly rejected proposals

for

an over-

arching international tribunal charged with prosecuting crimes of transnaterrorism.

tional

The repeated formal

rejections

of

terrorism

as

an

international problem that should be addressed in supranational judicial fo-

rums date back to the League of Nations

era. 18 In 1926, the International

Congress of Penal Law recommended that the Permanent Court of International Justice "be

competent to judge individual

liabilities"

incurred as a result

of crimes considered as international offenses "which constitute a threat to

world peace." 19 This proposal died on the vine of international diplomacy.

The

assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles

on Octo-

1934 prompted the French government to propose an international
convention for the suppression of terrorism in a letter to the Secretary-Gen-

ber

9,

eral of the

League of Nations. 20 The core of the French proposal was a sugges-

an international criminal court would be the most feasible forum for
addressing political crimes of an international character, and the Council of
the League responded by establishing a Committee of Experts to prepare a
tion that

preliminary draft of "an international convention to assure the repression of

17.

See

W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism,

22

HOUS. J. INT'L. L. 3,

22 (1999) Consensus Eludes Legal Committee in Final Act of Session as it Recommends Blanket
Condemnation of Terrorism, Press Release GA/L/3140, Nov. 23, 1999.
18. Voeau of the International Congress of Penal Law Concerning an International Criminal Court
;

(Brussels, 1926), reprinted in Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,

Memorandum

Submitted by

the

Secretary-General

74,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.l

(1949)

(Translating the original French text found in Premier congres international de droit penal, Actes du
congres 634).
19. Id. This strain of thought eventually led to the development of a draft statute for a criminal
chamber of the Permanent International Court of Justice, 34th Report of the International Law
Association 113-125 (1927).

20. Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,

by the Secretary General 16,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.l (1949).
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conspiracies or crimes committed with a political and terrorist purpose." 21

From November 1-16, 1937, the International Conference for the Repression
of Terrorism met in Geneva and adopted a Convention for the Creation of an
International Criminal Court. 22 This effort at an international forum to re-

spond to terrorism was implicitly rejected by the international community
ter only one state (Italy) ratified the multilateral treaty.
Although the proposed 1937 Convention never entered into force 23 it
mains highly relevant to the current debate

for

two reasons. In the

first

af-

re-

place,

the jurisdiction of the international court proposed in the 1937 treaty derived
solely

states, 24

and the court was limited to
severe" domestic law of either the state in which the crimes

from the consent of the affected

applying the "least

were committed or the state of the offender's nationality. 25 In

effect,

the 1937

Convention created an internationalized process for applying the substantive
law of different domestic systems, which is the antithesis for modern arguments that an international forum is essential for applying the international
norms against terrorism.
This model of the 1937 Convention is really the precursor for the Lockerbie
Court 26 and stands in sharp contrast to current efforts to portray transnational
terrorism as an international problem that requires a generalized international
definition and jurisdiction. Secondly, it is important to note that every one of
7

21.

Id.

See also 15

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1760 (1934) (containing the text of the

fall

Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature Nov.

16,

O.J.

resolution passed by the Council).
22.

Convention

for the

1937, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938), League o'Nations Doc. C.546(I).M.383(I) 1937.V
(1938), reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL

CONVENTIONS (1937-2001)
23. After the

71 (2001) [hereinafter 1937 Convention].

Convention was transmitted

to all the

members of the League of Nations, 24

signed the Convention but only India actually ratified
24-

1937 Convention, supra note 22,

art.

its

states

text.

21 (referring to the obligation of the domestic states to

enact criminal legislation to punish the acts defined in the underlying multilateral treaty and

empowering those same
Court). This provision
the

Rome

states to

is

"commit the accused

to trial" before the International Criminal

in stark contrast to the highly controversial jurisdictional provisions of

Statute of the International Criminal Court which allow the

consenting states in establishing personal jurisdiction over their

citizens.

ICC to bypass nonRome Statute of the

United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
arts. 12-19 reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
International Criminal Court,

25.

1937 Convention, supra note 22,

26.

The

art. 21.

Scottish Court in the Netherlands was an internationalized process applying Scottish

law to prosecute the Libyan nationals responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan
See

Am Flight

http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/indexl.asp?path=%2Fhtml%2Flockerbie%2Easp

2003).
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the multilateral conventions in the sixty-five years of international dialogue
since the 1937 Convention have adhered to

its

pattern by defining different

terrorist acts as substantive violations of international

law and specifically re-

quiring sovereign states to enact domestic criminal legislation for the purpose

of punishing those acts. This uniform historical pattern undercuts faddish ar-

guments that the very nature of transnational terrorism requires an international forum and forces proponents of an internationalized process to bear the
burden of overturning the customary practice of the international community.
Another persistent strain of thought after September 1 1 postulated that international prosecutions would appear more legitimate, particularly to Muslim states, than domestic prosecutions, which could be seen with some
suspicion overseas. In the view of some commentators, the perceived illegitimacy of US domestic mechanisms, especially the Military Commissions authorized by President Bush, 27 mitigates towards the creation of an
international supranational tribunal. For example, Justice Richard Goldstone,

the

first

chief prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of

Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law Committed

in the Territory of

Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY),

speculated that the perceived difficulty of obtaining a

fair trial for terrorists in

some countries to resist extraditions to domeswhereas those same countries would be legally barred from resisting

the United States would cause
tic courts,

extradition to a forum created under the Chapter VII authority of the Security

Council. 28

27. See Military
Citizens in the

scope of

Order of November

13,

2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (while it is beyond the

War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG.

this essay to

completely assess the merits of the forthcoming military commissions, the

order defines the class of persons subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions as "any
individual

who is

not a United States citizen" with respect to

writing that there

member

of

al

is

whom the

President determines in

reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times

Qaeda, or

(ii)

has engaged

in,

aided, or abetted or conspired to

(i) is

or was a

commit

acts of

international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threatened to cause,

or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects

national security, foreign policy or economy; or
individuals described in subparagraphs

(i)

or

(iii)

on the United

States,

its

citizens,

has knowingly harbored one or more

(ii) .)

Henry Weinstein, A Trial Too Big for the U.S.?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, Al; Ed
Vulliamy, US Dilemma Over Trials of bin Laden, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED OBSERVER, Nov. 4,
28.

2001 (quoting Justice Goldstone as favoring international tribunals
terrorists

and speculating that he would be selected

International

Criminal

Court),

available

at

0,1501,587365,OO.html Qan. 30, 2003).
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Additionally, in the words of one prominent international lawyer

thinking in terms of a global war on terrorism in the long-term,
better to try [bin Laden] in an international forum

it

where we could

if

"we're

would be

get the in-

condemnation of judges from all the world's legal systems under both national and international law." 29 In a similar vein, the current ICTY
prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, reported that "quite a few people" at United Naput, but also the

tions headquarters revealed in private conversations that prosecuting terrorists

in

The Hague would be

the "most valid solution." 30 This would of course

expand the mandate of the ICTY. Ms. Del
Ponte perhaps revealed her agenda for suggesting such an expansion with the
caveat that "[i]f the Security Council were to decide to pursue that path, it
would have to increase the funding earmarked for the Hague Tribunal." 31
The Military Order authorizing military commissions has been one of the
most controversial aspects of the United States' efforts to bring justice to terrorists, 32 yet even its most vocal critics accept that such forums promulgated
under the President's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief are
require the Security Council to

War on Terrorism: Are These Rules for Hunting Terrorists; Could bin Laden
(CNN Burden of Proof broadcast, Oct. 6, 2001), cited in David J. Scheffer, The

29. America's Legal

be Brought to Trial

SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REV. 389, 390 n.3 (Summer, 2002). This view perhaps
modern incarnation of the views articulated by the then Secretary of State Thomas
a letter dated April 18, 1793, 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1 1 (1904):

Future of Atrocity law,
represents a
Jefferson in

Compacts
between nation and nation, are obligatory on them by the same moral law
which obliges individuals to observe their compacts. ... It is true that nations are to be
judges for themselves; since no one nation has a right to sit in judgment over another,
but the tribunal of our conscience remains, and that also of the opinion of the world.
These will review the sentence we pass in our own case, and as we respect these, we
must see that in judging ourselves we have honestly done the part of impartial and
.

.

.

rigorous judges.
30.

Prosecutor Del Ponte Hopes to Try Bin Laden in

International

The Hague,

Interview with the

War Crimes Tribunal Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, Rome L'Awenire,

2001 (copy on

file

Hague
Dec.

2,

with author).

31.

Id.

32.

James Podgers,

ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue,

1

A.B.A.

J.

e-Report, Feb.

http://www.abamet.org/journal/ereport/f8midtribus.html (Jan. 30, 2003);

8,

2002, available at

DAVID

J.

SCHEFFER,

Options for prosecuting international Terrorists, United States institute for
PEACE SPECIAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr78.html
Gan.30, 2003).
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"clearly authorized

under international law." 33 From

than sanctioning a "multiplicity of

this perspective, rather

various countries" the creation of

trials in

an overarching international tribunal that could perhaps include participation
of Islamic judges is being packaged as a part of the international coalition
against terrorism. 34 Nevertheless, allowing sovereign states to bypass their do-

mestic enforcement mechanisms and abdicate their responsibilities to a newly

spawned international mechanism

is

not likely to be an effective response in

the long term.

The

cries for

an international tribunal imply that an international response

always appropriate for crimes grounded in international law that shock the

is

conscience of mankind, which in turn implies an unseemly assertion that domestic prosecutions are always inappropriate and unfair. While terrorism
widespread, and

may be

is

impossible to eradicate, the compelling motivations

that have required the formation of international forums in other contexts are

notably absent.
In other words, despite the inherent difficulty of investigating and prose-

no culture o{ impunity because one or
always have jurisdiction, political will, and a very

cuting international terrorists, there
several sovereign states will

is

when there is
who are within

strong motivation to prosecute that particular set of terrorists
available evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of persons

the substantive and personal jurisdiction of the sovereign state. Creation of an
international forum specifically designed to respond to crimes of terrorism

would be
because
solely

a wholly

it

new development

would be the

first

in the field of international criminal law

time that an international forum was created

due to the nature of the crimes committed.

If

the nations of the world

committed to combating the core problem of transnational terrorism, the
best place is in the domestic forums of affected states. This approach will accomplish the most in the long term to ensure that the rule of law is strengthened and justice is done.
are

33. William Glaberson, U.S. Faces
22, 2001;

Michael R. Belknap,

Historical Perspective

38 CAL.

Tough Choices

A Putrid Pedigree:

W.

L.

Laden Is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, B5, Oct.
Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in

If Bin

the

REV. 433, 441 (Spring, 2002). The Bush Administration has

pointedly reminded the world that the procedures published that will govern the conduct of any
Military

Commissions authorized by the President are

standards, Article 75, Protocol

August 1949 and Relating
U.N.T.S.
34.
F.

3, reprinted in

I.

compliance with the international

See Protocol Additional to the

Geneva Conventions of

to the Protection of Victims of International

Armed

12

Conflicts, 1125

16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).

Comments by Justice Richard

Kennedy

in full

Goldstone, Bringing International Criminals to Justice, John

Library and Foundation Responding to Terrorism Series,

http://www.jfklibrary.net.forum_goldstone.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
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2001, available at
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International Criminal

"International Criminal

Similarly,

an international

War Against

of the

terrorist tribunal

is

Terrorism

Law"

not warranted by the very exis-

tence of an emerging collection of concepts and processes termed "international criminal law."

intersection of

two

The concept of international criminal law springs from

distinct legal planes;

due

the

to the nature of the international

system, the criminal aspects of international law are necessarily implemented

through the criminal justice systems of sovereign
essay,

it is

important to

states.

For the purposes of this

norms under
the conclusion that the most

realize that the simple recognition of legal

no way leads ineluctably to
appropriate, or even most desirable forum, is an internationalized court.
Though some states cooperate to prescribe some norms in binding internainternational law in

tional obligations, 35 the domestic criminal systems of sovereign states present

a

competing

set of

pragmatic and practical challenges in implementing and

enforcing those same norms.

nate in the choices

made by

The

criminal aspects of international law origi-

sovereign states

who

conduct under established international norms.

36

united to criminalize certain
In other words, the

mecha-

nisms of diplomacy and state consent work together to define and proscribe
certain conduct to the point that

national norms.

From

it

ripens into a violation of substantive inter-

the standpoint of developing binding norms of conduct

through the evolution of international law, the twentieth century was a period
of almost breathtaking development.

At the same

development of international forums lagged behind
the substantive development of crimes defined and articulated as a matter of
international law. Indeed, the principle that states are obligated to use domestic

time, the

forums to punish violations of international law has roots that run back to

the ideas of Hugo Grotius. 37

The

very nature of sovereign power allows the do-

mestic forums of a state to punish criminals whether their crimes derive from
international

35.

norms or domestic

prohibitions.

As

early as 1842,

US

Secretary

Professor Bassiouni has listed 24 categories of international crime generated from 274

M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law Conventions and Their Penal
Provisions 20-21 (1997).
36. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, in
International Criminal Law and procedure 27 Gohn Dugard & Christine van den
Wyngaert, eds. 1996) (summarizing some twenty different acts and types of conduct criminalized
international conventions that help guide the merger of international law with criminal law.

under binding international conventions and discussing the

differing

approaches to enforcing

international criminal norms).

RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999).

37.
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of State Daniel Webster articulated the idea that a nation's sovereignty also
entails "the strict

and

faithful

observance of all those principles, laws, and us-

ages which have obtained currency

among

civilized states,

their object the mitigation of the miseries of war."

One way

and which have

to envision the current state of international criminal law

new and more

tectonic plates.

effective international forums are like

Even though the body of

terrorist

pattern of requiring domestic enforcement, there
fault line

is

two

is

a zero

sum game with

re-

sliding

conventions followed the

an inherent tension

at the

between domestic and international criminal forums because the

risdictional allocation

to

is

imagine that pure domestic enforcement of international norms and the

finement of

for

38

ju-

regard to a particular individual

or criminal act.

The

phrase "international criminal law" describes a deceptively simple con-

cept that

is

not confined to the

brary books.

The

title

of law review articles or the spines of

expression obscures the reality that

its

genesis

lies

li-

in the

lawmaking processes of the international community, and cannot therefore be
seen as a linear exercise of legislative mandate accompanied by international
judicial enforcement. The field of "international criminal law" is an ambiguous concept with indistinct boundaries. 39

Because no single

class of

and complete foundation

crimes or isolated body of law forms an accurate

for the currently existing tribunals created at the in-

ternational level to punish individuals for violations of international law,

one

distinguished scholar and diplomat has proposed the unifying concept of
"atrocity crimes." 40 In short, the concept of international criminal law

is

more

mere aspiration to be attained yet falls short of being a constrained
body of law with an empirical existence and definable contours. For the close
observer of this dynamic field, it is not surprising that there is an undercurrent
of debate challenging the very existence of a distinct discipline termed "interthan

a

national criminal law." 41

38.
39.

John Bassett Moore, l A Digest of international law 5-6 (1906).
Though international criminal law certainly includes the body of law

international terrorism, this concept also includes crimes against humanity (and

its

proscribing

component

some human rights violations, war crimes
(both in the classic sense of conflicts between nation states and in the growing body of law
regulating conduct in the context of non-international armed conflicts), genocide, and other
transnational crimes such as piracy, slavery, and drug trafficking.
40. David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REV. 389, 398 (Summer,
parts of persecution of minority populations) torture,

2002).
41. See,

e.g.,

Leslie C.

Green,

Is

There an International Criminal Law?, 21

(1983).
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a result of this ambiguity, during the negotiations of the

Elements of

Crimes required by Article 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), 42 some delegations vehemently voiced their view that the concept of "international criminal law"
practical meaning.

The Elements

is

too

ill

defined and vague to have any

of Crimes are designed to "assist the Court in

the interpretation and application" of the norms defined in the
ute.

43

The Rome

Rome

Stat-

Statute also stipulates that the Court "shall apply" the Ele-

ments of Crimes during its decision-making. 44 After agreeing that the Elements
of Crimes would be much more than a summarized, non-binding set of brief
comments, the delegates negotiated a detailed list of the component parts for
every one of the numerous offenses proscribed in the Rome Statute with the
understanding that the prosecutor must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for that offense. A number of delegations felt
that referencing a discrete body of "international criminal law" in the Elements
of Crimes document would introduce exactly the kind of circular vagueness
that would defeat the very purpose of negotiating elements for each offense.
After extensive debate, the nations of the world joined consensus on the
Final Draft Elements of Crimes.
single, accessible

document

The Elements

of Crimes are enshrined in a

that takes otherwise

amorphous crimes and

delin-

and circumstances for every offense, along
with the mens rea that attaches to each component of each crime. This is an
important development because it portends the possibility that nations
around the world now have a unified, consensus document to consult when
eates the conduct, consequences,

considering the normative content of the crimes of genocide, found in Article 6
of the

Rome Statute,

expansive

list

crimes against humanity, contained in Article

of war crimes contained in Article

The Elements

7,

and the

8.

of Crimes are a crosscut oi legal norms that are an off-the-

shelf source of accessible detail to assist domestic jurisdictions throughout the

world, in addition to serving as a resource for judicial activities in the interna-

Many states

framework for implementing those crimes within their domestic enforcement mechanisms.
For the purposes of this essay, the Elements do embody consensus agreetional arena.

are using the agreed elements as a

ment on the concept of art autonomous legal field termed "international criminal law." The chapeau language to the Article 7 crimes states clearly that the
42. Elements of Crimes,

States Parties to the

Adopted September

Rome

10,

Id., art.

in

Report of the Assembly of

Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1st Sess., 108-155, U.N.

Doc. ICC- ASP/1/3 (2002).
43.

2002, reprinted

9(1).

44. H., art. 21.
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crimes against humanity provisions relate to "international criminal law" and
accordingly "should be strictly construed." 45 This diplomatic result recognized
the emergence of an interrelated system in which domestic forums are responsible for

implementing international norms, but in no way elevated interna-

tional forums to a de facto hierarchical supremacy.

The

Internationalization of International Criminal

The development of a general body of legal norms along with
a system

Law

the emergence of

termed in shorthand "international criminal law" does not mean that

international forums are the preferred judicial enforcement mechanism.
pursuit of accountability for international crimes

is

The

a notable aspect of Presi-

dent Bush's recent observation that the nations of the world are "joined in serious purpose
fate of

—very

serious purposes

our freedom

world of coercion."
of

last resort

now

46

rest.

—on which

We build

the safety of our people and the

we

a world of justice, or

will live in a

Nevertheless, international forums have been the courts

rather than the courts primarily charged as the optimal

first

response.

Although

and proscribe crimes under
international law, the domestic courts of the world have the primary role in
punishing violations and securing the rule oi law. 47 The debate over the
phrase "international criminal law" described above reflected a continuing
tension between the international respect for sovereign justice systems, and
the transcendent importance of truth and accountability. Phrased another
way, none of the international forums in recent history have been created to
enforce international norms simply because the offenses were defined and proscribed by the power of international law. Rather, internationalized mechanisms have been created only as a necessary fallback when domestic forums
have failed to enforce the transcendent norms of international law.
states cooperate together to define

U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000).
46. Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the Bundestag, May
45.

23, 2002, available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-2.html (Nov. 20, 2002).
47. See,

e.g.,

Attorney Gen. of Israel

v.

Eichmann-Supreme Court Opinion,

18, 26, (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem, 1961), affd
is

36

1.L.R.

"in the absence of an International Court, in

country to give effect to

its

277

(Isr.

reprinted in

36

1.L.R.

Sup. Ct., 1962) (international law

need of the judicial and legislative organs of every
criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial").
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For example, in responding to what President Roosevelt later described as
the "blackest crimes in

all

history," 48 the Allied

Declaration on October 30, 1943.

most unthinkable

brutalities

Powers issued the Moscow
German forces were able to commit al-

49

under the shield of Nazi sovereignty. Adolf Hit-

imposed the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle) in order to exercise his
will as supreme through the police, the courts, the military, and all the other
ler

institutions of organized
"I

owe

German

inviolable fidelity to

Adolf Hitler;

to the leaders he designates for me."

from

whom

The oath of the Nazi party stated:
vow absolute obedience to him and

society. 50

51

I

Accordingly, power resided in Hitler,

subordinates derived absolute authority in hierarchical order.

This absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in

all

areas of pub-

lic

and private

ist

despotism equaled only by the dynasties of the ancient East." 52

life

led in Justice Jackson's

famous words

Sheltered from international scrutiny by

to "a National Social-

German sovereign prerogative,

the

domestic system was harnessed to prevent a judicial response to the horren-

dous crimes committed because the outcomes of prosecutions were predeter-

mined

to accord with the political guidance of the Fuehrer.

Germany was

The

rule of law in

therefore twisted to conform to the Nazi party rather than the

principles of restraint

cow Declaration

to

and

justice. In response, the Allied

make punishing

those perpetrators

53

powers used the Mosa key allied

war

In the context of the current debate over internationalizing justice,

portant to note that the

Moscow

goal.

it is

im-

Declaration specifically favored punishment

through the national courts in the countries where the crimes were committed.

The Declaration

specifically stated that

German

criminals were to be "sent

48. Statement by the President, March 24, 1944, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON
United States Representative to the International Conference on military
tribunals 12, department of state publication 3080, washington d.c. (1945)

[hereinafter Jackson Report].
49.
11.

IX Department of State Bulletin, No. 228, 3 10, reprinted in Jackson Report, supra note 48, at
Declaration was actually issued to the Press on November 1, 1943. For an

The Moscow

account of the

political

and

legal

PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR:
Drexel a. Sprecher, Inside the
Comprehensive Account 1037-38.
actuality, see

50.

51.

Id. at

war aim into
85-1
AN AMERICAN STORY
10 (2000).
Nuremberg Trial: a Prosecutor's

maneuvering behind the

effort to bring this stated

157.

Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, II TRIAL OF THE
Major War Criminals Before the international Military Tribunal 100 (1947)
[hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].

52.

53.

After extensive debate over the relative merits of the terms "perpetrator" or "accused" the

delegates to the Preparatory
finalized draft text of the

Commission (PrepCom) ultimately agreed

Elements of Crimes

for the International

PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000).
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back to the countries
they

in

which

abominable deeds were done

their

may be judged and punished

in order that

according to the laws of these liberated

countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein." 54

precedence was clearly stated

for building the rule of

even though the subject matter jurisdiction

law at the domestic

for horrific violations

The

level,

came from

international law. Presaging the actual International Military Tribunal, the

Declaration went on to proclaim that major criminals whose crimes had "no
particular geographical localization"

Allied governments.

would be punished by joint decision of the

55

Seen through the prism of international criminal law, the Moscow Declaration and the subsequent London Charter did not elevate the international forum to an automatic precedence and superiority. The international forum was
limited only to those offenses where a single country had no greater grounds
for claiming jurisdiction

than another country. Justice Jackson recognized

this

famous opening statement. He accepted the fact that the International Military Tribunal was merely an alternative to domestic courts for
reality in his

prosecuting the "symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism." 56
clarified that

any defendants

of this Tribunal

.

.

.

will

who succeeded

in "escaping the

condemnation

be delivered up to our continental Allies." 57

Following the legacy of Nuremberg by nearly

where

fifty

years, the current

ad hoc

would not be achieved
domestic forums. Instead of being driven by an abstract

tribunals were both created in contexts

or even pursued in

He further

justice

evaluation of the nature of the offenses as violations of international law, the

community focused on the need to prosecute offenders by filling
the domestic enforcement void with an international tribunal. In the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Milosevic regime exercised dictatorial power over
international

the Yugoslav judicial system that prevented any accountability for the wide-

spread violations of international law. Thus, the "particular circumstances" of
the impunity in the Former Yugoslavia warranted the creation of the international tribunal. 58

Rwanda, the Security Council
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) where there
Similarly, in the context of the genocide in

54.

Eichmann, supra note 47.

55.

Id.

56.

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR

57.

Id.

WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 52, at 99.

at 100.

58. Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution

(1993), U.N.

SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.

S/2-5704, para. 26 (1993).
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would have otherwise been a prosecutorial void. The genocide ripped apart
Rwandan society. All the judges fled and the judicial system was in total disarray. In the case of Rwanda, the problem was not a lack of political will, but a
complete breakdown of the rule of law hampered by a judicial system deemed
to be incapable of addressing the

mass of violations. 59

Both the ICTY and ICTR drew their lifeblood from the political process of
the Security Council because the only viable system of justice would have
been a newly created international forum. From the perspective of Charter legal authority, the ICTY and ICTR are best understood as enforcement measures of a judicial nature. In other words, the Security Council

the circumstances at

hand

to

assume

was forced by

a quasi-sovereign role to create subordi-

nate judicial structures within the territorial bounds that would otherwise

have been policed by responsible governmental structures. 60 Nations are
gally obligated to accept the decisions of the Security Council.

use of Chapter VII authority in this

genious because the international

61

Hence, the

manner was both unprecedented and intribunals were grounded on a Security

Council determination that judicial accountability

for

crimes would facilitate

the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. 62
edifice of internationalized justice that has

on the

le-

become such

landmark

a familiar

international scene in the past decade merely filled the void

The

left

by dys-

functional domestic systems.
In relation to the current debate over creating a supranational forum to re-

spond to terrorism, the essential feature of the ad hoc tribunals

is

the reality

that they were not created as an international response simply due to the

nature of the crimes as substantive violations of international law. Although
the ad hoc tribunals enjoyed legitimacy and authority over sovereign states im-

mediately upon their inception by virtue of the plenary authority of the Secu-

Council with respect to maintaining international peace and security, 63

rity

they represent a limited response to specific enforcement gaps.

59. See generally

also

Development of International Law, 88

CHARTER

AM.

Theodor Meron, War Crimes
J.

INT'L

L.

U.N.

62.

See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 58, paras. 18-30.

63. See,
I.C.J.

e.g.,

in

25.

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph

REPORTS 151

Yugoslavia and the

78 (1994).

61.

art.

specific

& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

VIRGINIA MORRIS

COURT FOR RWANDA (1998).
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 29. See

The

(1962), reprinted in 56

AM.

J.

2,

of the Charter),

INT'L L. 1053 (1962) (holding in part that the

Security Council has plenary authority under the Charter to take decisions

enforcement measures under the Charter regime).
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conditions that warranted the creation of the ad hoc tribunals also led the Security Council to

mandate

a jurisdictional hierarchy in

which each interna-

tional tribunal has explicit jurisdictional "primacy" over national courts. 64

Therefore, the jurisdictional framework of the ad hoc tribunals in

no way im-

an "inherent supremacy" for international tribunals over domestic forums
that derives simply from the nature of the underlying criminal offenses.
In the context of the war on terrorism, the formation of the ICTY and
ICTR do not warrant the assumption that international mechanisms are al-

plies

ways the appropriate response to international crimes. The specific contextual
interests of eliminating the problem of impunity and restoring respect for the
rule of law mitigated against relying

on domestic enforcement, but

does that lead to the conclusion that an international forum

is

in

no way

the appropriate

response to international crimes. Unlike the situation in the Former Yugoslavia, international terrorists are private actors

of civilized society, and are therefore in

no

who

act outside the constraints

position to block state enforcement

mechanisms. In Rwanda, the international mechanism was an essential gap
filler

to provide support to a collapsed judicial system.

As noted above,

the jurisdictional hierarchy was a logical corollary to the

use of Chapter VII authority to establish the tribunals.

As

a legal matter, inter-

national efforts are hardly sufficient to be the sole source for dispensing justice. 65

As

a practical matter, the gap

remains yawning.

between the victims and the courts

An effort to create an international tribunal for prosecuting

terrorism would be similarly ineffective as the focal point of effective and

com-

plete enforcement.

The newly

established

ICC

is

the culmination of recent efforts to create a

superstructure of international accountability mechanisms to address impunity
for international offenses.

64.

Virginia Morris

With

respect to the proposal for an international

& Michael P. Scharf, An insider's Guide to the international

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 126 n.378 (1995).
65. At the time of this writing, the ICTY has issued 79 current indictments; with 55
legal proceedings (of which

suspects in

44 are in custody and 1 1 are provisionally released under strict terms
Chamber) 33 individuals are currently in various stages of trial while 30 cases
have been completed (20 indictments were withdrawn and 10 indictees were deceased). The
ICTR has issued 80 indictments of whom 60 persons are in custody while 20 remain at large; 8
persons have been sentenced, 1 acquitted; 22 are in trial and 29 are in custody.
issued by the Trial

;
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of the

significant that the

Rome

Statute did not in-

jurisdictional crimes because delegates could not

on the form of such an

offense. 66 Despite the clear rejection of

diction over terrorist crimes during the drafting of the

proponents vocally maintained

September

after

1 1

ICC

juris-

Rome Statute, some ICC

that

its

provisions for punish-

ing crimes against humanity should be twisted to cover terrorist acts as well.

Attempts

to stretch the jurisdictional

bounds of the ICC

to cover crimes of

terrorism would be the most blatant effort to superimpose international

mech-

anisms over functioning domestic courts. As of

July

Rome

2002, the

entry into force

its

on

Statute purports to establish a permanent supranational

1,

insti-

tution that enshrines the principle that state sovereignty can be subordinated

humani-

to the goal of achieving accountability for violations of international
tarian law.

67

Indeed, one commentator at the diplomatic conference in

Rome

argued that "outmoded notions of state sovereignty must not derail the

ward movement" towards international peace and

order.

dent supporters of the ICC are careful not to portray
a

naked exercise of

political

power, and view

its

its

68

for-

Even the most

ar-

potential authority as

erosion of state sovereignty

only as a necessary but limited incursion.
In other words, the creation of a supranational court
ride the unfettered discretion of

ICC

some

states

is

empowered

to over-

seen by the supporters of the

an overdue step towards a uniform system of responsibility designed to
"promote values fundamental to all democratic and peace-loving states." 69
as

Depending on

their perspectives,

commentators on the ICC see either

princi-

pled leadership backed by the courage of deeply held convictions or stark hypocrisy

66.

See

67.

See

and

self-serving opportunism.

Rome Statute, supra note 24, art 5.
Rome Statute, supra note 24, arts

prosecutorial

and

judicial

12-19.

The

extension of unchecked international

power over sovereign concerns

is

one of the primary reasons causing

the United States position to remain unwilling to go forward with the

present form." David

INT'L

L. 14,

on the

J.

Scheffer,

The United

States

21 (1999) [hereinafter Scheffer].

Final Draft Rules of Evidence

and

Rome

Statute "in

the International Criminal Court,

The United

93

its

AM. J.

States joined international consensus

and Procedure and the Final Draft Elements of Crimes on

June 30, 2000.
68.

Benjamin

Ferencz,

Plenipotentiaries

Address

to

the

United

Nations

Diplomatic

Conference

on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (June

of

16, 1998),

available at http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616ppc.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).

69.

Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with

Rome

Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction
Tribunals, 23

YALE J.

INT'L L. 383, 436 (1998).
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Though

its

supporters approach the

of international criminal justice at the

ICC as the penultimate development
dawn of a new century, the roots of its

core jurisdictional limitation are intellectually identical to the

bunal and the ad hoc tribunals. Article

1

of the

Rome

Nuremberg Tri-

Statute promulgates in

simple language that the court will "be a permanent institution and shall have
the power to exercise

its

jurisdiction over persons for the

most serious crimes

complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions." 70 The plain text of Article 1 compels the conclusion that the
ICC is intended to supplement sovereign punishment of international violations rather than supplant domestic enforcement of international norms.
Accordingly, a case is admissible before the ICC only where a domestic sovereign that would otherwise exercise jurisdiction is "unwilling or unable to
of international concern

.

.

.

and

shall be

genuinely" carry out the investigation or prosecution. 71

The

principle of

mandatory limitation even in a case in which the other
jurisdictional criteria are met because the Trial Chamber "shall determine
that a case is inadmissible" where the admissibility criteria are not met. After
hitting a diplomatic dead-end for nearly 70 years, persistent attempts to expand (some would say warp) the ICC jurisdictional scope over crimes of terrorism due to their highly emotionalized nature and the rise of global concern
would subvert the complementarity mechanism. Paradoxically, such an expansion would vindicate the stringent arguments of those who view the supranational ICC mechanism simply as an international effort to undermine
complementarity

is

a

sovereignty.

ICTR, the ICTY and now the ICC have
erected a formidable edifice of internationalized justice. At the same time,
it is absolutely clear that where domestic jurisdictions are functioning, the

The Nuremberg

Tribunal, the

internationalized response
permissible)

.

Though

is

not warranted (and in the case of the

ICC not

the development of international institutions to enforce

norms has broken new ground in the past fifty years and helped
to end impunity in some contexts, international mechanisms are not appropriate where domestic courts are complying with the rule of law and remain
international

capable of dispensing justice. Consequently, arguments for an international
terrorist court fall of their

such a mechanism would

70.

Rome

own

weight unless they can demonstrate a gap that

fill.

Statute, supra note 24, art

1.

Article

1

echoes the preambular language of the

Rome

Statute in which the signatories affirm that effective prosecution of international crimes "must be

ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation."
71.

Rome

Statute, supra note 24, art 17(1). For the negotiating history of the complementarity

regime, see Newton, supra note 69, at 44-55.
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above would probably seem curious to a casual observer.

framework conveying an extensive punitive capacity to sovereign forums, proponents of an international
terrorist tribunal bear the burden of establishing its usefulness on the internain light of the extensive jurisdictional

tional landscape.
rorist

The creation of an international mechanism

crimes would be an inherently political exercise.

It

of money, and require the expenditure of an enormous
will.

One

of the truths of international diplomacy

is

to prosecute ter-

would cost

a great deal

amount of political good

that international mecha-

nisms are created by the international community to achieve international
terests.

A

terrorist tribunal

could actually encourage acts of terrorism

in-

if it

replaced relatively efficient domestic mechanisms with a cumbersome, expensive,

and slow process

far

removed from the

realities

of everyday prosecutorial

and diplomatic practice.
There is no preexisting gap in enforcement mechanisms that would be filled
by an internationalized process to address crimes of terrorism. As of now, the
sovereign states of the world have cooperated together in using the United Nations structure to adopt twelve multilateral antiterrorist conventions (though

there are a

number of other

international instruments that address criminal

conduct that could be termed

The

"terrorist"

depending on the circumstances).

core body of international instruments includes the following: Conven-

on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 72
(known as The Tokyo Convention, 1963); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 73 (known as the Hague Hijacking Convention,
1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation 74 (known as the Montreal Convention, 1971); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 75 (1973); International Convention
tion

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sep. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 1042 (1963).
73. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1333 (1971), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/

72.

humanrts/instree/hague 1970.html Qan. 30, 2003).
74-

Convention

for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep.

23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted
75.

in

10 1.L.M. 1151 (1971).

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally

Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167, reprinted

m

13 I.L.M. 41

(1974), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/

inprotectedpersons.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
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Taking of Hostages 76 (1979); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 77 (1979); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
against the

of Civil Aviation 78

(known

Montreal Protocol, 1988); Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 79
as the

(1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of

Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf80 (1988); Convention on
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection81 (1991); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
International

Convention

for the

Bombing 82

(1997); and

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 83

(1999).

As noted above, the piecemeal approach

to addressing terrorism resulted

community, in conjunction with the
United Nations, to develop an overarching, comprehensive convention
from the

failure of the international

against terrorism, largely because of lingering dissension over

how

the scope of the international proscription against acts o{ terrorism.

to define

Taken

to-

gether, the pile of terrorism treaties accomplishes several crucial purposes.

76.

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081,

1316 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted

in

18 I.L.M. 1456 (1980), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/

humanrts/instree/takinghostages.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
77.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar.

3,

1980, T.I.A.S. 11080,

1456 U.N.T.S. 101, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1980).
78. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation

Supplementary to the Convention

for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against

the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 974 U.N.T.S. 178, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 627 (1988).

Convention
Navigation, Mar.
79.

80.

for

the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

10, 1988,

1678 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted

in

27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located

on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 685 (1988).
8 1 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1 1 99 1
U.N. Doc. S/22393/Corr. 1, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 721 (1991).
82. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164,
U.N. GOAR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/52/164, Annex (1997), reprinted in M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) 183
,

(2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/52/a52rl64.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).
83.

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/

109, 54th Sess.,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109, Annex (2000), entered

available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/54/a54rl09.pdf
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to say that the international instruments address-

been

ing aspects of terrorism have

permissible domestic jurisdiction.
lished principles of territorial

opment of

of the

the specific acts that states should proscribe under applica-

lists

ble domestic law.

Law Aspects

expanding the scope of
conventions built on estab-

at the forefront of

The

terrorist

and nationality

jurisdiction through the devel-

passive personality jurisdiction. Thus, this

body of international

instruments allows a state party to establish personal jurisdiction over offenders

who

tack.

85

direct attacks against

its

nationals regardless of the situs of the

This principle has been extended to the point that

if

a perpetrator

at-

even

intends to intimidate the population or to compel a government to do or to

may

abstain from taking a particular act, that government
nal jurisdiction.

86

The body

establish

its

crimi-

of existing conventional law therefore gives sover-

eign states a robust ability to prosecute acts of international terrorism, and
generally supports jurisdiction of several states over any particular act or at-

tempted act of international

terrorisrn.

In addition to establishing the norms and the clearly recognizable right for

sovereign states to enforce those substantive norms through domestic legisla-

framework deliberately

tion, the existing

facilitates

the cooperative efforts

necessary to ensure the proper exercise of jurisdiction by one or more states.

The

underlying goal of the conventions

justice in the state

feature of the texts
in

its

territory to

is

to facilitate the administration of

most able to prosecute the perpetrator. Thus, a recurring
requires a state party that apprehends an alleged offender

submit that case "without exception whatsoever" to

its

com-

petent authorities without "undue delay" for purposes of prosecution or to extradite

another

to

willing

state. 87

Furthermore,

the

treaties

facilitate

extradition between sovereign states by specifically providing a legal basis

ei-

ther through the text of the convention itself or by inclusion of the offenses

mentioned

convention into existing or future extradition

in the

treaties be-

tween the

parties. Lastly, the existing

84. See,

18 U.S.C. 32, 2331-2332e, 2339A, 3286, 3592 (2002). See also 28 U.S.C.A. 1605

framework of domestic enforcement incorporates measures to ensure "the greatest measure o{ assistance" between
e.g.,

(framing issues of jurisdiction).

Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 6(2); Hostage Convention, supra
note 76, art. 5. See also Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.252/L.3, reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
85.

See, e.g., Terrorist

MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) 219
86. See,

e.g.,

Terrorist

Bombing Convention,

Convention, supra note 83,

art. 7(2)(c);

Platforms Convention, supra note 80,
87.

See, e.g., Terrorist

(2001).

supra note 82,

art.

2;

Financing of Terrorism

Hostage Convention, supra note

art.

3(2)(c).

Bombing Convention, supra note
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76, art. 5(l)(c); Fixed
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states in

connection with investigations and prosecutions related to acts of in-

ternational terrorism. 88

The Convention on

the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against In-

ternationally Protected Persons provides a representative sample of the opera-

tion of domestic
Its

mechanisms

in responding to acts of international concern.

provisions require states parties to cooperate in order to prevent, within

on diplomats within or outside their
exchange information, and to coordinate administrative mea-

their territories, preparations for attacks
territories, to

sure against such attacks. 89 If a perpetrator succeeds in attacking an internationally protected person, state parties are obligated to

exchange available

information concerning the circumstances of the crime and the alleged

of-

90

and whereabouts. Ultimately, the state in whose territory
the perpetrator is located must either extradite back to another state with jurisdiction or "submit, without exception and without undue delay, the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings
in accordance with the laws of that State." 91
fender's identity

In short, for every terrorist crime committed or attempted, there will always

be one or more sovereign states that have both an available basis for extending

and the motivation to do so. In relation to the
prosecution of terrorist crimes, there is simply no remaining function that an
internationalized process would serve. Nevertheless, if an internationalized
terrorism tribunal generated a marked deterrent effect on those who would
commit similar crimes in the future, the vast amount of dollars, yen, riyals, and

jurisdiction over the crimes

euros spent could be a bargain.

Evaluating the potentiality of an internationalized process as an instrument
oi deterrence,

it is

worth noting that such an international forum would

al-

most certainly be unable to administer capital punishment, and its deterrent
value would therefore be limited to an undetermined degree. Furthermore,

no empirical evidence whatsoever of any deterrent effect of international justice mechanisms on the actions of real perpetrators in the real world
who inflict their crimes on real victims. As Justice Jackson famously pointed
u
out in his opening statement at Nuremberg, [w]ars are started only on the
there

is

e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 10(1).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected

88. See,

89.

Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 75, art. 4.
90.

Id., art. 5.

91.

Id., art. 7.
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theory and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal punish-

ment

.

.

.

probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the

will

war makers

feels

the chances of defeat to be negligible." 92

Justice Jackson

was

enduring truth that international

just articulating the

relations theorists are familiar with

— regime

elites are risk averse actors. If

they see a high probability of punishment and adverse consequences,

psychology

will often

prevent the undesirable conduct. In the

ing international norms, this

field

what we have termed "ending the

is

human

of enforc-

cycle of im-

punity." In the context of deterring violations of humanitarian law, criminal

prosecutions by international tribunals have a theoretical effect, but good

hopes and genuine aspirations cannot substitute
terrence. Terrorist actors

nal

coercion because

for the

would presumably be even

their

modus operandi

is

power of genuine de-

less susceptible to exter-

to

operate beyond

the

constraints of the rule of law and organized international society.

The Kosovo
fect of

experience

is

the best available case study

an internationalized process, and

genuine deterrence rather than

it

on the deterrent

served to demonstrate the need for

idealistic assertions of legal proscription.

Security Council repeatedly affirmed

ef-

ICTY

jurisdiction in

an ongoing

The

effort to

prevent abuses by the Milosevic regime inside Kosovo, and expressly ordered
the Belgrade regime to cooperate with the investigative efforts of tribunal personnel. 93

The same

resolution directed the

ICTY

ing information related to the violence in

prosecutor to "begin gather-

Kosovo that may

fall

within

its

jurisdiction." 94

In the face of an existing international forum with clear jurisdiction and
stated international support, Serbian forces massacred forty-five innocent
vilians at Racak,

Kosovo, crimes that ultimately contributed to the

tervention in Operation

92.

ALLIED FORCE.

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

93. See,

e.g., S.

C. Res. 1160, U.N.

95

ci-

NATO in-

While governments grumbled over

153, supra note 52, at 153.

SCOR, 54th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/l 160/(1998).

para. 17.

94.

Id.,

95.

Even

as the

NATO nations gathered in Washington to observe the 50th anniversary of the
Kosovo threatened to unravel the international posture that NATO a

alliance, operations in

is

community of common values based on principles of sovereignty, individual liberty, and respect
for the rule of law. Operation ALLIED FORCE represented the resolve of the world's strongest
military/political alliance to take concrete action against despots who commit intolerable
atrocities. By failing to take strong, if belated, action in the face of the crimes against humanity
committed by the Belgrade regime, NATO would have looked cynical and irrelevant to the
security and peace in Europe. THE ECONOMIST 15, Apr. 24, 1999.
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ICTY

the perceived slow pace of the

ment

reiterated

ICTY

investigations, 96 the Rambouillet docu-

jurisdiction over events in

Kosovo through an

explicit

provision that required the cooperation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(FRY)

officials

with the investigative efforts by ICTY. 97

Despite the clear warnings of the international community, and express jurisdiction of a functioning international tribunal, Belgrade's forces expelled

over

1.5 million

Albanians from their homes, committed uncounted rapes,

homes

in at

communities, and murdered an estimated 10,000 Kosovar

civil-

laged whole communities, destroyed tens of thousands of civilian
least 1,200
ians. 98

pil-

The ICTY subsequently

indicted Slobodan Milosevic and four of his se-

and violations of the laws or customs
one count of which specifically charged the
of war committed in Kosovo,
Racak massacre. This indictment and the trials it will spawn continue to spark
debate and keen interest in the law of armed conflict throughout the world.
Nevertheless, the Milosevic indictment represented an unequivocal deterrence failure for the established legal codes and judicial framework and the best
measure of the likely deterrent effect of an international terrorist tribunal.
nior officials for crimes against humanity
99

A New

Kind of Justice, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 80 (April 2000). In
February, 1999, the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

96. Charles Truehart,

Europe reported that there were
lack of cooperation by

FRY

at least

officials

210,000 internally displaced Kosovars, and reported the

with the surviving relatives of the victims from the Racak

massacre. U.N. Doc. S/ 1 999/2 14/(1 999)

.

This unwavering Security Council support was

ultimately expressed in the Chapter VII resolution authorizing the international military
civil

presence in Kosovo, which "demanded"

full

cooperation by

all

parties with the

and

pending

wake of the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo in the first six months of
1999. S. C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1244/para. 14/(1999).
97. See Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/648, annex, Art. II, para. 13 (1999).
All parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and
investigative efforts in the

prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
a)

As

required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) and

subsequent resolutions, the Parties shall
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in

complying with
b)

The

its

fully
its

cooperate with the International Criminal

investigations

requests for assistance and

Parties shall also allow complete,

international experts

—including

its

and prosecutions, including

orders.

unimpeded, and unfettered access

forensics experts

and

investigators

—

to

to investigate

allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
98.

Ethnic Cleansing

in

Kosovo:

an accounting,

U.S.

dept of State 3

(Dec. 1999).

An earlier version of the report was compiled by the State Department, which also issued a series of
weekly ethnic cleansing reports, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur Qan. 30, 2003).
99. Prosecutor v Milosevic, et al Indictment,
}

No. IT-99-37 (May

24, 1999), available at http://

www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).
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Security Council Resolution

On September 28,

Terrorism

1373

200 1 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, adopted Resolution 1373, which on its face is an extraordinary state,

ment of international unity and purpose. 100 In
wave of international concern and cooperation,
revisit

the post-September 11 tidal
states

had the opportunity

to

the approach that has been developed in dealing with international ter-

The patchwork

rorism.

quilt of

conventional law, implemented and adminis-

tered through sovereign systems,

is

clearly not a

complete solution, but the

Security Council unanimously elected to reinforce the existing framework.

Rather than opting
cisely

for

an internationalized process, the Security Council pre-

framed the language of Resolution 1373 to buttress the current approach.

Resolution 1373 uses sweeping language to impose a duty on states to enact
legislation

and

to punish the crimes of terrorism.

rects every nation in the

[e]nsure

that

The

operative paragraph di-

world to

who

any person

participates

in

the

planning,

financing,

preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

is

brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such

terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in

domestic

laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of

such

terrorist acts.

101

and immoral epidemic that undermines the stability of world order, the Security Council employed its binding
authority under Chapter VII to craft the most effective response possible. It is
important that the Security Council focused on improving and implementing
Because transnational terrorism

is

an

illegal

the sovereign enforcement of international norms rather than instituting an internationalized judicial response.

In

its

landmark statement outlining the international response

to terrorism,

number of additional steps that member
combat terrorism. For example, the Council

the Security Council also established a
states are required to take to

"[d]ecides that all States shall
rorist acts"

102

.

.

.

[p]revent and suppress the financing of ter-

and then mandated other

100. S. C. Res. 1373,
101.

Id.,

para. 2(c).

102.

Id.,

para. 1(a).

U.N. SCOR, 56th

Sess.,

explicit steps that states are to take

U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).

350

Michael Newton

such as

facilitating early

mation,

103

terrorists

warning to other

denying safe haven to

states

terrorists,

104

through the exchange of infor-

and preventing the movement o(

by effective border controls and controls on the issuance of identity

papers and travel documents. 105 In the context of criminal investigations and
prosecutions, states

must

"[a]fford

one another the greatest measure of

assis-

tance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in

obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings." 106
Finally, the Security

Council exhorted

all

sovereign states to take a

of cooperative actions to combat terrorism, including,
fying

among others,

and accelerating the exchange of operational information,"

107

number

"intensi-

becoming

parties to the relevant antiterrorist conventions, including the International

Convention

for the

Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, 108 and ensuring,

"in conformity with international law," that refugee status
terrorists,

and that "claims of

political

is

not abused by

motivation are not recognized as

grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged

terrorists." 109

Conclusion

My view is that an international tribunal in the present circumstances is an
and unnecessary aspect of the response to transnational terrorism.
The world will successfully combat terrorism by aggressively cooperating to
engage, investigate, hunt down, and prosecute those terrorists who survive
inadvisable

military action against them.
all
is

We've

already seen investigations in countries

around the world that have uncovered

credible,

have prevented some

links to terrorism

terrorist attacks.

—and

if

the press

Abdicating state responsi-

an internationalized process would be the first step towards paralyzing
politicization of the fight against terrorism and could pave the way towards ul-

bility to

timate failure in this critical global campaign.
In lieu of creating a superstructure of international enforcement, the Security

Council used Resolution 1373 to take the revolutionary step of establishing

103.

Id.,

para. 2(b).

104.

Id.,

para. 2(c).

105.

Id.,

para. 2(g).

106.

Id.,

para. 2(0-

107.

Id.,

para. 3(a).

108.

Id.,

para. 3(d).

109.

Id.,

para. 3(g).
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committee (the Counter-Terrorism Committee)

tation of
mittee,

its

no

terms.

later

The

Security Council asked

than 90 days

steps they have taken to

This

is

an important

all

to

Terrorism

monitor state implemen-

comon the

states to report to the

after the date of adoption of the resolution,

implement the various aspects of the

effort at identifying the gaps that

resolution. 110

can be addressed

through international assistance in creating a more certain expectancy of justice for those terrorists

and would be

terrorists

who

ignore and undermine the

international order. In addition to the subsequent Security Council statements

on

terrorism, the reports that sovereign states

have delivered to the Counter-

Terrorism Committee regarding the concrete steps and present status of international progress in prosecuting terrorist crimes are available on-line. 111

The

more secure future for us all treads the terrain of a vibrant
international cooperation and sovereign investigations and prosecution. An
international terrorist tribunal would disrupt that vital process.

pathway towards

110.

Id.,

a

para. 6.

111. See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ Oan. 30, 2003).
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1

Introduction

I

he

September 2001 changed the whole concept
the minds not only of Americans but of many other

horrific events of 11

of terrorism in

people throughout the world.

The

atrocities perpetrated

were on a scale that was hitherto (and, we must
paralleled. It

is

marily, directed against the
lives

were

names of

afflicted

thing unique,

bat

is

in

1.

which needs

it.

no way

at the

It is

It is

pri-

almost certainly the case that

World Trade Center and

the Pentagon but

as the worst case of a
for

many

years, rather

to diminish their horror,

evil of those responsible. It

still less
is,

To

phenomenon
than as some-

to excuse the con-

however, an important

to be taken in understanding terrorism

and seeking to com-

A successful strategy against terrorism has to be based on a recognition

Christopher Greenwood

and

hope, for ever after) un-

Algeria during 2001 than were cut short

September 2001
most of the world

duct or minimize the
step

that day

Algeria's terrorist victims are unlikely ever to be recorded.

see the events of 11

which has

Qaeda

something exclusively, or even

United States.

lost to terrorism in

by the murders committed
the

al

obvious, however, that terrorism did not begin that day.

also a mistake to conceive of terrorism as

more

all

by

Political Science.

is

Professor of International

Law at the London School of Economics
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that

it is
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an international phenomenon, the

ternational cooperation

on

which

a scale
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fight against

which requires

in-

too rare.

is all

That is particularly the case with attempts to bring terrorists to justice. In
some respects the record of international cooperation since September 2001 is
encouraging

—the unprecedented action taken by the United Nations Secunumber of

which the main anti-terrorism
treaties are now attracting, the broad coalition which cooperated in destroying al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan all demonstrate what can be achieved
by the international community when it works cohesively. But that is only
part of the picture. Serious differences remain about the law to be applied to
acts of terrorism, attempts to characterize terrorists as combatants in a war,
the forum before which terrorist acts can be tried and a host of other issues.
The purpose of this paper will be to examine two of these issues. First, what
is the law applicable to international terrorism and the reaction to it? In particular, what is the relationship between the laws of war and international
criminal law in this context? Secondly, what is the appropriate forum for the
prosecution of the surviving perpetrators of the 1 1 September outrage? In this
context, it is also necessary to ask how the machinery for bringing terrorists
before the appropriate forum can be made more effective.
rity

Council, and the

ratifications

The Proper Law

The Laws

of War

A threshold question which has been raised by the events of
the reaction they have provoked

is

whether terrorism

reference to the criminal law or the laws of war.

Team

that "the deliberate

September and

to be appraised by

The day after the attacks on the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the President
rity

falls

1 1

told the National Secu-

and deadly attacks which were carried out

more than acts of terror; they were acts of war." 2 Others
have argued that what happened was a crime but it had nothing to do with war.
In approaching this issue, it is important to keep in mind that the categories
of crime and act of war are not necessarily exclusive. International law is not
composed of a series of watertight compartments, each insulated from the othagainst our country were

ers.

The

fact that a particular act

der national law) does not
gravity that

it

mean

constitutes a casus

is

a crime

that
belli.

it

under international law (and un-

cannot also be an act of

Thus the

sufficient

fact that the attacks

on the

2. Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, at the
White House Cabinet Room (Sep. 12, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/20Ol/09/20O10912-4.html# (Apr. 29, 2003).
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World Trade Center and the Pentagon were crimes does not preclude them
from also constituting an armed attack for the purposes of the right of selfdefense in international law. That has not prevented a measure of academic

A number of scholars have argued that the concept

controversy on this point.

of "armed attack" in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
acts imputable to a state.

Others have suggested that there

is

is

confined to

a borderline be-

tween crime and armed attack which cannot be crossed.
Neither view has much to commend it and both are at odds with the practice of states and international institutions. Nothing in the text or the drafting
history of the Charter suggests that "armed attack" is confined to the acts of
states.

Moreover, the fons

et origo

of the right of self-defense in international

famous Caroline incident in 1837, concerned an attack on the United
Kingdom's territory in Canada by a group of what we would now call terrorists,
operating from US territory but in no way supported by the United States.
Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom seems to have considered
law, the

that this fact

made any difference

to the application of the law

on

self-defense

and the formulation of the right of self-defense in the correspondence between them concerning the Caroline has been quoted ever since. 3

Nor has

state practice or the jurisprudence of international tribunals since

the adoption of the Charter espoused a formalistic distinction between acts of

and acts of terrorist and other groups in determining what constitutes
an armed attack. The fact that the International Court of Justice, when it recognized in the Nicaragua case 4 that the covert use of force could amount to an
states

armed

attack, referred only to covert actions by a state should not be taken as

a finding (or

even an

obiter dictum) that covert uses of force

by anything other

than a state could not constitute an armed attack. The simple fact

was only

state

conduct which was in

issue in the

is

that

it

Nicaragua proceedings and

the Court neither needed nor attempted to address the status of violence perpetrated without the involvement of a state. Moreover, the Security Council

has repeatedly recognized that international terrorism, whether or not state
supported, can

amount

resolutions 1368
1 1

September,

it

to a threat to international peace

and 1373 (2001), adopted

and security and

in the aftermath of the events of

expressly recognized that the United States

self-defense in terms that could only

mean

in

it

had the

right of

considered that terrorist acts on

armed attacks for the purposes of Article 5 1 irrespective of who perpetrated them, for it was already likely by then that the
a sufficient scale constituted

3.

MacLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and

4. Military

1986

and Paramilitary

I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter

Nicaragua Case].
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on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the work of al
Qaeda. The same approach was taken by the North Atlantic Council on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) 6 and the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS). 7
The suggestion by some commentators that international terrorism must be
attacks

5

mode

dealt with exclusively through the

of criminal prosecution of the indi-

vidual and not through an application of the use o( force in self-defense

more remote from

anything, even

is, if

and logic. Arrest, prosecution and
the ordinary process of the criminal law can occur only once a degree of law
and order have been reimposed within a society after a shocking resort to vioreality

That reimposition of law and order may well entail the use of the milieven within a state and is still more likely to do so in the context of

lence.
tary

international society.

The

they committed in waging

prosecution of the Nazi leadership for the crimes

World War

was not an alternative to the use of
force in self-defense but something which was made possible precisely because
the victims of Nazi aggression were able successfully to employ force and over-

come

those aggressors. This

is

also the

II

approach that must be used in dealing

with the problem of international terrorism. Terrorism on the scale of what

September cannot be addressed through the medium of international criminal law or the law on the use of force alone. It requires a conscious and judicious application of both.

happened on

To

1 1

that extent, therefore,

meaningful to talk of terrorism in the con-

it is

may supply a justification for reThe extent to which the military

text of the law relating to war, for terrorism

under the

sort to force

jus

ad bellum.

response to the events of 11 September 2001 was justified under the United

Nations Charter

is

discussed elsewhere in this volume. 8

firmly of the view that the military action in Afghanistan
jus

5.

ad bellum.

6.

present writer

is

was lawful under the

9

See generally, S. C. Res. 1368,

Res. 1373,

The

U.N. SCOR, 56th

See Press Release,

U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001) and
U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).

S.

C.

Sess.,

NATO Reaffirms Treaty Commitments in Dealing with Terrorist Attacks

Against the U.S. (Sep. 12, 2001), available

e0912a.htm (Apr. 29, 2003).
7. Terrorist Threat to the Americas,

at

http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0910/

OAS Res. RC.24/RES.1/01

(Sep. 21, 2001), reprinted in

40

I.L.M. 1273 (2001).
8. See generally,
9.

Chapters

II

&

III

supra.

Christopher Greenwood, International

Law and the "War against Terrorism", 78 INT'L AFF. 301
Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan,

(2002); Christopher

Greenwood,

International

AlQaida and

SAN DIEGO

INT'L L.

Iraq,

4

J.

7 (2003).
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To

apply the jus ad bellum in this way, however,

from applying the

jus in bello to terrorism

is

a very different matter

and the response to terrorism. Of

where the response to an act of terrorism involves the use o{ force by
one state against another as happened in Afghanistan there will be an international armed conflict governed by the jus in bello. Moreover, to the excourse,

—

members of a
alongside, the armed

tent that the
of,

or

will

—

terrorist

movement such

as al

Qaeda

fight as part

forces of a state in such a conflict, their activities

be subject to the jus in bello (although they

will

not qualify for the status

of lawful combatants in such a case unless they are integrated into the armed
forces of a state or

form

a militia or irregular

group responsible to that state

and meeting the other criteria of the law of armed conflict 10 ).
That is a very different matter, however, from treating al Qaeda as a belligerent in its own right and characterizing its relationship with the United
States as an armed conflict governed by the jus in bello as some commentators
have suggested. Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest that there has
been an armed conflict, presumably of an international character, between
the United States and al Qaeda that goes back at least to the attacks on the
United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 11 and possibly to the
early 1990s and the first World Trade Center attack. On this analysis, this
armed conflict was already in being at the time oi the 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center with the result that this attack, against what was plainly
a civilian object containing thousands of civilians, was a war crime. The attack
on the Pentagon would also have constituted a war crime on this analysis,
even though the Pentagon was itself a military objective, because the means of
attack was a hijacked civil airliner.
This theory has the obvious attraction that, as happened in World War II,
the crimes which were committed could be tried by military commission. 12
Moreover, since this theory means that the United States has been engaged in
an armed conflict for many years, the use of the military on a war footing and
under wartime rules of engagement would raise no legal difficulties. These are
important considerations but there are several reasons

which they present

10.

is

Geneva Convention

one which should be

(III)

why

the temptation

resisted.

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,

art.

4A, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III].
11. On August 7, 1998, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were
bombed by powerful car bombs. Over 250 people died in these attacks with over 5,000 injured.

Osama
12.

bin Laden claimed responsibility for the attacks

For practice in World

War

II,

on behalf of al Qaeda.

see United States v. Quirin, 317
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US

1

(1942).
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something does not become so merely because it is useful that it
should be so. The question whether there is an armed conflict is one which
has to be decided by reference to the objective criteria laid down in international law, not the convenience (or inconvenience) of the results which
First,

may

follow.

Secondly,

Qaeda has

if

one applies the

criteria of international law,

it is

clear that al

neither the right nor the capacity to be a belligerent and to wage

war on the United States. The concept of an international armed conflict is
one which presupposes the existence in all the parties to the conflict of the legal capacity to wage war, that is to say the capacity to be party to international
agreements on war, to comply with those agreements in the conduct of hostilities and, most importantly, to engage in hostilities on a footing of legal equality with one's adversary. This last consideration is fundamental, for it is one of
the cardinal principles of the law of armed conflict that its rules apply equally
to all parties to the conflict irrespective of whether their resort to force was
lawful or unlawful. 13 As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht put it, "it is impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be bound by rules of
warfare without benefiting from them and the other side would benefit from
them without being bound by them." 14 That principle could not be applied to
hostilities between the United States and al Qaeda.
including, in particular, the
State practice before 11 September 2001
practice of the United States
was consistent in treating the concept of international armed conflict as something which could normally arise only between states. To the extent that there was a departure from this principle for
conflicts involving national liberation movements, 15 that departure was

—

—

strictly

confined to entities which had a degree of international personality

and recognition and which were required to undertake to abide by the relevant international agreements which comprise most of the jus in bello. Even
then it was a controversial move and one opposed by the United States. There

no support in state practice or in the literature of international law prior to
1 1 September 2001 for treating the concept of international armed conflict as
broad enough to encompass a relationship between a state on the one side and
is

13.

See, e.g.,

United States

v. List, in

TRIALS OF

WAR CRIMINALS

MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
LAW REPS. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 59.

BEFORE THE NUREMBERG

10, vol.

11, at

1228 (1950),

reprinted in 8
14.

Hersch Lauterpacht, The

Limits of Operation of the

Laws of War, 30 BRIT. Y. BK. INT'L.

L.

206,212(1953).
15.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Convention of

Protection of Victims of International

1125 U.N.T.S.

3,

Armed

12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Conflicts, arts. 1(4)

16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
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and 96(3), Dec.

12, 1977,
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group which has no
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legal personality,

with the laws of the armed conflict (even

no

no capacity to comply
wished to do so), and no compe-

territory,

if it

tence to wage war in the terms of traditional international law.

Nor is

there any sign that the United States regarded

itself as

engaged

in

an

September 2001. The response to
earlier acts of terrorism by al Qaeda was not couched in terms of the law of
armed conflict. 16 Consequently, the suggestion that there has been an armed
conflict between the two dating back, perhaps, to 1993 and the first attack on

armed

conflict with al

Qaeda

World Trade Center,

the

prior to 11

requires us to accept that such a conflict existed

even though the United States was apparently unaware of the

fact for the

better part of a decade.
Finally, while the disadvantages of characterizing the relationship

with

al

Qaeda as an armed conflict can no more preclude that relationship from being
an armed conflict than the advantages of so characterizing it can make it one,
it is important to realize that the policy considerations are by no means onesided. To treat al Qaeda as a belligerent is to confer upon it a status to which it
is

not entitled and does not deserve but which will inevitably suggest to

observers a degree of equality in

its

relations with the

many

United States.

It is

worth recalling that in the 1980s one of the demands made by the Provisional
Irish

Republican

members

as

Army

(IRA) was that the United Kingdom should treat their

combatants, not as

common

criminals.

The United Kingdom

demand even when ten IRA and Irish National Liberation
Army (INLA) members starved themselves to death in protest. Why, then,
give al Qaeda precisely what was demanded by, and denied to, the IRA? To do
rightly resisted this

so will inevitably be taken as conferring an element of legitimacy

on

acts of vi-

olence which can have no legitimate basis whatever.
In addition,
flict

with

armed

al

if

the United States

Qaeda, then

tion.

There may

also be serious

neutrality by states

consequences in the application o{ the law of

which choose

conflict gives

See, e.g.,

them every

remarks explaining the

the laws of

to stand aside

from the conflict

armed

(as

the law of

right to do).

Remarks by President William Clinton on Departure

Martha's Vineyard (Aug. 20, 1998), 34
his

members of the
and not by the members of agencies

operations must be conducted by

Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

as the

16.

engaged in an international armed con-

forces subject to military discipline

such

armed

its

is

WEEKLY COMP.

PRES.

for

Washington

DOC. 1642 (Aug.

DC

From

20, 1998). In

US response to the embassy attacks, President Clinton did not refer to
US response.

conflict as the basis for the

359

Law and

Terrorism: The Proper

An

earlier speaker 17 suggested that

series of policy imperatives, the

when

mean

moment. This

is

the law interferes with a whole

new

threats

The

present writer

which

call for

new

that law built up with painstaking care over

many years can or should be brushed
of the

Forum

law should be "retooled."

accepts that international terrorism poses

thinking but that does not

the Proper

aside in favor of the "policy imperatives"

so not least because conflict between law and policy

often masks a hidden conflict between immediate short-term policy objec-

and longer-term policy imperatives. In the long run, it is patently in the
interests of the United States that the rule of international law should be upheld and, in particular, that the laws of war should be respected and that
principles such as equal application and the proper treatment of prisoners of
war of which the United States has long been the champion should not be
undermined.
At the very least, therefore, a departure from these principles could be in
the policy interests of the United States only if it was really necessary. Yet that
is not the case. The claim that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict has nothing to do with the legality of using force under the jus ad beilum.
That has to be judged by reference to the criteria of self-defense discussed
above (and in other chapters of this volume) irrespective of whether the
United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda. Moreover, nothing in international law precludes the United States from using its armed
tives

forces in counter-terrorist operations unless the jus in bello

is

applicable.

Nor

does international law fetter the use of lethal force or the adoption of robust
rules of engagement

erations in a

way

when

military forces are

engaged

in counter- terrorist op-

that can be avoided by the expedient o{ declaring that an

what can be gained in
terms of international law by a distortion of the concept of armed conflict to
make it fit the operations against al Qaeda. If US law creates difficulties for

armed

the

conflict exists. It

US Government

Comitatus Act

18

is

difficult, therefore, to

—because,

for

—then the remedy

Terrorism and Criminal

see

example, of the application of the Posse
lies

with the

US

Law

Let us turn, therefore, to the other body of law which

may be applicable, namely

the criminal law (both national and international)

should be

made

ism of a clearly

Congress.

on

terrorist activity. It

which follows is confined to terrorinternational character. The most obvious point about such

clear that the brief analysis

17.

See Chapter XI supra.

18.

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2003).
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international terrorism

that the acts by which

is

course, crimes under domestic law.

is

is

accomplished

are, of

A striking (and profoundly depressing) fea-

ture of the debate discussing the crimes

the most obvious crime, murder,

it

committed on September 11th

often omitted.

is

Murder does not cease

that

to be

murder simply because the victims are counted in thousands rather than ones
and twos. It does not cease to be murder because it is carried out by flying hijacked aircraft into buildings rather than by more conventional means. The
Lockerbie verdict

is

a vindication of the principle that terrorist killing

liberate taking of life

by

terrorists

—can and should be prosecuted

as

— the

de-

murder. 19

Other crimes may exist in cases where no deaths occurred or a sufficient
link between the individual being prosecuted and the casualties sustained
cannot be established. Such crimes include crimes committed on or against
aircraft such as those identified in the Hague and Montreal Conventions. 20
These crimes are of course found in almost all domestic law systems as well. In
common law countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
the offense of conspiracy offers a valuable

weapon

against those

who

ter-

the offenses they scheme to perpetrate are not in the

rorist outrages,

even

if

end committed

(e.g.,

because of police intervention). Conspiracy

sarily as readily available,

however, in

and

not neces-

biological or chemical poisons

also be available for charging terrorists.

about the vast majority of these offenses

is

law countries. Other offenses such

civil

as the possession of explosives, firearms

would certainly

plan

is

The

striking thing

that they are generally ordinary

crimes covered by the ordinary principles of criminal law.

The
people
it

fact that in this particular context

we would

call terrorists

may be important

does not alter the underlying truth which

criminal and nothing more.

tween the

common

such crimes are committed by

is

The dichotomy

that the terrorist

is,

at

is

make

the terrorist criminal look
is

that distin-

guishing between the ordinary criminal and the terrorist operates to

look

somehow

Her Majesty's Advocate

less

bottom, a

not always desirable. Some-

worse than he otherwise might. However, what often happens
terrorist criminal

However,

that society tends to create be-

criminal and the terrorist

times this dichotomy seems to be created to

for other reasons.

make

than a criminal given the purpose of

the
his

Megrahi and Fhimah, No. 1475/99, High Court of Justiciary
at Camp Zeist, the Netherlands, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 582 (2001). An appeal by Megrahi was
recently denied on March 14, 2002.
20. See Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec.
16, 1970, 22U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1970) [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Montreal
Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24
U.S.T. 567, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1150 (1971) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
19.

See

v.
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crimes, for the terrorist often attempts to cloak his actions in the guise of free-

dom

and thereby claims that

fighting

Nothing should be allowed

to distract

noble aims permit his ignoble

his

from the criminal character of

acts.

all ter-

rorist activity.

Given that
are

still

when
treal

almost always constitute domestic crimes, there

terrorist acts

substantive rules of public international law worth keeping in

Many would argue that the Hague and Monrelevant when discussing the events of September 1 1th.

discussing these crimes.

Conventions are

In one sense, this

not the case. Since

is

jacked and then destroyed were

were

mind

flying to other

US

airports,

scope of both conventions.
ber 2001 appear to

fall

US

21

all

four of the aircraft which were hi-

registered, took off

from

what happened appears

US

airports,

and

to fall outside the

Nevertheless, although the events of

outside the scope of both conventions,

if

1 1

Septem-

a perpetrator

of one of the offenses recognized in the Conventions was found in a state other

than the United States, the obligation to extradite or prosecute
the Conventions would apply.

laid

down

in

22

Another Convention, which would have been relevant had the United
States been party to it on 11 September 2001, is the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). 23 Article 2(1) of that Convention provides that:

Any

person commits an offense within the meaning of

this

Convention

if

that

person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an

21.

See, e.g.,

Montreal Convention supra note 20,

shall apply only
(a)

art.

4(2) which provides that the Convention

if:

the place of take-off or landing, actual or intended, of the aircraft

is

situated outside

the territory of the State of Registration of that aircraft; or
(b)

the offense

is

committed

in the territory of a State other than the State of

registration of the aircraft.

See also the comparable provision in Article 3(3) of the

Hague Convention,

supra note 20.

Montreal Convention, supra note 20, art. 4(3) which provides that the requirement
that offenses occur outside the state of the registration of the aircraft does not apply when an
22.

See, e.g.,

"offender or the alleged offender

is

registration of the aircraft." Finding

found in the

territory of a State other

such an offender then

does not extradite him ... to submit the case to

its

prosecution." Montreal Convention, supra note 20,

Hague Convention, supra note 20.
23. See International Convention

for the

triggers a

competent authorities

art. 7.

than the State of

requirement

for a state "if it

for the

purpose of

See also Articles 3(5), 6 and 7 of the

Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. Doc. A/

Res.52/164 (Dec. 15, 1997), 37 1.L.M. 249 (1998) (not ratified by the United States until Jun. 26,

2002) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention].

362

Christopher Greenwood

explosive or other lethal device

government facility,

in,

into or against a place of public use, a state or

a public transportation system or

an infrastructure

(a)

with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

(b)

with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,

system, where such destruction results in or

likely to result in

is

facility:

facility

or

major economic

loss.

mind an attack carried
relying on the explosive force

While the draftsmen of this Convention did not have
out by flying hijacked

civil airliners

into buildings,

in

of the impact and the fuel carried by the aircraft to achieve the destructive
fect,

the language of the Convention

is

curred on 11 September 2001. Indeed,

entirely apposite to cover

ef-

what oc-

an important reminder that,
however unprecedented the events of 1 1 September may have been, the existing fabric of international law is capable of dealing with them and there is no
need to create an

entirely

new body

is

it

of law for that purpose.

Crimes against Humanity
In passing,

it

should also be recognized that the conduct of those

who planned

September 11th could also be charged with
crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are generally considered to

and perpetrated the

atrocities of

consist of murder (or certain other offenses)

committed

as part of a

or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

quirement that the attack occur in an armed

conflict.

25

Nor

24

widespread

There

is

no

re-

are crimes against

humanity offenses which may be committed only by the state and its agents;
they are also perfectly capable of being committed by non-state actors. 26 While
the present writer would prefer to deal with the surviving perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001 under the ordinary criminal law, supplemented,

where necessary, by the counter-terrorism treaties, if, for some reason, it proved
useful to try them for a crime against humanity, it seems clear that the elements
of such a crime were present. Murder was undoubtedly committed and even if

24.

See, e.g.,

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

art. 5,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/

9 (1998).
25.

The requirement

of a nexus with armed conflict in Article 5 of the Statute of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
that Tribunal
26.

See

and not a requirement of the substantive

W.A. SCHABAS,

(Cambridge, 2001), 37.

is

a limitation

on the

jurisdiction of

law.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

To

the surprise of the present writer, Professor Schabas argued, in a

discussion with the present writer for the

BBC Radio programme "Law in Action" on 5

2001, that the events of 11 September could not constitute a crime against humanity.
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there was not a widespread attack (a matter for debate) there was certainly a

systematic attack

on the

civilian population.

The Proper Forum
National and International Tribunals

The second

question to consider

is

what

the appropriate forum for trying

is

Newton, the present writer starts
most cases the appropriate forum is a national court

these offenses? Like Lieutenant Colonel

from the premise that

in

and that the most appropriate national court will generally be found in the
state where the offense was committed. So far as this writer is concerned, the
proper forum in which to try those persons still alive who were responsible for
the attacks of September 11th is the courts of competent jurisdiction in the
United States. Although it has sometimes been suggested that a jury in the
United States could not give a defendant a fair trial in a case as highly
charged as, for example, one involving the attack on the World Trade Center, there is no basis for such a suggestion. While it needs to be recognized
that outside the common law countries the jury is often viewed as a threat to
the rights of the accused rather than the guarantee of those rights, 27
sense to say that a jury which had heard
trial

all

it is

of the evidence put before

non-

it

in a

with the constitutional and other safeguards of the United States system

and which was properly directed by an experienced judge could not do justice
in such a case. To accept the argument that a fair trial in the United States
would be impossible comes perilously close to creating an atmosphere in
which the more serious the crime, the less likely it is that the perpetrator will
be brought to justice, because it is far from obvious that there is a court in any
other state which would be able to offer a better guarantee of a fair and effective trial.

The

only alternative to

trial in a

national court would be

ternational tribunal. Currently there

is,

trial

before an in-

no international tribunal in
over the crimes committed on

of course,

existence which could exercise jurisdiction

September 2001. Neither the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY) nor the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) has subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes o{
September 11th. The International Criminal Court (ICC) does not have ret1 1

roactive jurisdiction, quite apart from the fact that neither the United States
27.

It is

noticeable that in the Lockerbie

Government of Libya who
Other Case, 49 INT'L

trial,

on trial without a
Q. 278 (2000).

insisted

&COMP.

L.

was the defendants and the
see Anthony Aust, Lockerbie: The

supra note 19,
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(as the state in

whose

territory the offenses

some of the perpetrators

nationality of at least

ICC.
rity

were committed) nor the

An international trial would,

states of

are parties to the statute of the

therefore, require the creation by the Secu-

Council o{ a new court or tribunal. Such a step seems both unlikely and

unnecessary.

That

is

not to

however, that international tribunals have no part to

say,

The

play in the fight against terrorism.
scale of 11

September 2001 could constitute

that future acts of terrorism

the ICC. Indeed,

it is

on that

an act of terrorism on the
crime against humanity means

fact that
a

scale could

worth recalling that the

fall

within the jurisdiction of

an international
cases where there was no

possibility of

court exercising jurisdiction over terrorist offenses in

national court which was in a position to do so without imposing unreasonable

burdens on the state concerned was one of the reasons for the original proposals for

On

the creation of an international criminal court.
the subject of the ICC,

necessary to say a

it is

little

about the current

controversy between the United States and most of the European States.

There is no doubt that the differences between the two on this subject run
deep. That the United States has serious concerns about the ICC is something
which the European governments have to recognize. Some of the criticism of
the United States position is exaggerated, to say the least. The United States
was under no obligation to become a party to the ICC Statute and its choice
not to do so is one which has to be respected. At the same time, however, US
critics

of the court should bear in

mind

that their constant attacks

on the

may well be counter-productive. To
the ICC is an important step forward in

court are at least as exaggerated and

many

states

—probably

a majority

—

international cooperation against the most serious of crimes. For the United
States to denigrate that step while

demanding

national cooperation against terrorist crime
to

is

a range of other forms of inter-

scarcely the

most

effective

way

win hearts and minds.

Enhancing Effectiveness of National Mechanisms

for Bringing Terrorists

to Justice

Since domestic courts are generally the most appropriate forum in which
those accused of acts of international terrorism can be brought to justice,
a matter of the

tween
ters

states in relation to extradition

should be

from

utmost importance that the machinery

made

for

and mutual assistance

cooperation bein criminal

as effective as possible. Sadly, the present system

effective. Extradition

is

it is

matis

far

understandably subject to safeguards for the ac-

cused and those safeguards have been supplemented by the effect of various
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for
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for the

Forum

the Proper

accused

The

rights treaties.

however, an entirely

is,

dif-

some of the restrictions and limitations with which the extradition process has become hedged around. This is not the place for a
detailed examination of these issues but five matters require brief comment.
First, extradition must ultimately be based upon trust. The requested state
has to be willing to trust the requesting state. That trust is not, of course, blind
ferent matter from

trust. It

axiomatic that extradition should not occur without guarantees of a

is

fair trial.

However,

the right to a

all

too often

fair trial is

it

seems that our approach to

laced with a

somewhat parochial

this

notion of

attitude in

which we

perceive as deficiencies in the legal systems of other states any difference be-

tween

their legal systems

askance

at the

absence in English law of a

strict

On the other hand, many in

obtained evidence.
rified

and our own. For example, many

by the sight of a

US

US

lawyers look

exclusionary rule for illegally
the United

Kingdom

are hor-

prosecutor standing on the steps of a courthouse

claiming that the defendant has been indicted for the most serious crimes in

terms which

—

to the British ear

— perhaps

fail

to

make

entirely clear the dif-

Kingdom

ference between indicted and convicted and which, in the United

would amount

to a criminal

contempt of court because of the

risk of influenc-

ing the jury. Lawyers in both countries (and indeed throughout the

law world) are amazed at the practice in some

common

law states where the ac-

civil

cused's previous convictions are disclosed to the court at the

commencement

of the hearing.
It is

entirely appropriate

which the accused

will

requested country.

The

and necessary that the

fairness of the process to

be subject in the requesting state

is

scrutinized in the

process of scrutiny, however, has to be accompanied

by a recognition that the fact that the courts of the requesting state may have
different procedures

from those of the requested does not mean that they do

not offer a

The

fair trial.

fact that a state

not automatically exclude evidence

on evidence which

will

has no provision for jury

illegally

obtained, permits press

trial,

does

comment

be seen by the jury, or that imposes limitations unfa-

unknown in) the requested state on the right of appeal do not
and of themselves make the trial process in the requesting state unfair.
miliar to (or

Secondly, the fact that in international law there

is

no duty on

extradite a suspect in the absence of an extradition treaty

in

a state to

between that

state

which wants to try the suspect makes it a matter of great importance that gaps in the network of extradition treaties be closed wherever possible. The multilateral agreements on terrorism, such as the Hague and
Montreal Conventions and the Terrorist Bombings Convention, are of great
and the

state
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significance here, since these treaties serve as extradition treaties

those parties

This

is

who do

between

not already have bilateral extradition agreements.

new bilateral
amendment of existing

particularly important, because the negotiation of

agreements can be a very slow process, as can the
agreements.

A case in point

is

the negotiation in the mid-1980s of the Supple-

mentary Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United
States, which was designed to facilitate the extradition of terrorists (at that
time, primarily IRA suspects wanted by the United Kingdom). 28 This process

and met with stringent opposition from some
notwithstanding that the treaty was between allies in the fight

was, to say the least, complex
senators,

against terrorism with legal systems that are closely similar.

One feature of the
many
some

requirement of a treaty as the basis

for extradition

is

that

requests for extradition in terrorist cases are governed by treaties of
antiquity.

Those

treaties frequently

diction are that the offense was
state or that the

however,

far

assume that the only bases

committed on the

accused was a national of that

for juris-

territory of a requesting

state.

Such an approach

is,

phenomenon of international
AUFawaz case decided by the

too restrictive in dealing with the

terrorism. This point

House of Lords
United States

in

was highlighted

England

in 2002.

in the

The

case concerned a request by the

for the extradition of three suspects

the bombings of the

US

accused of involvement in

embassies in East Africa in 1998.

ground that under international law the United States had

It

was

common

extraterritorial ju-

had been directed against
embassies and diplomatic personnel but a question was raised as to whether
jurisdiction of this kind was sufficient to meet the requirements of a treaty
concluded at a time when the concept of jurisdiction was essentially territorial. The Divisional Court concluded that it was not (although it held that the
defendants could be extradited on the strength of acts performed in the
United States).
The House of Lords rejected the Divisional Court's narrow approach to jurisdiction. As Lord Hutton (who, as a former Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, has extensive experience of terrorist trials) said in the AUFaivaz case:
risdiction in respect of these offenses, because they

in the

modern world

of international terrorism and crime, proper effect would

not be given to the extradition procedures agreed upon between states

if

a

person accused in a requesting state of an offense over which that state had
extra-territorial jurisdiction

28.

(it

also being

an offense over which the requested

See Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S. -U.K.,

Exec. Rep. 99-17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1986), reprinted
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state would have extra-territorial jurisdiction) could avoid extradition on the
ground that the offense was not committed within the territory of the requesting
state.

29

This broader approach to jurisdiction
effective

mechanism

is

obviously far more likely to provide an

for international cooperation against forms of terrorism

which the traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction is wholly inadequate. Yet it must be open to question whether all courts faced with one of the
older extradition treaties would be willing to give that treaty the broader interpretation which the House of Lords gave to the United Kingdom-United
for

States Treaty.

Thirdly, there

is

the question of the political offender exception which ap-

The notion

pears in most extradition treaties.
tradited for a political offense

is

that an accused will not be ex-

well established in

most national extradition

laws and has traditionally been seen as an important safeguard o(
ties.

Yet the nature of a

terrorist offense

for political motives. If extradition

cal motives,

it

would

is

that

it is

civil liber-

almost always committed

could be prevented because of those

effectively be precluded as a

means of bringing

politi-

terrorists

was a serious obless importance to-

to justice. Fortunately, while the political offender exception
stacle to the extradition of terrorists at

day.

The more modern

one time,

it is

of far

multilateral counter-terrorist treaties each provide

which they apply are not to be regarded as political offenses. Similarly, the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism
(1977) provides that the crimes to which it applies may not be treated as political offenses and relies instead upon the safeguard that a defendant should not
that the offenses to
30

be extradited

if

there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she

would be prejudiced
gion or nationality.

31

at their trial

by virtue of their political

This approach makes

beliefs, race, reli-

far better sense, offering a safe-

guard based on the nature of the process which a defendant would face
extradited, rather than a "get out of jail free" card based

if

on the nature of the

offense of which they are accused.

needs to be borne in mind that some differences between

legal

systems create obstacles to extradition which cannot be brushed aside.

The

Finally,

it

most important instance

29.

Id.,

probably the different attitudes toward the death

para. 64.

Bombings Convention, supra note 21, art. 11.
See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977),

30. See,
31.

is

e.g.,

Terrorist

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (UN, 2001).
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penalty in democratic states. While some, noticeably the United States, retain
the death penalty for murder, the majority do not. For the parties to the Euro-

pean Convention on Human Rights, this fact creates a serious obstacle to extradition in cases where the accused faces a death sentence in the requesting
state

if

convicted. In Soering

Rights held that

it

v.

would be

United Kingdom 32 the European Court of Human

a violation of the prohibition of Article 3 of the

Convention (prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) to extradite a person to a non-Convention state if that person faced a
serious risk of being sentenced to death in a state where there was a long period of delay between sentence and execution. More significantly, for states
party to Protocol 6 to the Convention, there is a broader prohibition on the
death penalty which will generally preclude extradition where a death sentence

is

a real possibility. 33 In those circumstances, effective international

cooperation in bringing terrorists to justice

is

not compatible with the mainte-

nance of capital punishment.
Conclusion

The

title

of this panel

means

is

bringing terrorists to justice. Bringing terrorists to

must be brought before a court where they receive a
trial that is fair and is seen to be fair. This is an important part of the whole
process as it is not enough to lock someone in prison, execute them, or simply
make them disappear. Instead, to fight terrorism properly, public opinion must
be convinced of the guilt of the accused and of the egregious nature of the
crime that he has committed. If that is to be done in an effective manner, it requires a clear understanding of the law applicable to terrorist crimes and a

justice

that they

high degree of international cooperation.

United Kingdom,

1 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, April 28, 1983 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1985), E.T.S. 1 14, reprinted in
22I.L.M.539(1983).

32.

Soering

v.

33. See Protocol 6 to the
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Manuel

As

Supervielle

the Staff Judge Advocate for the

US

1

Southern Command,

I

am

ex-

posed to a number of international legal issues occurring in the inter-

national community. Interestingly, given

my

position,

I

am

exposed to the

me

Central and Latin America position on these issues which often causes

US government

delve deeply into the positions the

Mike Newton's

thesis

against international law are dealt with

To

date, this thesis echoes the

US

prosecute the types of crimes that

is

Uniform Code of Military Justice,

position that

many other

independent judiciary, which

1.

Colonel Manuel Supervielle, an

Southern Command. In
issues to

US

military

is

it

has the requisite ability to

nations want the International

The United

The United

States has the

States also

certainly not true in

think that

Army Judge

this position,

commands

I

crimes

and
has an ef-

a fairly extensive federal criminal code,

supporting state subordinate criminal codes.
world. However, something

how and where

a question of national political will.

Criminal Court (ICC) to have jurisdiction over.

fective,

takes.

that the decision as to

is

to

is

Advocate,

many areas

of the

occasionally missed by those

is

the Staff Judge Advocate for the

US

he provides legal advice on international and operational law

or operations throughout Central and South America.
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advocating the
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many

nations that recognize that

they do not have the rich history of an independent and impartial judiciary,

nor do they have the type of separation of powers to remove bias and corruption from the court systems like the United States does. For these countries,

many seem
ply

do not

trust their

frustration

ICC in lieu of their own domestic courts as they simown judicial and political systems. Hope has turned to

to prefer the

which has turned to despair

in

not surprising that such countries see the

on an

such countries and

it is

ICC

hope

as holding out

accordingly,
for achiev-

what has proven unattainable on the domestic
scale. Recognizing then that the United States does have the rich, independent infrastructure and a proven history of being able to deal with war criminals
and the like as well as the political will to handle those accused of crimes
against international law, it might nonetheless behoove the anti-ICC advocates to consider that other nations and their citizens do not have the luxury
of the same rich history. There maybe very logical reasons as to why other
countries would sign and ratify the Rome Statute that have nothing to do with
the US view on the statute.
Chris Greenwood's point that terrorism certainly did not begin on September 11th is exactly correct. While terrorism became of greater importance to
many US citizens on that date, it certainly was not created on that date. Many
countries in the region in which I work have long histories of terrorism within
their borders. As an example, Colombia has lost some 200,000 people to various acts of terror by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia over the
last 40 years. 2 Peru has had its share of problems with the Sendero Luminoso
terrorist group. 3 These examples bring to mind the idea that other places in
the world have been dealing with the problem of terrorism for many years. The
United States must be prepared to do so as well.
Finally, against the backdrop of this panel about challenges in bringing terrorists to justice and the previous panel on coalition operations, the likely passage of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) gives me some
ing

2.

3.

international scale,

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are also known
Sendero Luminoso is also known as the Shining Path.
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as the

FARC.

Manuel
concern. 4 While there

by the President,
friend

and

allies

sically this bill,

is

much

Supervielle

to like

about the contents of this

signed

bill, if

make working in coalition operations and with
much more difficult in some situations than ever before. Bait is

likely to

with the exception of

NATO countries, prohibits the US gov-

ernment from providing any kind of security assistance to countries that are
party to the ICC. Currently, every country in South America, except for Surinam, and every country in Central America, except El Salvador and Hondu5
ras, have signed or ratified the Rome Statute.

The caveat

to the

ASPA is that such security assistance may be provided by

the United States to such countries as have entered into an Article 98 agree-

ment agreeing not

to permit extradition of

US

service -members to the

ICC

Editor's note: The American Servicemember's Protection Act became law when President
Bush signed the Emergency Anti-Terror Bill on August 2, 2002. Notably, the ASPA finds that
"the United States will not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over
United States nationals," and provides that no United States court, and no agency or entity of
4.

any state or local government, including any court, may cooperate with the ICC in response to a
request for cooperation submitted by the

The ASPA also

ICC pursuant

to the

Rome

Statute.

ASPA,

§

2004(b).

US citizens to the ICC;

prohibits the extradition of permanent resident aliens or

the use of appropriated funds to assist the ICC; the participation of US service-members in any

chapter VI or VII operations, the creation of which
the

Rome Statute

is

authorized by the

UN on or after the date

enters into effect (unless the President certifies that the service-members will

not risk criminal prosecution by the ICC); and the provision of "military assistance" to a country
that
a party to the ICC (this prohibition does not apply to NATO countries or major nonNATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic of Korea and New
is

Zealand) and Taiwan); the President
assistance
statute

if

is

in the national interest of the

grants

authorized to waive this prohibition on military

United States.

ASPA, §§ 2004-2007.

the President the prospective authority to "use

appropriate to bring about the release of any (covered) person

all

who

Finally, the

means necessary and
is

being detained or

imprisoned by, or on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court." See
§ 2008(a). Covered persons include "members of the

Armed

ASPA,

Forces of the United States, elected

or appointed officials of the United States Government, and other persons employed by or

working on behalf of the United States Government,
party to the International Criminal Court." See
5.

for so long as the

ASPA, § 2013(4).
Rome Statute,

For a current update on signatories to the

see

United States

is

not a

Country by Country

Ratification Report, accessible at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/

partl/chapterXVIII/treatylO.asp (Oct. 23, 2002).
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State Department

is

currently pursuing such

agreements with nations throughout the world but

is

not having great success.

Absent such agreements

it

will

in our area of operations,

become

increasingly

and conduct coalition operations with many of our
the Southern Hemisphere.

difficult to plan, fund,

long-term

allies in

Article 98 of the
1.

Rome

Statute provides

The Court may not proceed with

a request tor surrender or assistance

require the requested State to act inconsistently with

its

which would

obligations under international

law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third
State, unless the

Court can

first

obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver

of the immunity.
2.

The Court may not proceed with

requested

State

to

act

a request for surrender

inconsistently

with

its

agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State
person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can

first

the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
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Daniel Helle

he multi-faceted nature of "terrorism" along with the lack of a commonly agreed understanding of the term gives rise to numerous ques-

I
tions

1

on how the problems should be

tackled.

determining whether additional or different norms

Such questions include

may be necessary

(including

deciding which acts should be considered as international crimes) and

combat terrorism while respecting the requirements imposed by

The

how

to

existing law.

following observations essentially relate to the relationship between

human

rights law, interna-

and international criminal

law. 2 All three, but

different legal regimes, in particular international

tional humanitarian law (IHL)

ICRC Delegation to the United Nations.
between IHL and international criminal law, I think of
"international criminal law instruments" as encompassing those conventions which have been
specifically aimed at preventing and repressing terrorism. I do not wish to label the Geneva
Conventions or their Additional Protocols as "international criminal law instruments," in spite
of the fact that these conventions contain obligations on all state parties to prosecute or
extradite persons suspected of having committed "grave breaches," several of which can cover
terrorist acts. This is because the primary aim of IHL instruments is to highlight the rights and
1.

Daniel Helle

2.

When

is

the Deputy

Head

of the

discussing the relationship

obligations

of the parties

to

a

conflict;

implementation should be dealt with

is

whereas the regulation of how cases of non-

treated

on

a separate, "second" level.
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also other
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branches of international law, are relevant

when

addressing various

While they share the common aim of seeking to protect
human dignity and security, each have their strengths and weaknesses, and
thus should be reserved to address the areas for which they are most suited.
aspects of "terrorism."

The concurrent
is

application of different legal regimes in any given situation

normally an advantage, notably because

festations of terrorism

ted the act (was

it

it

helps ensure that various mani-

can be addressed, taking into account who has commit-

a private individual, a

conflict, a representative of a state);

member of the armed

member

of a party to an armed

who the act was committed against

(a civil-

and the related question of the context
which the act was committed (was it committed during an armed conflict or
ian, a

forces);

in
in

"peace-time").
In

some

cases,

such a concurrence may help prevent the occurrence of

"gaps" in the system. For instance,

who do

during an armed conflict, individuals

if

not belong to any of the parties to the conflict commit a terrorist act

(whatever the motive), humanitarian law
sue at the penal level and there
"kick in."
It is

is

a

may not adequately

need

address the

is-

law to

for international criminal

1

not necessarily a significant drawback that different legal regimes apply

same event, if they all point toward a similar
provided by one legal regime is "subsumed" by the
to the

result, or the protection

other.

Such may be the

case, for instance, with respect to fair trial guarantees provided in

and humanitarian law.
There are, however, instances where

human

rights

different legal regimes point to differ-

ent results, so that their simultaneous application to the same subject matter
difficult to reconcile, or

cases, to achieve

is

they are simply incompatible with each other. In such

an acceptable

result,

may be

it

necessary to draft or interpret

the scope of application of the relevant instruments as mutually exclusive.

One

potential problem arises

when

the logic of criminal repression en-

croaches excessively onto that of humanitarian action and/or humanitarian
law.

The

national

preservation of the latter two

is

an important reason why the

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been

Inter-

attentively following

the drafting of international criminal law instruments at the United Nations.

1.

The

parties

do have a general

responsibility to protect civilians

duty of diligence cannot be taken so
every single act of violence which

far as to

may occur.

impose a criminal

under

their control, but this

liability for failing to

prevent

In any event, there also remains the separate need

to punish the direct perpetrators of such acts.
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Daniel Helle

An

illustration of this possible tension

was seen during the drafting of the

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 2

The Convention

covers more than just the transfer of "funds" as this term

is

normally understood, so as to include notably "assets of every kind, whether
tangible or intangible,

movable or immovable." 3

It

criminalizes the provision of

funds in the knowledge that they are to be used for a terrorist act. 4 In the context of an

such
it

armed

as the

conflict,

what then would be the

ICRC to carry out a

possibility of

an organization

large-scale humanitarian assistance program,

if

were to assume that even a small portion of the assistance might be diverted

by rebel groups

who are labelled as

doing, be accused of committing

terrorists

by the government? Could

an international crime? The

concerns with government representatives,

who amended

convention (by better qualifying the crime), so

ICRC

it,

in so

raised

its

the text of the draft

as to preserve the possibility of

delivering humanitarian assistance in conflict situations.

As

a

second example,

it

may be

that an act (such as killing a person)

is

an international criminal law instrument, whereas the
same act (such as killing a soldier) is not considered unlawful per se under international humanitarian law. Unless these two situations are distinguished,
there is a risk that members of one of the parties will be labelled as internalabelled as a crime in

tional criminals, for the

may in turn be

mere

fact of

having participated in

hostilities,

which

comply with the demands of humanitarian law (such as respecting and protecting detainees under their control)
If one side ceases to comply with its obligations, there is a further risk that the
opposite side will soon cease to comply also. The potential consequences for
all those finding themselves in the power of a party to the conflict and/or exa disincentive for

them

to

posed to the dangers of military operations should be evident.

A part of the

problem is that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," as was observed several times during the conference proceedings. This challenge has been a recurring one; for more than a century, there
have been divergent views between government representatives on who has
the right to take up arms against one another. It must be recalled, in this
connection, that disagreement in 1899 on the resistance movement's right
to fight enemy occupation led to the adoption of the Martens Clause, a provision which in its contemporary version ensures that no person is ever left
2.

See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.

109,

U.N.

GAOR,

6th Comm., 54th

Sess.,

76th Mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/54/109

(1999), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention].
3. Id., art. 1.
4. Id., art. 2.
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to the arbitrary treatment of authorities, but remains

the law.

under the protection of

5

Excluding an issue from the scope of international criminal law and leaving
to the

domain of IHL does not

necessarily

mean

that

it

addressed, but rather that a different set of rules takes over.

It

it

will

be

left

un-

should be noted

numerous acts of "terrorism" are already squarely prohibby IHL, whether as such or as acts subsumed under numerous other quali-

in this regard that
ited

fications,

such as hostage-taking, deliberate attacks against

indiscriminate attacks. However, as suggested above,

edged when considering what
acts

falls

the core characteristics of

upon

to guide

how

and thus

it

clearly unlawful in peacetime.

human

criminal law are put in contrast, there
their different nature

or

must be acknowlwithin the notion of "terrorism," that some

which are lawful under IHL are

When

civilians,

is

to assess

rights law,

humanitarian law and

often no real problem to distinguish

which

legal

regime should be relied

terrorism should be countered. There are

some

areas,

how-

where the delimitation between these branches of international law is
imprecise or uncertain, in which case one must carefully seek to establish the
boundaries of each legal regime. In this process, it can be useful sometimes to
approach "the border" from both sides, considering for each those arguments
that speak for inclusion and those that speak for exclusion of the regime being
considered. In this regard, it should be noted that there are risks associated
not only with an excessive scope of application of international criminal law,
but also of international humanitarian law. Thus, if there is doubt as to
whether various persons can be considered as taking an active/direct part in
hostilities, it may be relevant to approach the matter not only from the angle
of IHL, but also to analyze the question from the perspective of human rights
(including the right to life) and international criminal law.
ever,

The question of bringing
function of how one looks at
ogy.

One example can

"terrorists" before the right tribunal

may be

a

the subject-matter rather than one of terminol-

be found in Article 5 of the Third Geneva Conven-

where the drafters, according to the records of the proceedings, seemed
to have treated broadly, as one issue, the question of how doubts as to the status of POWs were to be resolved. This issue masks the fact that there may be
vastly different questions being considered. In one case it may be, for instance,
that the detaining authorities consider whether the person concerned
tion,

should be sent to a
tion
5.

is

POW camp or to a camp for civilian internees. This ques-

not entirely without importance, since treatment provided by the Third

For a discussion of the Martens Clause, see Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of

Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94

AM.
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J.

INT'L

L

78 (2000).

Daniel Helle

Convention is not identical to that provided by the Fourth Convention. It is
however an entirely different matter to decide whether the person concerned
should be punished for having taken part in

In the event that the

hostilities.

death penalty can be imposed, any absence of available

fair trial

guaran-

the composition of the
and the proce—including with
from humanitarian law
from
dure adopted, and whether these
law— opens up the
execution. Since the
human
tribunal

respect to

tees

originate

or

possibility for arbitrary

rights

above two questions are of a quite different nature, they should
with as separate matters; notably so that any

initial

also be dealt

decision with respect to

where the person should be detained should have no impact on the question
of criminal liability and punishment.
Lastly, it is clear that terrorism must be countered through a multitude o{
means, including diplomatic efforts, international cooperation to exchange
information and freeze assets, public debate and awareness-raising, to name
but a few. In this regard, IHL neither should be asked to perform more than
what it was made for, nor should it be discredited on erroneous grounds, such
as allegedly opposing criminal repression simply because it mandates humane
treatment and judicial guarantees. Conversely, IHL should be respected in all
cases where armed conflict occurs, whether or not the purpose of the conflict
is related to terrorism and in regard to all persons involved in or affected by
the conflict.

According IHL

its

appropriate place will help secure,

on the one hand,

that

various branches of international law have sufficient vitality to bring terrorists
to justice, while at the

tecting

human

dignity

same time preserving other approaches aimed
and public safety.
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Discussion

On
Yoram

the Distinction

Between Armed Conflict and Armed Attack

Dinstein

Care must be taken to distinguish between the two, markedly
of "armed conflict" and "armed attack."
rived from Article 5

1

UN

of the

The

Charter and

expression "armed attack"
it

col

I

is

as well as hostilities short of

1 1

"Armed

conflict,"

the term of art characteristic especially of the 1977 Proto-

Additional to the Geneva Convention, where

September

de-

is

constitutes the trigger for the

exercise of the individual or collective right of self-defense.

on the other hand,

different phrases

war between

used in the sense of war

states. 1

—Armed Attack, Armed

th

it is

Ordinary Criminal Acts

Conflict,

Michael Newton

The United

States was in an

armed

conflict with al

Qaeda

at the very least

by

armed attacks against US
personnel and facilities beginning arguably with the downing of the Blackhawk
helicopters in Mogadishu, including the bombings of the Khobar towers, the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Kenya, and the bombing of the USS
Cole in the Yemeni port. These armed attacks were reinforced and called for by
September 11th. There were,

1.

See generally Protocol Additional

in fact, a long series of

(I)

to the

Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International

& (b), Dec.

12, 1977,

1125 U.N.T.S.

3,

Armed Conflicts,

16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).

arts.

51.5(a)

6*.

57.2(a)

(iii)
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Qaeda members as well as by bin Laden himself. Each time one of these

armed attacks occurred, the United States had the authority under
the

UN Charter to engage in self-defense against al Qaeda. The

Article 5

1998 missile

tacks in Afghanistan are one manifestation of the United States pursuing

its

of

1

at-

law-

ful right to self-defense.

Christopher Greenwood

armed conflict existed before, or even after, the events of September 1 1th between the United States and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda does not have
the capacity to make a declaration of war any more than an individual in a nonofficial governmental capacity has the ability to do so. Politicians and academics alike, within the United States and outside, did not take the position before
September 1 1th that the United States was party to an armed conflict with al
Qaeda. It is only subsequent to these horrible events that some have argued
this to be the case. One reason some have taken this position is that it then
makes the unlawful targeting of civilians a war crime which may be properly
I

disagree that an

brought before a military commission.

and quite

incorrect. In this respect,

I

I

believe this to be a perversion of the law

Yoram

agree with

Dinstein.

The

events

preceding and including those on September 11th were armed attacks within
the meaning of Article 5

1

of the

UN Charter. These acts were threats to inter-

national peace and security and the Security Council, nations, and alliances

them as such. 2
Is there an armed conflict against Afghanistan? To be sure there is. The
fighting between the United States and al Qaeda personnel alongside the
Taliban is regulated and governed by the law of armed conflict but not because they are al Qaeda members but instead because they are fighting with a
Afghanistan. The fact that an al Qaeda member
party to an armed conflict
clearly identified

—

turns up in another country does not

mean

that they are automatic targets for

they are not. By claiming to be in an armed conflict with
States

is

giving a

Qaeda, the United
degree of legitimacy to people who are really nothing more

than horrible criminals. This
exceedingly
bunals.

difficult to

The United

is

a terrible error.

proceed against

al

States will have to try

I

al

believe this error will

Qaeda members
and

fit

what

is

make

before military

it

tri-

essentially a terrorist

crime into a framework of criminal offenses designed for crimes of war.

Michael Newton
It is

doubtful that anyone at this conference would contest the statement that

the attacks
2.

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th

See S. C. Res. 1368, U.N.

SCOR, 56th

Sess.

U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2001).
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UN

were indeed armed attacks within the meaning of Article 5 1 of the

Char-

may properly invoke its right to
since they were
self-defense under Article 51 as against al Qaeda members
the threat that caused the events of September 1 1 th. The right of self-defense
allows the United States then to do what? Not to engage in intentional attacks
on civilians but instead to attack those who have attacked you. This is done in
ter.

This clearly means that the United States

—

the context of an armed conflict. Recall that the United States

is

not a signa-

Geneva Conventions so as far as the United States is
concerned, these al Qaeda members are not proper combatants within the
meaning of Article 44 of this Protocol. 3 They are not civilians since they are
taking an active part in hostilities. Nor are they proper combatants. Instead,
they are unprivileged or unlawful combatants with none of the protections of
tory to Protocol

See Protool

I,

Article
1.

Any

I

of the

supra, art. 44,

which provides

44 — Combatants and

in relevant part:

prisoners of war

combatant, as defined in Article 43,

who

falls

into the

power of an adverse

Party shall be a prisoner of war.

While

combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law
armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of
his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to
be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
2.

all

applicable in

3.

In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of

combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
hostilities,

an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself,
he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his
arms openly:
a.

during each military engagement, and

b.

during such time as he
military

is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to

participate.
c.

Acts which comply with the requirements of

this

paragraph shall not be

considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph
4.

1

(c).

A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the

requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall

forfeit his right to

prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in
to those accorded to prisoners of

war by the Third Convention and by

all

be a

respects

this Protocol.

This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by
the Third Convention in the case where such a person
offences he has committed.
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Geneva Conventions. As unlawful combatants, however, they are committing war crimes which is exactly what al Qaeda members did on September
the

11th.

Christopher Greenwood

Al Qaeda members are not unlawful, lawful, or any other type of combatants
at all. Clearly, no one would suggest that they are lawful combatants, even
under Article 44 of GP I. You continue to give al Qaeda members a status
they do not deserve. I agree that al Qaeda members who are fighting alongside Taliban members in Afghanistan are entitled to be called combatants because that is truly an armed conflict. However, the attack on the World
Trade Center was not perpetrated by unlawful, unprivileged, or any other sort
of combatant or belligerent. It was perpetrated by common criminals. Do not
pretend that what these people did was a war crime. It was simple murder.
Murder under the ordinary criminal' code of the United States and New York,
nothing more, nothing

By bringing

this

notion of an existing armed conflict dating back into the

middle of the 1990s,
conflict.

more

Taking

less.

this position,

difficult for the

you are undermining the very laws of armed
that an armed conflict exists, will make it much

believe

I

United States to bring them to

justice.

Michael Newton
Inasmuch as your position suggests that these types of crimes are best prosecuted by domestic tribunals, I agree. That is not to say, however, that I believe
these people to be the same as the ordinary criminal on the streets of New York
City. Terrorism clearly overlaps the boundaries between criminal law and the
law of armed conflict. As practitioners, however, we must be careful not to rush
to apply domestic criminal law restrictions to what are international law of
armed conflict issues.

Manuel

Supervielle

an excellent point given the authorizations typically contained in rules
of engagement when an opposing force is designated hostile. As we all know,

This

is

when
enemy

this occurs,

actions

US

soldiers

—except

may

oi course

if

target the

who

suddenly sees an

al

said,

when we

mean that the US
Qaeda member must attempt

situations,

does

sight, regardless of

they meet the requirements of effectively

attempting to surrender. With that being

paradigm to these

enemy on

it

prosecution through domestic courts, or alternatively,
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on the rooftop
to first arrest him for
when al Qaeda forces
sniper
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are declared hostile, should he not simply be able to target

an

al

Qaeda mem-

ber on sight? These are the very real types of issues that must be resolved so
soldiers

have clear guidance and instruction in such

Harvey Rishikof
The tension that exists between these two

positions

difficult situations.

is

the problem associated

with the current classification schemes. Professor Greenwood would have conference participants believe that

on September 11th

al

Qaeda members who committed the

are garden variety, ordinary criminals. If this

is

attacks

the case,

then the correct domestic response would be to mobilize the Federal Bureau of

and bring them all to trial in federal court. This would mean that
the appropriate response would not be one using the military but instead one
using available police. On the other hand, these same al Qaeda members do not
fit neatly within the established classification system of combatants or noncombatants. Importantly for the future here, these conflicts between the classification systems must be resolved. In the future, groups that are likely to cause
such problems are likely to be one part criminal, one part terrorist, and one part
political. How then do we resolve the classification scheme to deal with each
category independently as well as different categories when combined?
Investigation

Michael Newton

armed conflict has demonstrated its ability to evolve
over time and that is exactly what is happening now. It is no longer enough to
treat terrorism in general within the paradigm of ordinary criminal conduct.
The United States has proven since September 1 1th that it is unwilling to continue to treat terrorists this way. So the paradigm must expand or shift and that
shift is to treat such behavior as war crimes precisely because the United States
is unwilling to recognize the right of a group to attack a sovereign state. So the
United States will treat them as unlawful combatants, participants if you do not
like the word combatant, in what is an organized armed conflict, war if you will,
controlled, directed, and funded against the United States.
Fortunately, the law o{

Christopher Greenwood

An

armed

conflict has always

been defined

as a

war or

conflict

between two

more modern times, between a state and an entity such as a
national liberation movement which may have many of the attributes of the
state. Suggesting that the current conflict between al Qaeda and the United
States is an armed conflict within the meaning of that term elevates al Qaeda to
a status it does not deserve nor is it entitled to. On what basis does a terrorist
states or possibly, in
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movement such
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acquire the right to declare war on a sovereign

such as the United States? By suggesting that

state

upon it
ing

Qaeda

as al

—Bringing

its

a status that

does not otherwise possess. In doing

it

activities. Finally,

moment

nience of the

US

inconsistent with

has that

it

I

am concerned

that this

Qaeda in
towards al Qaeda in

to refer to al

actions

is

ability,

so,

you confer

you are

legitimiz-

simply a matter of conve-

this fashion. It

is

certainly

the past.

Adam Roberts
It is

important to remember that the Military Order's jurisdictional mandate

for violations of the laws of war
it

and

for other applicable laws.

4

As I understand

no exclusion within that framework for trying people
Professor Greenwood suggested they should be.

then, there has been

murder exactly

as

On Military

is

for

Commissions

Michael Newton
Military commissions are an ad hoc

many years.

mechanism

that have existed in history for

A perception exists that these commissions will somehow not live

up to the requirements of international humanitarian law but

if

one takes the

time to look at the Executive Order and the Secretary of Defense's Imple-

menting Rules,

it

will

be quickly noted that these commissions

will in fact pro-

vide the required due process and substantial fairness, fairness not found in a

number of domestic court systems spread throughout

the world. 5 Additionally,

military commissions are not the only option for the prosecution of those de-

tainees

who

ultimately are prosecuted, they are merely one option available.

The United States may also release some detainees
or to its own federal courts.

to other nations' courts

and

Christopher Greenwood

The

however, the specific provision of the military

able,

when

a trial before a tribunal

disclose

4. See

do find objectionorder which provides that

idea of military tribunals does not actually bother me.

is

I

ordered closed, the defense counsel

what transpired during the closed session

to his

own

client.

Executive Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Non-Citizens in the

Terrorism, 13

November 2001,

art. l.(e), available at

may not
I

War

do not

Against

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/

2001/1 1/2001 11 13-27.html (Oct. 10, 2002).
5.

See generally

id.

See also

Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No.

1,

March

21,

2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (Oct. 10, 2002).
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work

believe that practicing lawyers could be, nor should they be, required to

Many

under such conditions.

lawyers

I

know

consider such a provision

unethical.

Michael Newton
Some commentators have taken the position that when armed conflict occurs,
people must either be combatants or non-combatants. When captured, the
combatants become prisoners of war while the non-combatants are civilians
and should be released. The problem with this approach is that it leaves out a
whole third category of individuals. These are people who do not qualify for
combatant status but yet have taken part in the hostilities. For example,
members of al Qaeda are not lawful combatants if for no other reason than they
lawful

becoming

combatant as set out in the
Hague Regulations of 1907 or the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 6 This third
category is one of an unprivileged combatant in an armed conflict. That is to
say by virtue of taking a part in the hostilities, this combatant is properly a target but is not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions as he is not

do not meet the four-part

a lawful

test for

a lawful

combatant. The United States has taken the position that for so long as

these combatants are unprivileged/unlawful, they

On

the Challenges Associated with Defining

may be punished.

and Addressing Terrorism

Michael Newton

The

underlying act of killing in a political context, killing to create fear as in

terrorism, or killing in
sentially the same.

defining
side the

an armed conflict context from an actus reus view

That is

to say,

it is

the taking of a

life.

is

es-

The difficulty comes in

when it is a lawful taking of life and when the taking of life is done outlaw. As Daniel Helle indicated, this is a significant challenge in defin-

ing the applicable substantive legal provisions that set out

versus what

is

a political

murder versus what

is

what

is

terrorism

the act of a lawful combatant

The conventions on terrorism correctly point out
in a number of places that certain acts do not comprise terrorism when committaking part in armed conflict.

ted by a lawful combatant taking part in

armed

conflict.

19(2) of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist

6.

See

Hague Convention

(IV) Respecting the

For example, Article

Bombings

Law and Customs of War on Land, Anx.

Art. 1(1-4); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Armed

specifically

Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 4(2(a-d)), 6 U.S.T. 3

U.N.T.S. 31.
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1,
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states that the activities of armed forces during

an armed

conflict are

by international humanitarian law rather than the Convention.
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1

John Murphy"

O,

this,

the

last

panel of the conference,

'The Road Ahead"

or,

more

we have been asked to consider

specifically,

the "application of any legal

lessons learned, review of the role of international conventions

on

terrorism,

and future military operations against terrorism." This is not an easy task. As
Yogi Berra reportedly once observed, "it's difficult to make predictions, especially

about the future." This

is

particularly true given that, as Richard Posner

has recently pointed out, so-called "public intellectuals" or the "experts" have a
notoriously bad record
so

many

when it comes to predictions. 3 Accordingly,

in this, as in

enterprises, caveat emptor.

Be that

as

it

may,

this

chapter proceeds along the following

since any effort at "futurism" necessarily involves

lines. First,

an analysis of present

trends,

it

attempts to identify the most salient trends in international terrorism and

1.

I

would

like to express

my appreciation for the excellent research assistance of Andrew Kenis,

a third year student at the Villanova University

School of Law, Rita Young-Jones, former

reference law librarian at the Villanova University School of Law,

second year student

at the Villanova University

School of Law.

I

am

and Charles

2002 research grant from the Villanova University School of Law that greatly

on
2.
3.

J.

Kocher, a

also grateful for a
facilitated

this chapter.

John Murphy is a Professor of Law at Villanova University School of Law.
RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS (2001).

summer

my work
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combat terrorism. Next it turns to two kinds of recombating terrorism which have been the focus of con-

efforts to

sponses employed in

siderable scrutiny already at this conference:

conventions, at both the global and the regional

the so-called antiterrorism

and the use of coercive
measures, i.e., economic sanctions and the use of armed force. As to these
measures, the effort will be to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, especially in light of current trends, and to set forth some tentative proposals for
improvement.
levels,

Trends

September 11th

itself is a

spectacular demonstration of a disquieting trend in

international terrorism: the increased willingness of terrorists to
bers of people

and

to

kill

large

num-

make no distinction between military and civilian targets. 4

many commentators were of the view that

had little interest in killing large numbers of people because it would undermine their efforts to gain sympathy for their cause. A major cause of this radical change in
attitude has been aptly pinpointed by Jeffrey Simon:
Until recently

Al Qaeda

...

is

terrorists

representative of the emergence of the religious-inspired terrorist

groups that have become the predominant form of tenorism in recent years.
of the

key differences between religious-inspired

motivated ones

is

terrorists

and

One

politically

that the religious-inspired terrorists have fewer constraints in

minds about killing large numbers of people. All nonbelievers are viewed as
the enemy, and the religious tenorists are less concerned than political terrorists
about a possible backlash from their supporters if they kill large numbers of
their

innocent people. The goal of the religious tenorist
to their religious beliefs,

and they believe that

is

transformation of

all

society

killing infidels or nonbelievers will

rewarded in the afterlife. Bin Laden and al Qaeda's goal was to
and Western influences out of the Middle East and help bring to power
radical Islamic regimes around the world. In February 1998, bin Laden and allied
groups under the name "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders" issued a fatwa, which is a Muslim religious order, stating that it was the
religious duty of all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and civilian,
anywhere in the world. 5
result in their being

drive

US

4. It is worth noting that in 1998 bin Laden told ABC News that "he made no distinction
between American military and civilian targets, despite the fact that the Koran itself is explicit
about the protections offered to civilians." See Peter L. Bergen, Excerpts from Holy War, Inc., 82

Phi

Kappa phi forum

5. Jeffrey

26,

28 (2002).

D. Simon, The Global Terrorist Threat, 82 PHI
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It is

important to note that there are other religious terrorist groups besides

Qaeda. Examples include Hizballah, a radical Shia Islamic group in Lebanon, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), and the Palestine Islamic Jihad,
al

all

of

whom

use terrorism in the

West Bank, Gaza

Strip,

and

Israel to

under-

mine Middle East peace negotiations and to establish a fundamentalist Islamic
Palestinian state. There are also the Abu Sayyaf Group, a radical Islamic separatist group operating in the southern Philippines; Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), which is based in Egypt and seeks the overthrow of the Egyptian
government; and the Armed Islamic Group, which is located in Algeria and
plots the overthrow of the secular Algerian government and its replacement
with an Islamic

state.

September 11th may also demonstrate another trend: the emergence of
smarter and more creative terrorists. The planning and carrying out of the terrorist operation on September 1 1th was diabolically clever, and the 19 hijackers were well educated and from middle to upper middle class backgrounds.
Smarter and more creative

terrorists,

moreover, are better equipped to take

advantage of the information on weapons
struction
available

—

targets,

on the

—including weapons

and resources necessary

of mass de-

for a terrorist operation readily

Internet. Similarly, they are better able to take advantage of

the various vulnerabilities of a technologically advanced society, including

major networks of communications, electrical power, pipelines, and data.

Another major trend

is

the "globalization" of terrorism. 6 According to

Joseph Nye, globalization

is

"the growth of worldwide networks of interdepen-

Nye

suggests, over the last several decades, there has

dence." 7 In particular,

been

a substantial increase in "social globalization,"

i.e.,

the spread of peoples,

and ideas, and this has resulted in "new dimensions of military globalism: humanitarian intervention and terrorism." 8 Perhaps the most
salient example of social globalization resulting in terrorist military globalizacultures, images,

tion

is

the worldwide expansion of the

more than

sixty countries. 9 It

is

al

Qaeda network,

not the only example, however. Hizballah

portedly has operations in six continents, and

6.

For further discussion

see

John

F.

said to operate in

Hamas and

the Sri

re-

Lankan

Murphy, The Impact of Terrorism on Globalization and

Vice-

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 77(2002).
S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why The world's Only
Superpower Can't Go It Alone 78 (2002).

Versa, 36
7.

Joseph

8. Id. at
9.

86-87.

See Seeing the World

Anew, ECONOMIST, October
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Tigers of Tamil Eelam are said to "maintain cells far from the lands where

and grievances are focused." 10

their goals

An

encouraging trend

The breakup
tral

is

the apparent decline in state sponsored terrorism.

of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the countries in cen-

and eastern Europe from under the Soviet yoke,

sources of state support that terrorists could rely on.

greatly reduced the

Even

for those countries

—

on the US State Department's list of sponsors of terrorism Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria
there has been some movement away from state support of terrorism toward cooperation with the international community's campaign against terrorism. 11 The main problem area is
the Middle East. Although Iran and Syria, for example, have taken action
that remain

—

against al Qaeda, they continue their active support for terrorist groups, such
as

Hamas and

Hizballah, that primarily target Israel and

ground that these groups are not

terrorists

on the
movements.

citizens,

its

but national liberation

moment on possible reasons for the distinctions made by
should come as no surprise that Iran and Syria should be

Let us reflect for a
Iran and Syria.

It

willing to cooperate, at least to a limited extent, in efforts to suppress al

Qaeda. The kind of radical Islamic fundamentalism espoused by bin Laden
and al Qaeda is a serious threat not only to the United States but also to Islamic governments in the Middle East. Even though they

may themselves be

regarded as having radical Islamic governments, Iran and Syria are nonetheless

among

those threatened by

direct their attention

mity. Here,

Qaeda. In contrast, Hamas and Hizballah

Israel,

long the target of Iranian and Syrian en-

one may speculate, the greater danger

not supporting these

among

toward

al

movements

for Iran

and Syria may

lie

in

in light oi the general support they enjoy

the people of the Islamic countries in the Middle East.

Interestingly, according to the latest

US Department

of State report, Latin

America had by far the largest number of international
2000 and 200 1. 12 Latin America, too, was a major venue

terrorist attacks in

for the activities of

Hizbollah, as well as other terrorist groups, "in the tri-border area of Argen-

and Paraguay, where terrorists raise millions of dollars annually
via criminal enterprises." 13 There was also evidence of Hizbollah members or
sympathizers in Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama. But allegations of
tina, Brazil,

10.

Paul R.

Pillar,

Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide, 19

BROOKINGS REVIEW 34
11.

See

(2001).

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

63.
12.

Id. at

172.

13.

Id. at

44.
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the presence of bin Laden or

al

Qaeda support

cells in

Latin America re-

mained uncorroborated.
Colombia was a particular problem area. In response to greatly increased violence and terror unleashed by Colombia's largest terrorist organization, the
16,000 member Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's former President Andres Pastrana decided, in February 2002, to terminate the peace process that had been a hallmark of his presidency and to
reassert control over the FARC's demilitarized zone. Three Irish Republican
Army members, allegedly helping the FARC prepare for an urban terror campaign, were arrested as they departed the demilitarized zone, and there were
media allegations of similar support by the terrorist group Basque Fatherland
and Liberty, or ETA. 14
These developments in Latin America, along with an apparent comeback
of the Shining Path in Peru, may have contributed to the successful conclusion of a new Inter- American Convention Against Terrorism by the OAS
General Assembly on June 3, 2002 (discussed in the next section).
Perhaps the primary impact of these trends, as well as of the severity of the

September
select

1th attacks and of the subsequent use of military force by

1

NATO

been to

raise

forces against the Taliban

an

and

al

Qaeda

US and

in Afghanistan,

has

issue as to the appropriate legal regime to apply to efforts to

control international terrorism. Prior to September

1

1th international terror-

ism had been treated primarily as a criminal law matter, with emphasis placed

on preventing the commission of the crime through intelligence or law enforcement means, or, if prevention failed, on the apprehension, prosecution
and punishment of the perpetrators. To be sure, the United States had previously used armed force on occasion against terrorism. For example, in 1986,
the United States bombed Tripoli, Libya in response to Libya's apparent involvement in the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American soldiers and the terrorist attack by Libyan backed Abu Nidal on El Al
airline counters that killed five Americans and wounded many others. Similarly,

in 1993, the

United States bombed Baghdad,

sassination plot by

and

in 1998,

it

Saddam Hussein

engaged in missile

Iraq, in

response to an as-

against former President George Bush,

strikes against

Afghanistan and the Sudan in

response to the East African embassy bombings. But none of these actions in-

volved military force of the magnitude and duration of the actions in Afghanistan after September 11th.

14.

Hence

after,

Id.

395

and
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September 11th, the law of armed conflict assumed a much greater prominence than it had previously in efforts to combat international terrorism.
But the law of armed conflict has hardly occupied the field. On the contrary, as

the fourth panel of this conference (Bringing Terrorists to Justice:

The Proper Forum) demonstrated,
armed

the issue

now may

be whether the law of

conflict or international criminal law applies. Also,

note that in

the wake of September

1

1th, various fields of

it is

important to

law and methodolo-

combating international terrorism have taken on a much greater significance. These include, among others, immigration and refugee law,

gies for

international

human

rights law, international finance,

US

constitutional law,

homeland secudisarmament, non-proliferation, intelligence gathering, and

private remedies (especially civil lawsuits), cyberlaw, privacy,
rity,

arms control,

public health law. 15

Given these developing trends, how has international law responded both
before and after September 1 1th? This chapter now turns to a classic subject
of international criminal law: the so-called antiterrorism conventions;
addresses economic sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism; and,

it

then

lastly,

the jus ad bellum dimensions of the use of armed force against terrorists; and
their sponsors.

Antiterrorism Conventions

Global Treaties and Conventions

At

this writing the

UN or its specialized agencies have adopted twelve global,

multilateral antiterrorist conventions. 16

Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979); Convention on the Physi-

These include

the:

;

cal Protection of Nuclear Material (1979); Protocol for the Suppression of Un-

lawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,

supplementary to the Convention

15.

for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against

For a sense of the breadth and depth of subjects

see the series of articles contained in the lengthy

now relevant to efforts to combat terrorism,
in Law and the War on Terrorism, 25

symposium

HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y ix-834 (2002).
16. The texts of these conventions may be found in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED
TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 2-13 1 (UN, 2001).
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the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988); Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-

Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
ful

on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991); International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997); and International Convention for
the Continental Shelf (1988); Convention

the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).

This plethora of conventions covering individual manifestations of terrorism has resulted due to the inability of the

UN

comprehensive

to develop a

convention against terrorism, largely because of disagreement on

how

terror-

ism should be defined. This so-called "piecemeal" approach has resolved the

problem of defining terrorism by avoiding

it.

Although these

treaty provisions

are often loosely described as "antiterrorism" the acts they cover are criminalized regardless of whether, in a particular case, they could be described as

"terrorism." Recently, however, there

agreement on a comprehensive

have been renewed

efforts to

text, a controversial exercise that

is

reach

examined

below.

The

basic purpose of the individual conventions

for international

tional terrorism.

cooperation

among

To accomplish

is

to establish a

framework

and suppress internathe Convention on the Prevention

states to prevent

this goal,

and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,

in-

cluding Diplomatic Agents, for example, requires state parties to cooperate

on diploexchange information, and to coor-

in order to prevent, within their territories, preparations for attacks

mats within or outside

their territories, to

dinate administrative measures against such attacks. 17
internationally protected person takes place,

an attack against an

If

and an alleged offender has

fled

the country where the attack occurred, state parties are to cooperate in the

exchange of information concerning the circumstances of the crime and the
alleged offender's identity

leged offender

is

found

is

and whereabouts. 18 The

state party

where the

al-

obliged to take measures to ensure his presence for

purposes of extradition or prosecution and to inform interested states and
international organizations of the measures taken. 19 Finally, state parties are
to

cooperate

17.

See Convention

in

assisting

criminal

proceedings brought for

on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against

Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3 166, U.N.
Sess.,

2202d

plen. mtg., Supp.

No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9407 (1973),

18.

Id., art. 5.
Id., art. 6.
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art. 4, available at http://

www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_protected_persons.html
19.

attacks

(]an. 21, 2003).
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their disposal.

an alleged offender
its

relevant evidence at

20

The key feature of these conventions
to

all

Ahead

in

its

requires a state party that apprehends

territory either to extradite

him

or to submit his case

none of these
Rather, they contain an

authorities for purposes of prosecution. Strictly speaking,

conventions alone creates an obligation to extradite.

inducement to extradite by requiring the submission of alleged offenders for
prosecution

if

extradition

fails.

Moreover, a

legal basis for extradition

is

pro-

vided either in the convention, or through incorporation of the offenses mentioned in the convention into existing or future extradition treaties between

To

the parties.

varying degrees, the conventions also obligate the parties to

take the important practical step of attempting to apprehend the accused of-

fender and hold him in custody.

The most important
prosecuted.

To

this

to ensure that the accused

is

alternative obligation to submit for prosecution

is

goal of these provisions

end the

stated quite strongly in these conventions.

the accused,

much

for prosecution

justice

less to

The

is

obligation, however,

not to

try

punish him, but to submit the case to be considered

by the appropriate national prosecuting authority.

system lacks

is

integrity,

If

the criminal

the risk of political intervention in the prosecution

Such intervention may prevent the trial, a conviction or the appropriate punishment of the accused. Such concerns were a major factor in the
insistence of the United States and the United Kingdom that Libya "surrender"
the two Libyan intelligence agents accused of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland and their rejection of Libya's insistence that it had the
right, under Article 7 o( the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, to submit, the accused instead to "its compeor at

trial exists.

tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." 21

Even

if

difficult to

the criminal justice system functions with integrity,

obtain the evidence necessary to convict

was committed in
removed between

when

a foreign country. This very practical
states of goodwill only

it

may be

very

the alleged offense

impediment can be

by patient and sustained

efforts to

develop and expand "judicial assistance" and other forms of cooperation be-

tween the law enforcement and

judicial systems of different countries.

20.

Id., art. 10.

21.

For an interesting exposition of the events leading to the Lockerbie

trial,

The

see Scott Evans,

And The Political Question
The Lockerbie "Extradition by

Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review
Doctrine, 18

MD.

J.

INT'L

L.

& TRADE

21 (1994);

Donna

Azrt,

Analogy" Agreement: "Exceptional Measure" or Template for Transnational Criminal

AM. U.

INT'L L. REV. 163 (2002).
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conventions create an obligation to cooperate in
tion poses major problems for
different types of legal systems.

even good

this respect

faith efforts

but

among

this obliga-

countries with

22

Under the piecemeal approach, and with the passage of time, gaps in the
coverage of terrorist crimes by the early conventions became apparent, and
new conventions covering other international crimes were concluded. For example, the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal conventions on civil aviation did not
cover attacks at airports, such as those at the Rome and Vienna airports during the 1980s.

As

a consequence, the International Civil Aviation Organiza-

(ICAO) adopted

tion

a

Protocol to the Montreal Convention on the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving International
Civil Aviation. 23 Similarly, the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner "Achille

Lauro" exposed the vulnerability of maritime navigation and infrastructure to

and led to the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Contiterrorist attack

nental Shelf. 24
It

est

was

however, that

in the 1990s,

UN member states sought to

fill

the larg-

gap in coverage of terrorist crimes.

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist

The 1990s was

a

Bombing

decade of extraordinary developments.

One of the most,

the most, extraordinary developments was the collapse of the Soviet

if not

Union and

the end of the Cold War. Also of great significance was the end of apartheid in

South Africa and the coming into power of new governments in South Africa
and Namibia. These and other developments led to a less confrontational at-

mosphere
tion."

UN and a sharp decline in support for "wars of national libera-

in the

This in turn helped lessen,

if

not entirely eliminate, the division between

and the non-aligned member states that had frustrated previous efforts to reach agreement on measures to combat terrorism. Indeed, because of the change of atmosphere, the General Assembly decided in
the

Western member

states

The problems become

computer network attack by
Some Legal Dimensions,
John
Computer Network Attack And International Law 323, 340-43 (Michael N.
Schmitt and Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, US Naval War College International Law
22.

terrorists. See

F.

particularly acute in the event of a

Murphy, Computer Network Attacks By

Terrorists:

Studies).
23.

See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against Safety of Civil

Aviation, 27 I.L.M. 628 (1988).
24-

See

Convention

for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms

Located on the Continental Shelf, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), available at http://www.imo.org/
Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 (Jan. 21, 2003).
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Ad-Hoc Committee on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (hereinafter Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism) to prepare
1997 to reincarnate the

as a

matter of priority a draft international convention for the suppression of

terrorist

bombing and

a subsequent international convention for the suppres-

sion of acts of nuclear terrorism.

moment

and consider the importance, in terms of combating international terrorism, of the General Assembly's decision to mandate the preparation of a convention against terrorist
bombing. In an article published in 1990, I suggested:
It is

A

worthwhile to pause

more

for a

serious deficiency

that

is

at this point

none of the

antiterrorist

conventions cover

those tactics most often used by terrorists, most particularly the deliberate
targeting, by

bombs

the reason for this

or other weapons, of the civilian population.
it is

To understand

necessary to briefly return to the problem of defining

terrorism.

A look at the primary components of most definitions of terrorism will help us to
understand

why

it

has proved impossible to reach agreement in the United

Nations and other international organizations. These definitions almost
invariably include a political purpose of motivation behind the violent act

government as the primary
from violent acts classified
violent act

is

and a

target, factors that serve to distinguish terrorism

as

common

crimes.

The

political

purpose of the

government by intimidation or
however, may lead some governments to be not

to influence the policy of a

coercion. These

same

factors,

only unwilling to criminalize such behavior but prone to actively support

it.

****

Nonetheless, there appears to be a growing recognition that even favored
national liberation groups cannot be permitted to engage in certain acts of

violence against certain targets. Moreover, under the law of armed conflict the
deliberate targeting of the civilian population

impermissible as well

when

covered by the law of armed

is

a

war crime.

It

should be

the targeting takes place under circumstances not
conflict.

This was the conclusion reached recently

by a joint group of U.S. and Soviet experts on international terrorism

who

recommended to their respective governments that they support the conclusion
make the deliberate targeting of a

of an international convention that would
civilian population

25.

John

F.

TERRORISM:

an international crime. 25

Murphy, The Need

for International Cooperation

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 381
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(1990).

in

Combating Terrorism, 13
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The adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing 26 on December 15, 1997, vividly illustrates
the sea change in the attitudes of UN member states towards terrorist acts that
various developments in the 1990s brought about, including,

it

should be

noted, several major terrorist bombings directed against various states. 27

Others have written about the terrorist bombing convention in some
detail, 28 and no such effort will be undertaken here. There are a few innovative aspects

about the convention, however, that deserve highlighting. In

keeping with the "piecemeal" approach, the convention does not define "terrorism" but identifies and defines particular conduct that
internationally, regardless of

its

is

to be

condemned

motivation, and subject to criminal penalties.

Article 2(1) of the convention provides:

Any

person commits an offense within the meaning of

this

Convention

that

if

person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an
explosive or other lethal device

governmental
facility: (a)

facility,

in,

into or against a place of public use, a State or

a public transportation system or an infrastructure

with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

(b)

with

the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system,

where such destruction results

To

in or

is

likely to result in

major economic loss. 29

ensure that sympathy with the motivation behind the bombing will not

serve as a legal justification of the act, Article 5 requires state parties to adopt

any measures that may be necessary to ensure that criminal acts within the
scope of the convention, especially
terror, are

when

"under no circumstances

they are intended to create a state of

justifiable

by considerations of a

political,

philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature

are punishable by penalties consistent with their grave nature." 30

None

and

of the

earlier antiterrorist

conventions has a similar provision. Along somewhat simi-

lar lines, Article 1

expressly eliminates, for the

1

first

time in a

UN antiterrorist

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. Doc. A/
37 I.L.M. 249 (1998) (ratified by US on Jun. 26, 2002) [hereinafter
Terrorist Bombings Convention]
27. These included, among others, the truck bombing attack on US military personnel in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the poison gas attacks in Tokyo's subways, a bombing in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and a bombing in Manchester, England. See Samuel
M. Witten, Current Developments: The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
26. See International

Res.52/164 (Dec.

Bombings, 92

AM.

15, 1997),

J.

INT'L L. 774, note 3 (1998).

28. Id.
29. Terrorist

30.

Bombings Convention, supra note

26, at art. 2(1).

Id., art. 5.
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convention, the political offense exception for purposes of extradition and

mutual
likely to

legal assistance. 31

have on

US

Samuel Witten notes the impact
law and practice:

In the case of most

modern U.S.

this provision

bilateral extradition treaties, the political

offense exception has been narrowed

and

already unavailable for offenses

is

covered under the 'prosecute or extradite' multilateral conventions such

Convention. As a

is

result, Article 11 will

effect with respect to U.S. treaty practice

have the most

on mutual

as this

significant practical

legal assistance treaties

with political offense exceptions without excluding prosecute or extradite
multilateral conventions. 32

At

the same time that

bombing convention adds

it

eliminates the political offense exception, the

a protection for the accused in Article 12,

which

provides that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford

mutual

legal assistance,

if

the requested state

party has substantial grounds for believing that the request was

made

"for the

purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political

opinion or that compliance with

the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons." 33

Such

a "humanitarian" provision

antiterrorist conventions,

although there

UN

is

normally not present in the

is

a provision along similar lines in

the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. 34
Article 12 does not specify

who

in the requested state

is

to decide

whether

been considerable
to be made by the executive branch or by

"substantial grounds" exist. In the United States there has

debate over whether
the judiciary.

35

this decision

is

Interestingly, Article 6,

which

sets forth the

mandatory and

discretionary bases of criminal jurisdiction over the offenses covered by the

convention, establishes a truly universal system o( jurisdiction in that
lizes all five

31.

it

uti-

of the accepted bases of jurisdiction in international criminal

Id., art. 11.

32. Witten, supra note 27, at 779.

Bombings Convention, supra note 26, at art. 12.
34. See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 34th Sess., 105th Mtg, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979, entered
into force 1983), art. 9, 1316 U.N.T.S. No. 21931.
35. For discussion of this debate, see Christopher H. Pyle, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 118-29 (2001).
33. Terrorist
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law

—

territorial, nationality, universal, passive personality,

risdiction.

36

and protective

ju-

As noted by Witten,

[o]f particular interest to countries

many government

facilities

such as the United States that maintain

outside

their

territory

Convention's

the

is

unprecedented recognition of broad protective jurisdiction in Article 6(2) (b) 37
with respect to attacks uoing explosive or other lethal devices against a state or
government facility of that state abroad, including an embassy or other
diplomatic or consular premises. This provision would recognize the United
States jurisdiction, for example, to prosecute in

bombing attacks

against

all

US government

US

courts the perpetrators of

abroad,

facilities

diplomatic and consular premises and military installations,

Khobar Towers bombing
It

in

e.g.,

including

the 1996 Al-

Dhahran. 38

may be noted parenthetically that a US court recently upheld its jurisdiction to

bombing of the US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, including bombing allegedly committed by foreign nationals that
resulted in the deaths of foreign nationals on foreign soil. 39 The coming into force
of the bombing convention clearly confirms this exercise of jurisdiction. 40
Another innovative provision of the bombing convention, not found in
prior antiterrorism conventions, is Article 8(2), which provides for so-called
conditional extradition. 41 That is, an accused person might be sent tempoconsider various charges arising from the

rarily

by her state of nationality to a requesting state for a

36. Terrorist

Under

Bombings Convention, supra note

trial

or proceeding

26, at art. 6.

Bombings Convention, each state party has
discretion to establish its jurisdiction over offenses set forth in Article 2 when: "The offence is
committed against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or
other diplomatic premises of that State." In a footnote Witten points out that "the Convention
will reach attacks on extraterritorial government facilities such as tourist centers, economic
development offices and military facilities." He notes further that "lt]he provisions of the
Bombing Convention regarding attacks on government facilities are
broader than those of the
1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, which addresses attacks only on "the
official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally
37.

Article 6(2)(b) of the Terrorists

.

.

.

protected person likely to endanger his person or liberty." Witten, supra note 27, at 778, fn 24.
38. Witten, supra note 27, at 778.
39.

United States

40.

The

Bin Laden, 92

F.

Supp. 2d 189 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).

Bombings Convention entered into force on May 23, 2001. As of May 28,
The United States became a party to the convention on April 19, 2002.
Article 8(2) of the Bombing Convention provides:

2002,
41.

v.

it

Terrorist

had 62

Whenever

parties.

a State Party

is

permitted under

its

domestic law to extradite or otherwise

surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person
to that State to serve the sentence

imposed

which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and
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convicted, would be returned to

her state of nationality to serve any sentence imposed as a result of the

trial

or

proceeding for which the extradition or surrender had been sought.

As noted above, only

UN

the

toward

terrorist

the sea change in the attitudes of

bombing

states of

that took place during the 1990s permitted

the successful conclusion of the bombing convention.
ever, there are troubling

member

developments

in the

At

this writing,

how-

Middle East that could seriously

undermine the success of the convention as an antiterrorist measure. Specifically, the sudden increase in suicide bombings by Palestinians against Israeli civilians, and the celebration in some circles of the resulting carnage,
risks a return to some of the divisions between Western member states and
certain

member states

of the developing world that characterized the

UN dur-

ing the 1970s.

International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing

As Hans
of the

and Legal Counsel
1996, the Secretary-General had recognized

Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs

UN,

has noted, as early as

the need for an international convention dealing with terrorist fund-raising. 42
Similarly, in

May

1998, the foreign ministers of the

G-8 countries

issued a

statement on terrorism identifying as a "priority area for further action: Preventing terrorist fund-raising.

." 43
.

.

The

President of France subsequently

called for the negotiation without delay of a "universal convention against the

December 1998, the General Assembly decided
the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism "should elaborate a draft interna-

financing of terrorism" and in
that

tional

convention

for the suppression of terrorist financing to

isting international instruments." 44

supplement ex-

France introduced a draft convention that

served as the basis of discussions in the committee and on December

9,

1999,

State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they

may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be
discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph
See Terrorist
42.

Hans

1

sufficient to

of the present article.

Bombings Convention, supra note 26, art. 8.
and Limitations of International Sanctions Against

Corell, Possibilities

COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Schmided., 2001) [hereinafter COUNTERING TERRORISM].
43. See Clifton

M. Johnson,

the Financing of Terrorism,

P.

Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppression of

39 I.L.M. 268 (2000).

44. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,

Agenda Item 155

Terrorism, in

243, 253 (Alex

(1998).
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the General Assembly adopted a resolution opening for signature the Interna-

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 45
Like its immediate predecessor, the bombing convention, the financing
convention is a "model" antiterrorist convention that incorporates what
tional

Clifton Johnson, the chief US negotiator for the convention, has called:
increasingly standard provisions of the recent counterterrorism conventions.

These include provisions:
an international element;

1)

limiting the Convention's application to acts with

2) obligating States Parties to criminalize the

covered

offenses irrespective of the motivation of the perpetrators; 3) obligating States
Parties to take into custody offenders

found on their

territory; 4) facilitating the

extradition of offenders; 5) requiring States Parties to afford one another the
greatest

measure of assistance

in

connection with the criminal investigations or

proceedings relating to the covered offenses; 6) prohibiting extradition or
legal assistance requests relating to a covered offense from being refused

mutual

on

political offense grounds;

and

7)

providing for the transfer of prisoners in

order to assist the investigation or prosecution of covered offenses. 46

Johnson goes on to point out that the financing convention adds "specific and
unique provisions directed at terrorism financing." If adopted and effectively
implemented, these provisions have the potential to constitute a major step for-

ward

in the effort to

combat international

Dealing with the financing of terrorism

lem

is

terrorism.
is

a delicate matter.

A major prob-

that terrorists often operate through "front organizations"

on the

which appear

surface to be engaged in legitimate activities or through organizations

that in fact have charitable, social or cultural goals
activities to further these goals.

States, action

Moreover, in some

and engage

states,

in legitimate

such as the United

by the government to prevent or limit the financing of organiza-

tions with charitable or similar goals could raise serious constitutional issues.

In an effort to avoid such

difficulties,

Article 2(1) carefully limits the scope of

the convention:

1.

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that

person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and

wilfully,

provides or

collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the

knowledge

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.
54th Sess., 76th Mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/54/109
I.L.M.
39
270 (2000) [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention].

45. See International

109,

U.N.

GAOR 6th Comm.,

(1999), reprinted in

46. Johnson, supra note 43, at 268.
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that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a)

constitutes an offense within the scope of

annex; or

listed in the

(b)

Any

and

as defined in

An act which

one of the

treaties

other act intended to cause death or serious

bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation

of armed conflict,

when the purpose of such an act, by its

compel a government or
an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 47

nature or context,

to intimidate a population, or to

is

Under paragraph

1(a) of Article 2, the

tion that funds should be used or

convention requires actual inten-

knowledge that they

will

be used to carry out

one of the offenses listed in an annex to the convention. Such an intention or
knowledge of how the funds are to be used is also required by paragraph 1(b).

The

moreover,

latter paragraph,

the definition

is

precedent that

As

sets forth a definition of terrorism,

not identified as such.

may be drawn upon

in the case of

its

financing convention

It

although

therefore establishes an important

in future antiterrorism conventions.

predecessor conventions, the principal objective of the

is

to require state parties to criminalize

risdiction over the offenses set forth in the

and

establish ju-

convention and to extradite or sub-

mit for prosecution the persons accused of the commission of such offenses.

The

financing convention goes further than

requirements

it

its

predecessors, however, in the

imposes on state parties to take steps to prevent the commis-

sion of covered offenses. 48 In particular, as aptly summarized by

Rohan

Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism, the convention

Perera,

requires

state parties to consider the following measures:

(i)

Adopt

regulations, prohibiting the opening of accounts, the holders or

beneficiaries of which are unidentified or unidentifiable

that such institutions verify the real

owner of such

and measures

to ensure

transactions.

With respect to the identification of legal entities, financial institutions
when necessary are required to take measures to verify the legal existence and
(ii)

structure of the customer by obtaining either from the public register or from the

customer or both, proof of incorporation or other relevant information.

(iii)

Obligations

authorities

on

financial institutions to report promptly to the

complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of
which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose.

all

transactions

47. Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 45, art. 2.
48.

competent

Id., art. 18.
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(iv)

Measures requiring financial institutions to maintain at
on transactions, both domestic or international. 49

least for 5 years, all

records

More

generally, the

convention provides an extensive

drawn from the 40 recommendations of the

list

of measures,

multilateral Financial

many

Action Task

Force, for state parties to consider in identifying, tracking and blocking transactions involving terrorism financing. 50

Another innovative provision

in the convention

is

which

Article 5,

re-

quires each state party to "take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity

located in

its

territory organized

responsible for the

management

under

its

laws to be held liable

when

a person

or control of that legal entity" has committed

an offense under the convention. 51 Normally, the antiterrorist conventions
address only the issue of criminal and not civil liability. 52 The convention also
enhances the deterrent
freezing of funds

prohibiting state

effect of

its

provisions by providing for the seizure or

and proceeds used for the commission of an offense 53 and by
parties from claiming privileged communication, banking se-

crecy, or the fiscal nature of the offense to refuse a request for

mutual

assis-

tance from another state party. 54

As

Clifton Johnson has suggested, the financing convention has the poten-

have a considerable impact on efforts to combat terrorism. 55 Johnson
notes further, however, that the impact the convention has in practice will detial

to

pend in no small measure on "the degree to which investigators and prosecutors can establish the necessary link between the act of financing and the
terrorist intention of the contributor or collector of the funds." 56

This

may be

a

heavy evidentiary burden to bear, since the contributors and recipients of
funds for the commission of terrorist acts are adept at using

and other techniques
ber states of the

Rohan

49.

UN

to disguise their purpose. Moreover, relatively few

mem-

currently have in place the legal infrastructure or the

Ferera, International Legal

Framework

for Co-operation in

UN

Ad-Hoc Committee on Measures
COUNTERING TERRORISM, supra note 42, at 284.
Role of the

money laundering

to

Eliminate

Combating Terrorism

International

—

Terrorism,

the
in

50. Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 45, at art. 18.
.

51.

Id., art. 5.

52. Elsewhere

I

have advocated a more extensive use of civil

liability

or sponsor the commission of international crimes. See John F.

Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative
J. 1

to

Id., arts.

12

& 13.

55. Johnson, supra note 43, at 268.
56.

Id. at

269.
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Criminal Prosecution, 12

(1999).

53. Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 45, at art. 8.
54.

against those
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One may

trained personnel to cope with the techniques of terrorist financing.

hope, however, that the cooperative arrangements called for by the financing

convention

help to remedy this situation.

will

For the financing convention to be effective, of course,
widely ratified and implemented.

34

parties (including the

At

this writing there are

United States). The

UN

it

will

have to be

132 signatories and

Security Council itself has

given an enormous boost to the convention and to the effort to combat terrorfinancing.

ist

On

September

under

28, 2001, the Security Council, acting
57

Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Resolution 1373, which, by any measure, constitutes a landmark step by the Council. In this extraordinary resolution, the

Council

sets forth a plethora of steps that

to take to

combat

States shall

.

.

.

member

states are required
u

terrorism. For example, the Council

[p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts" and then

sets forth explicit steps that states are to take to this end. 58

decides that
rorism.

59

[d]ecides that all

all

states shall take a large

Among

number

The Council

also

of other steps to combat ter-

the most noteworthy of these, states are to deny safe haven

to terrorists, to afford

one another the greatest measure of assistance

in crimi-

nal investigations or proceedings relating to the financing or support of terroracts,

ist

including assistance

in

proceedings, and to prevent the
controls

obtaining evidence necessary for such

movement

of terrorists by effective border

and controls on the issuance of identity papers and

Using terms of exhortation rather than command,
Council "[c]a/k upon

all

travel

documents.

in Resolution 1373, the

number of actions in cooperation
including, among others, "intensifying

States" to take a

with other states to combat terrorism,

and accelerating the exchange of operational information," becoming

parties

to the relevant antiterrorist conventions, including the International

Con-

vention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, and ensuring, "in conformity with international law," that refugee status

is

not abused by

and that "claims of political motivation are not recognized
fusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists."

In

1373
itor

my
is

to establish a

for re-

60

committee (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) to mon-

implementation of the resolution and to

no

57. S. C. Res. 1373,

U.N. SCOR, 56th
and (d).

Id.,

grounds

view, the most significant step the Council has taken in Resolution

the committee,

58.

as

terrorists,

later

than 90 days

Sess.,

59.

Id.,para.2(a)-(g).
Id.,

upon

all

para. 3 (a)-(g).
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resolution,

on the

steps they

Council further "[e]xpresses
order to ensure the
responsibilities

its

full

have taken to implement the resolution. 61 The
its

determination to take

necessary steps in

all

implementation of this resolution, in accordance with

under the Charter." 62 Failure to establish such monitoring

devices to ensure that antiterrorist measures adopted by the
in practice has

been

a

monitored

tively

antiterrorist

in the past as to their

are effective

UN efforts.

major deficiency of past

A primary example of UN

UN

measures that have not been

implementation

is

effec-

the antiterrorist

As we have seen, a sea change in attitudes on the part of many
(though not all) member states of the UN has resulted in the conclusion of
"model" new antiterrorist conventions, especially the bombing and financing
conventions. The conclusion of new, or even the ratification of old, antiterrorist conventions, however, is not the crucial issue. The crucial issue is
conventions.

the extent to which the global antiterrorist conventions have been or will be
vigorously implemented. Conclusion of antiterrorist conventions
first

the

step in the process. Unfortunately,

many

state parties

seem

is

only the

to regard

it

as

last.

Vigorous implementation, moreover, encompasses more than merely
fying the conventions, passing

implementing

necessary administrative measures,
structure to

combat international

i.e.,

legislation,

rati-

and adopting the

creating an appropriate legal infra-

terrorism.

It

requires the taking of active

steps toward ensuring the primary goals o{ the conventions: the prevention of

the crimes covered by the conventions and the prosecution and punishment
of the perpetrators of the crimes.
spect

is

The

record of the conventions in this re-

unclear.

A major part of the problem

is

the lack of adequate data on the extent of

and of successful prosecutions of
be adequate data available on the extra-

successful actions to prevent terrorist acts

Although there appears to
prosecution and punishment of aircraft

terrorists.

dition,

ing other manifestations of terrorism

is

hijackers, 63 information regard-

quite sparse.

Most of the

antiterrorist

conventions contain provisions requiring the state party where the alleged
fender

is

of-

prosecuted to communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to

the Secretary-General of the

61.

Id.,

para. 6.

62.

Id.,

para. 8.

UN

(or to the Director-General of

IAEA

or the

At least this was the case around 1985 when I last examined the data. See JOHN F. MURPHY,
PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY
63.

INITIATIVES, 110-15 (1985).
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Council of ICAO), 64 and the Secretary-General has issued reports on "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism." 65 But these reports focus primar-

on the terrorist events that triggered the conventions and on a summary of
the most important provisions of these conventions. There appears to be little
information on the extent and success of efforts to prevent the acts the con-

ily

ventions cover or to prosecute the perpetrators of these acts.

Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee established by Resolution 1373, has recently emphasized the importance of implementing antiterrorist measures. According to Ambassador
Greenstock, "Governments were already familiar with what needed to be
done. But few had done it. Resolution 1373 drew on the language negotiated
by all UN members in the 12 Conventions against terrorism, but also delivered
a strong operational message: get going on effective measures now." 66 He reports that, as of May 30, 2002, 155 reports had been submitted to the committee from member states and others. Member states who have not submitted
reports are "almost without exception those with

little

experience of the sub-

67

and unsophisticated law and order systems."
A cursory review of the reports submitted by some member states with sophisticated law and order systems (the United States, United Kingdom, Israel,
Germany and Italy) that have had major problems with international terrorism
reveals that the Counter-Terrorism Committee is gathering valuable information regarding the legislative, executive and judicial steps these countries are
taking to combat international terrorism in general and the financing of international terrorism in particular. One of the questions that member states have
been asked to respond to is: "What steps have been taken to establish terrorist
acts as serious criminal offenses and to ensure that the punishment reflects the
seriousness oi such terrorist acts? Please supply examples of any convictions
obtained and the sentence given." However, the examples of convictions and

ject

sentences supplied in these reports are either non-existent or very

US

report

is

See, e.g., Article 19 of the

65.

See, e.g.,

Measures

51st Sess.,

Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 45.

to Eliminate International Terrorism:

Agenda Item

153,

International Terrorism: Report of the

166,
66.

The

the most forthcoming in this respect, noting that the United

64.

GAOR,

brief.

U.N. Doc. A/55/179 Qui.

Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.

U.N. Doc. A./5 1/336 (Sep. 6, 1996); Measures to Eliminate
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item

26, 2000).

Presentation by Ambassador Greenstock, Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee

(CTC)

Symposium: Combating International Terrorism: The Contribution of the United
Vienna on 3-4 June 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/
1373/viennaNotes.htm Qun. 12, 2002).
at the

Nations, held in

67. Id. at 2.
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US

States has prosecuted cases under

laws implementing the Montreal

Con-

vention (Aircraft Sabotage), the Hague Convention (Aircraft Hijacking), the

Hostages Convention, and the Internationally Protected Persons Convention

and

giving,

by way of footnotes, citations to cases involving the crimes covered

by these conventions. 68 Even

this

information

example, no information regarding

is

skimpy, however, giving, for

how US law enforcement

officials

came

to

have custody of the accused.
This

may be that the Counterwith member states, could re-

a serious problem that should be resolved.

is

Terrorism Committee, in

its

future interactions

It

more detailed information regarding the apprehension, rendition (where
applicable), prosecution and punishment of persons who commit the crimes
quest

covered by the 12 antiterrorist conventions. Alternatively, the
Prevention Branch, which

is

UN Terrorism

part of the Centre for International

Crime Pre-

vention in Vienna, might be assigned the task of collecting such information

with respect to the

1 1

other antiterrorist conventions. 69

Still

other alternative

approaches might be for the Security Council to establish a monitoring com-

some of the
major antiterrorist conventions or to draft a convention that would establish a
monitoring committee for selected antiterrorist conventions and create an inmittee that would receive and evaluate reports from state parties to

ternational obligation for state parties to submit reports to

it.

For any such

monitoring committees, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with

its

proactive

approach,

70

The Draft

International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism

could serve as an excellent model.

One of the tasks the newly reconstituted Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism was
entrusted with by the General Assembly in 1996 was the preparation of a draft
international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

The

Committee began this task in 1998, immediately upon completion of the bombing convention. 71

68. The US report is attached as an annex to the Letter dated 19 December 2001 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001)

concerning counter- terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/1220

(December

21, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ Qan. 15, 2003).

The information

regarding

US

prosecutions appears at page 22.

Ambassador Greenstock suggested that the Centre for International
Crime Prevention (CICP) might provide "model laws and guidance on implementation" for the
11 other antiterrorist conventions. See Presentation by Ambassador Greenstock, supra note 66.
69. In his presentation,

70.

Id. at 1.

71.

Corell, supra note 42, at 254.
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the primary proponent of a convention to

combat nuclear terrorism in order to fill gaps in coverage left by the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 72 The Convention on
Nuclear Material prohibits parties from exporting or importing or authorizing
the export or import of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, unless

they give assurances that such materials will be protected at prescribed levels

during international transport.

The convention

international cooperation in the recovery
material,

and requires that

state parties

ing nuclear material punishable,
ers. It

also provides a

framework

for

and protection of stolen nuclear

make

certain serious offenses involv-

and that they extradite or prosecute offend-

does not, however, apply to nuclear material used for military purposes.

At this writing the draft convention 73 under consideration by the Ad-Hoc
Committee on Terrorism would expand the definition of "nuclear material" to
include objects and materials for military use and provide a clearer definition
of the crime of illegal acquisition for terrorist purposes.
rorist acts against

It

would

also cover ter-

nuclear power plants, vessels with nuclear power sources

and the use of automatic nuclear devices. As noted by Hans Corell, "[i]n this
regard, the new convention could cover to the broadest possible extent the
possible targets, forms and manifestations o( acts of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, unlike the 1980 [actually 1979] Convention, the proposed convention would draw a distinction between acts of nuclear terrorism from other
criminal acts involving the use of nuclear material by referring to the purpose

of such acts." 74

To

date, however,

it

has not proven possible to reach agreement on a

final

The main sticking point seems to be that some memnon-aligned movement want the convention to cover the activities

draft of the convention.

bers of the

of the military forces of a state. Article 4(2) of the present draft excludes acts of

armed

forces

from the scope of the convention. Other member

states

have pro-

posed extending the scope of the convention to include acts of state terrorism. 75
In this commentator's view, such proposals have a political agenda behind

them and

72.

are

unacceptable

to

Western member

states.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened

1980, entered into force

on 8 February 1987, 1456 U.N.T.S.

Only

for signature

if

the

March

101, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.

3,

1419

(1979).
73.

See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the

Committee, 53rd

Sess.,

A/C. 6/53/L.4 (Oct.

74.

Corell, supra note 42, at 254.

75.

Id. at

22, 1998), at 4.

255.
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convention's scope

is

and not

limited to nuclear terrorism by private actors

extended to the acts of state military forces or of government

officials

is

there

be any prospect of reaching a consensus on a draft convention on the

likely to

suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

One may also question whether the
of nuclear terrorism

ity

is

too narrow.

draft convention's focus

Many

on the

possibil-

observers, including this one, are

of the view that the risk of so-called "catastrophic terrorism" 76

greater from

is

the possible use of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons than

it is

from

the use of nuclear weapons. For this reason, a joint group of US and Soviet experts

on international terrorism recommended

and sponsor

a draft

that their

governments

convention to cover terrorism involving weapons of mass

destruction, including in particular nuclear, radiological, chemical
cal

To

weapons. 77

there

be sure, there

substantial debate as to

is

Kellman's observations

may

and

how

of terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction.

is

initiate

biologi-

great a risk

78

But Barry

serve as a sensible middle of the road position:

low probability
threat which, if it occurs, could have exceptionally high casualties. Yet four
points can be offered without serious contradiction. First, technical obstacles to
catastrophic terrorism will decline with time. The capabilities for producing
difficult

because catastrophic terrorism

is

lethal devices will spread,

and the choke points of human

activity will

Assessing risk

is

a

become

more concentrated, thereby unfortunately converging the ability to make a
lethal weapon with an ability to use it to devastating effect. The necessary
ramification

is

that whatever the technological barriers to accomplishing an act

of catastrophic terrorism

sooner or

later.

Even

if

may

may not be, those barriers will be overcome,
are not now realistic, they will be. 79

or

the risks

As pointed out by Barry Kellman, Catastrophic
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 537, note 1 (1999):
76.

Catastrophic terrorism
terrorists

who

is

Terrorism

—Thinking

Fearfully, Acting Legally,

an intentionally undefined term, reflecting the fact that
have a long menu of options to

aspire to inflict catastrophic injuries

employ, and reflecting the conclusion that debates over whether a particular technology
is

or

is

not within

this category

are,

essentially,

inconclusive.

The

'catastrophic terrorism,' as opposed to conventional terrorism, turns less

device

is

used than on the magnitude o{ the

definition of

on what type of

effects.

COMMON GROUND ON TERRORISM

176-77 Gohn Marks and Igor Beliaeveds., 1991).
78. See, e.g., Judith Miller, Threat of Unconventional Terrorism is Overstated Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, October 26, 2000, at A24, col. 1. For a contrary view, see, e.g., Patrick L. Moore, Is
Catastrophic Terrorism Just Strategic 'Peanuts, American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Law and National Security, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW REPORT, July-August 2000, at 1.
77.

See

'

79.

Kellman, supra note 76, at 538. See also Barry Kellman,

Approach

to Bioterrorism,

25

HARV.

J.

L.

PUB. POL'Y 721 (2002).
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the possibility of catastrophic terrorism, three other multilat-

not directed expressly against terrorism, should be

eral conventions, while

noted

the

at least parenthetically.

The Convention on

the Prohibition of the De-

velopment, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and

Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction 80 prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of microbiological and biological agents (weapons) that
are of potential use to terrorists.

It is

generally agreed, however, that this con-

vention has been ineffective because of a lack of enforcement provisions, and

an

effort to

remedy

this situation

in the face of opposition

through a protocol has apparently foundered

from the United States. 81 After years of effort,

in

1993

UN adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-

the

Use of Chemical Weapons. 82 In sharp contrast to the
Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention has rigorous verification procedures implemented through a new Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Which was established at the Hague and
has been functioning since 1997. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention,

duction, Stockpiling and

from using, producing or stockpiling poison gas or

state parties are prohibited

lethal chemical

weapons, and are obliged to dispose of existing chemical weap-

ons by the year 2010 at the

Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

latest. Lastly,

83

spread of nuclear weapons

which has

among

the Treaty

as

states,

its

on the Nonproliferation of

primary goal the prevention of the

may

also serve to limit the access of

individual terrorists to nuclear arms. 84

Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism

At

this writing the

sive

Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism

convention on international terrorism before

item, however, has

it.

85

been slow and, in the opinion of

has a draft comprehenProgress

on

this

agenda

this observer, likely to

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 1419, 26U.S.T.583.
81. See Elizabeth Olson, US Rejects New Accord Covering Germ Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2001, at A47, col. 1.
82. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons, January 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3, A/RES/4 7/391.
83. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
84. For a brief discussion of the NPT, see John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 122-29 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
85. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 5 1/2 10 of
17 December 1996, 6th Sess. (28 January-1 February 2002), U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No.
80.

Bacteriological (Biological)

37(A.57/37),at4-16.
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wisdom of such an exercise. The
history of efforts to conclude a comprehensive convention on international
from the 1937 League of Nations Convention 86 to the 1972 draft
terrorism
remain

so.

I

hold with those

who question

the

—
the UN General
convention introduced by the United
Assembly — has not been happy one. Michael Reisman, an eminent authorStates

87

ity in

in

a

international law, has recently cautioned that,

d]espite the relatively promising developments in the 1996 General

Assembly

and the 1998 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing, the political positions which have retarded the development of an
effective international legal regime in this regard have changed little. The NonAligned Movement's solidarity has been broken by a number of prominent
resolution

.

.

.

defections, yet a substantial

number of states

still

resist a definition

that might be applied to terrorist activities of groups that

'freedom

fighters' or fighters in

Despite

its

community

It

some wish

to view as

wars of 'national liberation.' 88

limitations, the "piecemeal"

well.

of terrorism

approach has served the world

should continue.

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Although the recently concluded Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 89 is not, strictly speaking, an antiterrorist convention, it deserves a
brief mention,

if only

because

eration that might serve as a
tions.

Moreover,

as pointed

it

has extensive provisions on international coop-

model

for the parties to the antiterrorist

out by Hans Corell, the General Assembly, in

resolution adopting the convention,
that the

convenits

recommends

Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly in its resolution

51/210 of 17 December 1996, which

is

beginning

its

deliberations with a view to

developing a comprehensive convention on international tenorism, pursuant to

Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 7 INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 862, 868 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1941).
87. Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/L 850 (1972).
86.

88.

W.

Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses

to

Terrorism, 22

HOUS.

J.

INT'L

L. 3,

58

(1999).
89.

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (2001). The text of and information regarding the

Sess.,

convention may be found at http://www.undcp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_convention.html
2003).
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Assembly resolution 54/110 of 9 December 1999, should take into consideration
the provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 90

As noted above,

have grave doubts about the wisdom of trying to conclude a
comprehensive convention on international terrorism, but provisions in the
I

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime may well serve
to future efforts to combat international terrorism.

as a guide

Regional Treaties and Conventions

There are now

at least eight antiterrorist

at the regional level.

91

It is

conventions that have been adopted

which these convenFive of these conventions have

unclear, however, the extent to

have had any operational significance.
been adopted only very recently, 92 and it is therefore too
tions

in terms of their operational efficiency.

Some of these recently adopted regional

conventions have noteworthy provisions, however, and these

The

plored below.

them

early to evaluate

Organization of American States

Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the

will

be briefly ex-

(OAS) Convention to
Form of Crimes Against

Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 197

1,

and

on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977, are of earlier
vintage and will be explored in somewhat greater detail. The terms of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention
the European Convention

90.

Hans

Corell,

Statement by Mr. Hans Corell to the Security Council Briefing on

December
and dates of entry

International Terrorism,
91.

The

texts of

9,

2000, at 9 (copy

into force

on

file

with author).

and other information concerning seven of these

and conventions may be found in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE
PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 16, at 134-225.
These include: the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance;
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism; the Arab
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; the Treaty on Cooperation among the States
Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating International Terrorism;
the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism; and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The text
of the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, adopted on June 3, 2002, is available at
treaties

http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGresl840_02.htm (Jan.
92.

The

five recently

adopted

antiterrorist

Suppression of Terrorism, 1998; the Treaty on Cooperation

Commonwealth

17,

2003).

conventions include the Arab Convention on

among

the States

Members

of the

of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999; the Convention of the

Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999; the

Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999; and the
Convention Against Terrorism, 2002.
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on Suppression of Terrorism, 1987,

will

be briefly examined, but there appears

to be insufficient data available to allow for

an evaluation of

its

operational

significance.

The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Arab Convention)
has several noteworthy features. The first is that only member states of the
League of Arab States can be parties to the convention. 93 The second is that,
unlike most of the antiterrorist conventions, the Arab Convention defines terrorism

as:

[a]ny act or threat of violence, whatever

its

motives or purposes, that occurs for

advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror
among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or
security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or
the

private installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or aiming to

jeopardize a national resource. 94

The convention

goes on to define "terrorist offence" as "[a]ny offence or at-

tempted offence committed in furtherance of a

terrorist objective in

any of the

Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests, that
ishable by their domestic law."

95

is

pun-

Also included within the definition of terrorist

offense are offenses stipulated in several global antiterrorist conventions, 96 as
well as the provisions of the
lating to piracy

on the high

Significantly,

UN Convention of 1982 on the Law of the Sea, reseas. 97

however, the Arab Convention also provides that

"[a] 11 cases

of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occu-

pation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance

with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence.

This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the

93.

Arab Convention on Suppression of Terrorism,

territorial integrity of

art. 1, available at

http://www.al-bab.com/

arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm (Jan. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Arab Convention]
94.

Id., art. 2.

95.

Id., art. 3.

These include the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages; and the Arab Convention, supra note 93, at art. 3(a)-(e).
97. Arab Convention, supra note 93, at art. 3(f).
96.

Board Aircraft; the Hague Convention
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this provision seeks to justify the

commission

of terrorist acts against Israel and reflects an attitude that prevented the Ad-

Hoc Committee on Terrorism from
ing the early 1970s.

There appears to be no data available on the operational

significance of the convention,

Treaty on Cooperation

pendent States

in

adopting measures against terrorism dur-

among

if

any.

the States

Members of the Commonwealth

of Inde-

Combating Terrorism

The Treaty on Cooperation among
of Independent States in

Members of the Commonwealth
Combating Terrorism (Commonwealth Treaty), like
the States

Arab Convention, has a definition of terrorism, but, unlike the Arab Convention, has no provisions providing exceptions for "wars of national liberation." Under the Commonwealth Treaty terrorism is defined as "an illegal act
punishable under criminal law committed for the purpose of undermining pubthe

lic safety,

ulation,

influencing decision-making by the authorities or terrorizing the pop-

and taking the form of: [there follows

a listing of various manifestations

of violence or threats of violence against persons or property]." 99

monwealth Treaty

also contains

The Com-

an elaborate definition of "technological

ter-

rorism" involving the use or threat of use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or
bacteriological (biological)

weapons or

components

their

found in the other antiterrorist conventions.

100

—

a provision not

Also noteworthy are the Com-

monwealth Treaty's many detailed provisions on cooperative measures to prevent and punish terrorism, including provisions that envision the possibility of
an antiterrorist unit of one state party crossing the borders of another state
party in order to render assistance to the latter state in the event of a terrorist
incident. 101

Again though, there appears
any, of the

nificance,

if

98.

Id., art.

2(a).

99.

Treaty on Cooperation

States in

Commonwealth

among

Combating Terrorism,

art.

the States
1

to be

little

data on the operational

sig-

Treaty.

Members

of the

Commonwealth

of Independent

(1999).

100. Id.
101. Article 12(1) of the Treaty, for example, provides:

"The

parties

may,

at the request or with

the consent of the Party concerned, send representatives of their competent authorities,

including special anti- terrorist units,

accordance with

to

provide procedural, advisory or practical aid in

this Treaty." Id. at art. 12.
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OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
At this writing the current status of the OAU Convention on the Prevention
and Combating of Terrorism is most uncertain because of the dissolution of the
Organization of African Unity and the establishment of the African Union. 102

Assuming that the new organization adopts the
the convention deserves some brief comment.

OAU Convention,

Like the other recently adopted regional conventions, the
tion contains a detailed definition of a "terrorist act,"

provisions calling for cooperation

among

103

however,

OAU Conven-

as well as extensive

state parties in preventing

and com-

Arab Convention, as well as the
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 104 the OAU Convention also includes a provision that
"the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle
against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces
bating terrorism. Unfortunately, like the

not be considered as

shall

terrorist acts." 105 It

sions are incompatible with the

no circumstances

justifiable

worth noting that such provi-

approach taken by Article 5 of the

Bombing Convention, which provides

ist

is

UN Terror-

that terrorist bombings are "under

by consideration of a

ideological, racial, religious or other similar nature

political, philosophical,

and

are punishable by pen-

consistent with their grave nature."

alties

Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism

The

Convention Against Terrorism, 106 adopted on June 3,
2002, came about in response to the events of September 1 1th. The Organization of American States was the first organization to condemn the September 1 1th attacks, and ten days thereafter the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting in
Washington instructed the OAS Permanent Council to prepare a draft text of
an Inter- American Convention Against Terrorism in time for the meeting of
Inter- American

Corinne A. Packer and Donald Rukare, The
J. INT'LL. 365 (2002).

102. See

96

AM

103.

OAU Convention

New African

Union and

on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism,

Its

Constitutive Act,

art. 1(3), available at

http://www.fidh.org/intgouv/ua/rapport/1999/antiterroconvention.pdf (Jan. 17, 2003).
104. See

Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International

Terrorism,
105.

art. 2, available at

http://www.oic-un.org/26icfm/chtml (Jan.

OAU Convention, supra note

106. See Inter-American

103, at art. 3(1).

Convention Against Terrorism, supra note
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By any measure the convention

is

an

extraordinary instrument.
Previously, the only antiterrorist convention adopted in the Inter-American

OAS

Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are

context was the

of International Significance

however,

is

(OAS

Convention). 108 The

OAS

Convention,

focused narrowly on the kidnaping of diplomats, despite efforts to

broaden the scope of the convention, contains many ambiguities, and
deal with crucial problems. Moreover,

it

fails

to

has a total of only nine parties, includ-

ing the United States, and has not been an effective international instrument
for the protection of diplomats. In practice

the

it

has in effect been superceded by

UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against In-

ternationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 109

By contrast, 30 of the 33 nations present at the meeting of the OAS General Assembly signed the Inter- American Convention Against Terrorism. 110
And there is nothing narrow about the focus of the Inter- American Convention. On the contrary, among other things, the convention defines "offenses"
within the scope of
antiterrorist

its

coverage as including the offenses covered by the

UN

conventions and requires state parties to the Inter-American

Convention to make a declaration upon ratification that they are not parties
to one or the other of the UN antiterrorist conventions if they wish these conventions to be inapplicable to them, thus creating a strong inducement on
OAS member states to sign and ratify the UN antiterrorist conventions. 111
Also, under Article 3 of the convention, state parties "shall endeavor" to become parties to the UN antiterrorist conventions and "to adopt the necessary
." 112
The convention
measures to effectively implement such instruments.
further requires state parties to use the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and other specialized entities as guidelines for measures
.

107. See Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Opening Remarks and

General Assembly, June

3,

.

Q&A With the Press Following OAS

2002, http://wvv^.state.gov/secretai7/rrn/2002/10670.htrn Qun.

4,

2002).

was signed by the United States on Feb. 2, 1971 and entered into force for
the United States on Oct. 8, 1976. T.I.A.S. No. 8413, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/
108. This convention

Terrorism/Conv 16.pdf Qan.

17, 2003).

109. For further discussion of the

Diplomatic
E.
1

F.

10. See Powell, supra

note 107, at

111. See Inter- American

Murphy, Protected Persons and
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 277, 299-303 (Alona

Convention,

LEGAL ASPECTS OF
Murphy eds., 1977).

Facilities, in

Evans and John

112.

OAS

see

John

F.

2.

Convention Against Terrorism, supra note 91,

Id., art. 3.
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combating the financing of terrorism, 113 to deny safe haven to persons suspected of terrorism, as either refugees, 114 or asylum seekers, 115 and to reject application of the political offense exception to requests for extradition or

mutual

legal assistance. 116

On

the other hand the convention permits a state

party to refuse to provide mutual legal assistance
for believing that the request

has been

made

if it

for the

"has substantial grounds

purpose of prosecuting or

punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or that compliance with the request would

cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons." 117

By way of

affirmative steps, the convention requires state parties to adopt

domestic law measures to provide for the identification and seizure of funds
used to finance terrorism, 118 to promote cooperation and the exchange of

in-

formation in order to improve border and customs control measures necessary
to prevent the international

movement

of terrorists and trafficking in arms,

without prejudicing applicable international commitments regarding the free

movement

of people and the facilitation of commerce, 119 to enhance channels

of communication between their law enforcement authorities, 120 to "afford

one another the greatest measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance with
respect to the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of the offenses established [in the

UN antiterrorist conventions],"

operation and training programs.
Significantly, Article 18 of the

121

and to promote technical co-

122

convention requires the state parties to hold

periodic meetings of consultation, with a view to "[t]he
this

Convention.

." 123
.

.

The

Secretary General of the

meeting of consultation of the state parties

ment

full

implementation of

OAS

is

to

convene a

after receiving the 10th instru-

of ratification (under Article 22 the convention

is

to enter into force

on

the 30th day following the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification). Also, the Inter- American

1998, has been revitalized

113.

Id., art.

4(2).

114.

Id., art.

12.

115.

Id., art.

13.

116.

Id., art. 11.

117.

Id., art.

118.

Id., art. 5.

119.

Id., art. 7.

Committee against Terrorism,
and become active.

14.

120.

Id., art. 8.

121.

Id., art. 9.

122.

Id., art. 16.

123.

Id., art. 18.
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Convention Against Terrorism, then, has the poten-

become an important instrument for the effective implementation, at
on a regional basis, of the UN antiterrorist conventions. Whether it will

to

least

do so remains

might be useful to

end for the
with the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee.

lish a liaison

to be seen.

European Convention on

It

vention)

124

to estab-

the Suppression of Terrorism (European

way of

a series of offenses,

combat

efforts to

exception to international extradition.

Con-

none of which

connected with

Under

a political

Article

2,

terrorism, the political offense

To this end, Article

1

of the convention

between
an offense

"for the purposes of extradition

Contracting States" are to be regarded "as a

tives."

OAS

was an early attempt to deal with a primary obstacle, especially dur-

ing the 1970s, in the

125

this

the Suppression of Terrorism

The European Convention on

lists

Terrorism: The

political offense or as

motive or as an offense inspired by

political

mo-

the convention invites state parties to exclude addi-

tional acts of violence against persons or property from the political offense

exception. 126

At

the same time, Article 13 of the convention allows a state

party to register a reservation permitting

the ground that the offense
listed offense

is

provided that

is

it

to reject a request for extradition

—notwithstanding

of a political character

on

that a

involved:

it

undertakes to take into consideration

when

evaluating the

character of the offense any particularly serious aspects of the offense including:
(a)

that

it

created a collective danger to the

persons; or (b) that
that cruel or vicious

Under
dite

it

physical integrity or liberty of

affected persons foreign to the motives behind

means had been used

Article 5 of the

an accused

life,

Convention

in the

it;

or

(c)

commission of the offense. 127

a requested state

may

refuse to extra-

if it:

has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an
offense mentioned in Article

1

or 2 has been

made

for

the purpose of

prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality,

124. See

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

(1977),

reprinted

in

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 16, at 139, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/090.htm Can.
125. This description of the

17, 2003).

European Convention

at 13-15.

126.

European Convention, supra note 124,

127.

Id., art.

art. 2.

13.
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or political opinion, or that the person's position
these reasons.

Should a

state party decide

vention, under Article 7

prejudiced for any of

it

not to extradite an offender covered by the con-

must "submit the

ever and without undue delay to
prosecution."

may be

128

its

case, without exception whatso-

competent authorities

for the

purpose of

129

Although the convention

is

an antiterrorism

initiative,

it

nowhere

tempts to define terrorism. In attempting to exclude a variety of

at-

common

crimes as well as "terrorism" from the political offense exception to extradition, the

convention may have attempted too much, because many

upon signing or
dite for

states,

ratifying the convention, reserved the right to refuse to extra-

an offense which they consider

has largely been cured, at least

among

as political. 130

state parties

This defect,

who

are

if

such

it

be,

members of the

European Union, by the EU's 1996 Convention relating to the Extradition between Member States. 131 Article 5 of the EU Convention eliminates the political offense exception in extradition between state parties and paragraph 4 of
that article provides that reservations to the European Convention shall not
apply to extradition between member states. 132 However, a member state may
limit the

listed in Articles

1

and 2

EU

Convention to the violent crimes
of the European Convention. 133 Moreover, para-

ambit of Article 5 of the

graph 3 of Article 5 preserves the right to refuse extradition

might be persecuted or punished on account of his race,
or political opinion.

Adoption of the

if

the fugitive

religion, nationality

134

EU

Convention, then, would appear to have removed,

at

European Convention that
raised serious doubts as to its effectiveness in practice. 135 Moreover, some
early hold outs, such as Ireland and France, have become parties to the
least partially, the "internal inconsistency" of the

128.

Id., art. 5.

129.

Id., art. 7.

Murphy, supra note 52, 14-15.
Convention relating to the Extradition between Member
September 1996.
130.

131. See

132.

States,

OJ 96

C 313/02

of 27

Id., art. 5.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Geoff Gilbert,
L. 3,

The "Law" and "Transnational Terrorism," 26 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L

21 (1995).
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European Convention, 136 and English and French courts have applied it when
surrendering fugitives. 137 Hence, although one could wish there was more of
it, there is some evidence that the European Convention has been of some
use to European efforts to combat terrorism.

AARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism
Like the European Convention, the SAARC Regional

S

pression of Terrorism
offenses

and provides

(SAARC

Convention),

that, for the

138

in Article

may

agree

I,

lists

a

number of

purpose of extradition, they shall not be

garded as political offenses. Further, under Article
parties

Convention on Sup-

among themselves

for

II,

re-

any two or more state

purposes of extradition to include any

other offenses involving violence, in which case this offense, too, shall not be

regarded as a political offense. 139 Unlike the European Convention, the

SAARC Convention contains no provision for reservations to the requirement
that the listed offenses be regarded' as nonpolitical offenses. Article VII,
ever, provides for

if it

how-

an exception to extradition requirements:

appears to the requested State that by reason of the

trivial

nature of the case

or by reason of the request for the surrender or return of a fugitive offender not

being

made

in

good

faith or in the interests of justice or for

any reason

it is

unjust

or inexpedient to surrender or return the fugitive offender. 140

Although

all

seven members of SAARC (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Mal-

and Sri Lanka) are parties to the convention, it is unclear the extent to which it has had operational significance. As of 1993 it
appeared that some member states of SAARC had not yet enacted the endives, Nepal, Pakistan

abling legislation required to give effect to the convention. 141

would violate its
constitution, and France, while an initial signatory, did not ratify because of opposition from the
French Left, which had traditionally opposed the extradition of political offenders. See Murphy,
136. Initially, Ireland did not

even sign the convention, claiming that

to ratify

it

supra note 52, at 14-15.
137. See Gilbert, supra note 135, at 21.
138. See

SAARC

Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987), reprinted

in

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 16, at 147, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/
Terrorism/Conv 18.pdf Can.
139.

ia., art. II.

140.

Id., art.

17, 2003).

VII.

141. See Report of the Secretary-General, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,

A/51/336, Sep.

6,

1996, at 42.
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Coercive Measures Against Terrorists
State Sponsors

Economic Sanctions
As briefly noted above,

And

Of Terrorists

the primary goal of the International Convention for

the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and a primary goal of the just

concluded Inter- American Convention Against Terrorism

nomic sanctions against

terrorists

who

private organizations

is

to impose eco-

by denying them financing as well as against

A

support them by seizing and freezing their funds.

and other countries' efforts to block the financing of international terrorism is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is
worth noting parenthetically, however, that, according to recent newspaper reports, members of al Qaeda may be turning to trade in gold, diamonds, and
gems to finance their terrorist network in response to the freezing of their bank
accounts. 142 Also, al Qaeda reportedly increasingly relies heavily on the
detailed discussion of United States

and on an informal money transfer system, known as "hawala" in
Arabic, to move its funds. Hawala relies on trust and networks of friends and
family to move its funds and leaves no paper or electronic trails. It is, of course,
impossible to monitor or freeze an account if there is no bank account or electronic movement of money. Lastly, again according to recent newspaper reInternet

ports, the

European

United States

is

how

it

allies

officials are

zations

identifies terrorists

and

their financiers.

among

its

European

reportedly questioning the listing of several individuals and organi-

whose

the Taliban.

The

over

beginning to face growing resistance

links to extremist causes are less clear

than those of al Qaeda or

143

focus of this section of the chapter

more

is

on economic sanctions

against

mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Economic sanctions imposed unilaterally by the United States, or in
concert with like minded states, not pursuant to Security Council mandate,
state sponsors of terrorism and,

specifically,

are outside the scope of this chapter.

Although

it

was

its

invasion of Kuwait rather than

its

sponsorship of terror-

ism that precipitated Security Council action against Iraq, in
lution 687, 144 the Council

142. See,

May

e.g.,

[r]equires Iraq to

Sengupta, U.N. Report Says

23, 2002, at

143. See

u

Johnson

al

Qaeda May

be Diversifying

col. 1.

et

Bush Faces Widening Gap With Europe,

U.N.

SCOR46th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/687/(1991).
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WALL ST. J. May

15, col. 6.

144. S. C. Res. 687,

famous Reso-

inform the Security Council that

A15,
al.,

its

,

21, 2002, at

A
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not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any or-

ganization directed toward commission of such acts to operate within

its terri-

and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism." 145 Evidence that Iraq has failed to carry out this retory

quirement

is

considerable. 146

Economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council

come

against Iraq have be-

a highly contentious issue, with critics contending that they hurt the

people but not the government of Iraq and that the Security Council actions
are lacking in legitimacy because of dominance by the

To meet

these criticisms

permanent members. 147
and to ensure the continuance of economic sanctions

against Iraq, the Security Council recently agreed to a major revision of the
sanctions, including the adoption of new so-called "smart sanctions." 148

the

new

sanctions regime,

chased by Iraq are
the

lifted.

UN

Under

export controls on purely civilian goods pur-

Indeed,

all

contracts for export of goods to Iraq under

food program are presumed approved unless found to contain items

oil for

"Goods Review List" (GRL). 149 The GRL consists of so-called "dual use"
items that may have both a legitimate civilian use and a potential military use

on

a

in a prohibited nuclear, chemical, biological, ballistic missile or conventional

These items will be subjected to additional scrutiny by the
Iraq Sanctions Committee established by the Security Council. Perhaps most
important, Resolution 687 remains in force, with its requirements that Iraq
destroy its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, and limit its
ballistic missiles range to 150 km.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the new "smart" sanctions will be
any more effective than the old "dumb" sanctions were in inducing Iraq to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 687. This commentator, for one, remains
military program.

skeptical.

to

We will return to this issue when we turn to the use of military force

combat terrorism
Prior to

its

later in this chapter.

recent actions with respect to

most elaborate

al

set of actions that the Security

Qaeda and

the Taliban, the

Council had undertaken with

respect to international terrorism was with respect to Libya. In response to ev-

idence of Libyan complicity in the destruction of Pan
Lockerbie, Scotland and of Union de transports aeriens

145.

Id.,

Am

(UTA)

flight

103 over

flight 772, the

para. 32.

146. See,

e.g.,

147. See,

e.g.,

PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, supra note 1 1, at 65.
The Once and Future Security Council 18 WASH.QTRL'Y3

Jose E.Alvarez,

148. See S. C. Res. 1409,

U.N. SCOR, 56th

Sess.,

U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1382/(2001).

U.N. Doc. S/1409/(2002) and

149. S. C. Res. 1382, supra note 148.
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Council adopted a resolution urging the Libyan Government to provide "full
and effective" responses to requests made by the French, the UK, and the US

Governments concerning these catastrophes. 150 When the Libyan Government failed to do so, the Council decided that this failure constituted a threat
151
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charto international peace and security.
the Council decided that states should adopt various sanctions against

ter,

Libya unless

responded to the requests

it

sures Libya also

action and

all

had

commit

To

avoid these mea-

cease

all

forms of terrorist

itself "definitely to

assistance to terrorist groups

demonstrate

tions,

to

for cooperation.

its

and

.

.

renunciation of terrorism."

.

promptly, by concrete ac-

152

In a third resolution the

Council applied further comprehensive sanctions against Libya in 1993. 153

Although they had previously strongly resisted a proposal along these lines,
in 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to a trial of the
two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish
Court
tive,

154

siting in the

The Security Council welcomed this initiaLibyan Government was to ensure the appearthe two accused persons. 155 The Council also

Netherlands.

and decided that the

ance in the Netherlands of

would suspend the sanctions it had imposed against Libya once
the Secretary-General had reported to the Council that the two accused persons had arrived in the Netherlands for trial and the Libyan Government had
satisfied the French judicial authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA
decided that

it

flight 772.

On April

5,

1999, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that the

two accused persons had arrived in the Netherlands for trial and that the
French authorities had informed him that the Libyan Government had satis-

bombing of UTA flight 772.
Accordingly, the President of the Council announced that the sanctions
against Libya had been suspended. 156
fied the Council's

On January

demands with

respect to the

31, 2001, a three judge Scottish Court, sitting at

the Netherlands, convicted Abdelbaset Ali
telligence agent, of
flight 103.

Mohmed

al

The second Libyan defendant, Al Amin

U.N. SCOR, 47th
C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th

Sess.,

Megrahi, a Libyan

151. S.

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/73 1/(1992).
U.N. Doc. S/748/(1992).

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/883/(1993).
C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/l 192/(1998).

153. S. C. Res. 883,

Id.,

at para. 4.

156. Statement of the President of the Council, April 8, 1999,
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Am

Khalifa Fhiman, former

152. Id.

155.

Zeist,

murdering 270 people in the 1988 bombing of Pan

150. S. C. Res. 731,

154. S.

Camp

S/PRST/1 999/10.

International

Law and

manager of the Libyan Arab
acquitted.
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Airlines in Malta where the

court sentenced Megrahi to

life

bomb originated, was

in prison,

and

his conviction

was upheld on appeal. 158

The

Council's actions against Libya, then, have had a quite extraordinary

denouement. Less successful were the Council's measures against Afghanistan
prior to September 1 1th and against Sudan. With respect to Afghanistan, the
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, demanded that the Taliban
hand over Osama bin Laden, who had been indicted by the United States for
the August 7, 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, to
"appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or
to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice." 159 By the same resolution the Council decided to impose economic sanctions against the Taliban as of November 14, 1999, if they
failed to accede to this demand. When the Taliban had not turned Osama bin
Laden over by November 14, 1999, the Council announced on November 15,
1999, that the sanctions were to come into effect.
As to the Sudan, the Security Council became involved in response to a
Sudan backed assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 26, 1995. In a resolution adopted on January 31, 1996, the Council declared that "those responsible for that act must be
brought to

justice," called

upon the Government of the Sudan immediately

to

"extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltering in the Su-

dan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt. ..." and further called upon the Sudan to "[d]esist from engaging in the activities of
assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist elements and act in its relations
with its neighbors and with others in full conformity with the Charter of the
UN and with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity." 160 When the
Government of the Sudan did not comply with this request, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided to impose certain economic
sanctions against the Sudan. 161

157. See Peter Finn, Libyan Convicted of Lockerbie Bombing: Second

WASH. POST,

Feb.

1,

2001, at

A

Man

acquitted in Attack,

1.

Al Megrahi v. Her Majesty's Advocate, Appeal No. C104/01 Q-C 2002) (Scot.), available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/downloadAockerbieappealjudgement.pdf G an 17, 2003).
159. S. C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999), para. 2.
160. S. C. Res. 1044, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1044/(1996), para. 4.
161. S. C. Res. 1070, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/l 070/(1996).
158.

-
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Economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council

are often regarded as

alternative to the use of force in dealing with state sponsors of terrorism.

the Council declines to impose economic sanctions, or

posed by the Security Council

fail

when

an

When

sanctions im-

to induce a target state to cease

its

sponsor-

ship or support of international terrorism, however, the controversial issue of

what measures of self-help may be taken by
zation

Use

may arise.

of

It is

to this issue that

we

states acting

without Council authori-

turn in the next section of this chapter.

Armed Force

Other participants in this conference have addressed the jus ad bellum aspects
of the war on terrorism, and I will try to minimize overlap with the presentations of these other participants. To this end I will largely limit my comments to
the possible future use of armed force against terrorists in countries other than
Afghanistan and against their state sponsors. As to the use of armed force
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, I will just state my view that it has been fully
consonant with the jus ad bellum limitations of the UN Charter. 162 1 will not address any of the jus in bello issues.

At

numerous newspaper

Bush administration is developing a doctrine of preemptive action against states and terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. 163 United States
Vice President Dick Cheney reportedly has given as the rationale for such a
doctrine the inadequacy of the Cold War approaches of arms control treaties
and the policy of deterrence for present circumstances. One newspaper report
quoted Cheney as saying: "In terror, we have enemies with nothing to defend.
A group like al-Qaeda cannot be deterred or reasoned with. This struggle will
not end in a treaty or accommodation with terrorists it can only end in their
complete and utter destruction." 164
It seems clear that al Qaeda cannot be deterred or reasoned with. But all indications are that the likely first target of the new doctrine is Iraq and most
particularly the regime of Saddam Hussein. 165 It is at least debatable whether
this writing there are

reports that the

—

162. .Besides the presentations at the conference, for

an

analysis of the jus ad

bellum dimensions

Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of
Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT.'L L. 839 (2001); Jack M. Beard, Americas New War on Terror: The
Case for Self Defense under International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 559 (2002).
of the use of armed force in Afghanistan, see,

163. See,
17,

e.g.,

2002, at

David E. Sanger, Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First, N.Y. TIMES, June
Al, col. 1; Lydia Adetunji, Bush to lay out first-strike policy against terrorism,

FINANCIAL TIMES, June
to

e.g.,

Beat Terrorists

to

and Thorn Shanker, Defense
Punch, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at A8, col. 3.
11, 2002, at 3, col.

1

;

164. Adetunji, supra note 163.

165. See,

e.g.,

Sanger, supra note 163.
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Saddam Hussein can be deterred or reasoned with. There is substantial evidence that, unlike al Qaeda or Palestinian suicide bombers, Saddam Hussein
cares greatly about his own survival and the survival of his regime.
To be sure, there is no question of the evil nature of Saddam Hussein and
his regime.

own

He

after

is,

all,

a

man who used

chemical weapons against both his

people and in the war with Iran. Because of this history and Iraq's inva-

sion of Kuwait, Security Council Resolution 687
terrorism and eliminate

its

demands

that Iraq renounce

weapons of mass destruction under international

inspection. For the last three years, however, Iraq has barred the
166

and it
chemical and
tors,

is

widely assumed that

biological

it

has been developing

weapons during

former British Prime Minister

known

this time.

its

UN

inspec-

capacity for

Margaret Thatcher, the

as the "Iron Lady," has recently

come

out strongly in favor of the removal of Saddam Hussein:

Saddam must

War

go. His

continued survival after comprehensively losing the Gulf

has done untold damage to the West's standing in a region where the only

unforgivable sin

ceased has

made

is

weakness. His flouting of the terms on which

hostilities

community. His appalling
own countrymen continues unabated. It is clear to anyone

a laughingstock of the international

mistreatment of his

Saddam took

willing to face reality that the only reason

the risk of refusing to

U.N. inspection was that he is exerting every muscle to
build
[weapons of mass destruction] We do not know exactly what stage
that has reached. But to allow this process to continue because the risks of
action to arrest it seem too great would be foolish in the extreme. 167
submit his

activities to

WMD

There

is

.

a great variety of views

Saddam should be removed. One

on the

issue of whether, as a policy matter,

alternative view

is

that he can be contained,

and the appropriate policy is to ensure the destruction or degradation of
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, if necessary by the use of armed
force. 168 A variant of this view is that there should be a new "Bush doctrine"
that would eschew the use of force to overthrow Saddam under present circumstances but state explicitly that certain actions or "triggers" would result

UN

weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2003, pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1441. U.N. SCOR 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1441/(2002).
167. Margaret Thatcher, Don't Go Wobbly, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at A18, col. 4. For
another strong statement favoring the removal of Saddam Hussein, see Lawrence F. Kaplan, Why
166. Editor's

the

Note:

Bush Administration

will

go after Iraq,

THE NEW

REPUBLIC, Dec.

10, 2001, at 21.

168. For an article setting forth this view, although the author of the article rejects

supra note 167.
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it,

see Kaplan,
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and the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Examples of such
might include further evidence about Saddam's links with al Qaeda,

in military action
"triggers"

any transfer of weapons of mass destruction to

al

Qaeda or similar groups;

direct

complicity in the September 11th attacks or any such attacks in the future;

involvement in the September-October 2001 anthrax attacks; or the harboring
of groups that carry out terrorism against the United States. Bush could also

make

that

clear

terrorism

—

range

a

other

of

American troops

to

toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapon;

significant progress

another attempted invasion of Kuwait; an attack on
against

unrelated

actions

Iraqi

—would

also be

Israel; or

the use of force

considered redlines

that would

produce a policy of overthrow. 169

This chapter does not examine the detailed policy arguments that have

been advanced

in favor of

and against a policy of removal of the Saddam

Hussein regime. Rather, for present purposes,

it

assumes that the policy deci-

made to remove Saddam and that the use of armed force will be
required to do so. The question then arises whether this policy can be implemented in a manner consistent with US international legal obligations, especially those set forth in the UN Charter. Time and space limitations require
sion has been

that this chapter

examine

The examination

this

starts

question only

briefly. 170

from the basic proposition

Charter, the use of military force

that,

under the

UN

permitted in only two instances: in individ-

is

ual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter or pursuant to a

Security Council resolution adopted by the Council under Chapter VII of the

169. See Philip H.

Gordon and Michael

E.

Implementing a Bush Doctrine on Deterrence,

O'Hanlon, Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq?
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Policy Brief 93, at 8

(2002).
170. Because of the recent nature of

formulation, there has been relatively

its

little

legal

to remove Saddam Hussein from
Anthony Clark Arend, Iraq: First Make the Case,
there are a number of writings on the use of force

commentary on the Bush Administration's announced intention
power,

if

necessary by force.

WASH. POST,

An

exception

is

Apr. 17, 2002, at A15. Also,

against terrorism that are relevant to the

Bush Administration's

plans. See especially Reisman,

Some other writings of note include Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization:
International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Michael Byers, The
supra note 88.

Shifting Foundations of International

L. 2

1

(2002); Nigel

Law:

A Decade of Forceful Measures against Iraq,

White and Robert Cryer,

13 EUR.

Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687:

J.

INT'L

A Treaty Too

29 CAL. W. L. REV. 243 (1999); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks:
The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537 (1999); and Ruth Wedgwood,
Far?,

Responding

To

Terrorism:

The

Strikes Against

Bin Laden, 24
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am not among those who favor a doctrine of "humanitarian inter-

vention," either as

lex lata

or as de lege feranda.

Let us consider the second exception
curity

Terrorism: The

first.

There

is little

doubt that the Se-

Council could adopt a resolution authorizing member states to use

remove Saddam Hussein from power. Indeed, a good argument
could be made that Security Council Resolution 678, 172 which authorized the
use of force against Iraq in the Gulf War, would have permitted the removal of
Saddam Hussein if, as a policy matter, a decision was made to do so. 173 Assuming arguendo that the Council will not adopt a new resolution explicitly
authorizing Saddam's removal, the issue arises whether any previous Security

armed

force to

Council resolutions adopted with reference to Iraq implicitly provide such
authorization.

The United

and the United Kingdom have, in the past, argued that
Security Council resolutions have implicitly authorized the use of force
against Iraq. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France relied on Resolution 688 174 as support for the establishment by armed
force of refugee camps in Northern Iraq in 1991, and later in Southern Iraq, as
well as the creation of "no-fly" zones in both parts of the country. But this was
a highly

States

tenuous argument. 175 As noted by Christine Gray,

Security Council Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII and
authorize the use of force:

it

demanded

that Iraq

it

did not

end the repression of its

civilian

population and allow access to international humanitarian organizations. This did

not stop the

USA and

the

UK from claiming that their actions in the continuing

clashes with Iraq over the no-fly zones were 'consistent with', 'supportive of

implementation

of and

'pursuant

to'

Resolution 688.

',

'in

176

Reliance on implied Security Council authorization was also used by the

United States and the United Kingdom to

justify military actions against Iraq

UN

weapons inspectors under the Resolution 687
ceasefire regime. Both countries also added another justification for their use
of armed force against Iraq. Christine Gray has aptly summarized the circumstances. She is worth quoting at some length:
for

non-cooperation with

171. For further discussion of the Charter paradigm, see

U.N. SCOR, 45th

Murphy, supra note

84.

U.N. Doc S/678/(1990).
John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in 1 UNITED
NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 247, 287-288 (Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995)
174. S. C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc S/688/(1991).
175. For my view of this argument, see Murphy, supra note 68, at 290-91.
172. S. C. Res. 678,

Sess.,

173. For a brief discussion of this point, see

176. Gray, supra note 170, at 9.
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Thus

in

USA

December 1998 the

and

UK

undertook Operation Desert Fox

in

UN weapons
was a major operation lasting four days and nights and involving
more missiles than used in the entire 1991 conflict. The USA and UK referred
to Security Council Resolutions 1 154 and 1205 as providing the legal basis for
their use of force; these resolutions had been passed under Chapter VII, but had
response to the withdrawal by Iraq of cooperation with the
inspectors; this

not made express provision for the use of force.

The

first

said that Iraq must,

under Resolution 687, accord immediate and unrestricted access to UNSCOM
and IAEA inspectors and that any violation would have "the severest
consequences

for Iraq."

The second

to stop cooperation with

decision.

condemned

resolution

UNSCOM

the decision by Iraq

and demanded that Iraq rescind

Although these resolutions did not

its

UK

explicitly authorize force, the

argued that they provided a clear basis for military action; by Resolution 1205
the Security Council had implicitly revived the authority to use force given in

Resolution 678.

The

USA

also said that

its

forces were acting under the

authority provided by the Security Council resolutions. But this argument of

implied authorization was not accepted by other states; in the Security Council

debate following the operation only Japan spoke out clearly in

its

favor.

.

.

.

The argument of implied authorization was not used on its own by the USA and
the UK; this justification was supplemented by the claim that the use of force
was a lawful response to a breach by Iraq of the ceasefire. Thus the USA argued
that Iraq

had repeatedly taken actions which constituted

breaches of
"coalition"

678

for

its

obligations: following these breaches of

its

flagrant, material

obligations

.

.

.

the

had exercised the authority given by Security Council Resolution

Member States to employ all necessary means

to secure compliance with

the Council's resolutions and restore international peace and security in the
area.

The UK,

Council debate, said that Resolution 687 made

in the Security

a condition of the ceasefire that Iraq destroy

agree to the monitoring of

its

its

it

weapons of mass destruction and
By Iraq's

obligations to destroy such weapons.

flagrant violation of the ceasefire resolution the Security Council implicitly

revived the authority to use force given in Resolution 678 (1990). 177

In

my view Gray has convincingly responded to the US and UK arguments:

the argument of material breach has been criticized by commentators because
arrogates to individual states

Council.

It is

for the Security

power that properly

it

resides with the Security

Council to determine not only the existence of a

breach of the ceasefire, but also the consequences of such a breach in cases

where there

imposed by the Security Council. Moreover, it
seems doubtful whether any breach of Resolution 687 not itself involving the
is

a binding ceasefire

177. Id. at 11-12.
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USA and UK in turning to force

in response.

Those

support this doctrine of material breach seem impatient of disagreement

within the Security Council; they revive Cold
Security Council

and the

is

War

arguments that when the
member then the USA

unable to act because of a permanent

UK

can go ahead to use force, if there has been a breach of a prior
resolution passed under Chapter VII, even in the absence of express
authorization. But this has dangers for the Security Council: it discounts the
words of the resolutions reserving the Security Council's right to consider
further action;

it

also discounts statements in debates that

it is

for the Security

Council to take further action. This undermines the authority of the Security
Council and ignores the careful negotiations between states attempting to reach

agreement on controversial

It

might also be noted

issues.

178
.

.

.

that, as discussed above, the Security

cently adopted a resolution
tions" to induce Iraq to

179

new system

that establishes a

fulfill

its

Arguably, implicit in this resolution

responsibilities
is

re-

of "smart sanc-

under Resolution 687.

member states give
armed force now would

a requirement that

these sanctions a chance to work. If so, the use of

seem incompatible with

Council has

this resolution.

Assuming, again arguendo, that existing Security Council resolutions

would not authorize the use of force to remove Saddam's regime from power,
the issue arises whether such an action could be justified as an exercise of individual or collective self-defense under Article 5 1 of the UN Charter. In pertinent part, Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
." This
and other language
occurs against a Member of the United Nations
in Article 51 has been the subject of much critical analysis and debate. 180 Professor Michael Glennon has recently argued that Article 51 is "incoherent,"
that indeed "international 'rules' concerning use of force are no longer consid.

.

.

ered obligatory by states," and that therefore "Article 5 1, as authoritatively interpreted by the International Court of Justice, cannot guide responsible

policy-makers in the

US

US war against terrorism in Afghanistan or elsewhere." 181

178. Id. at 12-13.

U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1409/(2002).
180. For discussion and citations, see LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 955-73
179. See S. C. Resolution 1409,

(4th ed. 2001).

Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law. Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of
UN Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 539, 540, and 541 (2002). See also MICHAEL J.

181.
the

Glennon, Limits Of Law, Prerogatives Of Power: intervention after Kosovo
(2001); Michael J. Glennon, The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan.
28, 2002, at 24.
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This

is

not the place or time to address Glennon's views, except to say that,

my view,

in

they are seriously wrongheaded. 182

It

suffices for present purposes

Glennon is right, and Article 51 and indeed all of the UN
Charter norms on the use of force are inoperative, we are largely wasting our
time at this conference. Interestingly, Glennon himself states that he has "attempted merely to suggest what the rules are not, not what the rules should
be." 183 Apparently he believes that, with rules of the UN Charter on the use of
a sure
force inoperative, we should simply make up the rules as we go along
to note that,

if

—

prescription for a return to the "law of the jungle" in

Be that
of the

as

it

may,

seems to require the presence of an

precedent for the use of force in individual or

as a condition

collective self-defense.

view.

us return for present purposes to the text of Article 51

let

UN Charter. By its terms Article 51

"armed attack"

my

To demonstrate

that Iraq

had committed an armed

at-

would appear necessary, at a minimum, that
some evidence be forthcoming that Iraq was involved in some direct way with
the planning of, or otherwise directly supported, al Qaeda's September 11th
attack. Such support was at least part of the case in favor of the legitimacy as
an act of self-defense of the use of armed force against the Taliban in Afghanistan. There is some evidence of contact between Iraqi intelligence agents and
184
al Qaeda members prior to September 11th,
but, at least to my knowledge,
there is no evidence at this point of Iraq's involvement in the September 1 1th
tack

on the United

States,

it

attack.

One

of the hotly debated issues over Article 5

ercise of anticipatory self-defense,

1 is

whether

it

permits an ex-

the use of armed force to prevent an

i.e.,

A

literal

reading of Article 5 1 would seem to bar anticipatory self-defense, but

many

armed

attack, not just to respond to a

completed armed attack. 185

have argued, focusing on the term "inherent"
biguous drafting history of that

182.

Some, but by no means

all,

in Article 5

article, that Article 5

1

and

1

is

citing

an am-

a savings clause,

of the problems with Glennon's views are identified in Charles

H. Tiefer's review of Glennon's book, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After
AM J. INT'L L. 489 (2002).

Kosovo, 96

183. Glennon,

The Fog of Law:

Self-Defense, Inherence,

and Incoherence

in Article

51 of the

UN

Charter, supra note 181, at 557.
184.

According

November 9

that,

11th ringmaster

Ahmed

Lawrence Kaplan, "Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman announced on
in the months preceding the attacks in New York and Washington, September

to

Mohammed

Atta met twice

Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani.

.

.

.

in Prague with senior
According to Zeman, the two

an attack on Radio Free Europe's headquarters

ET AL, supra note 180,

at

agent

in Prague." Kaplan, supra note 167, at 123.

185. For discussion of the debate over anticipatory self-defense

DAMROSCH

Iraqi intelligence

men explicitly discussed

968-72.
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preserving the right to self-defense under customary international law as
isted prior to the

5

adoption of the

it

ex-

UN Charter. Assuming arguendo that Article

permits an exercise of anticipatory self-defense, at least a colorable argu-

1

ment can be made

that the use of force to

the scope of that doctrine. There
actively sought the possession of

with

al

Qaeda members, and

its

is

remove Saddam would

considerable evidence that

weapons of mass destruction.

Qaeda has

Iraq's

meetings

might supply

al

Qaeda

or other

groups with weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weap-

ons. Iraq's past use of chemical

weapons makes such

a scenario plausible.

element of the customary international law of self-defense,

US

within

provision of bases to various Middle Eastern

terrorist groups, 186 raise the possibility that Iraq
terrorist

al

fall

A key

as formulated by

Secretary of State Daniel Webster in a diplomatic note to the British in

1842 during the Caroline incident, was that self-defense must be limited to

which "the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 187 This requirement of an imminent armed attack is at first blush clearly lacking in the case of
Iraq. But the concept of imminence arguably takes on a new meaning when al
Qaeda or other terrorist groups may be supplied biological weapons. Under
such circumstances it will often be impossible to know when an attack is imminent, since the terrorist group will decide when it will be launched with no
cases in

forewarning.

When Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a preemptive attack in 1981, there

was general outrage expressed

Security Council adopted a resolution

188

that

condemned

in the

UN, and

the

the attack. Michael

Reisman has suggested that "now the general consensus is that it [the attack]
was a lawful and justified resort to unilateral preemptive action." 189 Perhaps.
But in any event the situation has changed dramatically from 1981. Now the
threat from Iraq is not nuclear weapons but chemical and biological weapons.
Moreover, now the threat is not so much that Iraq will use such weapons but
rather that it will make such weapons available to terrorist groups that will not
be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation. Under these circumstances, it
may be argued, it would be suicidal to wait for clear evidence of an imminent
attack. As Dean Acheson once said in a different context, "the law is not a
suicide pact."

PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, supra note 11, at 65.
Moore, Digest Of international Law 412 (1906).
S. C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/487/(1981).

186. See
187. 2
188.

189. Reisman, supra note 88, at 18.
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Many, perhaps most,
advocate's

brief,

not find this argument convincing. As part of an

will

however,

it

perhaps has a measure of cogency. At this writing,

the Bush administration has reportedly concluded that military support to

opposition forces or fomenting a coup should be tried over the next few

months

to dislodge

Saddam

out military assault.

190

before any decision

is

made

to engage in

an

President Bush has reportedly not yet decided

all

on

a

"some indications" that he "may give the
covert strategy and international sanctions time to run their course." 191 Such
an approach would be less problematic from an international law standpoint
than an all out military assault and likely to engender much less negative resingle cause of action, but there are

action. Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's National Security Adviser, has

component" of the administration's new military strategy is establishing "a common security framework for the great powers," in which the United States, Russia, China, Japan and Europe "share a
common security agenda" in which they work together to keep terrorists and
rogue states from challenging that system. 192 Avoiding precipitous action on
Iraq and working as closely as possible with the other great powers would
seem the best way to build such a common security framework and to develop
reportedly stated that a "critical

a

common

security agenda. 193

190. See Christopher Marquis, Bush Officials Differ on

June

19, 2002, at

A7,

Way to Force Out Iraqi Leader,

N.Y. TIMES,

col. 1.

191. Id.
192. Id. at

A6.

As this article is being reviewed in the page proof stage, the United States, the United
Kingdom and other member states of a "coalition of the willing" are bringing to a successful
conclusion the armed conflict stage of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Time does not permit the
193.

revision of this article to include a detailed analysis of the legal basis for the launching of the

armed attack against

Iraq.

A few preliminary observation may be in order, however. First,

In

its

on the commencement of hostilities, the United States relies on
previously adopted Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), as the legal basis for its resort to armed force. See Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council (Mar. 21, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/351/(2003). The British
justification for the attack also stresses the argument that previous Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1441, authorize the use of armed force against Iraq. See Statement by the
Attorney General Lord Goldsmith in Answer to a Parliamentary Question (regarding the legal
report to the Security Council

basis for the use of force against Iraq), at

nor the British statements

(Apr. 30, 2003).

cite self-defense

It is

noteworthy that neither the

and Article 51 of the

Resolution 1441 adds a substantial complexity to the mix, in that
call a

US

UN Charter as a justification.
it

constitutes

what I would

"masterpiece of deliberate diplomatic ambiguity" that masked real differences of view

between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France, Germany and
Russia, on the other, on how Iraq's failure to fulfill its obligations under Security Council
Resolution 687 should be handled. To the United States, for example, the words "serious
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At

this

juncture

it

the

would seem

War on

Terrorism: The

fruitless to

Road Ahead

speculate about possible military

action against other state sponsors of terrorism, including the other two

mem-

and North Korea, except
rent circumstances neither case would seem to call

armed

bers of the "axis of evil," Iran

force.

194

groups

The

is

use of

likely to

US

Qaeda

military force against al

to suggest that in curfor the use of
cells or

other terrorist

be undertaken with the consent and indeed active partici-

pation of the host country, as at present in the Philippines or possibly in the
future in Indonesia.

standing

on the

The

part of

goal should be to continue to develop an under-

all

states that terrorism

is

a

common

action that can

be defeated only through a

common

effort.

consequences" were code words

for the use

of armed force, but this was not the interpretation

favored by France, Germany, and Russia. See Bob Sherwood, Military force: pre-emptive defence of
breach of international law?,

FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar.

11,

2003, at 11, col.

2.

Lord Goldsmith's

statement argues that the absence of an explicit requirement in Resolution 1441 of a further

may take place shows that no requirement
was intended by the Council. To the contrary, however, the drafting history of Resolution 1441
demonstrates that France, Russia and Germany viewed the absence of an explicit authorization
in the resolution as precluding the use of armed force without a further decision of the Security

decision of the Security Council before resort to force

World Urges Iraq to Comply with U.N. CNN International at (Apr. 28, 2003).
Assuming arguendo that, on balance, existing Security Council resolutions, including

Council. See,

e.g.,

Resolution 1441, do not authorize the use of force against Iraq because of its failure to eliminate

weapons of mass destruction as required by Resolution 1441, this should not be the end of the
analysis. There is considerable evidence, and more is likely to be disclosed in the near future,
that, far from helping to enforce Resolution 687, France and Russia engaged in deals with the
Saddam Hussein government that undermined its enforcement. Moreover, in refusing to accept
a US and UK proposal that the Security Council adopt a resolution explicitly authorizing the use
of force if Iraq failed to carry out its obligations to disarm, France, Germany and Russia arguable
failed to fulfill their obligation as members of the Council to allow the Council to perform its
collective security functions to maintain international peace and security. As Edward Luck, a
long time observer and commentator on the United Nations, recently noted: "The United
its

Nations, sadly, has drifted far from

its

founding vision.

Its

Charter neither

council nor relegates the collective use of force to a last resort.
military alliance, not a universal peace platform."

Hypocrisy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at

All,

justly

Fast:

manner and,

if so,

Law,

& the War in Iraq,

may be

a virtue in acting in

members of the

the United States and other

States, International

was a wartime document of a
the World Safe for

col. 1.

be accused of engaging in lawless behavior. Jacques de

The United

democratic

Edward C. Luck, Making

Further, as Jacques de Lisle has recently suggested, there

"almost legal"

It

calls for a

coalition

Lisle, Illegal? Yes.

an

cannot

Lawless? Not so

Foreign Policy Research Institute

armed conflict in Iraq is over,
and plans to use them as
well as of the heinous nature of the Iraq regime, this would "greatly strengthen the US and its
partners' arguments for the near-legality and, thus, the legitimacy of their war in Iraq." Id. at 9.
194. It is worth noting that even the "Iron Lady" has not called for the use of military force
against either Iran or North Korea. Thatcher, supra note 167.
(Mar. 28, 2003). Professor de Lisle also suggests that,

there

is

if

after the

substantial evidence uncovered of weapons of mass destruction
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The Road Ahead: Conclusions and Recommendations
Most of my conclusions and recommendations
of this chapter. In
light a

this,

are set forth in previous sections

the concluding section of the chapter,

I

hope

to high-

few especially important points and, with trepidation, speculate a

bit

about the future.

A general observation

that

is

we have reached

the stage where implementing

the legal regime that has been developed to combat terrorism

importance.

We now have

in place

an impressive array of

is

of paramount

antiterrorist con-

ventions, at both the global and regional levels, that covers almost

To

ble manifestations of terrorism.

be sure

it

all

possi-

might be useful to develop a

convention directed toward the possible use of weapons of mass destruction
by

but otherwise coverage

terrorists

there has been

little effort

is

impressive. Until recently, however,

to ensure that these conventions constitute

an op-

erative system for combating terrorism. In contrast, establishment of the

Counter-Terrorism Committee by the Security Council to oversee

efforts to

combat terrorism, especially the financing of terrorism, and adoption of the
Inter- American Convention Against Terrorism are significant steps to this end.
The "catastrophic terrorism" of September 11th may so "concentrate the
mind wonderfully" 195 that we will finally give the problem of terrorism the kind
of attention it deserves. The unprecedented cooperation among states, inside
and outside of the UN, that followed September 11th is a prime example of
the high priority efforts to combat terrorism currently enjoy. But the risk of becoming complacent is always present, and may become greater if, as time goes
on, no new examples of catastrophic terrorism occur. In this connection it is
worth noting that in the past al Qaeda has demonstrated great patience in its
planning of terrorist attacks, with such attacks coming at three year intervals.
Moreover, we are still engaged in a struggle to establish the proposition that
the acts of terrorism covered by the antiterrorist conventions are illegitimate
at all times

and under

the terrorist.

The

tinian suicide

all

circumstances whatever the political motivation o{

support, explicit or tacit, given by

bombings

in Israel

the problem. Although this
is

is

many

states to the Pales-

and on the West Bank graphically

illustrates

a subject outside the scope of this conference,

crucially important to efforts to

combat terrorism

it

that a peaceful resolution

of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians be found.
195. This paraphrases, of course, the famous quote from

Samuel Johnson, "Depend upon

it,

Sir,

man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 74 (Suzy Piatt ed., 1989).
when

a
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International

Law and

the

War on

Besides the antiterrorist conventions
posal

more

effectively

if

we

Terrorism: The

we need

Road Ahead

to use other tools at our dis-

are to succeed in this "war

on

terrorism."

As

indi-

cated previously in this chapter, the record of economic sanctions applied
against state sponsors of terrorism

is

spotty at best.

The

record of economic sanc-

been egregiously bad. We need to work further on "smart
have a real impact on the governments of state sponsors of

tions against Iraq has

sanctions" that will

terrorism while sparing the general population of the targeted country.
Finally,

comment

calling for the establish-

"a

and rogue
that

return to Ms. Rice's reported

common security framework for the great powers" within which
"share a common security agenda" and work together to keep terrorists

ment of
they

I

we

states

from challenging the system. With respect

already have such a

common

Council and Chapter VII of the
fulminations, in the face of

I

would suggest

security framework: the

UN

Security

UN Charter. Contrary to Professor Glennon's

numerous

obstacles, this

common

security frame-

work has from time to time served us well. It is now time for the great powers
to recommit themselves to making the collective security system of the UN
work as envisaged by its founders. Such a pledge is long overdue.
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1

Introduction

he war against the

terrorists

tember

a

11,

2001,

is

who

attacked the United States on Sep-

new kind of international conflict.

It

does not rep-

resent traditional warfare between states adhering to the law of armed conflict.

Rather,

it

reflects non-traditional violence against states

and innocent civilians

by individuals or groups for political ends without regard to the
ior

on the

civilized

behav-

underpins the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, in-

battlefield that

cluding the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

(Geneva Convention

1

James Terry

is

a retired

III).

War

2

Marine Colonel currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for Regional, Global and Functional Affairs in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs within the

US

Department of State. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author alone.
2. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked

Members of Armed Forces

at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] Convention Relative to the Protection

85;

;

AI Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

The

perpetrators of the September 11th violence, the

al

Qaeda

organiza-

haven in Afghanistan by the Pushtun
Taliban militia. Although the Taliban was the strongest of the ethnic militias
in Afghanistan by mid-2001, it was unable to conduct normal foreign relations
tion,

or to

were protected and given

fulfill its

safe

international legal obligations. Because the Taliban militia con-

comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1333
(2000), 1267 (1999) and 1214 (1998), 3 independent press reports concluded
that it had become so subject to the domination and control of al Qaeda that
it could not pursue independent policies with respect to other states. 4
While the US-led coalition together with Afghan Northern Alliance forces
were successful in crushing al Qaeda and the Taliban in Operation ENsistently refused to

DURING FREEDOM, the detainees captured in Afghanistan and transported to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for post conflict disposition raised issues not addressed since the Vietnam Conflict when Viet Cong forces were captured in
South Vietnam. Although entitled only to

of Civilian Persons in

Time

U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter

THE LAWS OF

Common

Article 3 status under

of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75

GC IV]

.

These four conventions are

all

reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON

WAR

(Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed., 2000) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR]; and in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, Dietrich Schindler
and Jiri Toman eds., 3rd ed. 1988) Treaty
.

of the
3.

Red Cross website

texts are also available at the International

at http://www.icrc.org/eng (Jan. 3, 2003).

Security Council Resolution 1333 "strongly

training of terrorists

and

[the]

him

condemn [ed]"

the Taliban for the "sheltering and

planning of terrorist acts," and "deplor[ed] the fact that the

Taliban continues to provide a safe haven to
associated with

Committee

to operate a

network of

Usama

him and others
camps from Taliban controlled

bin Laden and to allow

terrorist training

and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist
operations." U.N. SCOR55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1333/(2000). In its preamble, Resolution 1267
found that the Taliban's failure to comply with the Council's 1998 demand in Resolution 12 14 to
terminate the use of Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorism
constituted a threat to the peace. U.N. SCOR 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999). Paragraph
13 of Resolution 1214 enjoined the Taliban from providing a sanctuary and training for terrorists.
U.N. SCOR 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1214/(1998).
4. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs and Vernon Loeb, 2 U.S. Targets Bound By Fate, WASH. POST, Nov.
territory

14,

2001,atA22.
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each of the four Geneva Conventions, 5 the Viet Cong prisoners were never6
theless treated as prisoners of war (POWs).

Simply stated, the issues presented
(1) a

US

officials in

Afghanistan required

determination whether the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied to the

conflict represented by

CONDA; and

ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation ANAwhether members of al Qaeda as a group and the

Operation

(2), if so,

Taliban individually or as a group are entitled to

Convention

POW status under Geneva

III.

The Application
Following the post-World
national law and the

of the

Laws

of

War

in

Afghanistan

War II review of serious breaches of customary inter-

Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 by

the Axis Powers,

Geneva
who become

a diplomatic conference invested nearly three years writing the four

Conventions designed to regulate treatment of those individuals
victims of warfare. These four conventions, like other treaties, establish

legal

between nations, not between nations and groups or nations and
subnational organizations. 7 The United States and Afghanistan are both High
Contracting Parties to the Conventions, 8 including Geneva Convention III,
relationships

and are thus bound by their terms and provisions.
Under Geneva Convention III, individuals entitled to
capture include members of the regular armed forces of a

POW

status

upon

party, the militia,

and those volunteers and volunteer units fighting with the regular armed
forces of a party. 9 Irregular forces, including militia and volunteers, fighting
apart from the regular armed forces, can also qualify for
status when

POW

captured, provided they are serving under an authority responsible for their

conduct, are in uniform or are wearing a distinctive sign recognizable at a
5.

Common

individuals

Article 3 appears in each of the four 1949

Geneva Conventions and

and groups who do not represent a government or

state but rather

addresses

an insurgency or

opposition group to the recognized regime. Unlike the Viet Cong, however, neither the Taliban

nor

al

Qaeda were

factions within a state with a recognized central government. Like the Viet

Cong, however, they were fighting an international coalition of the willing within the recognized
borders of a nation, despite
the
6.

its

lack of central government,

See Contemporary Practice of the United States, 62

MACV, Annex A of Directive No.
7.

which was

a high contracting party to

Geneva Conventions.

See U.S. ex rel Saroop

v.

381-46,

December

AM.

J.

INT'L L. 766-768 (1968)

citing

27, 1967.

Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 167 (3d Cir. 1997) where the court stated that

between nations."
The United States became a party on July

"[Tlreaties are agreements
8.

14,

1956.
9.

GC

III,

supra note

2, art.

4(A)(1) &4(A)(4).
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distance, carry their arms openly,

tent with the laws of war.

When

and conduct operations

in a

manner

a captive's status as a

POW

is

challenged because a party believes

the individual did not meet the criteria set forth above, that individual

accorded

POW

is

to be

treatment until a tribunal convened by the captor state

views the facts and makes a determination.
belligerent status

is

11

Similarly,

when an

can be determined by an appropriate

tribunal.

The Administration

III

until

re-

individual's

not clear upon falling into the hands of the enemy, that

dividual enjoys the protection of Geneva Convention
status

consis-

10

such time

in-

as his

12

Position

On February 7, 2002, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, gave the Administration view of the status of Taliban and

Qaeda detainees captured

al

in

Afghanistan.

Geneva Convention will apply to
Qaeda international terrorists.

President Bush today has decided that the

Taliban detainees, but not to the

Afghanistan

is

a party to the

al

Geneva Convention. Although the United

the

States

does not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate Afghani government, the
President determined that the Taliban

because Afghanistan

is

members

are covered under the treaty

a party to the Convention.

Under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, however, Taliban detainees are not
entitled to POW status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees would have to have satisfied four conditions: They would
have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would have to have worn uniforms
or other distinctive signs visible at a distance; they would have to have carried

arms openly; and they would have to have conducted their military operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

The Taliban have not

effectively distinguished themselves

from the

civilian

population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their military
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, they have

knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful
the

10.

al

Id.,

War on
11.

GC

12.

Id.

terrorist objectives of

Qaeda.

art

4(A)(2); see also 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of

Land, Oct.
III,

18, 1907,

supra note

2, art.

36

Stat. 2227,

Annex.

5(2).
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Al Qaeda

an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state
party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the
status under the treaty. 13
Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to
is

POW

What

the

White House was

on terrorism was not

a

clearly implying,

if

not saying, was that this war

war envisaged when Geneva Convention

III

in 1949. In this war, global terrorists transcend national boundaries

was signed

and

inter-

White House statement, the
Bush Administration committed the United States to the principles of Geneva
Convention III, while recognizing that the Convention does not cover every
situation in which people may be captured or detained by military forces.
nationally target the innocent. In the February 7

Effect of

The language
flicts first

clear,

14

Not Applying Geneva Convention

of the four

Geneva Conventions

and only then does

however, that

all

it

Specifically, the

applies to international conIt is

The Bush AdminQaeda appears to be at

international conflicts are covered.

Convention

odds with these principles. More importantly,

flict.

Qaeda

address the status of those involved.

istration position of not applying the

the Convention which

III to al

is

all

overlooks the very fabric of

combatant actors in a concombatants into the category of

designed to address

Convention divides

it

to al

all

lawful combatant, or alternatively, that of unlawful combatant.

By decrying the application of Geneva Convention III to al Qaeda fighters,
the US decision deprives the United States of its strongest legal rationale for
jurisdiction both in US federal court and internationally. More specifically,
absent the authority to act under Geneva Convention III, the authority to detain al Qaeda fighters, to remove them from Afghanistan, to try them before
military commissions for war crimes, to provide them no more than humane
treatment, and to send them to third countries could be challenged. Without
the authority of Geneva Convention III to rely upon, the detainees could be

13.

White House

Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing at the

2002), at 1-2, available at Lexis, Federal
14.

See, e.g.,

GC

III,

supra note

News

2, art. 2.

Service (Jan.

Article

2,

6,

common

provides in relevant part that the conventions shall "apply to

other armed conflict which

White House

(Feb. 7,

2003).
to all four

all

Geneva Conventions,

cases of declared

war or of any

may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties
445
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entitled to rights either enshrined in the

Covenant on

and

Civil

Political Rights

US Constitution or the International
(ICCPR) as the ICCPR is generally
15

Geneva Convention

believed to apply to those situations in which

III

does

not apply.

The Taliban and Al Qaeda
as

One for Purposes

Must Be Viewed

Fighters

of Application of International

Law

During the period that Taliban authorities controlled the political machinery
of state in Kabul, they constituted the de facto government of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan continued to have the essential elements of statehood, and was

upon by the

called

international

community

to

comply with

reflected in Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999)

its

obligations, as

and 1333 (2000) (which

upon the Taliban to take specific actions), and the international agreements prior Afghan governments had signed (even if it was unable or unwilling
to comply with their terms). 16 The close relationship between the Taliban and
al Qaeda political and military elements was obvious. As Resolution 1333 recognized, "the Taliban continue [d] to provide a safe haven to Usama bin Laden
and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a
base from which to sponsor international terrorist operations." 17
Professor Robert Turner of the University of Virginia explained that when
"bin Laden masterminded the attacks on New York and Washington, Afghanistan [was] in breach of its state responsibility to take reasonable meacalled

sures to prevent

its

territory

from being used to launch attacks against other

September 11, 2001, al Qaeda supplied the Taliban with the
money, material, and personnel to help it gain the upper hand with the Northstates."

18

Prior to

ern Alliance. 19

15.

International

Covenant on

Civil

and

Political Rights,

opened

for signature

Dec.

19, 1966,

1992 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, signed by the United States Oct.
[hereinafter

ICCPR] The ICCPR provides
.

5,

1977)

the same protections, in article 14, that the President

has provided to the detainees here.
16.

No

Security Council

nationhood or that

it

document

had ceased

C. Res. 1333, supra note

17.

S.

18.

Robert

F.

exists claiming that

Afghanistan had

lost its right to

to exist as a viable state.

3.

Turner, International

Law and the Use of Force in Response to the World Trade Center

Pentagon Attacks, JURIST ONLINE, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34-htm

Can. 23, 2003).
19. Michael Jansen, U.S. Focused
available at

Initially

on bin Laden Mercenaries, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001

NEXIS, Major World Newspapers

(]an. 23, 2003).
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Thus Afghanistan, as a sovereign state, under the leadership of Taliban authorities, had thoroughly aligned itself with al Qaeda forces prior to September 11. As the President stated on November 13, 2001, "[international
terrorists, including members of al Qaeda, have carried out attacks on United
States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens
and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of
armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces." 20
This statement reflects recognition that the Taliban and al Qaeda are closely
aligned and that the Taliban provided the safe haven in which al Qaeda could
function. 21 In light of the support and safe haven provided al Qaeda by the
Taliban leadership, it must be concluded that the Taliban fighters and al
Qaeda members who were together when fighting US and Northern Alliance
forces when captured must be viewed as one when determining the application of Article 4(A)(1) of Geneva Convention III.

Geneva Convention
Geneva Convention

111 is

Applicable to al

Qaeda and

the Taliban

and trial of the regular and irregular forces of a state party whose militia has been engaged in an international armed conflict. 22 Article 2 of the Convention provides that it shall apply
to armed conflict which "may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." As stated previously, Afghanistan has been a state party to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions since 1956, the United States since 1955. The
Taliban, with

Afghan

its al

territory,

III

applies to the detention

Qaeda

allies,

effectively controlled nearly

90 percent of

while exercising governmental functions therein, to include

operating a system of taxation, administering Islamic courts, appointing and

confirming regional governors, district leaders, mayors, and other regional and

and imposing law and order.
The fact that the United States and its coalition partners did not recognize
the Taliban government is immaterial to the treatment of its fighters and
local officials,

20.

Military

Order of President of the United States, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain

Non-Citizens in the

War

Against Terrorism,

November

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ll/20011113-27.html

13,

2001,

Q an

-

23,

available

2003)

at

http://

(emphasis

supplied).
21.

See, e.g., S.

C. Res. 1267, U.N.

SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.

S/1267/(1999) which provides:

"[d]eploring the fact that the Taliban continues to provide safe haven to
to allow

him and others

Taliban-controlled

associated with

territory

and

to

him to operate
use

See

GC III, supra note 3,

arts.

4

bin Laden and

camps from

Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor

international terrorist operations. ..."
22.

Usama

a network of terrorist training

& 5.
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those of the allied

Convention

who

is

al

clear

Qaeda under Geneva Convention III. Article 4(3)
on this point. That provision extends coverage to

profess allegiance to a

government or an authority

Detaining Power." This interpretation
ating history.

23

of the
forces

"not recognized by the

supported by the Article 4(3) negotiBecause the Taliban, with its al Qaeda supporters, exercised
is

actual control over the greater part of Afghanistan prior to and after Septem-

ber

1 1,

2001, and clearly opposed the coalition's use of force in Operation EN-

DURING FREEDOM,

must be concluded that an armed conflict did
between two High Contracting Parties to Geneva Convention III.
Taliban and

The

fact that the

it

al

Qaeda Forces Do Not Qualify

Convention

opposing forces does not

applies to

mean

for

POW Status

an international armed

conflict

that these forces will be accorded

under the Convention, however. Article 4(A)

exist

and

its

POW status

sets forth in pertinent detail the

basic categories of persons entitled to protection as

POWs. As noted

earlier,

these include: (1) armed forces of a party and militias and volunteer corps forming part of such

armed

members of other militia and volunteer corps
requirements; and (3) members of regular armed forces

forces; (2)

who meet the four basic
who profess allegiance to an
Neither the Taliban nor

Convention

authority not recognized.
al

Qaeda

forces qualify for protection under the

"armed forces of a Party," or the "militias and volunteer
corps forming part of such armed forces." This results from their failure to fulfill the basic requirements applicable to any armed force, militia, or volunteer
corps under Article 4(A) of the Convention. Neither al Qaeda nor the
as the

Taliban satisfied the requirement of wearing uniforms or other distinctive
signia;

24

neither were subject to a

command

in-

structure that enforced the laws

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 3 GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, COMMENTARY 63 Qean S. Pictet ed.
23.

See

1960) (noting that Article 4(A)(3)

is

written to bring an end to the practice of refusing to give

POW status to unrecognized but otherwise deserving combatants).
24.

The White House and Department of Defense stated publicly that the Taliban and al Qaeda

did not distinguish themselves from the civilian population. See Press Briefing at the

House, supra note

13.
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and customs of warfare, 25 and neither in their operations adhered to the laws
and customs of warfare. 26
As one independent observer has reported with regard to the lack of respect

shown

to the laws of war:

These non- Afghan fighters, along with the Taliban army, have not only broken
the traditional norms of Afghan civil societies, they have also committed
massive crimes against humanity by beheading and killing prisoners of war
(POWs) and massacring thousands of civilians in different parts of the Country.
In 1998 and 1999, the International Red Cross reported that the Taliban and
their non-Afghan army killed thousands of civilians in Bamyan and set fire to
8,000 houses and shops. 27

The Depart-

This wanton violence has continued until quite recently.

ment

of State has reported that the Taliban "massacred hundreds of Afghan

civilians,

women and

including

children, in Yakaoloang,

Mazar

-e-Sharif,

Bamayan, Qezelbad, and other towns." The Taliban routinely failed in its attacks to discriminate between military objectives and civilians, as required under the law of armed conflict. For example, "[t]here are reports that as many
as 5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians, were massacred by the
Taliban after the takeover of Mazar -e-Sharif." 29
28

25.

Article 4 of

GC

III

requires that forces be

subordinates." This military

"commanded by

command requirement is intended

with the laws and customs of war. According to the

not

commanded by any person

Memorandum: Why Taliban

a person responsible for his

to ensure widespread compliance

US Department of Defense,

responsible for his subordinates."

are Unlawful Combatants, at

1

these forces "are

US

(Oct. 19,

Department of Defense
2001) (copy on file with

author).
26.

The Taliban and

al

Qaeda

as a

whole ignored the laws and customs of war. According to the

laws and customs of warfare, parties must take precautions to protect civilians, for example, by
verifying the military nature of targets, respecting the principles of proportionality

and minimizing incidental

Geneva Protocol

I

loss

of civilian

Dec.

THE LAWS OF
27.
also,

12, 1977,

WAR at 419, supra note
et. al,

By

Armed Conflicts,

1125 U.N.T.S.

Neamatollah nojumi, The
Lee A. Casey

See generally,

GC

and

necessity,

IV, supra note 2; see also, 1977

Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to

the Protection of Victims of International
for signature

life.

the

1

[hereinafter

Part IV

GP

I],

-

Civilian Population, opened

reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON

2.

Rise

of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 229 (2002). See
aren't POWs, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2002, at

Laws of War, They

A3.
28.

US Department of State,

2001, at

1,

available at

Fact Sheet: Taliban Actions Imperil Afghan Civilians,

November

http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwh01110301.html

(J

an

-

2,

23,

2003).
29.

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 2000-

Afghanistan, at §l(g) (Feb. 2001).
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The

State Department also reported in

November 2001

were using the entire populations of villages

as

human

that the Taliban

shields to protect their

ammunition and weapons, that they were relocating the police
ministry in Kandahar to mosques, that they had taken over humanitarian relief organization buildings, and that they were discovered transporting tanks
and mortar shells in the guise of humanitarian relief. 30 These and other similar
stockpiles of

reports provide strong support for the President's conclusion that the Taliban

Qaeda)

and customs of war, failed to
exhibit insignia or otherwise distinguish themselves from civilians, and were
(and

al

forces flagrantly violated the laws

not subject to responsible military command. Under these circumstances, the

Taliban and

al

Qaeda do not meet

the Article 4 criteria for groups entitled to

POW status.
A Group Determination of Status Does Not Violate the Convention
Article 5 of Geneva

Convention

III

provides that where doubt arises as to the

proper status of an individual or individuals, "such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present convention until such time as their status has been deter-

mined by a competent tribunal." For the reasons set forth above, there can be
no doubt that the Taliban and al Qaeda do not qualify for POW status, a decision the President came to after consulting with his most senior advisors, and
undertaking a careful and reasoned analysis.
The process of group determination exercised by the Executive Branch was
consistent with the drafters' intent that questions of status are given serious

consideration by responsible leaders. 31
lied decisions

on

POWs

were established in

It

was

also consistent with

US and

al-

Korea and Vietnam, although Article 5 Tribunals
Vietnam to address individual cases where doubt existed. 32
in

Nevertheless, the President determined that the detainees would continue to

enjoy the protections of the present convention as long as they are held.

The protections to be accorded all prisoners of war are contained in Part II
of Geneva Convention III. Those protections, which the President has determined applicable to all al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, even though these individuals do not warrant designation as POWs, require humane treatment

30.

US Department of State, Fact Sheet:

The

Taliban's Betrayal of the

Afghan

People,

November 6,

2001, available at http://usembassy.state.gOv/islamabad/v.-wwh01110702.html (Jan. 23, 2003).
3

1

See, e.g.,

WAR 53
32. See,

FRITZ

KALSHOVEN AND LlESBETH ZEBVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF

(2001).
e.g.,

Roberts, supra Chapter VII, note 22 and accompanying text.
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and protection from insults, reprisals, and public curiosity. 33 Part II also requires free "maintenance" and medical attention. The detainees are being
provided meals that reflect their Muslim culture and religion, and clothing,
shelter,

pads for sleeping, blankets, and medical care. 34 They are also receiving

additional privileges, including the ability to send and receive mail, the right
to visit individually with the

assistance of a

Muslim chaplain provided by the

While the detainees

POWs

under Part

privileges

ICRC, and the opportunity

II

to worship with the

US Navy.

Guantanamo are being accorded all protections due
Geneva Convention III, they are not subject to the

at

of

and benefits accorded

POWs under the Convention. These benefits

include respect for rank, 35 pay, 36 and traditional courtesies accorded military

personnel by others in the profession of arms. 37

The

Trial of Detainees before Military Commissions

When President Bush issued his Military Order of November

13, 2001, the trial

of non-citizens before military tribunals had not been contemplated since

World War

II,

and then not

specifically for terrorist defendants. In this case,

the use of military commissions to try these defendants for war crimes provides

important advantages over civilian

trials.

As White House Counsel Alberto

Gonzales stated,

American jurors, judges and courts the grave risks associated with
terrorist trials. They allow the government to use classified information as
evidence without compromising intelligence or military efforts. They can
dispense justice swiftly, close to where our forces may be fighting, without years
[t]hey spare

of pretrial proceedings or post-trial appeals.

And

they can consider the broadest range of relevant evidence to reach their

verdicts. For example, circumstances in a

meet the authentication requirements

33.

GC III, supra note

34.

Id., arts.

13,

15-16.

Id., arts.

44-45.

36.

Id., arts.

54, 62.

37. See,

and

2, art. 13.

The

rights

2001, supra note 19, at

35.

e.g.,

GC

III,

war zone often make it impossible to
documents in a civilian court, yet

for

2,

are

supra note

nationality, decorations,

Order of November
consistent with the provisions of these two articles.

announced by President Bush

2, art. 18,

and

articles

in his Military

which provides, in pertinent part, that "badges of rank
having above all a personal or sentimental value may

not be taken from prisoners of war."
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documents from
determine the

al

Qaeda safe houses in Kabul might be essential to
Qaeda cell members hiding in the West. 38

accurately

guilt of al

The procedures

for trials

by military commission are carefully

set forth in

Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, signed by Secretary
Rumsfeld on March 21, 2002. 39 As the Order makes clear, "[t]hese procedures
(discussed in detail below) shall be implemented and construed so as to ensure
that any such individual receives a full and fair trial before a military commission

." 40
.

.

.

Military commissions

do not gain

their authority

from Article

III

of the

Constitution which underlies our federal court system. Rather, these tribunals

Commander-in-Chief authorities unand have been specifically approved by the US Supreme Court. 41

operate as a function of the President's
der Article

I

The nature

of the proceedings and the nature of the evidence are shaped by

the law of armed conflict. That body of law has very different premises than

our domestic criminal law. Under domestic law, the killing of another person
is

presumed unlawful unless

justified or

self-defense) or condition (e.g.,
flict,

less

there

is

a

is

a specific defense (e.g.,

mental defect). Under the law of armed con-

presumption that the

some other norm

excused by

killing of

another combatant

is

lawful un-

violated, such as the status of the aggressor as

an

unlawful combatant. In such cases, the individual had no combatant immunity to engage in belligerent acts.
It is

also important to note that the purpose of holding the detainees at

Guantanamo

is

not specifically in anticipation of

tional function of the

nition that

if

reason, trials

US

war

effort.

released, detainees

—

if

any are held

—

This

is

trial,

but rather as a tradi-

based on a common-sense recog-

would quickly rejoin the

hostilities.

not begin until the conflict

will

is

For this
over.

At

the end of hostilities, the equation, of course, could change. Continued de-

tention at that point would have to be based

on

38. Alberto R. Gonzales, Military Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y.

39.

DOD Military Commission Order number

of Certain Non-United States Citizens In the

1

a legitimate judicial or law

TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A18.
for Trials by Military Commissions

- Procedures

War Against Terrorism

(Mar. 21, 2002), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf Can. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
Military

Commission Order]

40.

at

Id.,

DOD

1.

30-31 (1942). This case involved the trial by military
commission of unlawful combatants who were German soldiers smuggled into the United States
by submarine who discarded their uniforms upon entry, but were captured prior to committing
41. See

Ex

parte Quirin, 317 U.S.

1,

acts of sabotage.
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enforcement need.

It is

premature

at this point to

determine to

whom

the

need might apply.

At the conclusion

of hostilities, those individuals for

whom

investigations

have revealed violations of the law of war could be charged with offenses before a military

commission. Under the provisions of Military Commission Or-

der No.

the accused will be furnished a copy of the charges sufficiently

in

1:

(1)

advance of

trial to

prepare a defense; (2) a presumption of innocence will

apply; (3) the standard of proof

is

beyond

a reasonable doubt; (4) at least

one

defense counsel shall be provided; (5) the accused shall not be required to testify; (6)

the accused and his counsel shall have access to the prosecution's evi-

dence, including exculpatory evidence, in advance of
witnesses and evidence
at all

may be

phases of the proceeding.

trial;

(7)

defense

presented; and (8) the accused shall be present
42

Within this construct, commission membership shall include between 3
and 7 members who shall be commissioned officers of the US armed forces. 43

The

presiding officer shall be a judge advocate. 44 This official shall ensure the

expeditious conduct of the

trial as

be judge advocates from the

well as

its

fairness. 45 Prosecutors shall either

US armed forces

or special

trial

counsel from the

Department of Justice made available by the Attorney General. 46
The conduct of each trial before a commission follows the federal model
and is precisely set forth in Article 6(E) of DOD Order No. 1. Post-trial procedures include a formal review process by a three officer review panel, with one
of the officers experienced as a judge. 47

The

Secretary of Defense will then re-

view each record of trial and the recommendation of the review panel.
after

review by the Secretary, the record of

trial

be forwarded to the President for review and

and

all

Finally,

recommendations

final decision.

will

49

Conclusion

The Bush Administration has embarked upon a careful process of identification and detention of al Qaeda and Taliban combatants, investigation of

42.

DOD Military Commission Order, supra note 39, art. 5.

43.

Id., art.

4A(2),

44.

Id., art.

4A (4).

45.

ia.,art.4A(5)(a),(c).

46.

Id., art.

4B(2).

47.

Id., art.

6H(4).

48.

Id., art.

6H(5).

49.

Id., art.

6H(6).

(3).
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offenses,

While
ized in

and the development of

a

thorough and

fair

may exist in terms of how al Qaeda members are characterterms of Geneva Convention III, the regime established to examine the

differences

conduct of their actions and the actions of the Taliban
in a

mere "distinction without

The

adjudicative process.

fighters will likely result

a difference."

President has stated that he will only try foreign

before military commissions, and then only

if

enemy war

criminals

they are chargeable with offenses

against the international laws of war. Trials before military commissions will

be as open as possible, consistent with the urgent needs of national security.

Each defendant before

a military

commission

will

know

the charges against

him, be represented by qualified counsel and be allowed to present a robust
defense.

Order of November 13, 2001, like the Secretary of
Defense's Military Commission Order No. 1 of March 21, 2002, is designed to
ensure that individuals subject thereto receive a full and fair trial. The military
commissions that are authorized will not undermine the constitutional values
of any American nor violate the civil liberties of any non-US national appearing before them. Rather, the regime created draws a delicate balance between
the President's obligation to defend the nation and the desire of all Americans

The

President's Military

that any commission established under the President's Constitutional authorities

provide the same procedural and substantive protections evident in the

domestic courts of this country.
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T

1

on actions we must consider as
the United States moves to the road ahead in Afghanistan. Winning
the war on terrorism requires that we approach this complex problem in a multifaceted way. We must cultivate counter-terrorism cooperation on a regional
basis as well as on an individual state basis for it is only through such cooperation that we can be successful.
Using all instruments of power available, we must stimulate an increased
political will to act on the part of states on the front lines in this war on terrorism. We must enhance our public diplomacy efforts and economic support to
stimulate. religious and social institutions, especially educational institutions,
to be more responsive and responsible in the education of their future citizens.
We must further, across the reaches of the US Government, enhance our image and our relationship with the Muslim population, at home and abroad.

1.

oday

I

will offer a series of observations

James Terry, a retired Marine Colonel, serves

as the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Regional, Global and Functional Affairs in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs within the

Department of State. The views expressed

in these

for

US

remarks are the views of the author alone.
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Of critical importance
American

in these efforts

is

our focus on non heavy-handed,

aid to countries struggling with the difficulty of dealing with the

conditions that foster the development of terrorism. In these efforts,

we can

not be seen as unilateralists but instead must be seen as partners in the global

We must foster the development of greater coop-

effort to address these issues.

exchange of information, especially
This has occurred most recently with Morocco, a coun-

erative action, including the effective

among Muslim

states.

with which the United States did not have as developed a relationship be-

try

fore the events of

September 11th.

We must share the best counter-terrorism laws, regulations, and treaties we
can develop with these
similar laws.

We

states in

must create

an

effort to aid

effective

to extradition.

in the

development of

agreements between states

forcement operations so as to ensure that
ject

them

terrorists

And we must enhance

for

law en-

captured abroad are sub-

cooperation in our nation's

and sharing, much as has been done since September 11th, with countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Regional training programs and bilateral programs designed to enhance forensic law enforcement and legal methodology, as are currently being pursued
with Pakistan, must be undertaken. At the same time, it is critical that we
guard against the imposition of those US laws and policies which alienate us
from those we wish to influence. As an example, recent Arab bashing legislation proposed in the House of Representatives and the Senate does not necessarily serve our interests well. These efforts may well be called for but they do
not help us in our efforts to appear even handed to different groups.
intelligence gathering

Operationally,
front line states
bility in

it is

important to understand that capacity building in such

must focus on the ultimate goal of individual

state responsi-

dealing with the problems of terrorism. In working towards this goal,

the United States must overcome the view that
tions such as the

United Nations.

It is

it

has a bias against institu-

important that

we not be seen

bashing in either our legislation or our voice. In that regard, for the

months

I

as

UN
nine

last

have been the head of a working group addressing the American

Servicemembers Protection Act. 2 Our focus has been on ensuring that

this

act does not deprive the president of the flexibility he needs to support the In-

ternational Criminal Court
this

work

is

when

it is

in our national interest to

do

so.

That

occurring should be shared with coalition and allied partners to

ensure they understand that while our principled objections to the problems

2.

American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, Pub.

(2002).
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No. 107-206,

1

16 Stat 899
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inherent in the
that there

when

Rome

may be

Statute remain very

a time,

if

real,

our government recognizes

made to the Rome Statute,
member of the International

certain changes are

the United States will agree to

become

a

Criminal Court.

The long-term

goal o{ these operational considerations must be the inter-

nal sustainability of this process region-wide and world-wide.

Our main

goal

must be to create national counter-terrorism systems that really do work. In
support of this goal, we must focus on programs like our International Military
Education and Training Program and ensure that funds for these programs
support those countries working alongside us in pursuit of our goal. Such

must account for the stated needs of the host and not just
our perceived view of what would make them more effective. In this regard, a
phased approach to engaging these countries would be useful.
Phasing our cooperation and operations with countries in such a way that
we move from training to policy and then to operations may well allow us to
gauge the will of these participants at each step; building trust and debunking
myths about US objectives that are simply not true. On the diplomacy side, we
must work with states to harness their desire to increase their regional
counter-terrorism role. An example of how this can be successful is the retraining assistance

gional counter-terrorism operations center for Southeast Asia, recently cre-

ated by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States. This
center promises real opportunities to work alongside and support our

on

new

allies in

combatant commanders and
their respective staff judge advocates must play an important role in the development and working of these centers as consultation on the desired training,
policy development and operations for such centers is critical for their success.
Finally, useful agreements must be developed between the United States and
other states which tie cooperation on counter- terrorism efforts to US assisthe war

tance.

terrorism. Obviously, the regional

Such agreements may, by

necessity,

need to be confidential

in the early

stages o( cooperation but they are nonetheless necessary.

From

a

governmental process perspective,

this will

not be easy. In South-

must provide the authority to overcome restrictions on aid to countries such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia.
Necessarily, such legislation will be required to be drafted in such a way that
US assistance is contingent upon the particular country's participation in the
global war on terrorism. At the same time, over-reaching congressional mandates must be avoided. We must avoid the traditional "litmus test report" language as a condition for aid and we must ensure that the entire range of
east Asia for example, Congress
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economic support funding and international

foreign military financing,

mili-

and education training funding is used.
Not surprisingly, we have invoked each of these strategies in our efforts in
Afghanistan. Our goals for the road ahead in Afghanistan have focused on security, infrastructure support, nation building
and by that I include political
development, education and woman's rights and reconstruction (including
tary

—
—

the revitalization of the agricultural sector). In the security area, continued
steps to destroy the al

Qaeda network

ANAENDURING FREEDOM that

include the success of Operation

CONDA

and the other follow-on operations to
have been complemented by the provision of stability by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

The
of the
the

an Afghan Army and police force are key elements
and German efforts to build a more secure Afghanistan. In this task,

initial steps to train

US

Germans

are doing a superb job in developing a police organization that

understands and respects fundamental
sensus

among the

different

war

human

lords has

most recently

rights.

An

effort to build

been pursued through

con-

their inclusion

Loya Jirga electoral process; a process that resulted in the election of Hamed Karzai to head the transitional
in the political process,

in the

governing authority for the next two years.
this process

Sharif,

This

The

inclusion of the war lords in

has helped ease ethnic tensions existing in such

cities as

Mazar

-e-

Kandahar, and Jalabad.
is

a great start but

it is

not enough.

We must focus now on honing the

mean the legal,
economic, political, and military instruments. In that regard, the Bonn Agreement 3 that established this process eight months ago is holding. As an examinstruments of power in the Afghan government. By that

ple,

woman's

rights

I

have been emphasized through the naming of two

women

to major cabinet posts within Karzai's transitional authority. In the recon-

struction area, three successful conferences in Washington, in Brussels, and in

Tokyo have produced pledges of some
conferences are scheduled.
thority through

Money

is

4.5 billion dollars in aid,

and additional

starting to flow to the transitional au-

UN development programs, bilateral donors and the accessing

of assets frozen during the Taliban regime. Importantly also, refugees and

dis-

placed persons by the hundreds of thousands are returning to their homes, and
schools have reopened for millions of Afghan children.

Agreement on Provisional Arrangements
Permanent Government Institutions, Dec.

3.

in

Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of

5,

2001, pmbl., at http://www.uno.de/frieden/

afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm (Apr. 26, 2003).
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To

economic development and effective reconstruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure, we must ensure that a
broad based government at the working level not just the cabinet level is
established. We must ensure that security forces are trained to respect and
protect human rights. We must ensure that peaceful and cooperative relations
are fostered between Afghanistan and its neighbors, especially Pakistan and
Iran. We must ensure that major drug production and trafficking is
achieve these goals of political

stability,

—

—

eliminated.

Within the next two years, we must help Afghanistan move toward increased stability and prosperity; a stability and prosperity marked by a transitional authority beginning to provide important social services to

We

its

twenty-

must help Afghanistan develop into an emerging
economy through agricultural development and small scale industry. We must
facilitate the establishment of a national military and police force capable of
assuming responsibility for internal security. And perhaps most importantly,
we must be prepared to overcome the inevitable backlash which will result
when this struggle proves to be long and hard. The road ahead in Afghanistan
is surely a difficult one to traverse, but one that our country, working together
with others, can do so with success.
five million citizens.

459

XXVIII
V

Panel

—The Road Ahead

Commentary
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I

will

1

begin by saying a few words about the United Nations and terrorism

before September 11, 2001, the impact of September 11th, and where the

United Nations seems to be headed. 2
best,

UN Member States have always had,

at

an ambivalent relationship with terrorism. Some delegates have preferred

to see

it

as a social

phenomenon, not

as a criminal

UN

instrument for advancing a

symposium in Vienna in
2002, over fifty delegates spoke, and almost all of them talked about terrorism
as a social phenomenon; only one speaker addressed terrorism as a weapon.
Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that wars oi independence often inpolitical or other agenda. Indeed, at a

volved acts of terrorism.

1.

Nicholas Rostow

Nations.

He

is

It is difficult

terrorism

for participants in

such struggles to admit

currently the General Counsel to the United States Mission to the United

held the Stockton Chair in International

2001, prior to September

1 1

and being called

Law

Naval War College in
United Nations. He has

at the U.S.

to the U.S. Mission to the

served in a number of senior Federal government positions, including Legal Adviser to the

National Security Council, 1987-1993, and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence,

1999-2000. The views expressed are

positions of the U.S.

his

own and do not

necessarily reflect the

Government.

my Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism since September
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 476 (2002) and Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the
2.

See

Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97

AM.

J.

INT'L

L.

333 (2003).

11th,

35

Counter-
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to having used terrorist tactics.

And, of course,

and the Pakistani-Indian

Israeli conflict

in the debates

about the Arab-

conflict over Kashmir,

Arabs and

and others deprecate the use of the term "terrorist" to describe any
undertaken against "foreign occupation." 3 In contrast, there is substantial

Pakistanis
acts

evidence, including in the Arab-Israeli warfare since September 2000, that

weapon. The evidence of terrorism's political effectiveness with
many governments, inter-governmental institutions, and commentators has
terrorism

is

a

been accumulating

for decades; as

on many occasions,

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has said

terrorism, although itself unjustifiable under any circum-

stances, does not invalidate legitimate grievances. 4

Prior to

September 11th,

UN

Member

States addressed the issue of terror-

ism chiefly through the General Assembly and the Sixth (Legal) Committee

The

in particular.

forum

principal

for negotiating the twelve

UN

bodies have provided the

conventions elaborating particular

handling of nuclear material, hostage taking, 6 maritime naviga5

terrorist acts:

tion, 7

Sixth Committee and other

and the

like. 8

UN

Rostow, supra note 1, at 475 n. 4 (Pakistani and Syrian positions). Pakistan's
Mission website states that "a comprehensive legal definition of terrorism should not only draw a
3. See, e.g.,

between terrorism and people's legitimate struggle for right of selfdetermination but must also take into account all forms of terrorism including state-sponsored
clear

distinction

terrorism." Available at http://www.un.int/pakistan/terrorism.html (last visited June 16, 2003).

In addition,

on June

4,

2002, Pakistan's

the Islamic Conference (OIC) at the

UN Ambassador told a meeting of the Organization of

UN that, "After the events of

1 1

September 2001, India has

sought to take undue advantage of the opportunity to portray the Kashmir liberation struggle as
terrorism,

and

determination

to delegitimize
is

the struggle, disregarding the fact that the right of

a crucial principle of the

themselves., including by

armed

UN

Charter, as

resistance. This

is

is

self-

also the people's right to defend

true of liberation struggles everywhere

including Palestine." Available at http://www.un.int/pakistan/20020604-html

(last visited

June

16, 2003).
4.

See Statement of Secretary-General Kofi

Annan

to

the 20 January Security Council

meeting on terrorism, S/PV.4688 (2003), ("Just as terrorism must never be excused,
so must genuine grievances never be ignored. True, it tarnishes a cause when a few wicked men
ministerial

commit murder

in

its

name. But it does not make it any less urgent that the cause be addressed,
wrong put right. Otherwise, we risk losing the contest for the hearts

the grievance heard and the

and minds of much of mankind.")
See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1929, 1456 U.N.T.S. 24631.
6. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1361 U.N.T.S.
5.

206.
7.

See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-1 (1988), reprinted
8.

All the Conventions, including in addition

in

27 1.L.M. 672 (1988).

some regional conventions,

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED
SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2001).
publication,
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are reprinted in a
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The United Nations

first

began to look

sacre of the Israeli athletes at the 1972

seriously at terrorism after the mas-

Munich Olympics.

On the initiative of

the then-Secretary General, the General Assembly began attempting to negotiate a
later,

comprehensive convention on terrorism. The

such a convention

still

fact that, thirty years

does not exist highlights the fundamental prob-

lems the international community confronts in terms of reaching consensus

on how

to define terrorism

stances.

The

and whether

it

is

unacceptable in

all

circum-

Security Council did not begin dealing with terrorism until the

end of the twentieth century. When Russia held the presidency of the Security
Council in October 1999, the Russian UN delegation proposed Resolution
1269, a strong condemnation of terrorist attacks as threats to international
peace and security. 9 At the same time, the General Assembly's Sixth Committee continued its work on outlawing specific terrorist acts such as terrorist
bombings and the financing of terrorism. 10 The events of September 11th
changed the Security Council's focus, making terrorism one of the Council's
central concerns.

The

Security Council's immediate response was the adoption of Resolution

1368, a severe condemnation of the attacks recognizing that such attacks give
rise to

the inherent right to use force in self-defense. 11

The

Resolution does

not include any language about the causes of terrorism. That was a sign that
the attacks of September 11, 2001, had shaken everyone. Secondly, without

much

ado, the Resolution uses the

terrorism."

word

"terror" instead of the phrase "acts of

September 11 thus caused delegates

to put to

one

side their usual

use of the subject of terrorism in order to engage in political warfare over the

and India-Pakistan conflicts. Then, on September 28, 2001, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1373.
Resolution 1373 is one of the most far reaching Security Council resolu-

Arab-Israeli

tions ever adopted.

It calls

on

all

member states

to take the kind of action nor-

mally set forth in multilateral conventions. Indeed, a

number of paragraphs

dealing with the financing of terrorism mirror provisions of the Terrorist Fi-

nancing Convention. 12 Without defining terrorism, the Resolution requires

9.

See S.C. Res. 1269,

10.

See

e.g.

U.N.

SCOR 54th Sess., U.N.

all

Doc. S/1269 (1999).

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings, G.A. Res.

GAOR,

U.N. Doc. A/52/164 (1998); International Convention for the
GAOR 6th Comm., 54 Sess.,
76th mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (1999).
11. See S. C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001).
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
37 ILM 249 (1998).
165,

U.N.

52d

Sess,

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N.
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and passive assistance

to terrorists, including by prohib-

iting the harboring of terrorists. States are to

territory

The

by

make

criminal the transit of their

terrorists as well as financial transactions

on behalf of

terrorists.

Resolution requires States to freeze assets of terrorists and their collabo-

on States to strengthen border controls, take measures to make
the forging of identity documents more difficult than it is, and cooperate interrators. It calls

nationally against terrorism, including through sharing information. In addition, the

Resolution notes with concern the connection between terrorism

and other criminal

activity

Security Council

Committee (CTC)
curity Council.

such as narcotics

Resolution

trafficking.

1373 established the Counter-Terrorism

Membership is the whole Seand established its own proce-

to monitor implementation.

The Committee named

dures for carrying out

its

mandate.

It

itself

also has developed relations with the

UN

membership that have been path-breaking in Security Council terms.
Both the first Chairman, the British Permanent Representative, and his successor, the Spanish Permanent Representative, have reported at least once a

month

to

all

Member

State delegations

practice of transparency has

CTC.

ceptance of the

The

enhanced Member

activities of the

States' understanding

CTC responds

to

and ac-

each such report, continuing an open-ended
the

CTC

efforts to build counter-terrorist capacity.

As

part of

Member

This

One result is that the CTC has received more than
Member States of their implementation of Resolution
made

logue with

CTC.

13

300 self-evaluations by
1373.

on the

States that has

dia-

the center of world-wide
its

work, the

CTC

has

forged relations with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations,

encouraging them to establish counter- terrorist

priorities for their

members

and to assist their members in improving their counter- terrorist capabilities.
The work focuses on infrastructure, rather than operations, but it is infrastructure that permits successful counter- terrorism operations.

The CTC, like other Security Council committees, operates by consensus.
Each member therefore has a veto. As a result, the CTC has not yet been
able to overcome the political differences about terrorism, including how to
define terrorism, among its members. Nevertheless, the Committee has progressed from engaging in a paper dialogue with UN Members to consideration
of

13.

site visits to

determine

if

A refrain at the United Nations

"transparency."

The

is

what they claim. And,

in the

the complaint that the Security Council does not act with

CTC has avoided this criticism through the device of frequent Chairman's

The CTC thus
Council itself may follow.
briefings.

States are doing

has created a model other committees and, indeed, the Security
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future, the

CTC may conclude that

it

has to refer recalcitrant

Members

to the

Security Council.
Terrorist sanctions constitute another prong of the Security Council's at-

tack on terrorism.

The

original sanctions regime

on

terrorism in Afghanistan

14

was established in Resolution 1267. This resolution was aimed at that part of
Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
and demanded that bin Laden be turned over to "appropriate authorities." After the collapse of the
torial focus

Taliban regime, the Security Council removed the

from the Resolution.

15

terri-

This change also constituted a Security

Council innovation. Hitherto, the Council had adopted sanctions as a means
to influencing a government. Resolution 1390 (2002)

they
rity

may

take in whatever location

successor Reso-

al

Council Committee charged with monitoring

1267 Committee

its

Qaeda personnel in whatever form
they may be. Members provide the Secu-

and

lution 1455 (2003) target Taliban

and

—with names of persons and

terrorist sanctions

entities identified as

— the

engaged in

terrorism or terrorism-related activities to be adopted so that the entire inter-

community can take action against them. While this system raises
some procedural and due process concerns, it has resulted in worldwide action
against al Qaeda members and collaborators. 16
The attacks of September 11, 2001, have had a transforming effect. Americans see the world differently as a result. Other countries have been slower
to change their perceptions; some have yet to do so. The United Nations, as
an organization and as a collectivity of independent States, has changed its
habits. Some of the changes have enhanced the international community's
capacity to combat terrorism, and some have enhanced the international
national

community's

ability to

undertake anti-terrorist operations. All have increased

the role of the United Nations in counter-terrorism, including in relation to

other international organizations. All also have increased in
tional expertise

rorism
to

14.

crisis;

combat

on

institu-

These actions are not the solution to the terimportant and useful steps in the international struggle

terrorism.

they are

terrorism.

SCOR, 54th
U.N. SCOR, 57th

See S. C. Res. 1267, U.N.

15.

See S. C. Res. 1390,

16.

See

the discussion of these issues

International

UN

Law annual meeting,

U.N. Doc. S/l 267/(1999).
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/l 390/(2002).
in the Proceedings of the American Society of
Sess.,

April 3, 2003, panel entitled

Implementing Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390."
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Michael Saalfeld

O

1

ur discussions have revealed again the extent to which this situation

has confronted us with complex

international legal perspective.

We

new questions and challenges from an

must respond

with determination and solidarity but in doing so

The answers we
ture guidelines

joint efforts,

heads.

are looking for in the legal field will be decisive for the fu-

on countering

and

them with

we must keep our

international terrorism.

aware of the fact that the shape of these guidelines
fectiveness

to

stability

And we

will

should be well

be decisive for the

ef-

of the long-term cooperation between the states

forming the international coalition against terrorism.

The

NATO

Alliance as a consequence of the attacks of September 11th

considered the attacks to be an act covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic

1

.

Michael Saalfeld

is

Defense in Germany.

the Director of International Legal Affairs for the Federal Ministry of
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which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. 2 On
that basis the European NATO Allies are providing substantial military contributions to combating terrorism.
Germany, for instance, has a third of its naval assets operating in the Gulf of

Treaty,

Aden area in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In Afghanistan,
German special operations forces are employed alongside US forces, fulfilling
Germany's obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373 which
quires that

all

terrorist acts

.

states "take the necessary steps to prevent the
.

.

(and

to)

ensure that any person

who

re-

commission of

participates in the

fi-

nancing, planning, preparation and perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

is

brought to

The requirement
litical

for close

justice.

." 3
.

.

among

cooperation

mandate, often with military means,

nations in

calls for

some

fulfilling this

creativity

and inno-

vative thinking in the legal arena as well. There seems to be consensus
least

one point, the longer the war on terrorism

aspect of acceptance of the use of these

means

lasts,

po-

on

at

the more importance the

will gain. In

Europe recently,

the discussion has been characterized by the aim to harmonize as far as possible the military

need

to prevent further terrorist acts with the legal

preserve the standards of

human

rights

need

to

and humanitarian law which have

been well established over the last 50 years.
Regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, there seems to be a clear understanding between all coalition partners that the inherent right of collective
and individual self-defense as embodied in Article 5 1 of the UN Charter provides the authorization to take all necessary measures to accomplish the tasks
set

out in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373. Accordingly, there

no doubt

is

that military forces in the areas of operation are entitled to target

persons suspected of perpetrating or supporting acts of international terrorism. Similarly, there

is

no doubt

and detain such personnel
2.

See

that military forces have the authority to seize

in order to bring

them before

North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,

the courts.

art.

5,

On

available at http://

www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (Oct. 29, 2002), which provides:

The

an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, will assist the
Parties agree that

Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the

other Parties, such action as
restore
3. See S.

and maintain the

C. Res 1373, U.N.

it

deems

necessary, including the use of

security of the

North Atlantic

SCOR 56th Sess., U.N.
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area.

Doc. S/1373/(2001).

the

armed

force, to

Michael Saalfeld

other hand

it is

from these two resolutions that self-defense

also clear

mate only when performed

in

ance the protection of

human

and

international peace

accordance with the Charter, which

security.

against

rights

The

the

is

legiti-

tries to bal-

aim of maintaining

crucial question then becomes,

what

does the Charter require?

The

fight against international terrorism has to

be fought on multiple fronts

with multiple means. Three questions have been debated in Europe regarding
the post September
1.

1

To what extent

1th behavior of nations. These questions are:

does humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict, ap-

"War on Terrorism"?
To what extent does common human rights law

ply to detainees in the
2.

What effect does

apply?

on the death penalty found in the European Convention on Human Rights have on US-European military cooperation within the coalition for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) ? 4
3.

I

will discuss

each of these questions

Regarding the
Rights,

the prohibition

Mary Robinson,

in her

don on 6 June of this year

—established

High Commissioner

speech at the

Commonwealth

for

Human

Institute in

Lon-

stated:

There has been a tendency
aside

UN

question, the

first

briefly.

ride

to

roughshod over

principles of international

human

—

or at least to set

rights

and humanitarian

There has been confusion about what is and what is not subject to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. There have been suggestions that the terrorist
acts of 11 September and their aftermath in the conflict in Afghanistan
demonstrated that the Geneva Conventions were out of date.
law.

In that context the President of the

an answer which appears

as simple as

International humanitarian law

ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger, has given

it is

to the point:

quite distinctly, the body of rules that
and conduct of hostilities during an armed
the fight against terrorism takes the form of armed
is,

regulates the protection of persons
conflict.

.

.

.

Inasmuch

conflict, the position

applicable. Factually,

as
is

if

uncontroversial: international humanitarian law
there exists an

armed

conflict,

is

whatever the causes,

See Sixth Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, art. 1, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No.

4.

114, 32, available at http://ccbh.ba/en/econv/protocol6.asp (Oct. 29, 2002).
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whatever the aim, whatever the name,

it

is

regulated

by international

humanitarian law. 5

While there

an ongoing international discussion as to whether the fighting in
Afghanistan was or is an armed conflict, in my view there are good reasons for
believing that an international armed conflict exists between the United States
and its allies on the one hand and the Taliban as the de facto government of Afis

ghanistan on the other. This view also seems to be shared by a number of US
6

le-

the case, the law of armed conflict started to apply

no later
than October 7, 2001, the day Operation ENDURING FREEDOM commenced.
Given that the law of armed conflict applied then in October 2001, Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention would require that Taliban and Al Qaeda
gal experts. If this

is

personnel integrated into the Taliban fighter force be treated as Prisoners of

War (POWs). As POWs,

these personnel could not be punished for the mere

participation in hostilities in Afghanistan as they were privileged combatants.

These individuals could, however, be held liable for violations of the law of
armed conflict and for crimes unrelated to the hostilities. For these crimes,
they would, of course, be subject to prosecution. This view seems to be shared
throughout the European Union. By way of example, none other than Javier
Solano, the European Union Foreign Policy Chief, called for the recognition
by the United States of the right of the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay to
be treated as prisoners of war. Mr. Solano further argued Article 5 tribunals
should be held for those personnel whose status is uncertain. 7
What does that mean for international cooperation in meeting the aims set
by Security Council Resolution 1373, especially that of bringing

Third Geneva Convention stipulates that

justice? Article 12 of the

may

terrorists to

only be transferred to a power that

POWs

Convention and only
after the detaining power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of the
transferee power to apply the Convention. 8 If it is agreed that the Geneva

5.

Jakob Kellenberger, Address

is

a party to the

26th Round Table in San Remo on Current Problems in
"The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions:

at the

International Humanitarian Law,

25 years later- challenges and prospects." (Sep. 5, 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList99/EFC5AlC8D8DD70B9C1256C36002EFClE (Oct. 30, 2002).
6. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions,
5 GREEN BAG 2d 249, 256 (2002); Robert Goldman, Certain Legal Questions and Issues Raised by
the
7.

8.

September 11th Attacks, 9

HUM.

RTS. BR. 2 (2001).

Qaeda Britons have no Complaints, THE SCOTSMAN, Jan. 22, 2002.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
See David Lee, Al

Aug.

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75

U.N.T.S. 134, Art. 12 (1949).
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Conventions apply to those personnel currently held

in

Guantanamo

Bay,

then Article 12 must be adhered to in the event of exchanges of detainees be-

tween coalition partners.

ENDURING
FREEDOM is entitled to POW status. There might be al Qaeda members who
have never participated in the fighting in Afghanistan but who have taken
Certainly, however, not every person captured in Operation

part in the preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts someplace else in the

world. Those criminals cannot be

POWs but should be granted

minimum

the

standards of human rights which are non-abrogable for each person detained

by a state authority. These non-abrogable
lar

both according to

I

to the

of minimum standards in Article 75 for

who do

codifies

all

Geneva Conventions provides

a set

persons in the power of a party to a

not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Geneva

Conventions or Protocol
I

standards are quite simi-

common human rights law and international humanitar-

ian law of armed conflict. Protocol

conflict

minimum

—more

or less

I.

9

Under the assumption

—customary

that Article 75 of Protocol

law, this article could

form the

set of

minimum rights to which each suspect is entitled. Accordingly, those detainees who are not entitled to POW recognition and protection, should be
treated at a minimum in compliance with Article 75 of Protocol I.
on the death penalty as established in the 6th Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights. 10 With its Resolution 1271 (2002), "Combating Terrorism and Respect for Human Rights," on January 24, 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe called upon all Council member states "to refuse to exFinally,

would

I

like to

address the European prohibition

tradite suspected terrorists to countries that continue to apply the

tence

.

.

.

unless assurances are given that the death penalty will not be

sought." Similarly, section 8 of the

Act

German

International Legal Assistance

stipulates that the extradition of a person to a requesting state

provide for the death penalty for the criminal offense committed
ceptable

if

death sen-

whose laws
is

only ac-

the requesting state guarantees that the death penalty will either

not be imposed or enforced.
Clearly, significant differences exist

members with
cation of the

9.

Rome

a conflict.
10.

ratifi-

Statute and the subsequent creation of the International

Geneva Conventions of

Protection of Victims of International
3,

coalition

respect to the death penalty. Moreover, with the recent

See Protocol Additional to the

U.N.T.S.

among "War on Terrorism"

Armed

12

August 1949, and Relating

Conflicts (Protocol

I),

adopted June

8,

to the

1977,

1

125

40-41. Article 75 identifies certain acts that are prohibited regardless of the status of

Such prohibitions include murder, the taking of hostages, and

Supra note

3.
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torture,

among others.
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July 2002, different obligations with respect to rights

seriously affect the ability of coalition

militarily in the

"War on

Terrorism." This

is

members

to cooperate

particularly the case

Rome Statute are
the Rome Statute,

where

per-

sonnel of a state bound by the

required to work with person-

nel of a state not a party to

for these

less

far-reaching

human

rights obligations

fying state.
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Ronald Winfrey 1

IT,im Terry spoke about pursuing
CSJ/

exchange of information, about intelligence
touch on a few of those points momentarily,

terrorism, about the effective

gathering and sharing.
as well as a

that

regional cooperation in the fight against

is

I

too shall

new framework

within the structure of the

Pacific

Command

being used to promote such cooperation.

There

is

when you

quite clearly, a pervasive global threat

dressing international terrorism.

As

is

currently a buzzword

US Government but this term is somewhat lacking as it misses a vi-

part of what

dination

it is

increasingly multilateral re-

sponse to these threats. Interagency coordination
within the

talk about ad-

the twenty-first century progresses,

marked by increased interdependence and an

tal

US

is

is

necessary in this global war

simply

part

of

the

solution.

on

terrorism. Interagency coor-

It

must

be

coupled

intergovernment coordination on a scale never seen before. With

come cooperative

efforts

A framework that

this

with

must

with nongovernmental organizations as well.

would suggest as a potential starting point for promoting regional cooperation on terrorism is that used by the Pacific Command's
I

Ronald Winfrey currently serves as Attorney- Advisor for International Law and Homeland
Defense and as the foreign engagement coordinator for the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,
1

.

US

Pacific

Command.
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group

joint interagency coordination

ganization was formed at Pacific

events of September 11th.

It

for counter-terrorism.

This particular or-

Command in Honolulu immediately after the

was formed

in Pacific

Command's Operations

permanent part of that organization.
Generally, we know that terrorists have and will continue to exploit legal
seams between nations, such as nations where passports are easily obtained, as
well as the inherent seams between law enforcement agencies and immigration agencies. Indeed as we now know, the perpetrators of the September 1 1th
attacks were using legally obtained US visas. Acknowledging that some of
these seams may never be closed, there is still much that can be done. As with
many other aspects of this War on Terrorism, the effort to close the seams will
not be the domain of any single agency, department or ministry. Accordingly,
new forms of governmental and international cooperation are required.
The new counter-terrorism group at Pacific Command is designed to emphasize capabilities. While coordination is imperative, it is not the means to
defeat terrorism
improved capabilities are. Actionable intelligence is pivotal
and a collaborative interagency team is the optimum tool to obtain such intelDirectorate and

it is

a

—

ligence.

Once

ter security

this intelligence

cooperation with

obtained, interagency options include thea-

is

allies in

the Pacific, information operations,

public affairs or public diplomacy initiatives,

point to leave you with on this

and

flexible, so

starting point

is

is

and

The

finally, military options.

become more adaptable
methods of responding. The

that as terrorist cells

too must governments in their
great intelligence collection

and

analysis followed by coordi-

nation across multiple agencies, multiple governments, and nongovernmental
organizations.
Still

another area highlighted by the events of September 11th

is

the

diffi-

culty in synchronizing a response plan that not only cuts across multiple agencies

but multiple time zones and countries. There was a real need after 9/1

1

to

ensure security not only in the immediate area of Hawaii but also across our
area of responsibility including Japan, Korea, Alaska and

Command

Guam. To

facilitate

Area Coordinator (JRAC) organization. The Joint Rear Coordinator Organization is the central hub for
antiterrorism efforts in the Pacific Command regarding homeland defense.
this,

the Pacific

uses a Joint Rear

This organization coordinates the contributions of approximately thirty thou-

sand law enforcement
terrorist incident.

officials (local, state,

These

officials

include

and federal

fire fighters,

first

responders) to a

paramedics,

civil

de-

fense officials, public utility officials, and others. This organization provides

the framework for coordinated information sharing and planning to protect

not only Department of Defense installations but also
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critical

civilian

Ronald Winfrey

infrastructure within our area.

come

a

number of very unique

With homeland defense

legal issues dealing

preparations have

with the use of Department

of Defense personnel in response to terrorist attacks

—

that arena being the

primary area of responsibility of civilian law enforcement agencies such as the

FBI and others. Here Pacific

Command must be careful not to run afoul of the

Posse Comitatus Act which, as you know, limits the ability of the Department
of Defense to undertake certain actions in the United States. 2

Jim Terry also spoke of a phased approach to regional cooperation. In the

Command, we

Pacific

use and believe in this phased approach,

like

any

we might begin furthering cooperation with a
country through workshops, seminars, and war games. Thereafter, we

developmental process.
certain

much

Initially,

might build practical modules into existing exercises
bra Gold exercise. Finally,

we might

transition to a

—such

Team

as

our annual Co-

Challenge

series of

exercises.

In closing, the scope of cooperation in the current war

know,

is

truly

remarkable worldwide.

Many

and agreements to begin our
lot more to be done but I believe that our
and we are moving in the right direction.

2.

18U.S.C. § 1385 (2003).
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terrorism, as

you

we

face

of the security challenges

not only in the Pacific but throughout the world
relationships

on

will require

new partnerships,

There is a
have proven fruitful

effective coordination.
initial efforts

.
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Jane Dalton

1

September 1 1th proved beyond any reasonable doubt that international treaties and other negotiated documents are not sufficient, by
themselves, to win the War on Terrorism. I was in the Pentagon when the attack came and there is no doubt in my mind that the Pentagon and the United
States were attacked with weapons of mass effects. Some 3,200 people from
more than 90 countries throughout the world died on that day. 2 This was an attack on democracy, on liberty and on religious freedom. This was not the first
armed attack by these terrorists on these core American values either. This was
one of a continuing series of attacks, beginning in 1993, if not before, with the

I

believe that

World Trade Center bombing. These armed attacks included the 1998
embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania and continued with the tragic attack
on USS Cole in 2000.
first

For

me

then,

it is

interesting to consider the concept of preemption or an-

ticipatory self-defense while in the middle of

an armed

conflict as these

concepts do not seem well juxtaposed at times. In World

1

Navy Captain Jane Dalton

is

currently the Legal Advisor to the

War

II

two

and the Gulf

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.
2.

See Fact Sheet: September 11th, 2001 Basic Facts,

Department of State (Aug.

available at http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12701.htm (Oct. 30, 2002).

25, 2002),
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War, enemy

forces were declared hostile.

fore striking

enemy

forces.

No hostile

Being engaged in armed

intent was necessary be-

conflict, the

enemy

appropriately took the fight to the enemy, not waiting for the
to us, nor waiting for

some indication of hostile intent or

at the series of events occurring since 1993,

currently involved in an

armed

or anticipatory self-defense
If one

is

conflict,

not an

it is

hostile act.

clear that the

an ongoing

United States

conflict

come

to

Looking

United States

is

where preemptive

issue.

were to ask leaders of al Qaeda

whether or not they were
involved in an armed conflict with the United States, they would assuredly
answer yes. Their actions have made this clear as have their words. I believe
that they are at this very
for the very

moment

this instant,

planning more attacks on the Unites States

next possible instant that they can accomplish these attacks.

concur with John Murphy that imminence takes on a new meaning when
you are talking about weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps the new paradigm
I

regarding such imminence or immediacy
Iraq

when

not that used in World

were massing on borders or scud missiles were

forces

instead the

is

new paradigm must

War II or in

flying.

Perhaps

consider that at the next possible opportunity

the United States will have to act decisively to prevent an attack

on the United

The intelligence indicators found in past conflicts do not apply in this
we will not see armored units massing on an opposing border. What may

States.

one;

be found, however,
of mass destruction
group.

The

is

the constituent components necessary to build weapons

(WMD)

being transferred from a country to a terrorist

conducting of tests. This point in
ble opportunity to prevent

may be

may be the assembly of components and the
time may now be the United States last possi-

indicators of the future

an attack. For

impossible to eliminate

it

if

the threat

later. This, to

me,

is

is

not eliminated then,

the

it

new concept of immi-

nence that scholars and practitioners must understand.
One reason the UN condemned the Israel attack on the Osiraq reactor was
because the threat caused by the reactor, providing enriched uranium for Iraqi
nuclear weapons development, was foreseeable but not imminent. 2 Today the

That is, we know that an attack is imminent,
but it is difficult to foresee exactly where or when the attack will occur. Given
this case, the United States must strike now while it has the enemy and their
weapons in its sites and it is within US capabilities to strike. Delaying such a
situation

strike

2.

See

may

well be reversed.

may cause

the opportunity to evaporate forever.

G.A. Res. 36/27 (Nov.

13, 1981), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa36

.htm (Oct. 30, 2002) See generally, Mallison
.

Upon

the Iraqi

& Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack ofJune

Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self Defense?

(1982).
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,

15

VAND

J.

7,

TRANSNATL

1981,

L.
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Jane Dalton

I

agree with the idea that there are self-defense criteria that should be stud-

These four criteria are: do obindicators that an attack is imminent exist; does past conduct or
declarations reasonably lead to the conclusion that an attack is proba-

ied before acts in self-defense are undertaken.
jective
hostile

do the nature of the weapons available support a likely attack; and are
there no other practicable means than the use of force to mitigate/eliminate
the threat. Regarding objective intelligence indicators, although I cannot re-

ble;

veal classified intelligence here,
indicators that an attack

duct of

believe that there are substantial objective

imminent.

is

Qaeda from 1993

al

I

On

the second criterion, the past con-

to the present coupled with present declarations

and indicate that other attacks are planned. As to
Qaeda has proven its ability to be extremely flexible and

are nothing short of hostile

the third criterion,

making

agile,

al

civilian airliners as well as simple pleasure boats into

weapons.

Finally, are there other options short of using force to mitigate/eliminate the

threat

—there do not seem

to be such options available.

ing to martyr themselves, there

When

terrorists

belong to no

they are trying to protect,

is

very

territory,

little

when

when their goal is

Yoram

we know

it

deterrence that you can use.

they have

no population which

to destroy innocent civilians,

the concept of deterrence becomes an entirely
terrence as

When people are will-

new

then

challenge. Traditional de-

does not seem to apply to such zealots.

Dinstein's position

on

interceptive self-defense also intrigues me. 3

This notion of an irreversible course of action commencing might merit
ther study.

what

I

am uncertain

as to

what metrics we might develop

for

fur-

measuring

an irreversible course of action other than by studying exactly the
things that we have previously discussed, the history of a group, its stated intent, the weapons available, alternative courses of action, etc. Clearly, even
is

truly

using interceptive self-defense, actions of the United States would

bound by

still

be

proportionality and discrimination.

Recall also that the use of military force

of national power at our disposal.
sources to achieve our objectives.

We

is

only one of the

must continue

The conventions

that

many instruments

to use all available

John Murphy spoke

economic and other sanctions, law enforcement, are
all available instruments of power. These instruments of power should be used
relentlessly, on all fronts, as appropriate. The joint rear area coordination
of, as

3.

well as diplomacy,

Professor Dinstein argues that "[ijnterceptive, unlike anticipatory, self-defense takes place

an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way.
Whereas a preventive strike anticipates an armed attack, an interceptive strike counters an
armed attack which is 'imminent' and practically 'unavoidable.'" See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE (3d ed. 2001) 172-173.
after the other side has

committed

itself to
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Ron Winfrey spoke about in the Pacific Command area of operations also exists in the Southern Command, European Command and the
Central Command. These different exercises of US instruments of power are
group that

all

absolutely critical.

Having

said this, the

United States should not hesitate

to use military force to accomplish "involuntary disarmament" of

its

enemies

when necessary.
As Ron Winfrey indicated, the greatest current need is for actionable intelligence. The United States must improve its ability to conduct intelligence
gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance. We are working towards this. As
an example, Germany has been an exceptional ally in support of our intelligence gathering

efforts to

Central and European
ippine

Armed

support our maritime interdiction operations in the

Commands'

areas of responsibility. Similarly, the Phil-

Forces have increased dramatically both their intelligence gath-

ering and counter- terrorism forces in the last 12 months.
Still
is

another point to be made though

not, by

itself,

is

that an increase in

US

capabilities

enough. Other states must also step to the forefront and take

The United States is available to assist such states as Yemen and Georbut we cannot do it for them. The United States should not be required to

action.
gia,

be the world's protector. Other states must also accept responsibility

own safety. The United

for their

States will certainly be willing and able to continue to

advise and assist in this respect as

we

are doing in the Philippines

and Georgia

and Yemen.
expand regional cooperation, we must expand the
funding available for such cooperation. As you well know, the Department of
Defense is constrained in its ability to conduct security assistance missions
since it receives no direct funding for such missions. Instead, the Department
of State, as the Security Assistance Program Manager, receives funding for security assistance and then determines how this funding will be spent. If we
wish to improve our coordination and cooperation with our allies, we must
pursue alternative and additional funding to increase our ability to train
alongside and conduct exercises with our allies. A significant challenge to accomplishing these missions is the restriction on expenditure of funds that constrains the Department of Defense.
Finally, the coming years offer many challenges as we deconflict jurisdiction in the homeland defense arena. The United States has significant challenges facing it that must be overcome so as to ensure that the Department of
Similarly,

Defense,

if

the

we wish

to

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Central Intelligence

Agency, the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the
Secret Service and other agencies understand
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who

has primary control over

Jane Dalton

what

and in response
the homeland of the United States.

specific types of operations

curring in
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to

what

specific threats oc-
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Discussion

On

Iraq

Yoram Dinstein
The road ahead must surely go through

Iraq,

the administration in Washington and

given recent statements issued by

—even more

significantly

—Saddam

Hussein's continued breaches of Iraq's undertakings under the cease-fire agree-

ment of

1991.

At

the present

moment, however,

this

defense. Self-defense as an issue vis-a-vis Iraq arose
2

is

not a question of self-

—and was

August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. At that point

Council determined

—

in a binding resolution

—

resolved

—on

in time, the Security

that Iraq

had committed

a

breach of the peace. Ultimately, the Security Council did not directly impose
1

military sanctions

on

Iraq, in

accordance with Article 42 of the

UN Charter,

because the Security Council (which has no standing army) cannot activate
Article 42 unless
Article 43.

What

and

agreements are included with

until special

the Security Council did instead was give

its

states, as per

blessing to the

use of force, in the exercise of collective self-defense (pursuant to Article 51
of the Charter), by an Amercian-led coalition of states

who came

2

to the aid of

Kuwait. Legally speaking, the coalition invoking the collective right to
defense could have acted on

1.

S.

C. Res. 660, U.N.

2. Id.; S.

the

SCOR, 45th

its

own, without the blessing of the Security

Sess.,

U.N. Doc S./660/(1990).

C. Res. 678 para. 2 authorized, in relevant part

Government of Kuwait.

security in the area."

.

.

to use all necessary

U.N. SCOR, 45th

self-

Sess.,

all

means

"Member

States co-operating with

to restore international peace

U.N. Doc. S/678/(1990).

and

.
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not envisaged as necessary by Article 51). However, from a

practical-political standpoint, the blessing of the Security

Council proved be-

neficent both domestically (in the United States) and internationally (in ce-

menting the unusual coalition which emerged)

From

a jus ad bellum viewpoint, the respective positions of Iraq (as the ag-

and the coalition (fighting in collective self-defense) was fixed for the
duration of the war on 2 August 1990. Contrary to what many laymen and
even lawyers believe, that war has not yet come to an end. Hostilities were
suspended in 1991 following a cease-fire concluded with the consent of all the
parties, based on Security Council Resolution 687. 3 The cease-fire has since
been punctuated by thousands of acts of hostilities, the latest of which occurred only last week (when Amercian and British warplanes attacked Iraqi
radar stations which tried to lock on to coalition aviation). There have been
other, and more serious, rounds of hostilities in 1998 and 1999.
By dint of Iraq's continued violations of the 1991 cease-fire especially, albeit not exclusively, insofar as the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction is concerned
if the United States opts to resume hostilities against Iraq
tomorrow or the day after, it would not need a Security Council resolution.
gressor)

—

—

The

fact that Iraq has systematically violated the cease-fire terms

able,

and

it

suffices to justify unilateral forcible action

is

indisput-

by the United States

against Iraq. Should anyone wish to stop the United States, let

him go

to the

Security Council and seek such a resolution (which would certainly be vetoed

by the United States). Forcible action against Iraq at the present juncture does

not

commence

a

new armed

tinuation of the ongoing

on

conflict. It represents, purely

armed

conlict that

and simply,

a con-

began when Iraq invaded Kuwait

August 1990. Therefore, the question of the imminence of any threat
posed by Iraq today is irrelevant. All that need be said is that Iraq is in clear
material breach of the cease-fire agreement. Under Article 60 of the 1969 Vi2

enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a material breach of any
cluding a cease-fire agreement)
aggrieved party.

justifies

treaty (in-

termination of the treaty by the

4

John Murphy

Yoram Dinstein

in his inimitable fashion has set forth a marvelous advocate's

brief for further military action against Iraq.

I

do not quite see

it

as

C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/687/(1991).
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679

3. S.
4.

However,

(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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There are other positions to be considered, particularly since this is a
very complex question. Clearly, the Security Council authorized the use of individual and collective self-defense in its Resolution 678. 5 It is also clear that
this right existed in any event under the terms of Article 5 1 of the UN Charter.
iron tight.

was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, not necessarily to re-engage Iraq more than a decade after the ceasefire was signed.
Security Council Resolution 687 recognizes the restoration of the territorial

However,

this right to self-defense

integrity of

Kuwait and imposes

a

number of significant

obligations

upon

Iraq.

These obligations include everything from desisting from the practice of terrorism, the involuntary disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and the
accompanying inspectors to prove this disarmament. 6 Clearly, Saddam
Hussein and his regime supporting thugs have violated this resolution. The
key question though is who gets to decide what happens about these violations? Who decides whether the cease-fire has been broken? Who decides, if
there has been a material breach, whether this breach is justification for the
continuing use of force? It strikes me that such a decision is properly taken be-

same organization that authorized the initial use of force, the Security
Council. Accepting Yoram Dinstein's argument that no additional authority
is needed from the Security Council to re-engage Iraq stretches the very nafore the

ture of the previous resolutions.
to the contrary
trary.

Yoram

and

I

believe there

also believe that there

Dinstein's case

strong an argument

I

is

a nice

on the other

is

is

language in these resolutions

negotiating history to the con-

work of advocacy. But there

is

at least as

side of his position.

James Terry
President George Herbert Walker Bush was very clear in his view that Resolution 678 provided the authority to do very specific things. This essentially was
to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the territorial integrity of Kuwait, nothing more. To take the position now that Resolution 687, which interprets the original authority of Resolution 678, would allow the United States to
do such things as Yoram Dinstein suggests must be studied very carefully. Pragmatic action must prevail as we consider the world community, the other permanent members of the Security Council, and our friends and allies. It would
be dangerous, in my view, to act on the position advocated by Yoram Dinstein.

5.

S.

C. Res 678, supra note

6.

S.

C. Res. 687, supra note

2.

4.
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Terrorism.

Chris Greenwood
It is

very important to recognize that terrorism

is

a habit

and that one of the

most serious of the many moral and practical arguments against terrorism is
that it becomes rapidly endemic and has done so in many parts of the world in
the course of the twentieth century. Because the major problem of terrorism
that

it is

endemic,

it is

important not to have

illusions that the

is

complete elimi-

nation of terrorism can be achieved in any short measure of time for as soon as

one proclaims terrorism has been eliminated, every subsequent terrorist bomb
becomes a victory for the terrorists and a defeat for those claiming elimination.
Accordingly, there is a need in pursing this campaign against terrorism to keep
the rhetoric careful and limited and not to raise false expectations.
Secondly, there is a need for humility and caution in the matter o( military
operations in response to terrorist acts. Sometimes they may be extremely effective as they have been so far in Afghanistan. In other cases, they may not

remember that World War I began as an Austrian attempt
wipe out what Vienna perceived as the hornet's nest of terrorists in Serbia.

be.

to

It is

sobering to

The most

difficult issue in

tion but the prudential

dealing with terrorism

judgment

as to

whether

is

not the legal basis for ac-

a particular course of action

is

wise and will be supported by the international community. This must be a

continuing criterion, discussed and analyzed, before action
part of this battle as has
is

for that of ideas.

For in

is

taken.

been reflected by numerous conference

many

respects, this

is

A

large

participants,

a battle to de-legitimize terror-

ism and to gain international support, recognizing that gaining such support

on the international
Finally,

it is

number of compromises.
study how terrorist campaigns end. Sometimes

stage often requires a large

important to

they run out of steam, sometimes because of the very extreme character of

discredited.

—and

—

may well be true ultimately of al Qaeda they become
Sometimes as we all know, compromises, political compromises of

their actions

this

various kinds are reached with terrorist groups.
terrorists

causes

sometimes do act in the name of a

may have

We must remember that some
Such public
must be considered even

larger public cause.

serious elements of legitimacy that

means by which they are pursued cannot be defended. Often, very difficult decisions have to be made as we see that have occurred in Israel regarding
Palestine. In other words, there is no substitute in the whole of the campaign
if

the

against terrorism for the continuous exercise of historically informed political

judgment.
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Nick Rostow
The United States has long based

its

national security policy

on the

validity of

anticipatory self-defense. Perhaps not articulated quite as sharply as President

George Walker Bush articulated it but anticipatory self-defense nonetheless. I
do not believe that President Bush changed much in his policy from the US historical approach to protecting itself and its citizens.
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